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This study, through extensive empirical fieldwork research through interviews, interrogates 
the politics associated with the exercise of the power by the legislature to remove heads of the 
executive branch of government in the Nigerian presidential system. The study draws insights 
from the cases of impeachment in some selected states from 1999-2007. Through the 
frameworks of structural functionalism, elite and legislative role theories, the study analyzed 
the behaviors, attitudes and dispositions of the Nigerian political elite towards the exercise of 
requisite constitutional powers. The findings of the study show that external influence 
weakens the institutional capacity of the legislature to effectively exercise its oversight power 
over the executive. The prevalence of patron-client politics encouraged a selective application 
of impeachment provisions as an instrument of political vendetta and harassment. This has 
weakened the oversight power of the legislature thereby engendering accountability 
problems. It also deepens the crisis of governance because of the failure of the relevant 
institutional framework to tame unethical behaviour exercised by the political elite. 
Additionally, the Nigerian presidential system is unable to deliver public goods through an 
integrated institutional process. Policy outputs run contrary to the institutional framework that 
is supposed to provide the requisite capacity for the promotion of good governance in their 
exercise of political power, the political elite exploit institutional structures and processes at 
the expense of the public. This has evolved into a political culture that undermines good 
governance. The study therefore recommends the need for multiple measures of 
accountability, a truly independent judiciary, legislative independence and a reorientation of 
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Introduction to the Study 
 
The central focus of the political scientists in the study of the state is power. With ‘a 
legitimate monopoly of coercive power’ exercised within a defined territory, the state is 
concerned with how to generate and employ power (Fukuyama, 2015, p.12). The exercise of 
power, therefore, is directed towards the promotion of the public interest. Harold Lasswell’s 
definition of politics as ‘who gets what, when and how’,  as well David Easton’s (1957) 
conception of politics as the ‘authoritative allocation of values for the society’, centers on the 
exercise of power for the community. These definitions were reechoed by Heywood (2013). 
The focus of political scientists, therefore, is to investigate how the ‘actions and beliefs, 
social profiles, and overall configurations’(Higley, 2011, p.760) of the actors that comprise 
the elite ‘affect political regimes and policies’ (Higley, 2011, p.760). 
Essentially, the preoccupation of political scientists is to interrogate and monitor the exercise 
of power in society (Francis, 2011). The general perception of the activities of the political 
elite is the ability to impose limits on the possibilities in the political process. According to 
Francis, political scientists could define power through the lens of the institutional framework 
upon which it is exercised. Thus, ‘studies of the way in which power is exercised, 
accumulated and tempered by a multiplicity of actors in a variety of institutional settings 
provides the substance from which political scientists can define and recognize the nature of 
power’ (Francis, 2011, p.2). This development often means that politics becomes ‘fierce 
power struggles between ambitious, blinkered, and insecure elites’ (Higley, 2011, p.760). 
Ivar Kolstad and Arne Wiig (2015), attribute this to the self-serving character associated with 
the elites in most political systems. 
The exercise of power is subjected to control in order ‘to ensure that the government acts in 
the interests of the whole community, rather than simply in the self-interest of the rulers’ 
(Fukuyama, 2015, p.12). Within this, the rule of law is of paramount importance.  
 
The rule of law is a set of rules, reflecting community values that are binding not just on 
citizens, but also on the elites who wield coercive power. If law does not constrain the 
powerful, it amounts to commands of the executive and constitutes merely rule by law 
(Fukuyama, 2015, p.12).  
Societies are governed by a set of binding rules that reflect their values. Ideally, in any 
democratic state, the exercise of power is to promote the public good. In other words, 
political elites that are entrusted with power by the public are expected to exercise the same 
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in a manner that would provide more benefits to the people. Francis Fukuyama (2015) 
explains this from the liberal democratic principle where the state exercises power within the 
confine of the rule of law with a view to promoting accountability. He defines the state as ‘a 
legitimate monopoly of coercive power that exercises its authority over a defined territory’ 
(Fukuyama, 2015, p.12). The primary concern of the state, therefore, is to employ and deploy 
power for the provision of the basic public goods that enhance human development.  
The exercise of this power is not absolute: it is sandwiched by legitimate and binding 
constraints placed upon those who hold power by certain rules that reflect the values of the 
community (Fukuyama, 2015). In Europe, power constraining institutions define the behavior 
of the members of the executive (Moller 2015; Fukuyama 2010). This countervailing power 
was designed to act as a restraint against the excessive use of power against the citizens. In 
essence, the consciousness of political accountability pervaded the process of state building. 
And the culture of the rule of law was a norm in the society. Thus, adherence to the rule of 
law in the exercise of power is a design to make the political elites responsible to the public. 
The essence of democratic accountability, therefore, is ‘to ensure that government acts in the 
interests of the whole community, rather than simply in the self-interest of the rulers’ 
(Fukuyama, 2015, p.12).  
 
Francis (2011) in her study of the provincial legislature of KwaZulu-Natal identifies the 
legitimate relationship of elected government officials to institutions of power as a 
distinguishing feature of the political elite who operate within the confine of constitutional 
and institutional constraints. She defines the political elite ‘as a group of individuals whose 
legitimate relationship to the institutions of power enables them to possess the key political 
influence or take the most important political decisions about that environment’ (Francis, 
2011, p.2). The political elite, as conceptualized in this study, is a group of individuals who 
exercise a large amount of influence, authority and power within the political system. They 
are a set of people whose sphere of operation within the formal and informal institutions of 
government impact governance. In Nigeria, the political elite extend beyond the confine of 
the legislative, executive and judicial structures, to include individuals in the external 
environments of these government institutions, who exert considerable influence on the 
process of government. 
In a presidential system, power is a central focus in the relationships between and among the 
various institutions of government. The concept of separation of powers and the doctrine of 
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checks and balances are institutional designs to control power relations among the three 
major branches of government: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. This 
presupposes that power in a presidential system is considered as a vital instrument that needs 
to be controlled in a bid to achieve the purpose of the government. As a governing system, a 
presidential system encourages a decentralized exercise of controlled power with a view to 
servicing a common purpose (Oyewole, 1980; Anise, 1980).  
Government institutions and structures operate upon the strength of the individuals occupying 
available positions. As locus of state power, these institutions function within the confine of 
the law. Effective application of the law depends largely on the dispositional character of the 
individuals in position of authority. This study considers the exercise of the constitutional 
power of the legislature to monitor the policy process through a disciplined and responsible 
executive. The constitutional capacity of the legislature to remove head of the executive 
branch is a control measure to instill discipline in the exercise of power. 
Extant provisions of the Nigerian constitution empower the legislature to control public 
policy with a view to ensuring good governance. The drafters of the constitution constructed 
the statutory oversight responsibilities of the legislature with a view to guaranteeing 
transparency and accountability. The constitution empowers the legislature to exert maximum 
weapons of political discipline of impeachment against members of the executive found 
guilty of “gross misconduct” in the course of the discharge of assigned responsibilities. 
Sections 143 and 188 of the constitution stipulate a procedural process for the removal of the 
leadership of the executive at the federal and state levels respectively. This is necessary in 
view of the provisions of section 308 that bars institution of any civil or criminal proceedings 
against the leadership of the executive while in office. The impeachment provision is a 
constitutional measure designed to discipline erring members of the executive in cases of 
abuse of office. 
This study explores the interplay of power in the governing institutions in Nigeria’s political 
system. It involves the understanding of a web of interactions among political elites both 
within and outside a political structure. Thus, analysis of the politics associated with 
impeachment requires the examination of the activities of different political actors operating 
in different political structures assigned to perform certain statutory roles in the political 
system.  The study focuses on the power relation between the legislature and the executive 
drawing insights from the state. 
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The relative power imbalance between the governors and the legislature in Nigeria is not 
peculiar. In the United Sates, legislative scholars have noted that many citizens perceive state 
governors as the ‘face of the government’ (Joaquin & Myers, 2014; Carpenter & Hughes, 
2011). The annual speech at the legislature where state issues are put on the agenda for policy 
direction as well as the authority in fiscal policy presents them as chef legislators in their 
domains. To this end, ‘they tend to be more visible and seen as being out front in the 
development of the legislative agenda’ (Joaquin & Myers, 2014, p.3).  
Nevertheless, in a true presidential democracy, gubernatorial leadership and prominence do 
not guarantee stability. As Hale (2013) has noted, the governor needs the legislature for fiscal 
responsibility. In other words, a bipartisan political environment is a necessity for fiscal 
accountability and good governance because policy process is not exclusive to the 
gubernatorial domain. Late Rotimi Williams, one of the architects of presidential system in 
Nigeria, noted that the political elites operating the Nigerian presidential system lack the 
necessary experience and knowledge (Soyinka, 1999). To him, the political elite in the 
legislature, executive, and, the public, require proper education on the workings of the 
Nigerian presidential system. 
In 2006, Chief Richard Akinjide noted that it had been difficult for the Nigerian leadership to 
exert its constitutional power to convert the nation’s oil resources into wealth for public good 
(Akinjide, 2006)1.  According to him, the abundant resources exacerbated greed with 
unreasonably high expectations of private appropriation of the state. The outcome is the 
erosion of personal ethical and social values, a development that contribute greatly to the 
dislocation of the country’s cohesiveness. In one of his monographs in 2011, Chief Akinjide 
identified the repeated mismanagement of resources and corruption as the major obstacles to 
economic development of Nigeria (Akinjide, 2011). This ought not to be if the political elites 
in the legislature and the executive branches of the Nigerian government adhered to the 
principle of separated but shared power. The Nigerian political elites, of which Chief 
Akinjide is one, often act in the contrary. 
                                                 
1Chief Akinjide is a Nigerian politician whose participation in Nigerian politics spanned from the immediate 
post-independence parliamentary system of the First Republic, 1960-1966, through the presidential system of 
the Second Republic, 1979-1983, and the Fourth Republic presidential system since May 29, 1999. 
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Similarly, in 2007, another prominent Nigerian lawyer, Chief Afe Babalola, lamented the 
fizzling out of the bite of law in the Nigerian anti-corruption crusade castigating the judiciary 
and the nation’s security agencies for complicity. 
If a criminal or fraudster knows that after embezzling state funds or defrauding other people or 
institutions he could employ part of his spoil to pay his way, would he relent? If he knows that 
he has the political alliance [with the legislature and the executive] that could make state 
pardon available to him...then he can afford as many fake certificates as possible... If a 419 
kingpin knows that he could meander through the judicial process by sheer advocacy- skilled 
lawyers, why would he not swindle every country of the world and hire the most proficient 
defence lawyers amidst celebrations by a society that is totally bereft of moral values 
(Babalola, 2007, p.17). 
The above submission negatively impacts on the image of the country. ‘Nigerians are 
subjected to degrading and inhuman treatment and treated as pariahs on the ground that they 
are Nigerians, who hail from the most corrupt country in the world’ (Babalola, 2007, p.28). 
Events and developments in the Nigerian presidential system since 1999 continually validate 
this claim.  
The Corruption Perception Index of Transparency International since 1999, as shown in 
Table 1, categorises Nigeria as one of the most corrupt countries in the world. The Daily 
Trust, a Nigerian newspaper, in its editorial on the ranking of Nigeria in the 2010 report of 
the Corruption Perception Index of the Transparency International (TI),  states that fight 
against corruption in Nigeria ‘has remained a problematic one, with sloganeering by 








                                                 
2 Daily Trust, November 1, 2010.  
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Table 1 - Nigeria’s position in the Corruption Perception Index, 1999-2014 
Year Score Rank Total 
1999 1.6 98 99 
2000 1.2 90 90 
2001 1.0 90 91 
2002 1.6 101 102 
2003 1.4 132 133 
2004 1.6 144 145 
2005 1.9 152 158 
2006 2.2 142 163 
2007 2.2 147 179 
2008 2.7 121 180 
2009 2.5 130 180 
2010 2.4 134 178 
2011 2.4 143 177 
2012 27 139 174 
2013 25 164 177 
2014 27 136 175 
Source: Compiled by the author from Transparency International Reports on the Corruption 
Perception Index, 1999-2014. 
There are empirical cases that justify this ranking. For instance, at the time of the arrest of a 
former governor of Bayelsa State, late Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, by the London 







Precisely where in the rogue's gallery of corrupt Nigerian leaders Diepreye Alamieyeseigha 
will fall is a matter for history to judge. Gen. Sani Abacha3, the military dictator who helped 
himself to at least $3 billion and salted it away in foreign bank accounts, doubtless stole far 
more. But General Abacha - who ruled the country from 1993 to 1998 - never fled money-
laundering charges in a foreign land by donning a dress and a wig to match forged travel 
documents, as Mr. Alamieyeseigha, the governor of a small oil-producing state in the Niger 
Delta, did last week, government officials said. For their sheer audacity, his antics are likely to 
earn him a prominent place among the leaders who in the past four decades are believed to 
have stolen or misspent $400 billion in government money, most of it the profits from 
Nigeria's oil reserves (Polgreen, 2005). 
Alamieyeseigha was the elected governor of Bayelsa State, 1999-2005. He was arrested by 
the London Metropolitan Police (LMP) in 2005 over allegations of money laundering running 
into millions of British Pounds Sterling. He was charged in a London court and remanded in 
prison custody before he was granted bail (Eze and Ighodaro, 2005; Polgreen, 2005). He 
however jumped bail. It was rumored4 that he disguised as a woman to escape identification 
by the British immigration authority and absconded to Nigeria. This account of his escape 
remains a mystery. The BBC News presents the account thus: 
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, governor of Nigeria's Bayelsa state, has an official CV that boasts 
awards including Best Governor on Security and the Golden Trophy for Good Governance. 
British prosecutors argue that his achievements also include money laundering to the tune 
of£1.8m ($3.2m). The governor denies this charge - but responded to it by developing a new 
talent as an escapologist as he jumped bail and fled the UK, eventually reappearing back in 
Bayelsa. Nigeria's anti-corruption agents also say he is a master of disguise, donning women's 
clothing as he fled - though the governor denies this. But he told the BBC that he does not 
remember any other details of the long journey home (BBC News, 6/12/2005). 
Section 308 of the Nigerian constitution precludes a governor from being arrested or charged 
in court for any criminal or civil offence while in office. 
Presenting Abacha as a decent “rogue”’ in looting, in comparison to the case of 
Alamieyeseigha depicts the debasement of the tenets and practice of the Nigerian 
presidentialism, a system that exhibits the culture of checks and balances. The difference 
between these two characters is the method of accountability. A military leader has his 
constituency restricted to the barracks with a regimented hierarchical order of operation. 
Thus, late Abacha could rule with impunity; he was neither elected nor selected by the 
people. But an elected civilian leader, like late Alamieyeseigha, operated under the dictum of 
constitutionalism requiring accountability to the people. He operated in an environment 
sandwiched by rules and procedures and a system of checks and balances. If he fails the 
accountability test, he risks punishment.  
                                                 
3Abacha was Nigeria’s military ruler from November 1993 until his death in June 1998. His regime was noted 
for its brutality and looting of the public treasury with impunity.   
4 It is yet to be established how he escaped to Nigeria.    
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The Nigerian presidential system offers the legislature the power to remove such an elected 
leader through the process of impeachment. As a former legislator said, ‘If you have the 
governor of the state misappropriating funds, or executing any projects outside the budget or 
misuse of power by the governor, it might lead to impeachment’ (Personal Interview I, May 
3, 2014).The principle of separation of powers among interdependent, but co-equal, 
institutions of government in a presidential system compels leaders to be accountable. The 
central accountability measure is the decentralised structure of the policy process.  
The three branches of government - the legislature, the executive and the judiciary - operate 
as checks on the application and exercise of state power with a view to ensuring the 
promotion of the public good. Extant constitutional provisions provide the legislature with a 
measure of power to control the expenditure of the government. The Nigerian constitution 
emphasises the balance of power through a power sharing practice among the three branches 
of government. Unlike the previous military regimes, where there is concentration of power 
in one individual, presidential system offers a decentralise power structure. The legislative 
power of control over the execution of policy includes sanction and punishment in order to 
enforce correction. 
My examination of the key issues relating to impeachment in the Nigerian presidential 
system is divided into eight chapters. In chapter one, I provide the context of my arguments 
and analysis from a general overview of presidential systems. This is essential in order to 
locate the rationale for the study of an aspect of the Nigerian presidential system. Here, I 
consider, in a comparative manner, the general principles of presidential systems and the 
initial empirical evidence of the disposition of the Nigerian political elite. This provides the 
basis for my argument that the inability of the legislature to perform its statutory oversight 
function constitutes a great challenge to accountability in Nigeria. 
In chapter two, I examine the perspectives on the study of presidential systems.  I engage in 
the review of extant literature on presidential systems with a view to identifying the 
parameters of the theory and practice. I discover two broad perspectives on the study of 
presidential systems: the traditional and developmental. I present the position of the 
traditional school that defines the operation of presidential systems by the institutional and 
structural design. On the contrary, the developmental perspective is more interested in the 
outcome of the operation of the institutions and structures. I discover that the two 
perspectives draw their strengths from the need for disciplinary measure but differ on the 
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methods and outcomes. The exercise of the power to remove elected officials in the executive 
branch is a common focus. Since the electoral process provides a specific term of mandate, a 
mid-term failure is better addressed by constitutional means to avert political gridlock. 
I make a series of claims out of these perspectives. Firstly, the general expectation in 
presidential systems is that the political elite would exercise power to cater for the interests of 
the public. Nevertheless, this is lacking in some of the developing presidential systems, 
especially in Nigeria. Secondly, the attainment of this goal requires a flexible and purposeful 
cooperation among the political elite. This includes the exercise of power within the confines 
of constitutional requisites for the promotion of good governance. Lastly, the impeachment 
provision is a measure to promote transparency and accountability. As such, the focus of the 
institutional properties of a presidential system is to promote the public good. 
In the third chapter, I explore extant literature and empirical data to explain the foundation of 
the presidential system in the Nigerian political system. My account presents two but periodic 
epochs. First is the practice of the Westminster parliamentary system in the First Republic, 
1960-1966, and, second, the adaptation of the American-modeled presidential system in the 
Second Republic, 1979-1983. The claims that the practice of a parliamentary system was 
responsible for the political instability that led to the military coup of January 15 1966, gave 
rise to the preference of the latter5. In comparing the two periods, I demonstrate that the flaws 
that truncated the practice of the two systems are located not within the institutional 
characteristics of the systems but in the attitudinal disposition of the political elite. Based on 
empirical evidence, I illustrate this in the examination of the exercise of the power of 
impeachment in the two periods and discover behavioural traits common to the conduct of the 
political elite who practiced in the two different governing systems. I examine the issues 
involved in the removal of the premier of the Western Region, Chief S. L. Akintola, in the 
First Republic and compared it with the impeachment of Governor Balarabe Musa of Kaduna 
State in the Second Republic. I demonstrate that the abuse of power, for the promotion of 
personal gains, is the bedrock of the crisis. My examination of the issues provides the basis 
                                                 
5 The political crisis that emanated from the nature of the relationship among the political elites created the 
environment for military rule from January 1966 to October, 1979. The subsequent political transition 
programme opted for a different system that guaranteed institutional checks on the exercise of power. 
Nevertheless, the new found system did not last for more than four years when the military took over on 
December 31, 1983. 
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for my claim that the Nigerian public is enslaved by the political elite who exploit their 
mandate which further results in poverty and a poor quality of life among the population. 
In chapter four, I examine the theories and concepts that anchor my analysis. I identify the 
usefulness of the structural functionalist, the elite and the legislative role theories for the 
analysis of the study. I evaluate their strengths in providing insights into the general analysis 
of the exercise of power in a presidential system. I discover, from the literature, that none of 
these theories is independently capable of providing explanation for the exercise of power in 
the Nigerian presidential system. In applying this to the Nigerian presidential system, I 
illustrate, with empirical data, that there is a wide gap between the behaviour of the political 
elite and the theoretical postulations that defines their roles and responsibilities within the 
institutional parameters. Theoretically, the concept of a regime of separated and shared power 
assumes a synergy among political elites to promote public goods. I found that in practice in 
Nigeria, separated power is an avenue for the reification of political intimidation and 
harassment. Rather than explore the institutional characteristics to improve the lots of the 
public, Nigerian political elites exercise power in contradiction with the expectations of the 
people. 
In chapter five, I present empirical data in an examination of the exercise of legislative power 
in removing state governors, and, the judicial review of the legislative actions in selected 
states. First, I explore the requisite legal rules that guide the exercise of the legislature to 
remove specified elected officials. Empirical evidence from judicial interpretations 
demonstrates that the extant rules and procedure are adequate to fulfill the intents of the 
constitution relating to impeachment. Second, I identify these constitutional intents as 
including the monitoring of the exercise of executive power, guarantees of good governance, 
strengthening of legislative responsibility and adherence to the rule of law. I claim that the 
use of impeachment as a weapon of political vendetta is responsible for governance crises in 
the Nigerian presidential system. I justify this claim by presenting data that indicates 
evidence of the abuse of power by a number of former state governors. I find that intra-elite 
crises facilitate the resort to constitutional breaches in the exercise of the legislative power of 
impeachment.  
In chapter six, I explore how internal and external factors influence the exercise of the 
legislative power of impeachment in selected cases. I locate this within the confine of the 
concept of patron-client politics or what Richard Joseph (1991) call prebendal politics. I 
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discover that informal relationships between elected political elites and their patrons are 
based, mostly, on the understanding of personal service. I present empirical data to illustrate 
how the political elite external to the formal legislative institution facilitate the abuse of 
power. In Oyo and Anambra States, for instance, godfathers with no formal authority lay 
claims over the administration of the state. I also present empirical data that indicates the 
provision of a series of measures to shield some state governors against any possibility of 
impeachment.  
In chapter seven, I explore a series of cases to analyse the disparate use of impeachment in 
Nigeria. I begin the chapter with the analysis of the impeachment of some former deputy 
governors.  I find that these impeachment cases were prompted by the governors because of 
personal feuds and rift with their deputies. My claim here is that deputy governors suffer 
more from the disparate use of impeachment as a weapon of political victimisation and 
intimidation. I also explore the cases of former governors who were investigated and 
indicted, by the EFCC, over the misappropriation of funds while in office. Indeed, some of 
the properties of these former governors have been seized and confiscated on the order of the 
court. I also examine the case of a former governor of Delta State, James Ibori, whose 8 
years’ rule was riddled with evidence of his abuse of power but without any legislative 
consequences. I claim that the nature of patronage politics in Nigeria impacts severely upon 
political accountability. I support this claim with empirical evidence from a series of cases of 
the misappropriation of public funds involving former governors who occupy positions of 
authority in the government. In most cases, these political elites are strategically placed to 
exploit institutional shields. I therefore claim that the institutions of government in Nigeria 
are ineffective to improve the quality of life of the people.  
I conclude the study with chapter eight where I interrogate the plausibility of impeachment as 
an instrument designed to promote good governance in Nigeria. I explore the level of 
corruption that characterises the exercise of power in a system of checks and balances and 
how the behaviour of the political elite incapacitates the institutions of government. I argue 
that corruption, as an instrument of statecraft in the Nigerian presidential system, frustrates 
political accountability. I claim that weak institutions of government, and especially the 
legislature, exposes the public to the reckless use of executive power which is against the 






Problem statement, context and methodology 
 
1.1 Background information 
 
By constitutional design, the legislative institution in Nigeria occupies a prominent position 
as a vanguard of good governance. In other words, drafters of the constitution constructed the 
statutory responsibilities of this political branch with a view to guaranteeing transparency and 
accountability6. To be sure, this governmental structure, as in other presidential systems 
(Huneeus et al, 2006; Hochstetler, 2011), is a principal actor in controlling the powers of the 
executive branch to achieve the desired objectives of the state7. The essence of legislative 
oversight function is to scrutinize the activities of government in order to promote good 
governance and safeguard the interests of the people (Oleszek, 2014). The legislature has the 
authority to represent and protect the interests of the public. 
The arena of the policy process in the presidential system is not an exclusive preserve of the 
executive branch (Lindsay & Ripley, 1994). In other words, the presidential system promotes 
a system of government that recognizes multiple governance institutions with a measure of 
interdependence designed to stimulate cooperation and collaboration. Presidential 
constitutions often stipulate the limits of presidential and legislative powers in the conduct of 
state affairs. These limitations place checks on the exercise of the powers of each institutional 
structure. This is the beauty of presidential democracy (Hinojosa & Perez-Linan 2006/2007; 
Hochstetler & Edwards, 2009; Hochstetler, 2011).      
This principle of separation of powers became a modern practice in Nigeria’s political system 
in 1979 with the adoption of a presidential system of government. For the first time, after 
independence in 1960, the legislative institution, constitutionally, assumed a more clearly and 
unique status as an organ separated from the executive branch (The Political Bureau 1987). 
                                                 
6Section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 vests the legislative powers of the federal 
and state governments in the legislative institutions.. Aside from this, sections 80-89 and 120-129, empower the 
legislatures at the federal and state levels, respectively, to authorize and monitor the disbursement of all funds 
for government expenditures. 
7Sections 13-24 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as amended, codify the 
fundamental objectives and direct principles of state policy. Section 16(i) mandates the Nigerian state to 
‘harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an efficient, dynamic and self-reliant 
economy’ with a view to securing the maximization of welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen based on 
social justice and the equality of status and opportunity’. Section 16 (2) specifically mandates the Nigerian state 
to promote ‘a planned and balanced economic development’ by harnessing the nation’s material resources and 
distributes it ‘as best as possible to serve the common good.’ 
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Thus, its role became more specific in the policy process. The constitution exhibited a clearly 
defined separation between its roles and those of the executive branch. 
The 1979 presidential constitution is an attempt to remove some of the identifiable 
constitutional teething problems that militated against the entrenchment of accountability in 
the First Republic (The Political Bureau 1987). Thus, the advent of the presidential system in 
Nigeria is a response to the divisive politics that characterized the polity in the First Republic. 
It is a design to rid the political system of the acrimonious relationship among the political 
elites in an ethnically diverse polity. However, the Nigerian political elite discovered later 
that the system was fraught with difficulties in terms of the conduct of state affairs and the 
maintenance of effective relationships among the three separate institutions for the promotion 
of good governance (National Assembly Debates 1980; Ogunbadejo, 1980; Ayo-Adeyemi, 
2000; Usman, 2010). The late Senate Leader in the Second Republic, Dr. Olusola Saraki, 
expressed this much when he said: 
 
We have just started to practice the presidential system of government, but little did we know 
at the time we were adopting this system that it was fraught with difficulties and that the road 
to success in the system is very rough and rugged (National Assembly Debate, 1980). 
In sum, there is the need for the practitioners, as well as the political system, to blend with the 
demands of the presidential system in the conduct of state affairs and the regulation of 
interactions among the three basic institutions.  
Evidently, this ignorance still pervades the practice of the presidential system in the Fourth 
Republic. A former Speaker told me that his members had little or no knowledge of the 
workings of the Nigerian presidential system especially when it comes to the issue of 
impeachment.  
From the benefit of hindsight, it occurs to me that at the commencement of the process, 
members did not appreciate fully the import of impeachment…It occurs to me that those who 
genuinely wanted the governor to go, did not ask themselves what happened after the 
impeachment of the governor. I think it was in the process that they now begin to ask 
themselves what happens after the removal of the governor. By the time the import began to 
dawn on them, it was very difficult to get consensus on what happened (Personal Interview 
VI, May 13, 2014). 
The outcome of this incident jeopardised the stability of the state with consequences for the 
relationships among the legislators.     
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However, another military interregnum, which lasted for almost sixteen years, truncated this 
learning process, which would have provided a template for the institutionalization of the 
culture and practice of the presidential system (Ayo-Adeyemi, 2000). This development once 
again denied the political system of the necessary opportunity to entrench the culture of 
accountability under a democratically elected government. For years, the praetorian nature of 
the Nigeria’s political system subjected the conduct of state affairs to a fashion of military 
fiat. This orientation impaired the democratic ethos in the conduct of the political elites and 
the structures of government. Hence, constant frictions between the two political branches in 
the conduct of state affairs characterized the Fourth Republic.8     
The parliamentary structure of the First Republic did not incorporate the culture of a 
separation of powers among the branches of government. Instead, it did encourage the fusion 
of powers between the executive and the legislature (Almond, et al, 2004). Thus, there was a 
minimal culture of legislative relevance, as an independent governmental structure in the 
conduct of state affairs in Nigeria. Apart from this, structural inhibitions in the parliament 
constrained the expected vibrancy in legislative debates. As Gordon Idang (1973) has noted, 
the structural deficiency of the parliament obstructed its ability to participate effectively and 
intelligently in the conduct of state affairs. In fact, analysts described the parliament in 1963 
as an ‘expensive and irrelevant talking shop’ (The Political Bureau 1987 p.94). Indeed, one of 
the high points that prompted the recommendation of a presidential system for the Second 
Republic was the need to reverse this trend and strengthened the legislature as an independent 
institution (The Political Bureau 1987).        
However, the Bureau observed that the attitudinal dispositions of the political elites, rather 
than the institutional structures, are responsible for abuse of power in the First and Second 
Republics9. The Bureau states that ‘only a politically conscious society, that is aware and 
jealous of its rights to choose those who direct public affairs, is capable of stopping such 
abuses’ (The Political Bureau 1987, p.78). The onus of this observation is the need for an 
                                                 
8The aborted Third Republic did not take off fully before another military engagement occasioned by the 
aftermath of the annulment of the results of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections. Unfortunately, most of the 
actors in the Fourth Republic politics were former military officers and civilians who participated in the 
previous military regimes. 
9 One of the political elites who spoke with me reechoed this observation about human nature. He said: ‘A lot 
has to do with the propensity towards corruption that is very high in the public sector in Nigeria. There is no 
question about that: my argument has always been that it is a question of attitude mainly whether one form of 




informed public to demand accountability and transparency as the twin instruments for the 
promotion of good governance.     
In a presidential system, members of the two political branches ‘are chosen in separate 
elections, and there is a clear separation of powers between the executive branch and the 
legislature’ (Kesselman, Krieger and Joseph, 1996, p.14). The functions and responsibilities 
assigned to each branch define the level of this separation of power and their responsibilities 
(Candelaria, 2012). The two institutions guard their autonomies and freedom. The legislative 
institution is constitutionally entitled to set its own agenda, initiate policy proposals, and defy 
presidential directives contrary to legislative proposals. Thus, the executive does not have a 
pre-eminent control over the legislature.     
Perez-Linan (2005) has contended that in more consolidated democracies, the inability of the 
executive branch to challenge the legislature ensures the development of a more balanced 
relationship. Such political systems disable the executive from circumventing constitutional 
processes and procedures in policy matters. The legislature is equipped with the power to 
carry out its statutory oversight functions, and take active part in the policy process. Even if 
presidents want to resort to executive orders as a means of circumventing legislative 
processes, they have to defer to the legislature in the conduct of some affairs of the state 
(Ogunbadejo, 1980). One of the devices of the executive to circumvent the legislature in the 
policy process is the exercise of the power of dissolution (Shugart and Carey, 1992). In most 
presidential systems, the power of the legislature outweighs that of the president as far as 
dissolution is concerned. While the legislature has the power to remove the president, the 
president typically lacks the legal resources to dissolve the legislature.   
In presidential systems, especially in developing democracies, legislative power to remove 
sitting heads of the executive branch most often heightens conflict situations because of the 
frequency of its application (Olson, 2002). With the global abhorrence of the military as an 
agent of change in the politics of the developing democracies, legislatures in new presidential 
democracies have realized that the impeachment process is the main constitutional tool for 
sanctioning the leaders of the executive branch who are involved in corruption or abuse of 
power (Hinojosa and Perez-Linan, 2007). Lawmakers would not therefore, hesitate to 
exercise their constitutional powers to hold erring members of the executive accountable.  
The legislative institution plays a vital role in governance because it performs important 
functions that are necessary to sustain democracy in complex and diverse societies (Huneeus 
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et al, 2006; Alabi, 2009; Schleiter and Morgan, 2009; Franchino and Hoyland, 2009). The 
legislature is a political arena where citizens passionately plead their various interests and 
shades of opinion through their representatives. Thus, the legislature combines diverse 
opinions to present a common viewpoint on pertinent public issues.  
The legislative arena, therefore, is a sine qua non for the expression and understanding of the 
supports and demands of the people to the system in democratic societies. Societal 
differences find their ways into the governmental processes through the representative 
assemblies with vital ties to the populace (Johnson & Nakamura, 1999). This institutional 
structure is a design meant to function as a vital instrument for the promotion of good 
governance through statutes that ensure a smooth operation for service delivery. Exactly how 
the structures perform these functions, vary with a system’s political architecture, the state of 
its party and electoral system, and the preferences of those who run it.   
The leadership of the executive branches at the state and national levels in Nigeria are usually 
sworn to oaths to discharge their duties faithfully, and, in accordance with the provisions of 
the constitution (Seventh Schedule, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999, as amended). The oaths of allegiance bound political office holders to be faithful and 
bear true allegiance to the Federal Republic of Nigeria and preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution. Specifically, the president and the state governors, by the virtue of the Seventh 
Schedule of the Constitution, have sworn to preserve the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of the State Policy (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999 as amended). Aside, they are also bound to abide by the Code of Conduct and be 
devoted to the service and well-being of the people.10 These oaths, when pieced together, are 
the guiding principles for their conducts in directing the affairs of the Nigerian state with a 
view to ensuring accountability11.  
Indeed, several provisions of Nigeria’s presidential constitution display the statutory will to 
achieve this objective within the rubrics of the governmental structures. Aside from the 
various provisions to scrutinise government policies, the constitution empowers the 
                                                 
10The Code of Conduct in Nigeria’s constitution is the guidelines that stipulate the ethics associated with the 
behaviours of public officials. Violation of these rules attracts sanction by the Code of Conduct Tribunal. For 
the details, see the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
11Apart from the pledge ‘to preserve the fundamental Objectives and Directive Principles of State 
Policy’[sections 13-24], which spells out the blueprint for the promotion of good governance, they also affirmed 
that they would not allow their personal interest to influence their official conducts and decisions (Seventh 
Schedule, constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). 
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legislature to exert the maximum sanction of political discipline, impeachment, against the 
executive found guilty of ‘gross misconduct’ in the course of the discharge of assigned 
responsibilities12. The impeachment power, in presidential constitutions, is a constitutional 
measure designed to discipline erring executive in cases of abuse of office (Plucknett, 
1942;Nwabueze, 1985; Baumgartner and Kada, 2003; Perez-Linan, 2007; Nichols, 2011; 
Kim, 2013). 
 
1.2 Issues and Contentions  
This study explores the exercise of legislative power to remove governors/deputy governors 
in some selected states in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. There are 36 states in Nigeria each with 
a unicameral legislature. Cases of impeachment took place in eleven states between 1999 and 
200713. This study focuses on four out of these cases- Oyo, Plateau, Anambra and Bayelsa 
States. There is a trend common to these four cases: the legislatures breached the 
constitutional procedure (Taiwo, 2010). Judicial intervention upturned the decisions of the 
legislative assemblies in Oyo, Anambra and Plateau States (Oni, 2013). Bayelsa presented a 
similar but exceptional situation14. The governor challenged his removal but the court 
declined jurisdiction (Lawan, 2010). Lawan (2010) has noted that the governor would have 
been restored by the court if he had proceeded to appeal the judgment of the state high court 
that declined jurisdiction.  
In three of the selected cases (Oyo, Plateau and Bayelsa), the PDP members had majority 
control of the legislatures. The governors and the majority of the legislature were from the 
same poilitcal party hat was controlling the federal government. This is an indcation that 
intra-party crisis rather than the gross misconduct of the governors informed the decision of 
                                                 
12Sections 143 and 188 of the constitution stipulate a procedural process for the removal of the leadership of the 
executive at the federal and state levels respectively. This is necessary in view of the provisions of section 308 
that bars institutions of any civil or criminal proceedings against the leadership of the executive while in office.  
13Out of the eleven cases, six deputy governors lost their positions through impeachment not because of acts 
envisaged as ‘gross misconduct’ but primarily because of the irreconcilable differences between them and their 
governors over ambition for succession. In these cases, the governor influenced the legislatures to press charges 
against their deputies. This trend of manipulation of the impeachment process for personal political ends is a 
common pattern to all the cases of impeachment in the country. In Osun State, the legislators could not garner 
the required two-third votes to remove governor Bisi Akande while the removal of the governor of Ekiti State 
and his deputy generated a constitutional crisis that compelled the federal government to declare a state of 
emergency. In Adamawa State, judicial intervention based on precedence, halted the attempt remove the 
governor through legislative breach of the constitution. 
14Though the legislature breached the constitutional procedure, there was no judicial intervention because of the 




the legislattures. Similarly, the case of Anambra State indicated the problem associated with 
divided government because while the PDP had the majority control of the legislature, the 
governor was elected on the paltform of an opposition party, the All Progrsive Grand 
Alliance (APGA).   
The focal point of the judgments of the courts was on the breaches of the rules of the 
legislatures rather than the offense committed by the governor. My claim here is that the 
governors were restored to their position not because they were transparent, but because of 
the inability of the legislature to follow the prescribed rules. Indeed, I present empirical data 
to indicate that the charges of abuse of power against three of the governors were valid. In 
particular, the governor of Plateau State, Joshua Dariye, did confess that he unlawfully 
abused with the resources of the state.  
Responsible legislative institutions should be able to carry out its constitutionally prescribed 
functions without the request to do so by a government agency, or by the involvement of such 
an agency to compel it to do so. In Bayelsa and Plateau States, the Economic and Financial 
Crime Commission (EFCC) was deeply involved in the investigation and coordination of the 
impeachment of the governors (Lawan 2010). The involvement of the (EFCC)15 in the abuse 
of constitutional procedure for impeachment is an indictment on the capacity of the 
legislative institution to check the executive arm against corruption and profligacy. 
Ordinarily, the involvement of EFCC in the impeachment cases in Plateau and Bayelsa 
(Lawan, 2010), is unconstitutional; it amounts to usurpation of the legislative oversight 
functions.   
Section 128 of the 1999 constitution empowers the state legislature to exercise its oversight 




                                                 
15 The EFCC was established by law in 2004 to investigate all financial crimes and coordinate the enforcement 
of laws relating to economic and financial crimes. Its involvement in the impeachment cases in Bayelsa and 
Plateau States were glaring because its officials provided security for the minority legislators that were forced to 
commence the procedure. 
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(1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of Assembly shall have power by 
resolution published in its journal or in the Office Gazette of the Government of the State to 
direct or cause to be directed an inquiry or investigation into -(a) any matter or thing with 
respect to which it has power to make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, 
authority, ministry or government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the 
duty of or responsibility for - (i) executing or administering laws enacted by that House of 
Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by 
such House. (2) The powers conferred on a House of Assembly under the provisions of this 
section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling the House to - (a) make laws with 
respect to any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing 
laws; and (b) expose corruption, inefficiency of waste in the execution or administration of 
laws within its legislative competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds 
appropriated by it (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). 
More importantly, the constitution empowers the legislature to exert a measure of control on 
public spending. Section 120 (1 and 2) specifies that all the resources of the state should be 
pooled together as the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF)16. Section 120 (3 and 4) stipulates 
that withdrawal from the CRF requires the authorisation of the legislature. Such authorisation 
is tied to specific projects as reflected in the appropriation law. Section 124 empowers the 
legislature to fix the remuneration of all political office holders including the governor and 
his deputy. As a measure to ensure legislative control of the finances of the state, section 125 
stipulates the annual audit of the accounts of the state by the Auditor-General, who is directly 
responsible to the legislature. Above all, the legislature has the power to remove the governor 
if involved in any act that amounts to gross misconduct.  
The focus of this study is the exploration of the politics behind the exercise of this power of 
impeachment in the selected states. These cases bring into the fore certain postulations over 
the exercise of the power of impeachment by the legislature in the Nigerian presidential 
system. The abuse of judicial process added a fundamental dimension into the cases of 
Plateau and Anambra states17. My findings show that impeachment as contemplated by the 
drafters of the Nigerian constitution, is a political instrument to promote accountability and 
transparency in government.   
Nevertheless, the lawmakers selectively exercise the power in a manner that is not in keeping 
with this original intent. The constitution provides a uniform rule, but there are some states  
                                                 
16The CRF is a pool created by the constitution to contain all the resources of the state from where government 
could draw resources to fund all projects contained in the fiscal policy as directed by the legislature for 
implementation. Withdrawal from the fund should be authorised by the legislature. This measure is a 
constitutional means to prevent indiscriminate access to the public treasury by the executive. 
17The constitutional provision in respect of the impeachment procedure clearly spelt out the role of the judiciary 
in the process. Nevertheless, the political elites in the legislatures and the executive branches of government of 
these two states abused their power of control over the judiciary while some judicial officers trampled upon the 
sacredness of the law. For the details, see Lawan, 2010. 
20 
 
where there is evidence of the abuse of office by the governors without any legislative or 
judicial actions being taken against them18 I examine empirical data on these findings. I 
found that the weakness of the legislature in this regard is a function of incapacity occasioned 
by the lack of an independent political base of a majority of the lawmakers. They are mostly 
clients to powerful political elites and the leadership of their respective political parties.  
 
I therefore contend that that the incapacity of the legislature to effectively exercise its 
oversight power in policy process partly contributes to the prevailing crisis of governance in 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic.  As such the semblances of legislative activism towards enforcing 
the intent of the impeachment provision are a mere demonstration. Nevertheless, the zeal 
waned as legislators’ initial eagerness was an invitation to the executive to negotiate on the 
welfare of the lawmakers at the expense of the dwindling hope of a responsible civilian 
administration19. 
There is no doubt that the practice of the presidential system in Nigeria’s political system has 
been fraught with certain political hiccups. Of importance in this regard is the problem of 
accountability and the promotion of good governance vis a vis the failure of the legislature to 
appropriate its constitutional power of oversight over the executive branch. The exercise of 
this power has been in abeyance of its manifest purpose. The exercise of legislative oversight 
power in this regard has not been able to stimulate the environment necessary for the 
institutionalization of responsible executive in Nigeria’s presidential system. Consequently, 
there is the failure of the Nigerian state to promote good governance. In the absence of 
effective institutional checks, systemic corruption retards growth and development    
(Fagbadebo, 2007; Fagbadebo, 2009; Ogundiya, 2010; Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011).  
Ordinarily in a presidential system, the exercise of impeachment power as a political weapon 
to discipline certain categories of public officials is dependent on the strength of the 
legislature. It is the only institution saddled with the responsibility of exercising such power. 
In addition, since discipline is a necessity for stability and productivity in a presidential 
                                                 
18There were indications that the EFCC had records of the fund mismanagement pandemic by the state 
governors at the time. In fact, some former governors had confessed to have misappropriated the funds of their 
states during their tenures. For details, see: Tran 2012; Adewole 2008. 
19From personal experience as the Press Secretary to the Speaker of the state legislature, it is evident that most 
of the gridlocks created in the legislature-executive relationships were measures to seek for enhanced welfare 
packages since state legislatures depends on the executive for funding. Unlike the funding of the judiciary 
charged on the Consolidated Revenue Fund, state legislatures are like an extension of the executive in terms of 
funding where all requests require the approval of the governor. 
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system, the legislature thus has a consequential effect on democratic advancement and 
governance. The presence of a powerful legislature is an unmixed blessing for 
democratization and the promotion of good governance (Fish, 2006).  
The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, places the legislature at a vantage 
position to exert its influence in ensuring accountability. One of the vital instruments 
designed to achieving this is the legislative oversight function. Section 4 (2 and 7) of the 
constitution empowers the legislature ‘to make laws for the peace, order, and good 
government of the State or any part thereof”. By extension, the constitution also links the 
exercise of the executive powers vested in the President and the State Governors respectively, 
to the legislative actions of the legislature at the national and state levels.   
Section 4 (1) of the Constitution vests the legislative powers of the country in the National 
Assembly (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, as 
amended).Specifically, section 4 (2) of the constitution stipulates that the legislative power is 
to be exercised with a view to making laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
nation. In a similar version, sections 6-7 of the constitution vest the House of Assembly of 
each state with the legislative powers to make laws, for the peace, order and good, 
governance of the state or any part thereof.      
In the spirit of the principles of separation of power and the doctrine of checks and balances, 
these legislative powers are not absolute; they are subject to judicial review. Indeed, section 4 
(8) states that the exercise of legislative powers should be subject to the jurisdiction of courts 
of law. It firmly entrenches the feasible presence of the judiciary as a formidable institutional 
actor in Nigeria’s presidential democracy. The constitution vests the executive powers of the 
federation and the states on the president and governors of the states, respectively. Section 5 
(1-2) affirms that these powers are meant for the execution and maintenance of the 
constitution and laws passed by the legislature. In the same token, it vests the judicial powers 
of both the federal and state governments in the established judicial institutions. In the 
exercise of these powers, the judiciary should play the role of an impartial arbiter with a view 
to controlling the excesses of the two political branches.     
The essence of the fragmentation of these powers is to promote the culture of responsible 
government (Perez-Linan, 2007). The fundamental objectives and directive principles of the 
Nigerian government as contained in chapter II of the constitution espouses this postulation. 
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One of such is the constitutional responsibility in section 15 (5) of the constitution which 
mandates the State to ‘abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power’ (The Constitution 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). A combination of the legislative, executive and judicial 
powers is the statutory instrument needed to make this provision effective.    
A presidential system has requisite institutional checks and controls to cope effectively with 
the challenges associated with accountability. Section 13 of the Nigerian constitution, for 
instance, mandates the authorities and persons in the legislative, executive and judicial 
branches ‘to conform to, observe and apply the provisions’ of chapter two of the constitution, 
including the mandate of the Nigerian state to abolish all corrupt practices and abuses of 
power (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). The 
provisions of this chapter set out the blueprint of the policies of the government as well as the 
philosophical foundations of the governmental process. This framework defines the 
boundaries of the functions of the three branches of government. More importantly, the 
legislature and executive activities are the driving forces for the realization of the import of 
these provisions.  
Chapter two of the Nigerian constitution provides for the socio-economic rights of the 
citizens. These are rights ‘designed to provide certain entitlements and protections for the 
interests of individuals in having access to certain socio-economic resources’ (Bilchitz 
2014).Protection of these rights by the government is a test of its legitimacy (Michelman 
2008). They are obligations of the government that require the commitment of the various 
organs of the state. The Nigerian constitution provides a series of measures to ensure the 
realisation of these rights. This is necessary because difficulties often arise concerning their 
justiciability and enforcement (Bilchitz, 2014). 
As important as chapter two of the constitution is, its successful implementation is dependent 
on strict adherence to section 15(5). Corruption and the abuse of power are the two main 
challenges which the structure of the presidential system seeks to overcome (Kada, 2003; 
Hochstetler, 2006; Perez-Linan, 2007; Kim and Bahry, 2008; Hochstetler and Edwards, 2009; 
Kim, 2013). They are formidable among the factors that engender governance problems (The 
World Bank, 2010; MO Ibrahim Foundation, 2011). The concept of separation of power and 
the doctrine of checks and balances are instruments to ensure responsible governance 
structures in the presidential system.      
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The drafters of the constitution were aware of the possibility that political elites could abuse 
their power. To this end, there are requisite provisions regulating the activities of the political 
elites in the institutions of government. Sections 80-83 and 120-123 of the constitution 
empower the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly, to control public funds 
of the federation and the states, respectively. Specifically, governments at these levels cannot 
withdraw any money from the Consolidated Revenue Fund without the authorization of the 
legislatures. By implication, the executive branch does not have the power to expend any 
fund not appropriated by the legislative assemblies. Besides this, the legislature also has an 
oversight over the administration of the appropriated funds.  
Sections 88-89 and 128-129 provide the necessary instruments for the national and state 
legislatures to discharge their responsibilities of curbing corruption.20 The provisions of these 
sections are sufficient for the legislature to effectively monitor and control the appropriated 
funds for each fiscal year. These provisions provide the Nigerian legislature with the ability 
to promote accelerated development and service delivery. 
Of relevance to this study is section 88 (2) and 128 (2) where the investigative power of the 
legislature is aimed at exposing corruption, inefficiency or waste in the execution or 
administration of the relevant laws of the federation (The Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). In essence, these provisions are the instruments for 
the execution of section 15(5)21 of the constitution. Violation of any of the letters of the 
constitution is a criminal offence. Thus, it is the responsibility of the holders of the 
legislative, executive and judicial powers to uphold integrity and transparency in the exercise 
of their powers. 
However, the constitution provides a shield for the holders of executive powers at the 
National and State levels against criminal prosecution in any court of law. Popularly known 
                                                 
20 Section 128 (1&2) states: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of Assembly shall have 
power by resolution published in its journal or in the Office Gazette of the Government of the State to direct 
orcause to be directed an inquiry or investigation into -(a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power 
to make laws; and(b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department 
charged, orintended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility for (i) executing or administering laws 
enacted by that House of Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be 
appropriated by such House.(2) The powers conferred on a House of Assembly under the provisions of this 
section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling the House to -(a) make laws with respect to any matter 
within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws; and                                                                                                         
(b) expose corruption, inefficiency of waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative 
competence and in the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it. 
21Section 15 (5) states: (5) The State shall abolish all corrupt practices and abuse of power. 
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as the immunity clause, section 308 of the 1999 Constitution specifically prohibits civil or 
criminal proceedings against them (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, 
as amended). By virtue of section 308(3)22, the President and his deputy, Governors of the 
States and their deputies, enjoy immunity during their period of office. The Nigerian 
Supreme Court elaborates on the potency and implications of the provisions of this section in 
Tinubu vs. I. M. B. Securities plc. Thus: 
 
The immunity granted to the incumbent of the relevant office under Section 308(1)(a) of the 
Constitution prescribes an absolute prohibition on the courts from entertaining any 
proceedings, civil or criminal, in respect of any claim or relief against a person to whom that 
section of the Constitution applies during the period he holds such office. No question of 
waiver of the relevant immunity by the incumbent of the offices concerned or, indeed, by the 
courts may therefore arise.23 
 
Regardless of the provisions of section 308, the drafters of the constitution recognised the 
possibility of the abuse of power. In this regards, the constitution places at the corridor of the 
legislature, the power to control the executive in matters bothering on abuse of power. 
Sections 143 and 188 of the Constitution provide rigorous procedures for removing any 
erring officeholders shielded from judicial prosecution while in office. Thus, the possibility 
of impeachment remains the only measure to provide adequate caution against the abuse of 
power by the executive while in office (Flynn, 1993; Kada, 2003; Hochstetler, 2011; David, 
2012).    
I argue in this study that the inability of the legislature to perform its statutory oversight 
function constitutes a great challenge to accountability in Nigeria. The quantum of funds and 
resources lost to corrupt practices by government officials are sufficient to arrest the failure 
of governance that litters the polity.  For instance, between 2000 and 2008, Nigeria lost 130 
billion US dollars to illicit financial flows. The Global Financial Integrity (GFI) in its report 
‘Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000-2009,’ indicates that Nigeria was 
                                                 
22 Section 308 states: (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, but subject to subsection 
(2) of this section (a) no civil or criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against a person to whom 
this section applies during his period of office; (b)a person to whom this section applies shall not be arrested or 
imprisoned during that period either in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise; and (c) no process of 
any court requiring or compelling the appearance of a person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for 
or issued: Provided that in ascertaining whether any period of limitation has expired for the purposes of any 
proceedings against a person to whom this section applies, no account shall be taken of his period of office. (2) 
The provisions of subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to civil proceedings against a person to whom 
this section applies in his official capacity or to civil or criminal proceedings in which such a person is only a 
nominal party. (3) This section applies to a person holding the office of President or Vice-President, Governor 
or Deputy Governor; and the reference in this section to "period of office" is a reference to the period during 
which the person holding such office is required to perform the functions of the office. 
23Tinubu vs. I. M. B. Securities plc. ([2001] 16 NWLR (pt 740) 670 at 695). 
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the 10th highest in terms of illicit outflows in the developing world, an average of 15 billion 
US dollars per year (GFI 2010). In 2012, British Prime Minister, David Cameron, and a 
former American president, Bill Clinton, accused the Nigerian government of lack of 
transparency in the handling of the nation’s oil revenues (Coffie-Gyamfi, 2012; Ujah and 
Kalu, 2013). Kickbacks, bribes, embezzlement, and other forms of official corruption are 
responsible for this phenomenon.      
The manifest function of executive-legislature collaboration in a presidential system is to 
promote public goods. The concept of separation of power, for instance, is to avert executive 
tyranny (Qvortrup, 2000). Likewise, the idea of interdependent relationships among the three 
organs of government seeks to promote good governance. I discover in this study that in 
Nigeria, this sort of relationship is an avenue for the reification of the vested interests of the 
political elites. Empirical data from the fieldwork shows that Nigerian political elites 
collaborate to secure self-interested positions.  
1.3 Context and Objectives of the Study  
My readings on presidentialism as a governing system propelled me to undertake a study of 
the practice of the system in Nigeria. I was particularly interested in the exercise of the 
impeachment power of the legislature in the face of the prevailing crisis of governance that is 
a feature of the Nigerian political system. The constitution stipulates the necessary steps to 
ensure that political leaders are accountable to the population. But in practice the system is 
far from meeting these expectations. My primary objective was to understand the workings of 
the Nigerian presidential system as it directly relates to the implementation of the 
constitutional provisions of impeachment of the executive. This I found to be a critical 
undertaking because as the study progressed it became clear that the political elites in the 
legislature are aware of the importance of the provisions. From the empirical data that I 
gathered, the intent of the drafters of the provisions is clear. I explore the judicial review of 
the cases for deeper insights through a judicial interpretation of the statutes. Indeed, the 
elaborate but procedural rules for the removal of the political heads of the executive branch 
of government are a design to ensure compliance with the rule of law. 
My observations of breaches in the exercise of this legislative power further aroused my 
interest with the specific objective to unravel the factors responsible for the manner of 
implementation of the constitutional provisions of this power. What are the explanations for 
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the behavioural patterns of the legislative political elite in the exercise of this power?  While 
the Nigerian legislature has the power to control the policy process, how can one explain the 
cases of corruption among state governors in Nigeria? Does the Nigerian presidential system 
engender good governance? The answers to these questions, as shown in this study, are found 
in the behaviour of the political elites, which in turn is influenced by their political and 
economic environments. 
 
The central claim of this study, based on my findings, is that the failure of the legislature to 
adhere to the principles associated with the exercise of the power of impeachment as an 
instrument of oversight engenders the prevailing governance crisis in the Nigerian 
presidential system. I argue, based upon empirical evidence, that in this political system 
where systemic corruption prevails, impeachment is rendered as a mere instrument of 
political victimization and competition. The political elites in the legislature lack the capacity 
to implement the constitutional provisions of impeachment in cases where this is warranted. 
Selective application of the provisions validates the claim that the exercise of the power to 
impeach has become a political instrument.  
1.4 Methodology of the Study  
I worked as the head of the media unit of a Nigerian state legislature from June 1999 to May 
2003. This provided me with the rare opportunity of observing the gap in the way 
standardized texts sometimes discuss research activities and the reality of social phenomenon, 
as experienced in the political process. Much of the existing ethical guidelines on research are 
not adequate for the analysis of social phenomenon until such are applied through the 
observation of the activities of the actors. Most of the guidelines in political science present a 
broad approach to how social research should be conducted without specific reference to the 
particularistic nature of some specific social phenomenon. Thus, my direct observation of the 
legislative process provided me with the opportunity to observe behavior and processes, and 
this background exposure to the legislature enabled me to conduct my research interviews 
from an informed perspective. 
I thus consider my insiderness (Labaree, 2002) as a legislative aide to the presiding officer of 
a state legislature, as a key feature of my ability to analyse the legislative process in 
impeachment episodes. This assisted me to develop a deeper understanding of the complex 
dynamics of socio-cultural, economic and political factors on impeachment procedures and 
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processes. This was further assisted by the person of the presiding officer in term of his 
willingness to incorporate one into his “kitchen cabinet”. I was offered a rare opportunity to 
gain in-depth insider’s knowledge of the actual operations and practice of the legislative 
processes beyond the confine of the legislative chambers, especially, during the processes of 
impeachment. This informed my choice of the methodological approach to the study. 
1.4.1 Methodological Approach to the Study 
In the choice of the appropriate design for this study, I considered the concepts of methods, 
methodology and epistemology. Methods refer to the techniques adopted for the collection of 
data. Methodology represents the appropriate approach to systematic inquiry. In other words, 
it refers ‘to a broad, theoretically informed, framework that guided the choice of methods and 
interpretation of data appropriate to the study’ (Francis, 2008, p.34). Epistemology refers to 
‘the nature of knowledge and the relationship between the knower and that which would be 
known’ (Mertens, 2010, p.470). Epistemological assumptions, according to Donna Mertens 
(2010, p.471), raises the following questions: 
 
What should my relationship as a researcher be with the people in the study? How should I 
interact with the people in the study? Should I be distant and removed so as to prevent bias or 
should I be close and involved so as to prevent bias? What makes it better so I can determine 
what is real in this context? If I am to genuinely know the reality of something, how do I need 
to relate to the people from whom I am collecting data? (Mertens, 2010, p.471) 
An interpretive meta-theory of the social sciences guided this study. The subject matter of the 
study comprises the attitudinal dispositions and preferences of the political elitesand their 
actions in the exercise of power. Thus, it would have been inappropriate to approach the 
study from a positivist perspective. Neither is a quantitative method of data collection useful 
for the understanding of the nuances and perceptions of the political elite. However, an 
understanding of these perceptions and dispositions is feasible through personal observation, 
interaction and deep field work and data collection (Creswell, 2009; Castro et al, 2010). The 
outcomes depend on the interpretations of the researcher, working within a clearly defined 
framework. My background exposure in legislative practice contributes further to my ability 
to interpret information and to ascribe meaning to it. 
I approach the study from the interpretive tradition of knowledge, which is concerned with 
creating meaning out of the understanding of the interviewees (Creswell, 2009; Castro et al, 
2010). The emphasis of this tradition is in an examination of the whole person within the 
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milieu of the social environment. It focuses on ‘human and social constructs that are often 
formed on the basis of actions and within cultural and social frameworks’ (Francis 2008, 
p.34). The concern of the approach is to explore detailed accounts of ‘how participants are 
making sense of their personal and social world’ (Smith et al, 2009, p.53).   
In correlation with this approach, I adopted a qualitative methodology and qualitative 
methods for the purposes of data collection. A qualitative methodology is a research strategy 
that ‘usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of 
data’ (Bryman, 2001, p.264). A qualitative approach to research, according to Hesse-Biber 
(2010 p.455), ‘aims to understand how individuals make meaning of their social world’. He 
notes that the social world is dependent on individual perceptions and is ‘created through 
social interactions of individuals with the world around them’ (Hesse-Biber, 2010, p.455). In 
other words, the use of qualitative research methods affords researchers with the ability to 
adopt ‘an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world’ under study (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2011, p.3). It privileges the exploration of the process of human meaning making.  
Qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, with a view to making sense of 
or interpreting phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. This method is 
useful in delineating some of the essential qualities of complex social phenomena 
(Dougherty, 2002, p.894). Institutional issues like power, authority, conflict, ‘involve 
intricate webs of causes, effects, processes, and dynamics: they are about qualities’ 
(Dougherty, 2002, p.894). ‘Qualitative analysis characterizes these webs so we can appreciate 
what the phenomenon is really like in practice, how it works, and how it is affected by other 
patterns in the organization’ (Dougherty, 2002, p.894). It is a flexible method to explore 
phenomenon in a natural setting. The objective of a qualitative researcher is to gain an in-
depth understanding of human behaviour in decision-making processes. It involves an 
interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject matter and gives priority to what the data 
contributes to important research questions or existing information.  
A study of the disposition of the Nigerian political elites toward Nigerian constitutional 
provisions is better understood through in-depth interaction and engagement. This study 
explores the interplay of power dynamics in the governing institutions in the Nigerian 
political system. It involved the understanding of a web of interactions among the political 
elites. Considering the research questions, the interpretive approach and the methodology it 
was appropriate to adopt qualitative methods of data collection.  
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1.4.2 Methods of Data Collection       
I derive the data for this study from extensive interviews of key informants. This technique 
affords the researcher the opportunity to elicit direct information on the subject under 
investigation (Wimmer and Dominick, 1997), and provides eye witness accounts of 
legislative politics24. Interviews generally allow researchers the freedom to deal with topics 
of interest and afford them the opportunity ‘to probe deeper into the initial responses of the 
respondent to gain a more detailed answer to the question’ (Wimmer and Dominick, 1997, 
p.156). It provides a ‘“mirror reflection” of the reality that exists in the social world’ (Miller 
and Glassner, 2011, p.131). Thus, it enables the researcher to access the ‘evidence of the 
nature of the phenomena under investigation’ (Miller and Glassner, 2011, p.131). In-depth 
interviews, in particular, elicit information and provide a means for exploring the points of 
view of research subjects (Miller and Glassner, 2011, p.133).     
I interviewed key informants from among the political elites in the legislature, the executive 
and the judicial branches of the Nigerian government. I had face-to-face interviews with two 
former speakers of state legislatures who presided over impeachment processes. I did not 
have difficulty in approaching them because I had established a friendly relationship with 
them while I was serving as a media aide to a speaker. This rapport afforded me the 
opportunity of interacting with them from the point of view of an informed researcher.  
Aside from the speakers, I also interviewed seven former principal officers of the state 
legislatures where impeachment processes took place. The initial difficulty of accessing a 
number of them was occasioned by their inability to comprehend the primary purpose of the 
interview in spite of all ethical documents indicating that it was meant for academic 
research25. My persistency and their independent checks on my activities eventually led to an 
invitation to interview them. This later became an opportunity to elicit deep revelations from 
these key informants on the motivations for the conduct of the political elites in political 
                                                 
24I was the Press Secretary to the Speaker, of a state legislature between June 1999 and May 2003. During this 
period, I was privileged to witness legislative politics especially during the two cases of impeachment in the 
state. My position as a principal legislative aide to the speaker afforded me the opportunity of observing the 
activities of the legislators. Aside from this, there were opportunities to interact with legislators from other state 
assemblies mostly at informal levels. 
25At first, the former principal officers were apprehensive that the interviews were a clandestine ploy to spy on 
them in favour of their opponents. This is indicative of the climate of political competition in the legislatures. 
30 
 
processes26. The friendly atmosphere generated during the interviews served as a link to 
informal interactions with other political elites who were involved in the politics associated 
with the impeachment procedures.  
I interviewed one of the former deputy governors of a state who was impeached by the 
legislature. He had wanted to speak about his experience27. The account of his experience, 
spurred me to seek further insights from his associates. This was beneficial because they 
supplied the lacunae in his account. The informal discussion, which he facilitated, created an 
atmosphere where free discussion with these associates led to much detail on the hidden 
factors that usually prompt legislative action in the Nigerian presidential system.  
I considered an interview with one serving judge as very important to this study. I had 
thought that access to retired chief judges who presided over impeachment cases would be 
easier since they no longer serve in government. However, they refused to grant access 
because of different reasons. For some, it was a memory that should not be remembered. A 
particular retired judge I met declined to entertain any questions because he was angry with 
the practice of the presidential system in Nigeria due to the failure of the political elites to 
allow unfettered judicial intervention. He did, however, refer and introduce me to a serving 
judge of a state high court whom he said would be willing to share his experience. My 
interview with the service judge provided some necessary insights on the politics associated 
with judicial shield in the process of impeachment. 
Beside the key informants from the legislature, executive and the judiciary, I also interviewed 
two individuals in the law profession, particularly constitutional law experts. I also 
interviewed a former Chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related 
offences Commission (ICPC)28 and one official the Economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC). In negotiating access with these key informants, I booked 
appointments. One  official of the EFCC and a chairman of one of the panels that investigated 
the allegations of gross misconduct leveled against a governor preferred telephonic rather 
                                                 
26There was a particular interview I conducted at the residence of a legislator who was with his friend who 
served as a commissioner during the period of an impeachment episode. Constant interjections by the 
commissioner revealed how the governor and the legislators negotiated the removal of the deputy governor and 
provided useful insights into the politics associated with the exercise of the power of impeachment.  
27He told me during the interview that he was already compiling his own account of his experience having 
waited for a long time to recount his experience. 
28The ICPC is an anti-corruption agency that investigates allegations of corruption against public officials and 
prosecutes.    
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than in-person conversations. All these respondents provided key information and insights 
necessary for the analysis in the study.  
In a bid to further cross-validate information gathered from the interviews, I sourced data 
primarily from archival materials such as law reports, records of legislative proceedings and 
government publications. Johnson and Reynolds (2006) have justified the use of archival 
materials by political scientists when personal interviews and other primary sources could not 
elicit all the necessary information needed to analyse the political phenomena under study. I 
relied on these written records to validate data sourced from interviews as far as possible and 
to place such data in context.   
In this chapter, I discussed the context of the study as well as the methods of data collection. I 
provided a brief survey of the general principles associated with the practice of the 
presidential system of government. I now proceed to chapter two where I discuss the extant 



















Presidential Systems: Comparative Features and Characteristics 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a variety of perspectives on presidential systems, of which, 
impeachment is just one of the components. Thus, an inquiry into the role and purpose of 
impeachment in presidential systems requires an analysis of the nature and characteristics of 
presidential democracy. The rationale of the tripartite institutional structure in a presidential 
system is the need for political synergy to ensure probity and accountability. Thus, to 
understand impeachment as an institutional instrument of transparency and accountability, 
there is a need to grasp the structural design of a presidential system through the lens of its 
origin and practice over the years.   
I present this chapter in five sections. First, I review the different scholarly perspectives on 
presidentialism as a governing system. This incorporates the traditional/classical and new 
generation/developmental perspectives. I identify and appraise the major characteristics of 
the presidential systems. I then present a general overview of impeachment in presidential 
systems followed by the issue of impeachment as an instrument of accountability and good 
governance. I explore the exercise of impeachment power by the legislative institutions in 
developing presidential systems. I further identify comparative typologies of impeachment 
episodes in developing presidential systems, especially in Latin America and Asia. 
The central focus in this chapter is the identification of the features and characteristics of 
presidentialism as a governing system. I discover that the various perspectives advanced by 
scholars centre on the exercise of power, and particularly the power of the legislature to 
remove the political heads of the executive. The practice of presidentialism in the countries I 
examine is dependent on the nature of politics within those countries. There is no uniformity 
in the ways in which each legislature exercises power. Each political system adapted specific 
ideals and principles to suit their domestic political system 
2.2 Perspectives on the presidential system      
Scholarly works abound on presidentialism, a governing system adopted by the American 
Constitutional Convention of 1787. These works address the system from different 
perspectives that suggest a comparative analysis of, and debate over, its desirability for 
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democratic stability vis-à-vis parliamentary systems. Scholars with similar viewpoints have 
succeeded in defining presidentialism by its features and attributes. When viewed from the 
perspectives of its practice in the United States and Latin America, presidentialism is a 
governing system that celebrates independence of origin and survival of the president and 
members of the legislature (Mainwaring, 1993; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997; Linz, 1994; 
2010; Sartori, 1994; Lijphart, 1994; Stepan and Skach, 1994; Elgie, 2005; Hochstetler, 2006; 
Marsteintredet & Bermtzen, 2008; Hochstetler, 2011; Hochstetler & Samuels, 2011; 
Marsteintredet et al, 2013; Oleszek, 2014; Lee, 2014; Cheibub & Limongi, 2014). In this 
governing system, the president and members of the legislature enjoy separate electoral 
mandates by popular vote with fixed terms of office. The executive power of the government 
as well as the symbolic status of head of state resides with the president who has a fixed 
tenure except if the legislature removes him or her from office before the expiration of his 
term through impeachment29. This mutual independence exemplifies a balance of shared 
power between the legislature and the executive in the policy process (Linz, 1994; 201030).  
The concern of the framers of the American presidential constitution, the progenitor of 
presidential systems31, is how to devise a governing system capable of averting the dangers 
inherent in the absolute exercise of power by an individual. William Scheuerman (2005) 
notes the anxieties of the American people about the dangers associated with monarchy and 
the need to reform it to conform to democratic principles.  
[T]he eighteenth-century revolutionaries jettisoned hereditary monarchy for an elected 
executive accountable to the people and their elected representatives. They also discarded 
notions of divine rule, paving the way for the principle that any citizen, as long as he (and 
ultimately she) meets certain minimal tests (for example, having reached the age of 35 years) 
hypothetically might come to occupy the office of the executive (Scheuerman, 2005, p.28). 
In other words, the people abhorred the notion of an absolute ascription of superior divinely-
based wisdom and moral prudence attributed to monarchs and expressed their preference for 
                                                 
29 Aside from impeachment, the president could resign or be declared incapacitated by the legislature on the 
grounds of ill health. In all, the process of removing a president before the expiration of his term has 
constitutional backing. 
30 Linz’s first published work, The perils of presidentialism, was published in the maiden edition of Journal of 
Democracy in 1990. It was republished in a volume of essays edited by Larry Diamond et al in 2010. This is the 
version used in this study. Other earlier works cited in this study included in the volume are Donald Horowitz 
Comparing democratic systems; Seymour Lipset The centrality of political culture; and Robert Elgie Variations 
on a theme. 
31 Presidentialism is the governing system adopted by the US Constitutional Convention of 1787. It was a 
departure from the British constitutional monarchy when America was still a colony.. Thus, an independent 
America is the first historical practitioner of the presidential system of government. For the details see 
Scheuerman 2005; Turley 1999; Nichols 2011; Farrand 1911; Ahrens 2001 and The Federalist Papers. 
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structured political institutions capable of generating ‘competent and intelligent holders of 
executive power’ (Scheuerman, 2005, p.28), outside the ‘bloodlines of the royal family or 
could be established via acts of consecration’ (Scheuerman, 2005, p. 28). This abhorrence 
was a direct consequence of the fate of the American colonist during the reign of King 
George III (Ahrens 2001). The American experience with monarchy inspired Thomas Paine 
to declare  
let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth placed on the 
divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, 
that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING (Ahrens, 2001, 
p.2)32. 
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, in the Federalist Papers, dispel the notion that the 
presidential system in America was the equivalent of the British monarchical system. 
According to Hamilton, 
It is impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and deception upon the 
gross pretense of a similitude between a king of Great Britain and a magistrate of the character 
marked out for that of the President of the United States. It is still more impossible to withhold 
that imputation from the rash and barefaced expedients which have been employed to give 
success to the attempted imposition. In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general 
spirit, the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of the United States a 
power which by the instrument reported is EXPRESSLY allotted to the Executives of the 
individual States (Hamilton 2008, Federalist paper No. 67). 
Significantly, the principles of political and legal equality rather than hereditary power 
became part of the virtues of a constitutional order.  
Most modern presidential constitutions epitomize the notion of the separation of powers and 
the doctrine of checks and balances (Lijphart, 1994; Fukuyama et al, 2005; Hochstetler, 
2011). In this system, branches of government share powers with measures to checkmate the 
exercise of these powers by the other branch (Ackerman, 2000). In essence, a shared power is 
a design to overcome the danger of concentration of power in an individual.33 The hallmark 
of a presidential system is the fragmented level of authority. Structural arrangements in the 
system institutionalize the culture and practice of checks and balances. With separated 
                                                 
32 One of the members of the Constitutional Convention, Mr. Morris, re-echoed this assertion during the debates 
on impeachment that ‘This Magistrate [President] is not the King but…the people are the King’ (Farrand, 1911, 
Vol. II, p 59). In spite of this, there were instances during the Constitutional Convention when delegates mooted 
the idea of monarchy as the preferred governing system. Indeed, debates at the Convention and the contents of 
some of the Federalist Papers document the frequent references to monarchy in the consideration of the future 
of the American state. For the details, see Farrand, 1911; Federalist Papers, No. 67; Ahrens 2001).  
33 The fear of the danger associated with monarchy informed the adoption of presidential system at the 
American Constitutional Convention of 1787. For the details, see (Scheuerman 2005; Ahrens 2001; Turley 
1999; Persson et al 1997; Farrand 1911). 
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powers, the three principal branches of government - the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary- operate within their constitutional boundaries, cooperating with each other as equal 
partners to avert dictatorship, tyranny and arbitrariness in government for the promotion of 
public good (Ndulo, 2000; Kada, 2002).  
These general features dominate the studies on presidential democracy. Nevertheless, the 
desirability of these features has generated a series of debates34. The early debate was over 
the desirability of the institutional and structural designs of the American presidential system 
and the British Westminster system (Laski, 1944). Harold Laski notes that the argument ‘is 
built upon a series of unexplored and unstated assumptions’ about the operations and features 
of the two governing systems (Laski, 1944, p.347). Subsequent works include the 
developments in post World War II presidential democracies in Latin America, Africa and 
Asia. I discus these perspectives under two broad categories: the traditional and the new 
generation/developmental schools of presidential system. This classification is based on 
issues raised by scholars at different times in the debates rather than the chronological period 
of their research.  
2.2.1 The traditional conception of presidentialism 
The central focus of the traditional school is on the impact of the institutional and structural 
design of the presidential system on democratic stability. Juan Linz (1994; 2010) revives this 
debate over the most desirable governing system conducive for democratic stability between 
presidentialism and parliamentarism. He identifies two principal institutional characters of 
the presidential system, which he regards as inimical to stability. 
1. Both the president, who controls the executive and is elected by the people (or an electoral 
college elected by the people for that purpose), and an elected legislature (unicameral or 
bicameral) enjoy democratic legitimacy. It is a system of “dual democratic legitimacy.” 2. 
Both the president and the congress are elected for a fixed term, the president’s tenure in 
office is independent of the legislature, and the survival of the legislature is independent of the 
                                                 
34 Robert Elgie (2005) undertakes a review of these debates in three ‘waves’. The first wave comprises of the 
works of Juan Linz and others who used one explanatory variable (regime type) and one dependent variable 
(democratic consolidation) to justify their perils of presidentialism, thereby promoting the merits of 
parliamentary system. The second wave consists of the works of scholars who used ‘more than one explanatory 
variable (the regime type, usually, plus the party system and/or leadership powers) and often a different 
dependent variable (good governance as opposed to democratic consolidation) (Elgie 2005, p.106) to 
demonstrate the merits of presidential system. The third wave represents works on thegeneral theories of 
political science seeking for neither the merits nor demerits of the two systems but focuses more on the outcome 
of power politics on policy outputs (Elgie, 2005). 
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president. This leads to what we characterize as the “rigidity” of the presidential system (Linz, 
1994, p.6). 
 
Out of these two principal features, Linz identifies four major pitfalls, which he regards as the 
‘perils of presidentialism’. These pitfalls are inherent in a winner-takes-all electoral process; 
rigidity of presidential terms and independent origin and survival of the president and the 
legislature; gridlock arising from the dual legitimacy of the president and the legislature; and 
the proclivity towards personality politics (Linz, 1994; 2010; Fukuyama et al, 2005, 
Hochstetler, 2011). Generally, different works classified in this group critique presidentialism 
in six major ways.35 
Linz posits that the dual democratic legitimacy and rigidity of the term encompasses ‘the 
characteristics and problems of presidential systems’ (Linz, 1994, p.6)36. His concern is the 
implication of the unipersonal nature of the office of the president, especially in case of 
divided government, when the legislature ‘represents[s] cohesive, disciplined parties that 
offer clear ideological and political alternatives’ (Linz, 2010, p.257). His focus, based on 
developments in Latin America, is the consequences of gridlock and immobility in 
presidential systems. 
Since both derive their power from the votes of the people in a free competition among well-
defined alternatives, a conflict is always possible and at times may erupt dramatically; there is 
no democratic principle to resolve it, and the mechanisms that might exist in the constitution 
are generally complex, highly technical, legalistic, and, therefore, of doubtful democratic 
legitimacy for the electorate. It is therefore no accident that in some of those situations the 
military intervenes as ‘poder moderador’ (Linz, 1994, p.7). 
 
Linz assumes that in the case of a confrontation with the legislature on policy issues, the 
president could mobilize the support of the public with a view to claiming valid democratic 
legitimacy. This development, he reasons, might lead to further conflict capable of 
degenerating into the collapse of the government because there are ‘no democratic principles 
[that] can decide who represents the will of the people in principle’ (Linz, 1994, p.7).  
                                                 
35Firstly, that presidential system is characterized by a zero-sum game (Linz 1994, Lijphart 2004). Second, 
presidentialism lacks incentives for coalition formation (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Linz and Stepan 1996; 
Valenzuela 2004; Lijphart 2004; Mainwaring 1993; Stepan and Skach 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996; Niño 1996; 
Huang 1997) and, third, that it encourages undisciplined political parties, which could make coalition formation 
fragile (Hartlyn 1994; Huang 1997; Linz 1994)35. The others are that the presidential system engenders minority 
government (Mainwaring 1993; Jones 1995; Valenzuela 2004); deadlocks and legislative ineffectiveness (Linz 
1994; 2010 Stepan and Skach 1993; Mainwaring 1993, O’Donnell 1994; Jones 1995; Valenzuela 2004); and 
encourages a breakdown of democracy (Stepan and Skach 1993; Linz 1994; 2010; González and Gillespie 1994; 
Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Riggs 1988; Ackerman 2000; Valenzuela 2004).  
36 Arend Lijphart (1994, p.91) agrees with this position saying that the rigidity and immobilism associated with 
the presidential system ‘are its serious weaknesses’. 
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Shugart and Haggard (2001) view this position as an invitation to the pursuit of dual purposes 
in the political system. To them, separate elections associated with a presidential system ‘has 
the potential of guaranteeing separate purpose’ (Shugart and Haggard, 2001, p.64). Their 
argument is that because of the independent origin and survival of the president and the 
legislature, the principle of the separation of powers has consequences for policy-making and 
outcomes.  
While the president should be interested in providing public goods at the national level as a 
result of his nationwide constituency, legislators’ separation from the executive typically 
makes them less interested in providing national policy than in parliamentary systems 
(Shugart & Haggard, 2001, p. 66). 
They insist that even if the president’s party controls the majority in the legislature, ‘a 
separation of purpose remains a real possibility’ (Shugart and Haggard, 2001, p.66). 
On the problem of a fixed term, Linz (2010 p.257) argues that the feature ‘breaks the political 
process into discontinuous readjustments that events may demand’. He considers as 
paradoxical the personalization of power in the presidential system, noting that in the event of 
a sudden midterm succession, the constitutional mechanism for transition of power could lead 
‘to the emergence of someone whom the ordinary electoral process would never have made 
the chief of the state’ (Linz, 2010, p.258). Rather than see impeachment as a feasible 
mechanism of intervention against descent to arbitrariness and impunity, Linz assumes that 
the gridlock in the process could engender military intervention. Though he identifies certain 
positive attributes of this feature37, Linz insists that in the face of an error of judgment or a 
changing situation, ‘uncertainties of a period of regime transition and consolidation no doubt 
make the rigidities of a presidential constitution more problematic’ (Linz, 1994, p.9).  
Alexander Hamilton, writing about the adoption of term limits in the American presidential 
system,   first spearheaded this criticism of the rigidity of a fixed term in a presidential system 
in the Federalist Paper No 7238. Hamilton39 has identified five “ill effects” of the fixed term 
                                                 
37 He admits that presidential system ‘reduces some of the incertitude and unpredictability inherent in 
parliamentarism’ and that ‘it assures the stability of the executive’ (Linz 1994, p.9). 
38The idea of a fixed term is not an original design of the American presidential system. Indeed, delegates at the 
Constitutional Convention rejected the proposed seven-year single term for the president and ‘proposed a four-
year presidential term capable of indefinite renewal. This shorter term guaranteed greater public oversight of the 
president and indefinite renewal allowed him time to bring his project to fruition’ (Engeman, 2014, p 17).The 
22ndAmendment of the American Constitution limited the presidential term to two. While Hamilton, as the 
Secretary of State, encouraged George Washington to retire after two terms of four years, Franklin Roosevelt 
however spent four terms of four years each (Engeman, 2014).  
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which he considers “pernicious”’ (Hamilton, 2008 Federalist Paper No.72). First, he notes 
that that exclusion from re-election ‘would be a diminution of inducements to good behavior’ 
(Hamilton, 2008 Federalist Paper No. 72). The second has to do with what he calls ‘the 
temptation to sordid views, to peculation, and, in some instances, to usurpation’ capable of 
leading to corruption and the abuse of opportunities (Hamilton, 2008, Federalist Paper No. 
72).   
An ambitious man, too, when he found himself seated on the summit of his country's honors, 
when he looked forward to the time at which he must descend from the exalted eminence 
forever, and reflected that no exertion of merit on his part could save him from the unwelcome 
reverse; such a man, in such a situation, would be much more violently tempted to embrace a 
favorable conjuncture for attempting the prolongation of his power, at every personal hazard, 
than if he had the probability of answering the same end by doing his duty (Hamilton 2008, 
Federalist Paper No. 72). 
Thirdly, Hamilton argues that an exclusion from re-election would deprive the community of 
the advantage of the experience the president gained while in office. Another ill effect related 
to the above is that exclusion from re-election would deny the society the valuable worth of 
such a president because ‘in certain emergencies of the state, their presence might be of the 
greatest moment to the public interest or safety’ (Hamilton, 2008, Federalist Paper No. 72). 
The fifth consequence Hamilton points out is that exclusion from re-election ‘would operate 
as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration’ (Hamilton, 2008, Federalist 
PaperNo.72). 
Scott Mainwaring (1993) sees a multiparty presidential system as more problematic in terms 
of stability. He contends that, ‘the combination of presidentialism and multipartism makes 
stable democracy difficult to sustain’ (Mainwaring, 1993, p. 199). Presidentialism to him 
‘compounds the difficulties created by multipartism’ because the system lacks ‘mechanisms 
intended to ensure legislative majorities (Mainwaring, 1993, p.200). He argues that this 
development was inimical to stability and purposeful policy outcomes since the president, 
when his party is not in control of the majority in the legislature, will have to build new 
legislative coalitions on each policy issue. Mainwaring prefers de facto two party systems as 
the best arrangement for a presidential system because the likelihood of ideological 
differences would be minimal while the nature of competition is conducive for stability. 
                                                                                                                                                        
39 Hamilton was a delegate at the American constitutional Convention. He played an active role in the campaign 
for the adoption of the American constitution as one of the principal authors of the Federalist Papers, a 
compendium of letters written to support the American presidential constitution amidst fear of rejection by the 
core component units. 
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Unlike the parliamentary system, he argues that coalition formation in a multiparty 
presidential system is not a guarantee for support from the opposing parties.  
Fred Riggs (1988), writing from the background of the American political system, sees the 
presidential system as an inherently fragile scheme of government. As an unusual form of 
liberal democracy with its origin in the monarchical system of Great Britain, (Turley, 1999; 
Ahrens 2001; Scheuerman 2005), Riggs is of the view that American presidentialism is 
exceptional. He attributes this to the three principal factors that shaped the form of the 
American presidential system: institutional features of presidential system, the inherent 
problematic associated with the presidential system and the unique American practices and 
tradition (Riggs, 1988; 1994). He explains that the failure of presidential systems outside the 
United States is a function of deep structural problems with the institutional design.  
Arturo Valenzuela (2004) blames presidential institutions for the recurring phenomenon of 
failed presidencies in Latin America, while Arend Lijphart (2000, p.21) sees presidential 
governments as inimical to democratic consolidation. O’Donnell (1994) argues that 
presidential institutions contribute largely to the descent of many Latin American countries to 
what he calls ‘delegative democracy’. In Africa, Van de Walle (2003) is of the view that the 
characteristic features of presidentialism explain the weak political parties on the continent. 
Not all scholars in the classical school agree with the position of Juan Linz on the perils of 
the presidential system. Nevertheless, they share similar view on the problematic of the 
institutional framework and the structural design of the system.  Mainwaring and Shugart 
(1997) in their appraisal of the issues raised by Juan Linz against the presidential system 
argue that the ‘consequence of dual democratic legitimacy is not exclusively a problem of 
presidentialism’ though they agree that it is more pronounced in presidential systems 
(Mainwaring & Shugart 1997, p.451). 
If both houses have the power of confidence over the cabinet, the most likely outcome when 
the houses are controlled by different majorities is a compromise coalition cabinet. In this 
case, dual legitimacy exists, not between executive and assembly, but between the two 
chambers of the assembly (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, p.451). 
They note that Linz ‘overlooked potential source of conflicting legitimacy’ between the head 
of state and the head of government in a parliamentary system (Mainwaring and Shugart, 
1997, p.451). They argue that a parliamentary system with role specification for the president 
is more debilitating in Third World countries because ‘the more authority the head of state is 
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given, the greater is the potential for conflict, especially in newer democracies where roles 
have not yet been clearly defined by precedent’ (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, p.452).  
On the rigidity of the fixed term provision, Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) agree with Linz 
only that the ‘provisions against re-election have been introduced primarily to reduce the 
president's incentives to abuse executive powers to secure re-election’ (Mainwaring and 
Shugart, 1997, p.452). While they support re-election, ‘despite the potential for abuse’, they 
are of the view that such could only be permitted ‘in countries where reliable institutions 
safeguard elections from egregious manipulation by incumbents’ (Mainwaring and Shugart, 
1997, p.452). On the issue of the winner-takes-all approach associated with presidential 
systems, they aver:  
The degree to which democracies promote winner-takes-all rules depends mostly on the 
electoral and party system and on the federal or unitary nature of the system. Parliamentary 
systems with disciplined parties and a majority party offer the fewest checks on executive 
power, and hence promote a winner-takes-all approach more than presidential systems 
(Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, p.453). 
 
They argue that the system of checks and balances associated with presidential system 
‘usually inhibit winner-takes-all tendencies’ (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, pp.453-544). 
They note that this safeguard mechanism is indeed ‘to limit the possibility that the winner 
would take all’ and if ‘it loses the presidency, a party or coalition may still control congress, 
allowing it to block some presidential initiatives’ (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, pp.453-
544). 
Aside from the identified lapses in the structural composition of the presidential system, 
Mainwaring and Shugart identify three positive aspects that conform to democratic 
principles. First, the principle of dual legitimacy provides voters with greater electoral 
choices among party candidates. They note that voters have an opportunity ‘to support one 
party or candidate at the legislative level but another for the head of government’ 
(Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, p.460). Beside this, a presidential system encourages what 
they refer to as electoral accountability and identification. 
Electoral accountability describes the degree and means by which elected policymakers are 
electorally responsible to citizens, while identifiability refers to voters' ability to make an 
informed choice prior to elections based on their ability to assess the likely range of 
postelection governments (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, pp.461-462). 
 
The third positive aspect of a presidential system has to do with the benefit of the mutual 
independence of origin and survival of the legislature and the president. They argue that the 
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legislature in a presidential system ‘can act on legislation without worrying about immediate 
consequences for the survival of the government’ (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, pp.462-
463)and as such, they consider policy issues irrespective of the differing interests of the 
leadership of the ruling party or coalition (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, pp.462-463). They 
aver that 
where presidents enjoy substantial assembly support, congressional opposition to executive 
initiatives can promote consensus building and can avoid the passage of ill-considered 
legislation simply to prevent a crisis of confidence. The immobilism feared by 
presidentialism's detractors is the flip side of the checks and balances desired by the United 
States' founding fathers (Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997, p.463)40. 
Donald Horowitz (2010) agrees with the submission of Mainwaring and Shugart (1997) on 
electoral choices available to the people. He opines that the Westminster democracy (which 
Linz prefers) with its electoral arrangement is prone to stifling the electoral choice of the 
people. Furthermore, he submits that there is insufficient evidence that a parliamentary 
system guards against the problem of rigidity and exclusion capable of engendering 
instability. Horowitz avers that the practice of the parliamentary system in the developing 
democracies in Latin America, Asia and Africa, depicts a descent to authoritarianism and 
political instability. He concludes that rather than dissipate energy on the structural flaws in 
governing systems, it would be more politically expedient to seek redemption in the electoral 
rules and governing system to accommodate features of both presidential and parliamentary 
systems41.   
Giovanni Sartori (1994) argues that while a “pure”42 presidential system is bad, government 
by parliamentary support alone cannot guarantee stability. He avers that government by the 
parliament is not sufficient to explain its durability or effectiveness. Unlike Linz, Sartori 
                                                 
40 Scholars of presidential systems in developing countries draw substantially from the American experience and 
the institutional structures of its practice over time. Indeed, scholarly works on the presidential system generally 
use the American origin as the benchmark for comparative analysis. Even in practice, the US model inspired all 
presidential systems (Linz 2007). 
41 Scholarly works on the appraisal of presidential and parliamentary systems in the developing democracies 
often propose a fusion of the features of the two systems to avert the inherent problems associated with their 
practice. To this end, terminologies such as semi-presidentialism, semi-parliamentary, presidential-
parliamentary, pervade literature on presidential systems. 
42 Sartori (1994) defines ‘pure’ presidentialism as the system whereby the president, as the head of state, and, at 
the same time, government that he appoints, is elected by popular votes, with a pre-established tenure that 
cannot be discharged by parliamentary votes. Similarly, Sartori notes three varieties of a parliamentary system: 
the British Westminster Cabinet system, the unstable French parliamentary system of the Third and Fourth 
Republics and the party-controlled parliamentary system. 
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contends that advocacy for parliamentary systems require specificity because both have the 
tendency to fail. According to him 
Parliamentarism may fail us just as much and as easily presidentialism. if we wish the 
alternative to presidentialism to be parliamentary system, we still have to decide which 
parliamentarism and to make sure that the exit from pure presidentialism does not simply 
lead, along a path of least resistance to parliamentarism, that is, to assembly government and 
misgovernment (Sartori 1994, p.108) (emphasis in the original). 
Sartori (1994) notes that with the exception of the United States, ‘the record of the 
presidentially governed countries is quite dismal and prompts us to wonder whether their 
political problem might not be presidentialism itself’ (p.107). He submits that presidentialism 
does not provide effective government because of its defective structural arrangement that 
encourages divided power and divided government. 
Robert Elgie (2010) in his proposal for a hybrid system to avert the inherent problematic of 
the presidential system, agrees with Linz’s submission on the danger of a dual executive. 
According to him, if the president and the Prime Minister belong to different political parties, 
the division in the executive branch is capable of engendering gridlock and thus, a proclivity 
towards instability. Elgie’s solution to this problem is a semi-presidential arrangement with a 
ceremonial president as a dignified actor in a constitutional democracy while the parliament 
chooses the premier as the head of the efficient component of the government exercising real 
power43.  
The cultural dimension introduced by Seymour Lipset (2010) further strengthens this 
submission. He contends that a governing system should consider the significance of the 
habitual attitudes of the people towards government. He agrees that cultures do change and, 
as such, in redesigning institutional structures of government, there is a need to ensure 
conformity to the prevailing cultural norms.  
The position of Arendt Lijphart (1994) differs markedly from the others. While he concurs on 
the problematic of the institutional and structural design of presidential systems, his major 
criticism is ‘its inclination toward majoritarian democracy, especially in the many countries 
where, because a natural consensus is lacking, a consensual instead of majoritarian form of 
                                                 
43 This arrangement needs to be qualified within the specific political culture. Nigeria’s post-independent 
parliamentary system was fashioned along this line (as will be seen later in the study); yet, the political 
instability it generated, due partly to the behavioural disposition of the political elites towards power, could not 
be abated until the time the military intervened in January 1966. For the details, see Ojiako 1980; Ademoyega 
1980; Ejimofor 1987. 
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democracy is needed’ (Lijphart, 1994, p.91). His concern is the feasibility of consensual 
arrangements in plural societies with a view to guaranteeing stability, which he notes is not 
possible in the institutions and structures of a presidential system. To him, presidentialism is 
not conducive to ‘the kind of consociational compromises and pacts’ necessary to foster 
democratic process in plural societies besieged by acute ethno-religious divisions (Lijphart 
1994, p. 97). Nevertheless, he appreciates the regime of separation of powers in presidential 
systems though he regards this as a paradox because the system also promotes a 
concentration of power not only in a political party but also in an individual. 
Alston and Mueller (2005) in their study of the Brazilian presidential system support the 
notion of a strong executive. They argue that when Brazil returned to democracy in 1985, the 
structures of the federal institutions of governance retained strong powers for the president. 
The country’s transition from a military dictatorship to a civilian government, like Nigeria in 
1999, was gradual and peaceful rather than revolutionary. As a result, the presidential system 
retained many institutional structures of the military regime along with their inherent culture. 
Most notable of these structures and culture is the institution of autocratic executive power. 
This enables the president to navigate through the legislature with ease of bargaining and 
pork barreling (Alston & Mueller, 2005; Golden and Picci, 2008)44.   
Indeed, literature is replete with factors that are responsible for the fragility of presidential 
systems compared to parliamentary systems. Przeworski et al (2000) have noted economic 
factors, arguing that parliamentary systems are common in countries with high rates of 
economic growth while most presidential democracies are concentrated in the developing 
countries with low rates of economic growth and development.  Shugart and Mainwaring 
(1997) proffer a different factor, arguing that fragility in a presidential system is a function of 
the location of power.  
                                                 
44Pork-Barrel is a terminology used to describe strategic political calculations by the political elites in the 
distribution of public goods in a manner that would boost their electoral strength. Its use in the context of the 
Nigerian political system is a measure not to distribute public goods to the constituents but to the elected 
representatives by the executive in order to ease legislative authorisation of pertinent issues. Another language 
for pork-barrel politics in Nigeria is bribery of the legislature to provide necessary shields for the executive. The 
Nigerian case is more worrisome as the president elected in 1999 is a former military head of state while most 
other elected and appointed civilian officials at the national and state levels had, at one time or the other, served 
with the military government as either military governors/administrators, ministers or commissioners. To 





Traditional studies on presidentialism pick holes in the institutional and structural design 
rather than in the policy outcomes of the governing system. It is noteworthy that there are 
divisions among scholars of this persuasion on some key issues; nevertheless, there is 
consensus over the desirability of the institutional and structural features of the system to 
promote democratic consolidation. Cheibub and Limongi (2014, p.136) have noted that the 
traditional school assumes that ‘interests generated at (sic) the electoral arena ultimately 
define relations between the legislature and the executive’. Scholars choose to adopt different 
explanatory variables and dependent variables to explain these institutional and structural 
flaws. While some, notably Juan Linz, use regime type as an explanatory variable, others 
such as Mainwaring (1993), Mainwaring and Shugart (1997), and Carey (2005), prefer 
multiple explanatory variables. 
The choice of good governance as one of the dependent variables by the latter studies of this 
school (Shugart and Haggard, 2001, Przeworski et al 2000) provides the window for a move 
beyond the institutional/structural design to the outcome of their impact on public policy. In 
other words, the concern here is not limited to the operation of the institutions and structures 
but their influence on the capacity of government to promote good governance. Studies of the 
presidential system involve the interplay of institutions and political roles. In doing this, there 
is a need to pay attention to the interplay of the content and contexts of constitutional rules, 
public expectations, and opinions, political roles of the structures of government and the 
behavioural pattern of the political elites. The informal institutional mechanisms interacting 
with the formal structural designs often provide the leeway for policy outcomes. This is the 
focus of the new generation school of the presidential system. 
2.2.2 The new generation/developmental45 school of presidential systems 
The developmental school of presidential systems originates from Harold Laski, according to 
whom 
[a] system of government is very like a pair of shoes; it grows to the use of the feet to which it 
is fitted. But it is well to remember of governments what is true, also, of foot-wear-that the 
shoes must be suited to the journey it is proposed to take (Laski, 1944, p.358). 
                                                 
45 The two phrases, new generation, and developmental school are used here interchangeably to denote the new 
perspective and orientation beyond the traditional persuasion. 
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In other words, it is fruitless arguing over the desirability of a system in terms of institutional 
structure when the outcome is at variance with the expectations of the people. He contends 
that for any governing system to conform to a democratic ethos, it must 
set out to conquer mass unemployment. It is no less certain that democracy will lose the spirit 
that gives it meaning unless our citizens have that sense of hope and exhilaration which is 
born only of an economy that, by its power to expand, is capable of raising the standard of life 
for all our citizens (Laski, 1944, p.358). 
Thus, the central issue that dominates the new generation school is how best a governing 
system should operate within the institutional structures to ensure policy outcomes that 
promote the public good. The early works of this school critique the traditional school’s focus 
on the “perils of presidentialism”. 
Jose Antonio Cheibub (2002; 2007) dismisses the traditional school’s argument that 
presidential systems are susceptible to instability. According to him, ‘instability of 
presidential democracies…lies in the fact that presidential institutions tend to exist in 
countries that are also more likely to suffer from dictatorships led by the military’ (Cheibub, 
2007, p.3). He argues that ‘there is nothing wrong with presidential institutions’ as such; 
rather, ‘the conditions under which it [institution] exists that leads to the instability of 
presidential democracies’ (Cheibub, 2007, p.7). Authoritarian legacies, especially in post-
military presidential democracies, engender instability in presidential systems as evidenced in 
the Latin American cases cited by the traditional school.  
To scholars in the new generation school, both presidential and parliamentary systems are 
modus operandi ‘with their own baggage’ (Moe and Caldwell 1994, p.172).  
Choices about institutional form have pervasive consequences for virtually all the building 
blocks of democratic government. When nations choose a presidential or parliamentary form, 
they are choosing a whole system, whose various properties arise endogenously - whether they 
like it or not - out of the political dynamics that their adopted form sets in motion (Moe and 
Caldwell, 1994, p.172). 
 
George Albert (2009) does not see much functional differentiation between presidential and 
parliamentary systems. Though the two systems ‘exhibit distinguishable structural 
features…the structural differences between them do not necessarily give rise to functional 
differences’ (Albert, 2009, p.531). He notes three principal factors that engender the 
similarities between the two governing systems: purposeful constitutional design, political 
culture, and unintended consequences. In other words, the barrage of criticisms against 
presidential systems vis-à-vis parliamentary systems is not necessary because each of the 
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defects in presidential systems is inherent in parliamentary systems as well. According to 
him, 
Presidential and parliamentary systems exhibit many more functional parallels than their 
distinctive structural features might otherwise suggest. This observation underscores the 
limitations of existing constitutional theory and makes plain that conventional constitutional 
conceptions of presidentialism and parliamentarism are not only limited but quite often 
mistaken (Albert, 2009, p. 577). 
 
In a presidential system, there is no strict adherence to the theory of the separation power but 
the conventional practice of separated but shared power (Cheibub & Limongi 2014). In this 
sense, there is no watertight separation of functions46. In fact, a contemporary trend shows 
that interactions among institutional actors within and outside the legislature and the 
executive characterize the functioning of modern presidential systems. As Cheibub and 
Limongi (2014, p. 124) have noted, ‘the question is not so much of what triggers conflict or 
cooperation between the executive and the legislature, but about institutions and the struggles 
that allow government to obtain the support of a majority’. 
Thus, the practice of power sharing within the framework of independent institutions is a 
necessary component of the effective governance needed to achieve the purpose of the state. 
The recognition accorded the opposition party as an alternative government (Albert, 2009), 
though numerically inferior with no power to modify legislation, serves as a counter-veiling 
force, thereby challenging the incumbent regime to practice good governance (Awotokun, 
1998; Fashagba, 2010). Mutual interaction, bargaining and compromise characterize the 
arenas of decision-making and the policy processes in presidential systems (Fashagba 2010; 
Keefer & Khemani, 2009; Golden & Lucio, 2008; Lyne, 2008; Alston & Mueller, 2005). The 
ultimate goal of this arrangement, though with varying modifications as the system 
progresses, is to safeguard the interests of the public with a view to ensuring the promotion of 
the common good. 
Cheibub and Limongi (2014) identify two features of this school. Firstly, inter-branch 
relation exhibits cooperation and coordination rather than conflict. In other words, a 
bargaining game replaces a zero-sum game. Secondly, the cooperation and coordination 
                                                 
46James Madison has averred that ‘the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought to be separate and 
distinct’ but that this ‘does not require that they should be wholly unconnected with each other’ (Madison, 2008, 
Federalist No. 47). ‘The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, 
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced 




character of the interaction between the political branches of government revolves around 
policy. In a presidential system, the policy arena requires synergy among the actors in the 
legislature and the executive. This is essential because their policy preferences only become a 
reality ‘through the continuous existence of a majority that controls both the executive and 
the legislature’ (Cheibub & Limongi, 2014, p. 136). 
The analysis of Cheibub and Limongi is compatible with the views expressed earlier by 
Chaisty et al (2012, p.1), that the focus should be more on ‘the capacity of the president to 
overcome the conflict-inducing nature of the separation of powers through successful 
formation of a coalition’. The outcome of this is the formulation and implementation of 
policies that emanate from a wider spectrum of bargaining necessary for optimum satisfaction 
of a larger section of the public. They argue in support of the position of Harold Laski (1944) 
that rather than focusing attention on the properties of the institutional structures, it is more 
appropriate to assess the governing system based on how best it navigates through the 
structural features for effective policy outcomes. As Oleg Zaznaev (2014) has noted, what 
defines a governing system is not only its constitutional and legal characteristics of power, 
but also ‘a set of informal practices that characterise the relationships’ between the legislature 
and the executive, which ‘depends not only on legal regulations but also on informal political 
practices’ (Zaznaev, 2014, p.196). Other factors to be considered include the process of 
institutionalization in new democracies and the necessity for the ‘creation of the mechanism 
of its functioning in practice’ (Zaznaev, 2014, p.196).  
Studies by the new generation school find that most of the structural defects identified as 
inimical to stability in a presidential system are instruments for the promotion of a cohesive 
governing structure that towers above primordial interest in policy process. For instance, a 
combination of multipartism and presidentialism provides opportunities for bipartisan 
strategies to overcome the ‘perils of presidentialism’ and gridlock (Chaisty et al 2012; 
Cheibub & Limongi, 2014; Hiroi & Renno, 2014). Rather than evolving into what 
Mainwaring (1993) calls a difficult combination, the structural composition of a multiparty 
presidential system provides key governing tools for the president to navigate through 
gridlock barriers in the legislative process for result-oriented policy outcomes. These tools 
are ‘agenda power, budgetary authority, cabinet management, partisan powers, and informal 
institutions’ (Chaisty et al, 2012, p.2). The scholars argue further: 
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In order to win support for the legislative agenda of the executive, presidents must behave 
much like prime ministers in the multiparty democracies of Western Europe: they must first 
assemble and then cultivate interparty coalitions on the floor of the assembly. The objective of 
the president is to foster the emergence of a legislative cartel which will reliably defend the 
preferences of the executive branch (Chaisty et al, 2012, p.3). 
Thus, presidents in multiparty presidential systems have the capacity to construct ‘effective 
and stable coalitions’ to avert the ‘perils of presidentialism’ (Chaisty et al, 2012, p.3). In spite 
of the variations in the application of these tools and the decline ‘in the values of partisan and 
agenda setting powers’ (Chaisty et al, 2012, p.3), they discover that their successful 
application depends largely on the capacity of the president to harness the windows of 
opportunity created by the inherent structural features of a multiparty system (Chaisty et al, 
2012, p.3). In essence, this ‘coalitional presidentialism’ (Chaisty et al, 2012, p.3) enables the 
president to negotiate ‘coexistence of a presidential executive with a fragmented multiparty 
legislature’ (Chaisty et al, 2012, p.3).  
Hiroi and Renno (2014) and Zucco Jr. (2014) aver that legislative processes and outcomes 
depend on the internal cohesion of the coalitions because members could agree or disagree on 
their motives and objectives. Similarly, George Tsebelis, in his analysis of the veto powers in 
the two major governing systems, alludes to this theme of governance and the mode of policy 
outcomes as the major distinguishing factor between presidential and parliamentary systems. 
He observes that in 
parliamentary systems, the executive (government) controls the agenda, and the legislature 
(parliament) accepts or rejects proposals, while in presidential systems the legislature makes 
the proposals and the executive (president) signs or vetoes them (Tsebelis 1995, p.325). 
To him, the focus should be on the capacity of the institutional and structural features of the 
governing systems ‘for policy change’ (Tsebelis, 1995, p.292). Thus, a governing system 
finds its importance in the policy outcomes of its decision-making properties. He submits that 
‘parliament will be more significant in presidential than in parliamentary systems and 
presidents will be less significant than government’ (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 325). In other words, 
the peril of personalization of power would have no effect on policy outcomes.  
Veto is an instrument frequently used in presidential system for checks and balances. This 
constitutional instrument allows presidents and the legislators to react to policy proposals. 
The president can veto the passage of the proposal of the legislature but at the same time, 
following constitutional procedure, the lawmakers could override such veto having satisfied 
the voting requirements. The essence of this mechanism is to provide enough checks and 
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balances with a view to averting dictatorship. Indeed, Shugart and Carey (1992) and 
Indridason (2011) see veto as an attribute of a presidential system. Indridason (2011, p.377) 
notes that veto provides the ‘most consistent and direct connection of the president with the 
legislative process’.  Palanza and Sin (2014, p. 767) see veto powers as ‘a crucial bargaining 
element in a system of separation of power, influencing the complex relationship between the 
president and congress’.  
It is instructive to note that developing presidential democracies incorporate different variants 
of the exercise of power by the various branches of government (Ginsburg et al, 2013). The 
scholars added: 
Our analysis suggests a surprising collection of findings and, by implication, pronounced 
skepticism regarding the classical typology of presidentialism, parliamentarism and semi-
presidentialism. Many countries, it seems, are veritable hybrids, showing absolutely no 
resemblance to the classic types across a long list of constitutional provisions concerning the 
power of executives and legislatures (Ginsburg et al, 2013, p.37) (emphasis in the original). 
To this end, they define parliamentary and presidential systems as an ‘assembly confidence 
executive’ and ‘directly elected executive’, respectively (Ginsburg et al 2013, p.37). They 
warn against the generalization of rules in a bid to explain policy outcomes. ‘We ought to 
then encourage more precise categorizations based on particular attributes of legislative-
executive relations that are believed to contribute to the outcome of interest’ (Ginsburg et al, 
2013, p.38). 
The developmental school incorporates the views expressed by scholars on the role of 
informal institutional characteristics of presidential systems. Kwasi Prempeh (2008) identifies 
contextual variables such as the electoral calendar, economic performance, the quality of 
presidential leadership, the relevance of actors exogenous to the executive-legislative 
relationship and the cultural heritage of the political system. Richard Neustadt (1990) 
demonstrates the roles of the informal institutions in the molding of presidential power over 
the years. He notes that American presidents derive their power from their popularity, 
evolving from their standing with the public, and from their professional prestige 
representing their reputations within the political class. 
Allen Hicken and Heather Stoll (2011; 2013) have noted the primacy of power in shaping 
competition in the various electoral constituents of presidential systems. In politics, the 
location of power is important as an instrument to influence policy outcomes. Thus, informal 
institutional variables like popularity are essential in a presidential system. Though Hicken 
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and Stroll (2013) identify variations in presidential power, they contend that the importance 
attached to the power equation between the president and the legislature is imperative in the 
arena of decision-making. In the United States, the real power of the president ‘comes from 
his ability to bargain and persuade effectively’ with the legislature (Lasser 2008, p.296).  
Chaisty et al (2012) acknowledge that the debate on the desirability of presidentialism and 
parliamentarism as governing systems ‘has increased our understanding of the role of 
institutional variables in the study of democratic sustainability’ but that ‘the existing literature 
suffers from four key deficiencies’ Chaisty et al (2012, p.2). The scholars opine that the  
debate has too often been univariate (looking at one institutional variable to the exclusion of 
others); it has too frequently been divorced from local context (ignoring national histories, 
cultures, and trajectories); it has unwisely ignored the role of informal institutions; and it has 
often tried to stake grand comparative generalizations on the experience of a single world 
region (Chaisty et al, 2012, p.2). 
They argue that a presidential system fosters bipartisan relationships through negotiation and 
cooperation with a view to ensuring the promotion of the public good. Gridlock is part of the 
expectations in presidential system as a measure to ensure bipartisan conclusion on matters of 
national interest. In the United States, cases of divided government have contributed largely 
to a united front exhibited by Congress on national issues. For instance, the Republican 
dominated US Congress passed a debt-ceiling bill to allow the president to finance the 
country’s fiscal needs in spite of the gridlock that led to the shutdown of the government 
(Dinan and Sherfinsk 2014). 
Presidentialism does presage divided government but because of weak party discipline, it is a 
measure to encourage the president to foster consensus building and cooperation among 
legislators whose unity is necessary for the promotion of public good in a system of separated 
powers. In other words, the weak party discipline regarded as one of the perils of the 
presidential system is actually a necessary feature to enable the system to foster national unity 
in the midst of contending and fragmented interests. The majority leader of the Senate of the 





Congress should be striding from accomplishment to accomplishment, not staggering from crisis to 
crisis. If we spent more time working together and less time running out the clock on procedural 
hurdles and Republican filibusters, we might actually get things done around here (cf. Dinan 2014)47. 
This underscores the importance of leadership in a presidential system. Marsteintredet et al 
(2013) have noted that leadership failings in presidential systems mostly occur when 
legislative support is deficient. Where this is prevalent, the president would find it difficult to 
survive and govern effectively. This difficulty is more prevalent in multi-party presidential 
democracies where the president’s political party requires the support of the opposition 
groups to maintain a controlling majority in the legislature.  
We believe that this pattern of governmental instability increases the importance of 
presidential leadership in the construction and maintenance of a governing coalition, 
preferably based on a negotiated political agenda…a governing coalition is imperative not 
only to implement the president’s agenda but also, perhaps, to keep the president in office 
(Marsteintredet et al 2013, p. 122). 
The central theme of the concept of separation of power and the doctrine of checks and 
balances is the inducement of control over the exercise of power (Oleszek 2014). In a 
presidential system, the concern is how to ensure efficient governance through careful 
attention by the legislature to the administration of laws passed. Legislative decision-making 
process requires effective monitoring of the activities of the executive by the legislature to 
ensure the implementation of the authorized legislations on government policies (Oleszek 
2014).  
Essentially, legislative oversight is continuous monitoring by the appropriate committees of 
the legislature ‘of how effectively, efficiently and frugally the executive branch is carrying 
out congressional mandates’ (Oleszek 2014, p. 382). The importance of this exercise cannot 
be overemphasized. Referring to the presidential system in the USA, Oleszek (2014, p.382) 
contends that ‘oversight enables Congress to challenge unwarranted assertion of executive 
power, to raise and ask the tough fiscal and policy questions of public officials, and to help 
administrative leaders fix (or avoid) mistakes’. In all, the fundamental objective of legislative 
oversight is ‘to hold executive officials accountable for the implementation of delegated 
authority’ (Oleszek 2014, p.382). Although a presidential system encourages separate 
governmental institutions, it nevertheless promotes cooperation and coordination (Cheibub & 
Limongi 2014) since all the branches of government work for the same government because, 
                                                 
47 Reid made this comment after a bipartisan vote in a divided US Congress paved the way for the Senate to give 
final approval for an increased debt ceiling that would enable President Barrack Obama to borrow enough 
money to cover federal obligations for a period of time. 
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as Lee (2014 p.2), has noted in the context of the American system, ‘the president and 
Congress share responsibility for policy outcomes’. This is the general expectation of the 
policy process in presidential systems. Thus, oversight is an instrument designed for the 
promotion of good governance with a view to preventing tyranny.  
Both the traditional and new generation schools emphasise the need for discipline in, and 
control of, the exercise of power. While the former school sees impeachment as an instrument 
of gridlock and invitation to anarchy, the latter school considers it a democratic measure to 
ensure compliance and accountability. An offshoot of the legislative monitoring role is the 
power of the legislature to ‘challenge the unwarranted assertion of executive power’(Oleszek 
2014, p.408) and sanction misconduct arising thereof. This power, which Oleszek (2014, 
p.408) describes as the ‘ultimate check on the executive,’ enables the legislature to determine 
the desirability or otherwise of the president to continue as the head of the executive branch. 
Indeed, studies of the various cases of impeachment in Latin America and Asia have shown 
promising degrees of flexibility in ensuring leadership accountability (Hochstetler 2006; 
Perez-Linan 2007; 2014; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008; Hochstetler and Samuels 2011; 
Taylor-Robinson and Ura 2013; Marsteintredet et al 2013).  
The next section discusses the exercise of this power in presidential systems. 
2.3 Impeachment in presidential systems 
One of the major criticisms of a presidential system is the absence of a constitutional measure 
to discipline the elected head of the executive branch. Juan Linz in particular has argued that 
the constitutional provisions relating to the removal of the president before the expiration of 
his term are not feasible (Linz 1994). Nevertheless, others see the measure as the best option 
to ensure accountability rather than gridlock. Cheibub and Limongi (2014) have argued that 
the same factors that engender the fall of parliamentary government usually account for 
impeachment in presidential systems. They aver that in the face of constitutional provisions, 
‘presidential systems too can display flexibility of removing government in a situation of 
crisis without at the same time abolishing democracy’ (Cheibub & Limongi 2014, p. 131). 
Young Hun Kim (2013) in particular has noted the flexibility provided by impeachment in 
resolving crisis in new presidential democracies.  According to him, impeachment attempts in 
presidential systems have provided ‘a better picture of how executive-legislative conflicts 
play out as legislators seem to actively engage in resolving political crisis without resorting to 
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extra constitutional means’ whenever they face challenges with the presidents (Kim 2013, 
p.17). 
Scholars have expressed diverse views on impeachment. Alexander Hamilton (2008) in the 
Federalist Paper No.65 sees the practice of impeachment as ‘a bridle in the hands of the 
legislative body upon the executive servants of the government’. Since leadership in 
democracy is a function of trust, Turley (1999, p. 7) notes that presidents secure people’s 
votes on trust and as such should conform to ‘certain minimal standards’ because 
impeachment questions the consent given by the people. Marsteintredet and Bertzen (2008, 
p.88) consider impeachment as a democratic legal procedure ‘in which the legislature, in 
some cases together with the Supreme Court, through a vote that requires a supermajority, 
removes the president’. To Richard Albert (2009), an impeachment trial incorporates both 
legislative and judicial functions. While it allows the legislature to encroach on the duty of 
the judiciary as interpreters of the law, it also permits the legislature to exert its duties as the 
conscience of the people. 
In sum, impeachment is a constitutional instrument designed to guard against the violation of 
the institutional and structural requirements of the presidential system. These requirements 
portend the desire of the governing system to pursue policies aimed at promoting the interests 
of the public and safeguard their welfare in an arrangement of multi-level control 
mechanisms. As a correcting measure, impeachment is a drastic last resort remedy rather than 
a frivolous instrument simply to send a message (Bloch 2006). It is a measure to forestall ‘the 
possibility that a sitting president could so abuse[s] the powers of his office as to threaten the 
welfare of the nation’ (Eisgruber and Sager 1999, p.223).  
With global abhorrence of military intervention as a solution to political instability in 
developing democracies, legislatures in new presidential democracies have realized that the 
impeachment process is the main constitutional tool for sanctioning presidents who are 
involved in corruption or abuse of power (Hinojosa and Perez-Linan 2007). Lawmakers 
should not therefore, hesitate to exercise their constitutional powers to hold the president 
accountable. In the absence of electoral accountability, there is the possibility that elected 
public officials might wish to indulge in the abuse of power with a view to maximizing 
personal gain while in office (Kada 2003a). As such, when electoral accountability becomes 
ineffective, removal from office remains the only legitimate method to terminate presidential 
tenure before the expiration of their term.  
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2.4 The purpose of impeachment in presidential systems 
A peep into the arguments of James Madison and the supporters of impeachment at the 
American Constitutional Convention48 indicates that there is the need for a controlling 
mechanism to safeguard the interests of the people against arbitrary rule by the leadership of 
the executive branch49. By virtue of the requisite constitutional provisions regarding the 
exercise of the power of the president as the chief executive of the state, it is necessary to set 
a limitation with a view to controlling it and holding the executive responsible for breaches of 
the public trust reposed in them (Davies 2014). Thus, the original purpose is to ensure a 
responsible executive. 
Impeachment in its original meaning as considered by the America Constitutional 
Convention is a device to enforce accountability by public officers (Nichols 2011). James 
Madison’s address at the Convention as well as the position of Alexander Hamilton in the 
Federalist Paper 65 agrees with this notion. Madison for one has argued that the 
impeachment provision is an ‘indispensable’ item ‘for defending the American endeavor’ (cf. 
Nichols, 2011, p. 2). His argument is that periodic elections are not sufficient to remove an 
executive involved in wrongdoing while in office. James Madison explained his position 
further: 
The limitation of the period of his service was not a sufficient security… He might lose his 
capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of 
peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers…In the case of the 
Executive Magistracy which was to be administered by a single man, loss of capacity or 
corruption was more within the compass of probable events, and either of them might be fatal 
to the Republic (Madison, cf. Nichols, 2011, p.2). 
Nichols describes impeachment as ‘Congressional opposition, motivated by the imprecise 
mix of partisanship and sincere concern for the nation that has always been essential to 
making change in a [presidential] democracy…’(Nichols 2011, p.52). Where there are 
established charges of breaches of the constitution by the executive and the need to hold it to 
                                                 
48 Discussion on impeachment in presidential systems cannot be devoid of its roots at the Convention. A true 
understanding of its purpose as one of the distinguished generic features of presidential systems is traceable to 
the mood of the debates at the convention, though it has its origin, as a governing disciplinary measure, in the 
British parliament. Subsequent presidential systems are models, in parts, of the American system. For the 
details, see Plucknett 1942; Morgan Jr. et al 1974; Turley 1999; Cammisa and Manuel 2014. 
49 Indeed, James Madison had argued vigorously at the Convention that impeachment was the only instrument to 
defend the ‘[c]ommunity against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate’ (cf. Farrand 




a standard of accountability, impeachment remains the motivation for the legislature to assert 
its status as the representative of the people. 
Florin Hilbay (2012, p.1) defines impeachment as an extraordinary ‘mechanism of 
accountability to determine whether or not certain high-ranking public officials should be 
removed from office’. He identifies three reasons that make it a special political rather than 
strictly legal instrument: 
[F]irst, the proceedings are not lodged in traditional institutions of law but are conducted by 
elected representatives of the people; second, not all grounds for removal are defined in 
criminal statutes but are instead couched in such broad terms as betrayal of public trust and 
culpable violation of the constitution; third, impeachable public officers share an important 
characteristic: beyond being protected by a term, they are vulnerable to removal from office 
only by way of impeachment (Hilbay, 2012, p.1). 
Implicitly, impeachment is a constitutional measure to get rid of an unaccountable leader with 
a view to ensuring transparency. In other words, a leader whose conduct infringes or hampers 
the welfare and well-being of the people is liable for removal. This means that the essence of 
impeachment in the constitution is to serve as warning signal to leaders of the consequences 
of their actions while in office. In the American political system, the essence of impeachment 
is to ensure that people entrusted with executive powers do not behave as kings in their 
domains (David 2012)50. Thus, as a political process, impeachment in its original conception 
represents an expression of the power of the people in a system of government besieged by 
elitist activities. Naoko Kada (2003b, p. 113) has argued that impeachment serves ‘as proof 
that democratic institutions [in presidential systems] could effectively check abuse of power 
by executives’. 
The set of people affected by this procedure ‘are generally entitled to security of tenure, [that 
ensures] that they are able to perform their functions without the contingencies and hassles 
occasioned by politics’ (Hilbay 2012, p.1). Thus, the idea of an immunity clause in the 
constitution, as in the case of Nigeria51, is part of the assumption that members of the political 
executive would operate as statesmen, and, as such, should be accorded the status and 
instruments necessary for them to act without being subjected to political intricacies. 
                                                 
50 President Estrada of the Philippine was charged and prosecuted after his impeachment (Fukuyama et al 2005), 
and was subsequently convicted but later pardoned by President Macapagal-Arroyo. 
51Section 308 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, states that ‘no civil or 
criminal proceedings shall be instituted or continued against’ the president and his deputy; state governors and 
their deputies during their period in office.  
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Impeachment therefore is a counter measure to ensure that such protection does not 
degenerate into impunity. 
From cases in Latin America and Asia, it is evident that the intent of impeachment provisions 
is to encourage the institutionalization of a constitutional means to resolve issues capable of 
endangering democratic regimes (Kasuya 2003; Fukuyama et al 2005; Perez-Linan 2007). 
Young Hun Kim (2008; 2013) argues that in the face of a constitutionally guaranteed term, 
impeachment provisions are motivations for performance. The intention of impeachment as 
an instrument in the legislative domain is to stimulate good governance through the 
promotion of the culture of a responsible executive. Legislatures could also invoke the power 
to pressurize the president to step down from power. In some cases, its initiation might 
reduce ‘the president’s willingness to cooperate on issues of policy or patronage’ (Kim 2013, 
p.17).  
Critics of presidential systems often cite impeachment or presidential interruption as a 
manifestation of regime instability or democratic breakdown. Indeed, Eisgruber and Sager 
(1999) have contended that politics and controversy surround the definitional property of 
impeachment. They note that ‘there is an enormous behavioral gap between acts which 
merely render the President politically unpopular with the Congress and acts which comprise 
a blatant misuse of office and put the nation at risk’ (Eisgruber & Sager 1999, p.223). 
Nevertheless, by virtue of the structural design of the system, it is a stabilizing factor for the 
promotion of good governance (Perez-Linan 2007; 2014; Carey 2005). In other words, it is a 
warning that the sprawling power ascribed to the executive is not a license for lawlessness. 
Thus, impeachment is nothing other than ‘democratic removal of a chief executive and 
installation of a new chief executive’ (Marsteintredet & Bertzen 2008, p.87).  
Presidential democracy incorporates principles and practices that enable the people to 
reassess their trust in their elected officers of the state. Florin Hilbay sees impeachment as 
one of the instruments ‘by which ordinary people, through their representatives, and on 
grounds that they themselves define, re-evaluate the terms of contract between them and 
those privileged few who man the ship of state’ (Hilbay 2012, p.3).  Hilbay reiterates the 
importance of the trust of the people in governance, arguing that constitutional fixed term is 
not sufficient to sustain the tenure of the elected officials, because the ‘guarantee can be 
breached once the people are convinced that their trust has been betrayed’ (Hilbay 2012, p.2). 
Legislative oversight of the executive is a major component of the ‘system of checks and 
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balances that is often embedded in separation-of-powers constitutions’ (Ginsburg et al 2013, 
p.9).Impeachment in presidential systems, ‘is meant to be used infrequently to correct grave 
abuses by the executive, and not as a routine means of unseating presidents’ (Fukuyama et al 
2005, p.110). In other words, an impeachment provision serves as a reminder of the presence 
of a gatekeeper to correct and punish misdeeds inimical to transparency, accountability, and 
good governance. 
It is evident that the primary purpose of impeachment is to serve as an instrument for the 
enforcement of good governance. Governance connotes the pursuit of collective interest, a 
task that requires the state to interact with the other actors in the political system (Pierre 
2011). Central to the issue of governance is government responsiveness to popular demands 
and expectations. Good governance, therefore ‘generally refers to a standard or model for 
how states or other political entities should govern and be governed’(Teorell 2011, p.1017). 
This quality of government presupposes the existence and persistence of developmental 
outcomes that enhance the welfare of the citizens. Good governance, therefore, has to do with 
the management of available resources of the nation for the promotion of the public good 
(World Bank 1992; Annan 1999; Nanda 2006; Salvaris 2009; Ogundiya 2010; Akomolede 
and Akomolede 2012). This entails transparency, accountability and good management 
practices. Thus, good governance occurs when the state achieves its desired end ‘defined in 
terms of justice, equity, protection of life and property, enhanced participation, preservation 
of the rule of law and improved living standards of the populace’ (Ogundiya 2010, p.204).  
Policy analysts have identified the absence of good governance as a critical factor detrimental 
to the consolidation of democracy in developing countries (Converse and Kapstein 2008). 
Other factors that draw their relevance from the crisis of governance are unfavourable 
conditions emanating from geographical location, control of natural resources, levels of 
poverty and inequality, and degree of ethnic fragmentation. Poor economic performance due 
to unethical management practices and the impact of economic reforms such as price 
liberalisation and privatization ‘that generates lots of losers and high levels of 
unemployment’ impinge on the quality of governance in developing democracies especially 
in countries where stronger presidential regimes facilitate authoritarian rule (Converse and 





2.5. Impeachment in the developing presidential systems 
Aside from the United States of America, Latin American countries and a few Asian and 
African countries practice presidentialism. Early studies of presidential regimes in these 
regions, especially in Latin America, indicate proclivity towards a breakdown of government 
with incessant political upheaval (Baumgartner & Kada, 2003; Fukuyama et al 2005; 
Hochstetler 2006; 2011; Perez-Linan 2007; Kim 2008; 2013; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). 
As already noted, this development attracted a series of criticisms dubbed the ‘perils of 
presidentialism’ (Linz 1994; 2010). Kathryn Hochstetler (2006, p.401) highlights a number of 
contentious issues such as divided government, fragmented party system, power relations 
between the president and the legislature, a parlous economy, corruption and scandals, and 
the ‘presence or absence of street protests [which] played a central role in determining which 
presidents actually fell’. Additionally, Perez-Linan (2007) highlights the end of the Cold 
War, changes in the foreign policy of the United States of America, political lessons derived 
from the military dictatorship in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s and the new roles of 
international institutions in the democratisation project, as the motivating factors for the 
frequency of impeachment episodes in Latin American presidential systems.  
Hochstetler (2006), for example, has discovered that 23% of elected presidents in Latin 
America were forced to leave office before the expiration of their terms between 1978 and 
2003. Out of forty presidents whose terms were over by the end of 2003, sixteen of them 
(40%), faced challenges of completing their term, while nine (23%), left office before the 
expiration of their fixed terms. Kim (2008) has discovered that presidential impeachment 
attempts were common, showing that about 45% of developing presidential democracies 
experienced presidential impeachment attempts and about 60% of interrupted presidencies 
faced some form of impeachment charges. 
Various studies on impeachment have identified a series of institutional and non-institutional 
variables responsible for the crisis of presidential removals through impeachment processes 
(Baumgartner & Kada 2003; Fukuyama et al 2005; Perez-Linan 2007; 2014; Llanos & 
Marsteintredet 2010; Kim 2013). Central to this is the power relationship between the 
legislature and the executive (O’Donell 1994; Shugart and Carey 1994; Baumgartner 2003; 
Baumgartner and Kada 2003; Fish 2006; Valenzuela 2004). This power dynamic is often 
reflected in the legal provisions for impeachment, the structure of party politics, the voting 
threshold for impeachment, and the partisan composition of the legislature. For instance, 
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where the legislature secures the confidence of a majority of members in case of 
confrontation with the executive, the voting threshold could work against the leadership of 
the executive. This happened in Ecuador and Guatemala when Presidents Jamil Mahuad and 
Jorge Serrano resigned in 2000 and 1993, respectively, after confrontation with their 
legislators (Valenzuela 2004, pp.9-10). 
Hochstetler (2006) identifies parlous economic policies, corruption and minority presidents, 
or divided government, as the major factors that facilitated impeachment in Latin America. 
She notes that most of the countries in the region adopted neoliberal economic policies, 
which generated ‘intense political and economic conflicts’ (Hochstetler 2006, p.405). The 
outcome of this development is the prevailing parlous state of the economy with its attendant 
implications for the general well being of the people. In most cases, prolonged protests 
against economic policies often resulted in demands for the removal of the presidents, as in 
the case of Paraguay in 1998/1999, which culminated in the resignation of President Raul 
Cubas, and Chile in 2000 (Hochstetler 2006; Perez-Linan 2007; Kim 2013; Marsteintredet et 
al 2013). In 2012, the aftermath of the clash between the police and landless peasants in 
Paraguay created the impetus for the legislature to impeach and remove President Fernando 
Lugo (Marsteintredet et al 2013; Perez-Linan 2014). 
Another factor is allegations of corruption that involve the president. Hochstetler (2006) has 
noted the difficulty involved in determining the level of culpability of presidents in the rising 
tide of allegations of corruption. According to her, it is difficult ‘to assess the overall 
incidence of corruption and scandal among the region's [Latin America] presidents’ even 
when ‘accusations are nearly constant,’ because ‘court action against a president is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to prove wrongdoing’ (Hochstetler 2006, p.407). Nevertheless, this 
variable becomes potent when the media sensitize the public by publicizing the scandals. 
Thus, a free press is a formidable actor in determining the survival or non-survival of 
presidents (Perez-Linan 2007; 2014; Kim 2013).  
Moreover, the success of legislative action against the president in this regard depends on the 
position of his or her political party in the legislature. Hochstetler (2006) and Kim (2008; 
2013) have noted that minority presidents face more challenges of removal in the face of 
scandal and corruption. Hochstetler asserts that the opposition members of the legislature 
would be ‘eager to bring corruption charges against presidents who were personally 
implicated’ (Hochstetler 2006, p. 408). In other words, divided government often motivates 
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the opposition to exploit socio-economic and political situations to move against the president 
(Hochstetler 2006; Kim 2013; Perez-Linan 2014). The second causal factor is a set of non-
institutional variables. These variables are the unintended consequences developed from the 
operation of the institutional attributes of a presidential system. They comprise mass protest 
against the government (mostly against economic hardship), performance of the president, 
and scandals which the legislature could not address (Hochstetler 2006; 2011; Perez-Linan 
2007; 2014; Kim 2008; 2013; Kim and Bahry 2008; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). This is 
not limited to presidential systems except that it often provides an opportunity for the hitherto 
unwilling legislature to commence a constitutional procedure of removing the president. The 
alternative is for the military to intervene as moderator. Indeed, most of the presidents who 
left office before the expiration of their terms were targets of sustained mass protests against 
their continuing stay in office. 
However, there are cases of presidents who survived such scandals because of their 
popularity ratings by the public. Lee (2014, p.2) argues that ‘a popular president can garner 
broader political support to stave off accusations of wrongdoing because of favorable public 
opinion toward the president’. Conversely, presidents with poor public ratings are vulnerable 
to rejection even if their parties have a parliamentary majority (Lee 2014). Thus, the 
popularity of the president would determine his or her level of protection from the legislature 
and his or her political party. Lee posits that 
 
The president’s party may want to change its relationship with the president if cooperation is 
expected to damage its electoral goals. Similarly, by signaling distance from an unpopular 
president or demonstrating an amicable relationship with a popular one, non-presidential 
parties can also increase their electoral payoffs (Lee 2014, p3). 
Palanza and Sin (2014) note that the strength of the president’s party does not determine his 
or her success and tenure in multiparty presidential systems. They argue that ‘the nature of 
conflict surrounding the legislative process in multiparty presidential systems may be better 
understood if partisan considerations, which have dominated the literature, are left aside’ 
(Palanza and Sin 2014, p.768). Llanos and Marsteintredet (2013) and Perez-Linan (2014) in 
their respective analyses of the 2012 impeachment of President Fernando Lugo of Paraguay, 
conclude that the successful removal of a president is often a result of long causal chains and 
causal conclusions. They argue that a frosty and failing relationship between the president 
and the legislature is the primary factor, but that the protest appeared as the last factor in a 
chain of events. 
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Judging by the cases in Latin America and Asia, whenever there are accusations of any act of 
wrongdoing against a president, three things are likely to happen. First, the legislature might 
decide never to give impeachment serious consideration. Second, the fact that the legislature 
initiates the process does not mean the removal of the accused from office. The third 
possibility is when the legislature commences the process, it might lead to the removal of the 
president either through conviction or resignation in anticipation of a successful conviction 
(Hinojosa and Perez-Linan, 2007; Perez-Linan 2007).  
I identify four typologies of the removal process52. The first is that of presidents removed 
from office through the impeachment process on charges of corruption. The Brazilian 
Chamber of Deputies voted to impeach President Fernando Collor de Mello ‘over his 
involvement in embezzlement and corruption’ in 1992 (Kim 2013, p.2). However, he 
resigned in anticipation that he would be convicted by the Upper House and subsequently 
removed. Similarly, the Paraguay Chamber of Deputies impeached President Raus Cubai 
Gran on the charges of negligence and abuse of power in 1999, but he also resigned before 
the Senate voted on the charges (Perez-Linan 2007). In 1993 and 2004, the legislatures in 
Venezuela and Ecuador impeached Presidents Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela and Lucio 
Gutierrez of Ecuador, respectively. The second typology is the case of a president accused of 
corrupt practices who survived the impeachment process either mostly because the president 
had majority control of the legislature and/ or the allegations were not sufficient to warrant 
his or her removal. In these cases, Presidents Ernesto Samper of Colombia and Luis Gonzalez 
Macchi of Paraguay survived impeachment processes in 1996 and 2003 respectively.  
The third typology is the president who resigns in anticipation of an imminent removal 
through an impeachment process. Presidents Raul Cubai Gran of Paraguay and Alberto 
Fujimori of Peru resigned in 1999 and 2000 respectively because of this. The other category 
of this typology is a president forced to resign because of popular protests by the opposition 
and the public against harsh economic policies and allegations of governance crisis. President 
Fernando de la Rua of Argentina in 2001, and Bolivian presidents Gonzalo Sanchez de 
                                                 
52 Hochstetler and Samuels (2011) discuss this under two broad categories-successful removal and failed 
attempts. In all, they identify 15 successful removals prompted by street protests (Bolivia 1985; 2003 and 2005; 
Ecuador 1999/2000; 2004/2005; Argentina 1989; 2001; 2002/2003; Guatemala 1993) and a combination of 
street protests and legislative action (Peru 2000; Paraguay 1998/1999; Ecuador 1997; Dominican republic 
1994/1996; Venezuela 1992/1993; Brazil 1992; 1987/1989) and 10 failed attempts (Nicaragua 2004/2005; Peru 
2005; Paraguay 1997; 2000/2003; Colombia 1995/1996; Ecuador 1987; El Salvador 1987; Venezuela 
2002/2004; Honduras 2003 and Brazil 1999). 
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Lozada and Carlos Mesa in 2003 and 2005 respectively, fall into this category. The fourth 
typology is the case where the legislature removes the president ‘through a declaration that 
the president is either physically or mentally unable to rule the country’ or that the lawmakers 
‘declare that the president has abandoned his or her office’ (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 
2008, p.88). Cases like this occur when the president has lost the confidence of the people 
while the legislature is determined to avoid the institutional intricacies of impeachment53. 
Marsteintredet and Berntzen (2008, p.86) describe this as part of the innovations associated 
with flexibility in removing presidents permitted by their constitutions54. One such example 
is that of February 1997, wherein the Ecuadorian legislature voted President Abdala Bucaram 
out of office on the charge of mental incapacity (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008).  





















                                                 
53 Removal on the charges of ‘mental incapacity’ and ‘abandonment of office’ as in the cases of Presidents 
Abdala Bucaram and Lucio Gutierrez, respectively, are not through impeachment procedures common to 
presidential systems (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008, p. 88). These cases were feasible in Ecuador because 
the charges require only a majority vote of the legislature. They require no established crime, and there are no 
requirements to level such charges against the president.  
54 The 1979 and 1998 constitutions of Chile, Costa Rica and Ecuador and 1979 and 1983 constitutions of Peru, 
stipulate that the legislature ‘can declare that the president either has abandoned office or is physically or 
mentally unfit to rule’ without any stipulated majority (Marsteintredet and Berntzen, 2008, p. 87).In Ecuador, 
such votes require only an absolute majority. Whereas the legislatures in Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala and 
Venezuela have the same constitutional power but require a stipulated two thirds majority of members vote 
(Marsteintredet & Berntzen, 2008, p.99, foot note 24). 
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Table 2: Typologies and the various causal factors of impeachment in Latin America 
                                                 
55 The Chamber of Deputies impeached him by 441-38 votes on September 29, 1992; the Senate voted 73-8 
three months after to remove him and subsequently authorized his prosecution for corruption charges. The 
president resigned in anticipation of the Senate decision (Perez-Linan 2007). 
56 General Lino Oviedo was the original presidential candidate but was barred from contesting elections and 
jailed for sedition. Cubas Rau manipulated his power to secure the release of his godfather, as part of his 
campaign promises, a decision that set him against the opposition (Perez-Linan 2007). 
57 Macchi was the Speaker of the Senate, representing a faction of the ruling party, but became president upon 
the removal of Cubas Rau. 
58 Macapagal-Arroyo succeeded Estrada (as his deputy).This weak political mandate coupled with the worsening 




Collor de Mello 1992) 
Worsening economy; rent–seeking scandals; media publications of 
scandals; minority president; cabinet withdrew support; mounted 
public pressure and public demonstrations; president impeached.55 
Venezuela (Carlos 
Andres Perez 1993) 
Worsening economy aggravated deadly riots and protests; general 
labour strike; media exposes corruption scandals; fractured cabinet 
and political party; two failed coup attempts; majority president lost 
partisan support; adverse judicial pronouncement on corruption 
allegations propelled the legislature to force him to proceed on  “ 
“permanent leave”. 
Paraguay (Raul Cubas 
Grau 1999) 
Divisive political environment; majority president but fragmented 
ruling party; release of godfather from prison56; conflict with the 
Supreme Court over Oviedo’s release; assassination of his deputy, 
Luis Argana; impeached by Chamber of Deputies; public protests; 
resigned in anticipation of Senate trial.  
The Philippines 
(Joseph Estrada 2001) 
Corruption scandals; adverse economy; public uprising, street 
protests and demonstrations; military and police withdrew support 
for the president  
Paraguay (Fernando 
Lugo 2012) 
Minority government; clash between police and landless peasants; 
public demonstration 
Failed Impeachment Factors 
Colombia Ernesto 
Samper (1996) 
Scandals on support from drug cartel to fund Samper’s election; 
president denied knowledge or consent; campaign manager resigned, 
prosecuted and jailed; implicated Samper; majority president; high 
public rating/support; shielded by members of the congress and 
acquitted by the legislature. 
Paraguay (Gonzalez  
Macchi (2003) 
Lack of electoral legitimacy57; fractured ruling party; economic 




Lack of political legitimacy58; corruption scandals; popular 
uprisings; failed coup attempts (2003 and 2006), bribery scandals; 
allegation s of electoral frauds; media harassments; fractured ruling 




Source: Data for the table was generated by the author from Kasuya 2003; Van de Loo 2004; Valenzuela 2004; 
Fukuyama et al 2005; Coronel 2007; Perez-Linan 2007; 2014; Hochstetler and Samuels 2011; Hutchcroft 2008; 
Kim 2008; 2013; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008; Marsteintredet et al 2013; Magno 2001. 
On April 20, 2005, the legislature also voted to remove President Lucio Gutierrez from office 
having been found guilty of “abandonment of office” and named his deputy, Alfredo Palacio, 
                                                 
59The Philippines political system provides the president with institutional shields with available instruments for 
pork barrel politics. For the details, see Magno 2001; Hutchcrof and Rocamora 2003; Fukuyama et al 2005; 
Kasuya 2003; Hutchcroft 2008; Kawanaka 2010; Davids 2012. 
 
impeachment attempts (2005, 2006, 2007) but strong presidency 
with enormous power for patronage59; strong support from the 







Minority president; plummeting economy; public protests; killing of 
demonstrators; loss support of the legislature.  
Argentina (Fernando 
de la Rua)   
Plummeting economic situation; public uprising; civilian deaths, 
corruption scandals; minority government Adolfo Rodriguez Saa 
was also forced to resign in 2001. 
Bolivia (Hernan Siles 
Zuazo 1985) 
Plummeting economic situation with hyperinflation; public 
demonstrations, civilian deaths; corruption scandals; minority 
government 
Bolivia Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada resigned because of popular pressure in 
2003; public demonstrations and deaths of civilian protesters; 
minority government; disintegrated coalition. Mass protests forced 
Mesa Gilbert to resign in 2005.  
Ecuador (Jamil 
Mahuad 2000) 
Corruption scandals; minority government; adverse economic 
policy; public demonstrations; split in the ranks of the armed forces 
over austerity measure  
Peru (Alberto 
Fujimori 2000) 
Corruption scandals; fractured ruling party; opposition candidate 
became president of the Congress; demonstrations; loss of 
legislative support; forced to resign while in Spain. 
Guatemala  (Jorge 
Serrano 1993) 
 Minority government; confrontation with the legislature and 
judiciary; economic crisis; domestic and international pressures 








Bucaram 1997) and  
Lucio Gutiérrez 
(2005) 
Minority president; antagonism of opposition; scandals on 
corruption, and abuse of power; low approval rates; labour protests; 
adverse media; adverse neoliberal economic measures; public 
demonstrations demanding his removal; declared ‘mentally 
incapacitated’ by the congress.  
Peru (Alberto 
Fujimori 1991) 
The Senate declared him moral incapacity but the vote failed at the 
House of Deputies. 
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as his successor (Marsteintredet and Bertzen 2008; Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 
2013).This kind of constitutional innovation for the purpose of national interest and 
accountability is necessary in developing presidential systems to achieve the primary 
objective of a presidential system. Thus, social and popular movements have become the 
moderating powers60 in removing presidents through popular impeachments in presidential 
systems (Hochstetler 2006; Marsteintredet and Berntzen, 2008; Hochstetler and Samuels 
2011; Zamosc 2012; Perez-Linan 2014).  
All these cases and typologies have shown the potency of peoples’ power in demanding 
accountability and good governance as a determinant of the survival of the presidents without 
leading to breakdown of government. Thus, beyond the ‘perils of a presidential system’ is a 
flexible measure to ensure that impeachment is not an instrument of political vendetta but a 
weapon to actualize accountability. A successful impeachment process requires interaction 
between the institutional and the non-institutional variables. In his recent study of the 2012 
impeachment of President Lugo of Paraguay, Anibal Perez-Linan proposed a two-level 
theory of impeachment. Perez-Linan (2014, p.34) emphasises that ‘the interaction between 
legislatures and the streets’ is the most formidable causal factor that facilitates the removal of 
a president, even if there was no legislative justification for the action. He identifies ‘a 
primary level involving causal statements and a secondary level involving concept formation’ 
to explain the successful impeachment of President Lugo (Perez-Linan 2014, p.38). He 
argues that certain political forces could create conditions capable of facilitating the 
termination of a presidential administration while other forces could shield the president from 
such hostile threats. 
While legislators who share the same political orientation with the president might shield him 
against impeachment, the same social forces could mobilize pressure to thwart legislature’s 
recourse to impeaching a president with high public rating. Perez-Linan insists that the ease 
with which the legislature removed President Lugo was not the function of the violent clash 
between the police and the peasant landowners, as claimed by Llanos and Marsteintredet 
(2013). He opines that the clash only provided an opportunity for the legislators to get rid of 
an unpopular president who lacked the majority control of the legislature. Nevertheless, he 
                                                 
60 The traditional school does not envisage such flexibility in leadership removal without necessarily 
precipitating military intervention. Linz (1994; 2010) in particular has argued that such a gridlock situation is a 
direct invitation for military intervention. 
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notes, ‘[w]hen opponents constitute a challenge and supporters fail to articulate a political 
shield, the president is exposed and the administration confronts a high risk of failure’ (Perez-
Linan 2014, p.38). Perez-Linan argues further that  
 
Actors pose threats and constitute shields in multiple ways, activating alternative causal 
mechanisms to affect the administration’s survival. Popular protests challenge the 
administration—even if they do not explicitly call for the president’s resignation—by 
signaling mass discontent with the government and by undermining public order. Popular 
discontent will embolden opposition leaders willing to openly demand the ousting of the 
president. Violent protests that compromise public order present incumbents with the choice 
of repressing demonstrators or relinquishing power (Perez-Linan 2014, p.38). 
He avers that adverse legislative action by the opposition would be fruitless if social forces 
against impeachment shield the president.  
On the conceptual level, Perez-Linan argues that the shields, whether a product the legislature 
or the public, need qualification. For him, protest movements will be effective against the 
president if they address broad interests that cut across the various sections of the community. 
On the other hand, social protests will becomes ineffective when they represent narrow 
‘interests or when they fail to incorporate important social sectors’ (Perez-Linan 2014, p.38). 
However, legislative shields will be ineffective in a fragmented ruling party, given that 
internal fractures in the party incapacitate its ability to provide the necessary votes needed to 
ward off opposition parties’ threats of impeachment. 
 
Table 3: Likely shields and threats to presidential terms 
 
 Configuration 1 Configuration 2 
Threat Social movements: Broad social   
coalition (popular sectors and 
middle class) take to the streets to 
protest against the government or 
its policies                             
 
Legislators: Legislature has constitutional 
authority to remove the president; opposition 
controls a majority and is willing to take 
control of the government 
Shield Legislators: Government coalition   
controls a majority in the 
legislature and avoids divisions 
Social movements: High presidential approval 
rates; broad coalition take to the streets to 
support the president 
 
Source: Adapted from Perez-Linan 2014, p. 41 
 
 
Perez-Linan (2014) identifies two major threats and shields, as shown in Table 3 above, 
detailing the interaction between institutional and non-institutional variables. The first threat 
is the presence of mobilized protest movements (non-institutional) with broad interests 
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incorporating popular sectors of the community, protesting against the government and /or its 
policies. However, the president will enjoy a legislative shield provided the governing party 
controls a cohesive majority required to thwart impeachment votes in the legislature 
(institutional). In other words, a divided government or fragmented governing party 
(institutional) provide a loophole for the opposition to mobilize sufficient votes in the 
legislature to remove the president facing social protest movements (non-institutional) 
(Perez-Linan 2014).  
Secondly, a legislature where the opposition has the required majority (institutional) will be a 
threat to the tenure of a president. At the same time, public protests (non-institutional) can 
shield him/her against a legislature dominated by the opposition provided he or she enjoys a 
high public approval rating. Perez-Linan submits that: ‘It is possible that high approval rates 
will be sufficient to discourage legislative conspiracies, but if they occur, demonstrators can 
shield the administration by taking to the streets to defend the government’ (Perez-Linan 
2014, p.41). Strategically, political elites in the legislature would not venture to initiate 
impeachment against presidents with high approval ratings (Perez-Linan 2014; Taylor-
Robinson and Ura 2013).  
2.7 Accountability in presidential systems 
Principal architects of presidentialism as a governing system were concerned about the 
prospect of taming the power of the executive. Since the system was a derivative of the 
monarchical system, most delegates at the American Convention of 1787 were cautious in 
recommending a governing system that would encourage impunity (Turley 1999; 
Scheuerman 2005; Aberbach and Peterson 2010). The concern of the framers of the 
American presidential constitution was how to devise a governing system capable of averting 
the dangers inherent in the absolute exercise of power by an individual. William Scheuerman 
(2005) in his work has noted the anxieties of the American people on the dangers associated 
with monarchy and the need to reform its contents to conform to democratic principles. 
According to him,  
 
the eighteenth-century revolutionaries jettisoned hereditary monarchy for an elected executive 
accountable to the people and their elected representatives. They also discarded notions of 
divine rule, paving the way for the principle that any citizen, as long as he (and ultimately she) 
meets certain minimal tests (for example, having reached the age of 35 years) hypothetically 
might come to occupy the office of the executive (Scheuerman 2005, p.28). 
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In other words, the people abhorred the notion of an absolute ascription of superior divinely-
based wisdom and moral prudence attributed to monarchs and expressed their preferences for 
structured political institutions capable of generating ‘competent and intelligent holders of 
executive power’, outside the ‘bloodlines of the royal family or could be established via acts 
of consecration’ (Scheuerman 2005, p.28).  
This abhorrence is a direct consequence of the fates of the American colonists during the 
reign of King George III (Ahrens 2001). The American experience with monarchy inspired 
Thomas Paine to declare, 
let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth placed on the 
divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, 
that so far as we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING (emphasis in the 
original)(Ahrens 2001, p.2)61. 
 
Accountability means the ‘obligation to answer for the performance of duties’ (Mulgan 2011, 
p.1). This goes beyond mere information; it includes the capacity to impose sanctions for the 
failure or abuse of responsibilities as a measure of remedy with a view to rectifying the 
governance failure through deterrence (Mulgan 2011). Central to accountability are the 
measures for correction to avert adverse consequences. Thus, accountability mechanisms 
such as parliamentary oversight and media investigations require the capacity to impose 
sanctions by the relevant agencies in a transparent manner. Accountability is not rhetoric of 
self appraisal but ‘a relationship between two or more parties, in which one party is subject to 
external scrutiny from others’ (Mulgan 2011, p.2).  
 
Guillermo O’Donnell (2008) identifies two types of accountability: horizontal and vertical. 
Vertical accountability represents the exercise of the voting power of the citizens in order to 
change leaders through the electoral process. Jacobson (1989) has argued that a prevailing 
culture of free and competitive elections is sufficient to motivate political leaders to govern 
responsibly. Since the public holds the key to determine their fate in elections, service 
delivery for the promotion of the interest of the public should be the priority of political 
leaders. Nevertheless, when the outcomes of elections might seem to have little relationship 
                                                 
61 One of the members of the Constitutional Convention, Mr. Morris, re-echoed this assertion during the debates 
on impeachment that ‘This Magistrate [President] is not the King but…the people are the King’ (Farrand 1911, 
Vol. II, p.59). In spite of this, there were instances during the Constitutional Convention when delegates mooted 
the idea of monarchy as the preferred governing system. Indeed, debates at the Convention and the contents of 
some of the Federalist Papers document the frequent references to monarchy in the consideration of the future 
of the American state. For the details, see Farrand 1911; Federalist Papers, No. 67; Ahrens 2001.  
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to the performance of political actors while in office, then the executive and legislative elites 
might choose to act irresponsibly (Jacobson 1989).  
Horizontal accountability, on the other hand occurs in-between elections through institutional 
measures and mechanisms (Mulgan 2011; O’Donnell 2008). State institutions, such as the 
legislature as well as other bodies and agencies, charged with the responsibility of conducting 
oversight activities over government administrations exercise horizontal accountability. Such 
institutions have the requisite powers and authority ‘to take actions that span from routine 
oversight to criminal sanctions or impeachment in relation to actions or omissions by other 
institutions of the state that may be qualified as unlawful’ (O’Donnell 2008, p.31).  
Adamolekun (2010) identifies diagonal and society-drawn horizontal accountability. 
Diagonal accountability, according to him, connotes the involvement of the citizens in 
enforcing horizontal accountability. Since the legislature is the symbolic representation of the 
public, the citizens, as in the cases of impeachments in some Latin American countries 
(Perez-Linan 2007; Kada 2003; Hochstetler 2011), mount pressures on their representatives 
to enforce accountability when the government seems to be working against the public 
interest.  
The society-horizontal accountability occurs when the citizens in conjunction with the civil 
society organizations seeks to directly enforce accountability (Perez-Linan 2007; 2014; 
Adamolekun 2010). This is feasible in societies where collaboration between the executive 
and the legislature leads to a crisis of governance. In the midst of legislative docility and 
executive recklessness, the public might decide to organize public protests against the entire 
government as was the cases in some Latin American countries (Mainwaring and Welna 
2003; Perez-Linan 2007; 2014).  
 In presidential systems, the legislature has the constitutional requisites to hold the executive 
accountable (Perez-Linan 2014; Hochstetler 2011; Adamolekun 2010). Indeed, the concept of 
the separation of powers and the doctrine of checks and balances are structural designs to 
ensure the promotion of transparency and accountability in government. With the exercise of 
oversight power in a system of separated but shared powers, the legislature as the conscience 
of the public, seeks to scrutinise government policies with a view to ensuring effective 
service delivery.In essence, a shared power is a design to overcome the danger of 
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concentration of power in an individual.62The Nigerian presidential constitution recognises 
the legislature as the principal institution responsible for enforcing the accountability of the 
executive branch. 
2.8 Summary 
Literature on presidentialism points to the eagerness of scholars to seek a governing system 
that is conducive to stability and good governance. Different studies have shown a continuous 
search for a system of accountability within the premises of democratic culture.  Positive and 
purposeful interactions between the structural properties and the political actors within and 
outside the institutional boundaries in accordance with the law guarantee this expectation. 
Thus, the institutional characteristics of a governing system require the necessary flexibility 
created by the interactions between the institutional and non-institutional actors to fulfill the 
original intent and purposes of the designers of the system. 
Traditional and new generation scholars of presidential systems appreciate the need for 
accountability with appropriate measures to control the exercise of the sprawling executive 
power in a system of separated but shared powers. Thus, impeachment remains the ultimate 
and appropriate constitutional instrument to discipline any abuse of power through removal 
of the culprits. In other words, the essence of impeachment provisions in a presidential 
constitution is to ensure transparency and accountability with a view to promoting good 
governance in the face of widespread powers at the disposal of the three principal institutions 
of government. Beyond the classical and developmental perspectives on presidentialism, the 
onus of any governing system is to promote the public good. The focus of the institutional 
and structural design of government is a direct response to the need of the people.  
From the empirical data of impeachment cases in Latin America, I discovered that the 
exercise of legislative power in a presidential system depends largely on the behavioural 
disposition of the political elites. I therefore claim that the study of the presidential system 
should be issue specific and analysed within the rubrics of the prevailing political culture in 
each of the political systems. The rationale for the presidential system is to instill a 
responsible executive that is checked by the legislature. Nevertheless, this task depends on 
                                                 
62 The fear of the danger associated with monarchy informed the adoption of a presidential system at the 
American Constitutional Convention of 1787. For the details see Scheuerman 2005; Ahrens 2001; Turley 1999; 
Persson et al 1997; Farrand 1911. 
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the perceptions and capacity of the legislators within the various institutional features of the 
political system. In developing presidential systems, where power is central to the career 
advancement of the political elite, the manipulation of rules often limits the extent to which 
the rationale and intent of the presidential system could be achieved. This is a common 
feature in the cases of impeachment in the Nigerian political system, as will be shown in the 
subsequent chapters. 
In the next chapter, I examine the evolution and development of the presidential system in 
Nigeria.  In doing this, I trace the political history of Nigeria’s political system from the 
parliamentary and presidential systems of the First and Second Republics and examine the 






















The Evolution and Development of the Presidential System in Nigeria:  
Practice and Problems 
  
3.1 Introduction 
The Westminster parliamentary system characterized the British colonial administration 
under an indirect rule policy in Nigeria (Ejimofor 1987). The indirect rule policy where 
British officials ruled the local communities by proxy using loyal traditional rulers and 
warrant officers63 was the first administrative format in the early days of colonial rule in 
Nigeria. Further constitutional development occasioned by the amalgamation of the Northern 
Protectorate with the two Southern Protectorates and the Colony of Lagos in 1914 gave rise 
to the institutionalisation of legislative bodies. Independent Nigeria adopted the Westminster 
parliamentary governing system and its principles. In this system, the Prime Minister, who is 
the head of the government, is also a member of the legislature and usually the leader of the 
party with the majority members. Membership of the Cabinet is usually drawn from among 
the parliamentarians. Thus, the system fuses both the executive and legislative power.   
Literature on the legislative institutions in Nigeria varies with the country’s historical and 
political development. The earliest works dwelt on the development of the colonial legislative 
legacy (Tamuno 1960; Adamolekun 1975; Okafor 1981; Ojo 1997a). These studies centered 
on the development of the legislative institution during the British colonial period. The 
dominant aspect of these works is the use of the legislature as a facade instrument of political 
development by the British colonial government in Nigeria.  The colonial government 
established the Nigerian Council in 1922 and Lagos Legislative Council in 1923 to legislate 
for Lagos, the colonial seat of government (Lafenwa 2006). There was no legislative 
assembly in the Northern Province.  
The Richards Constitution of 1945 provided for the establishment of a central legislature 
comprising members from the three regions, the Northern, Western, and Eastern Regions 
                                                 
63 The British colonial government administered the Nigerian territories through the existing traditional political 
institutions of Obaship/kings and Emirs in the Western and Northern parts respectively but used appointed 




(Lafenwa 2006; Ojo 1997a). The constitution also provided for the establishment of a House 
of Assembly for each region and a House of Chiefs in the Northern and Western regions. 
These legislative assemblies had no legislative powers. The colonial administration appointed 
majority members of the legislature at the central and regional levels with mere advisory 
powers. Indeed, the regional assemblies lacked independent power from the central 
parliament until 1954 when the Lytttelton Constitution divested the central parliament of its 
power to approve regional legislation (Lafenwa 2006; Fagbadebo 2000, Ojo 1997a). In all, 
these colonial legislatures lacked the power to influence or determine public policy. 
The outcome of this was the failure of the colonial government to ‘encourage the emergence 
of strong and virile legislatures that could play a surveillance role over the executive which 
was preserved exclusively for the British’ (Awotokun 1998, p.8). Selected members of the 
legislature appointed by the colonial government were expected to operate within the 
parameter set by the government. In other words, they were accountable to the colonial 
government. Thus, it was difficult to develop a legislative culture beyond the colonial 
mentality. Even when the colonial policy approved the election of Nigerians into the 
legislature shortly before independence, the legislative structure lacked the required 
independence to function as a true representative body of the people (Awotokun 1998; Ojo 
1997a). 
In this chapter, I examine the governing systems in the First and Second Republics of 
Nigeria. Although the governing systems differ, the patterns of the exercise of legislative 
power are the same. The focus is the behavioural disposition of the Nigerian political elite 
towards the exercise of power in the legislature where external factors largely determine the 
action of the legislators, especially in the exercise of the legislative oversight functions. I then 
turn to an examination in section two of the exercise of the legislative power of removal of 
the Premier of the defunct Western Region during the First Republic and the problem that 
arose thereof. In section three, I examine the political history of the presidential system and 
the recognition of the legislative power to remove the political heads of the executive branch 
of government at the state and federal levels. The content of the governing system is adapted 
from the American presidential system. In the fourth section, I explore the cases of removal 
and threats of removal of the political heads of the executive branch in a number of state 
governments. The recurring pattern of behaviour of the political elite is the use of the 
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legislative removal process to settle political scores rising from intra-party and inter-party 
rivalry.  
3.2 The politics of leadership removal in the First Republic, 1960-1966: The case of 
the Western Region64 
 
Studies on the legislative process of the immediate post-independence Westminster 
parliamentary system dominate the second phase of scholarly works on the Nigerian 
legislature (Mackintosh 1966; Tansey and Kermode 1968; Kermode 1968; Abayomi 1970; 
Adamolekun 1975; 1986; Graff 1988; Ojo 1997b; Lafenwa 2006). At independence in 1960, 
Nigeria adopted the Westminster Model of parliamentary democracy comprising a bicameral 
legislature at the centre. For the first time in the political history of the country, the December 
1959 general election produced an all-Nigerian legislature inaugurated in May 1960 
(Lafenwa 2006). The Western and Northern Regions each had a House of Assembly and a 
House of Chiefs while the Eastern Region had only a House of Assembly. As pioneer 
indigenous legislative bodies, the activities of the legislature at the central and regional levels 
reflected the nature of intra and inter party contestation in the immediate period preceding 
independence65. Emblematic of this development was the Western Regional crisis, 
engendered by the rift in the leadership cadre of the Action Group (AG) that culminated in 
the declaration of a state of emergency in 1962. The removal of the Premier of the Region, 
Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola sparked off a general political upheaval in the region and in 
the country. 
 
Governing leadership in a parliamentary system follows the principle of collective 
responsibility (Linz 1994; 2010; Perez-Linan 2007; 2014). According to this principle, the 
failure of the leadership is a collective failure of the government. Since the leader of the party 
with the majority seats in the parliament usually emerges as the Prime Minister or Premier (or 
the name designated for such a post), a vote of no confidence is sufficient to lead to the fall of 
                                                 
64 This development is germane to this study, though it took place under the Westminster model of 
parliamentary democracy. The nature of the process and the actors involved are useful in the analysis of 
subsequent removal episodes under the presidential system.    
65Bitter rivalry and acrimonious relationships existed among the leadership of the three major political parties in 
the immediate period preceding independence and after. Besides, the three political parties had their core 
supporters in their respective regions- Northern Progressive Congress (NPC), led by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello was 
domiciled in the Northern Region, Action Group (AG) led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo dominated the Western 




the government. The Prime Minister or Premier as the head of the executive is also a member 
of parliament. In specific terms, there is no separation of powers between the executive and 
legislative arms of the government as is the case in a presidential system. By extension, 
members of the executive and the legislature take collective responsibility for the failure or 
success of the government. 
The Action Group (AG) was the political party in control of the defunct Western Region in 
the political build up to the country’s independence. Nevertheless, the crisis in the leadership 
cadres of the party affected its electoral fortunes and weakened its structure (Famoroti 2011; 
Ojiako 1980). The division was primarily a reflection of the cleavages within the Yoruba 
society, the dominant ethnic group in the region (Diamond 1982; Joseph 1991). Aside from 
controlling the government of the Western Region, the AG was the arrowhead of the official 
opposition in the Federal Parliament. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the leader of the party, was 
also the official leader of the opposition in the Federal Parliament, while his deputy, Chief 
Samuel Ladoke Akintola, was the Premier of the Western Region (Akintola 1982; Lafenwa 
2006; Famoroti 2011). This separation of the office of the leader of the party and that of the 
premier of the region deepened the rift between the duo of Awolowo and Akintola, a 
development that eventually polarised the rank and file of the political party66. Moreover, this 
development marked the beginning of acute political divisions and bitter rivalry among the 
politicians in the region. The die was cast when the Regional Governor removed the Premier 
in May 1962. 
 
Section 33 (10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria, 1960, provided that 
Subject to the provisions of sub-sections (8) and (9) of this Section, the Ministers of the 
Government of the Region shall hold office during the Governor's pleasure: Provided that- (a) 
the Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it appears to him that the 
Premier no longer commands the support. (b) the Governor shall not remove a Minister other 
than the Premier from office except in accordance with the advice of the Premier 
(Constitution of Western Nigeria, 1960). 
When the Governor of the region, Oba Adesoji Aderemi, removed the Premier, Chief S. L 
Akintola, he, Akintola, took the case to the Western Region judiciary for redress claiming 
that 
                                                 
66 With Akintola as the Premier of the region, informal contacts with the ruling NPC through the Premier of the 
Northern Region, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello who also was the leader of the party, gradually became known to the 
leadership of the AG. 
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the Governor had no right to relieve the Premier from office in the absence of a prior 
resolution of the House of Assembly reached on the floor of the House to the effect that the 
Premier no longer commands the support of the House67 (The Privy Council). 
The claim of Akintola is that valid removal of the Premier should take place in the Parliament 
by the virtue of the system of government in operation. This attempt to validate the removal 
through parliamentary vote led to an unprecedented political fracas within the Chambers of 
the House of Assembly that preceded the popular operation wetie68 in 1964. The parties in 
the suit agreed to refer the case to the Federal Supreme Court for the interpretation of the 
power of the governor to remove the Premier in Section 33 (10) of the Western Region 
Constitution69. Specifically, they sought the Supreme Court to provide answers to two 
questions with a view to interpreting the Section 33 (10) of the Constitution of the Western 
Region.  
 
(1) Can the Governor validly exercise power to remove the Premier from office under section 
33 sub-section 10 of the Constitution of Western Nigeria without prior decision or resolution 
on the floor of the House of Assembly, showing that the Premier no longer commands the 
support of a majority of the House?  
(2) Can the Governor validly exercise power to remove the Premier from office under section 
33 (10) of the Constitution of Western Nigeria on the basis of any materials or information 
extraneous to the proceedings of the House of Assembly? (cf. The Privy Council, p.100) 
The pronouncement of the Supreme Court nullified the action of the governor. 
The answer to the first question therefore is that the Governor cannot validly exercise power 
to remove the Premier from office under section 33 sub-section 10 of the Constitution of 
Western Nigeria except in consequence of proceedings on the floor of the House whether in 
the shape of a vote of no-confidence or of a defeat on a major measure or of a series of defeats 
on measures of some importance showing that the Premier no longer commands the support of 
a majority of the members of the House of Assembly (cf. The Privy Council,  p. 100). 
                                                 
67 At the extraordinary meeting of the Action Group (AG), the ruling party in the region, on May 20, 1962, the 
leadership of the party passed a vote of no confidence in Akintola. Subsequently, 66 members out of the 124-
member parliament signed a letter asking the governor to remove the Premier because he no longer enjoyed the 
majority support of its members. The decision was the climax of a rift between the leader of the party, Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo, who was then the leader of the opposition in the Federal parliament, and the Premier, Chief 
S.L. Akintola. The cold war between the two leaders of the party became open at the Jos Convention of the AG 
in May 10, 1962 where Chief Awolowo, accused his deputy, Akintola, of insubordination. The convention 
asked Akintola to resign his positions as the Premier and deputy leader of the party. Akintola refused, and, 
instead defended himself by accusing Awolowo of undue interference in the running of his government as the 
regional Premier. This open division degenerated and affected the cohesion of the party. 
68Operation wetie is the acronym used to describe the arson, killings and looting that followed the 1964 Western 
Regional Election. The aftermath of the development created the template for military intervention and the 
collapse of Nigeria’s First Republic. For the details see Ejiofor 2010; Ojo 2012; Balogun 2009; Falola 2004; 
Anifowose and Odukoya 2012. 
69 At independence, the structure of the federal state allowed each of the three regions to have its own 
constitution different from that of the federal government. These regional constitutions were listed as schedules 
to the Nigerian (Constitution) Order in Council, 1960.  Aside from this, each had its own judiciary headed by a 
Chief Justice but that cases relating to the ambiguity of the provisions of the constitution could be referred to the 
Federal Supreme Court for interpretation (section 108). Similarly, the final appellate Court in Nigeria then was 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London (section 114 of the Constitution of the Federation 1960). 
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This judgment exhibits the parliamentary culture of taking valid decisions within the 
legislative chambers with the Mace, the legislative symbol of authority. Indeed, when the 
fracas began, the parliamentarians broke the Mace in a bid to void the authority of the 
legislature (Awotokun 1998; Lafenwa 2006). Valid legislative decision requires the 
placement of the Mace at the centre of the chamber as a symbol of authority. The Nigerian 
political elite in the legislature usually target the Mace each time there is a division with a 
view to ensuring the validity of the decision taken even if the members failed to form a 
quorum. On the other hand, rival groups, in a bid to forestall a legislative decision, usually 
reach out to the Mace to either destroy it or to take it away70. This culture which gradually 
developed during the First Republic has become part of Nigerian political culture. 
The Chief Justice of the Federation, Sir Adetokunbo Ademola, in his judgment agreed with 
the claim of Chief Akintola. 
 
 
The Constitution as framed in the light of normal constitutional practice and should be 
interpreted in that light... The governor cannot validly exercise power to remove the premier 
from office under section 33 sub-section 10 of the Constitution of Western Nigeria except in 
consequence of proceedings on the floor of the House whether in the shape of a vote of no 
confidence or a defeat on a major issue, or of a series of defeats on measures of some 




Nevertheless, Alhaji D. S. Adegbenro, the Premier appointed to succeed Akintola, appealed 
the judgment to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Council in its judgment 
validated the removal of the governor. In the judgment read by Lord Viscount Radcliffe, 
 
Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that the appeal should be allowed; that the 
Answer of the Supreme Court given on the 7th of July, 1962, should be reversed; and that in 
lieu thereof it should be declared that the Answer to the first Question is Yes and that the 
Answer to the second Question is Yes also... (cf. The Privy Council 1963, p.108). 
In fact, the Committee affirmed ‘that the right of removal…explicitly recognized in the 
Nigerian constitution must be interpreted according to the wording of its own limitations and 
not to limitations which that wording does not import’ (The Privy Council 1963, p.107). 
                                                 
70 I witnessed this development as a legislative aide. Each time there was crisis, the first duty of the security 
forces is usually to assist the Sergeant-at-Arms to protect the Mace and take it out of the reach of the legislators. 
Indeed, the speaker of the legislature once told me that a valid legislative decision could take place inside his 
office as long at the Mace was present. As will be seen in chapter five, this particular position dominated the 
political system until the judiciary further strengthened the operational ethics of the legislature. 
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The politics associated with, and the outcomes of, this landmark political development could 
be explained from two perspectives: disunity among the political elite within the party and 
the constitutional power of the governor. The remote cause of the removal was the personal 
rift between the leader and the deputy leader of the ruling party in the region, the AG. This 
division was exacerbated by distrust and animosities arising partly from the separation of the 
office of the leader from that of the regional premier71. There were allegations that Chief 
Awolowo sought to control the party and the government of the region and that Chief 
Akintola preferred to assert his authority as the effective head of the government, and, thus, 
began to ‘question the right of Awolowo to put reins on him’ (Akintola, 1982, p.76)72. Chief 
Anthony Enahoro, one of the core loyalists of Awolowo alluded to this in an interview:                                    
 
One major cause of the crisis was that for the first time in the history of the party, the leader of 
the party no longer combines party leadership with the office of the Premier and members 
have been encouraged to look beyond the party leader for patronage. Here then, was a 
dangerous opening for a rival leadership to be organised unless the deputy leader was 
completely loyal to the leader and had no ambition to supplant him (Nigerian Tribune, March 
16, 1962, cf. Akintola 1982, p76). 
Thus, the rivalry between the personal and public interests of the two leaders created disunity 
in the party and the machination to remove the Premier. In other words, there was no 
consideration of its impact on the overall goal of ensuring the public good.  
The second perspective is the constitutional power of the Governor to remove the Premier. 
The Constitution of Western Nigeria, 1960, gave the governor the comprehensive executive 
power to remove the Premier and ministers of government. The Governor, as the appointee of 
Her Majesty, the Queen of England,73 held power at the pleasure of the Queen and the 
governor was her representative in the Region. Section 32(1-3) of the Constitution vested the 
Queen with the executive authority of the Region to be exercised on her behalf by the 
Governor. Section 33 (2) vests the Governor with the power to appoint the Premier, ‘a 
                                                 
71 Chief Awolowo, the leader, was the leader of the official opposition in the Federal Parliament while Akintola, 
his deputy, was the regional premier.  
72 Indeed, this subtle resistance was predicated on the allegations of distrust that existed between the two leaders 
over the possibility of a coalition/alliance between the AG and the ruling Northern People’s Congress (NPC). 
Akintola, in his biography written by one of his sons, claimed to have met with the leadership of the NPC to 
explore the possibility of a working relationship between the two political parties without the authorisation the 
leadership of the AG. By this, the leadership of the AG loyal to Awolowo saw Akintola as a mole and a lackey 
of the leader of the rival NPC, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and Premier of the Northern 
Region (Diamond 1963; Akintola 1982).   




member of the House of Assembly who appears to him [Governor] likely to command the 
support of the majority of the members of the House’. Section 33 (8&9) provides for the 
conditions that could lead to the removal of the Premier while section 33(10 a&b) empowers 
the Governor to determine, as it appears to him, the tenure of the Premier if he could no 
longer control the majority of the parliament. There was no procedure to arrive at this 
decision and there was no precedent to follow in either Nigeria or Great Britain (The Privy 
Council 1963, pp.103-108). The onus then shifted to the judiciary for proper interpretation74. 
Judicial politics in this case lies within the power of control of the institutions of government. 
The judiciary of the Western Region relied on the interpretation of the Federal Supreme 
Court to arrive at a conclusive judicial position on the propriety of the exercise of the removal 
power of the governor. This decision, according to Okere (1987, p.794), ‘was unequivocally 
activist and sought to ascertain the intention of those who framed the constitution rather than 
a mechanistic, literal interpretation of the words used’ because the Supreme Court judgment 
‘was more in conformity with and sensitive to the Nigerian political climate’. The regional 
judiciary was under the control of the regional government while the Federal Supreme Court 
was under the control of the Federal Government75. In May 27, 1963, the Western Region 
House of Assembly retroactively enacted the Constitution of Western Nigeria (Amendment) 
Law 1963, to amend section 33(10a) of the constitution76. The Federal parliament ratified this 
amendment on June 3, 1963 and subsequently passed the 1963 Republican Constitution 
which effectively divested the Queen of England of her political role as the Governor-
                                                 
74 Indeed, The Privy Council insisted that by the virtue of the difference between the institutional and 
constitutional structures upon which the system was being practiced in Nigeria and Great Britain, ‘it is vain to 
look to British precedent for guidance upon the circumstances in which or the evidential material upon which a 
Prime Minister can be dismissed’ (The Privy Council 1963, p.107). 
75 At the time, the coalition government at the centre was the product of an alliance between the NPC (Northern 
Region) and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) (Eastern Region) while AG (Western 
Region) was the official arrowhead of the opposition. The crisis within AG was an opportunity for the 
NPC/NCNC government to weaken the electoral fortunes of AG. The fall out of the Western Region crisis was 
the formation of a new political party by Akintola, the United People’s Party (UPP). UPP and some members 
for NCNC in the region formed an alliance the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) to form new 
government in the region after the end of the emergency rule with Akintola as the Premier. Immediately after 
the removal crisis, Awolowo was found guilty of corruption by the Coker Commission that investigated 
allegations of fund diversion to a private company by Awolowo. Shortly afterwards, Awolowo was convicted of 
sedition and sentenced to prison. This development weakened the electoral fortunes of AG in the West. Thus, 
Akintola’s, NNDP later entered into an alliance with the NPC at the centre (Ojo 2012; Ojiako 1980; Sklar 1963; 
1965).   
76 The amendment reads thus: 33 (10a) (a) the Governor shall not remove the Premier from office unless it 
appears to him, in consequence of the passing of a resolution in the House of Assembly by a majority of the 
members of the House, that the Premier no longer commands the support of a majority of the members of the 




General of Nigeria. To that effect, the Nigerian Supreme Court became the final appellate 
court.  
By extension, the action of the Western Region parliament indicated that the removal of 
Akintola as the Premier, according to the existing constitutional provisions, was valid. The 
ratification of an amendment with retroactive power on issues of national importance by the 
Federal Parliament showed the degree of political desperation to protect the political interests 
of a faction of disunified political elites, in accordance with Higley and Burton’s theoretical 
premise. In the Nigerian political system, intra-party conflict occasioned by disunity among 
the political elite is common. The divisive relationship is usually a consequence of individual 
politician’s attempts to control the activities of the political party for personal ends. 
Competition for power within the party usually becomes intensive and acrimonious. They 
transfer this aggression into the government, hence a continuous cycle of political crises. 
Political elites in the coalition government at the centre had a vested interest in the crisis in 
the region. Larry Diamond notes that  
Ethnic inflammation and polarisation of the politics of the First Republic would not have 
progressed to the extent they did without the willful manipulation of political elites, for whom 
this became a calculated strategy in their competition for the enormous resources of class 
formation mediated by the state (Diamond 1982, p. 630). 
The outcomes of this development partly informed the subsequent rejection of the 
parliamentary system and the adoption of presidentialism as the governing system by the 
military for the Second Republic (The Political Bureau 1987). The military had assumed that 
the crisis that gave rise to the collapse of the First Republic was systemic without considering 
the nature of the characters and the attitudinal disposition of the political elites to power 
(Diamond 1982).   
3.3 Presidentialism in Nigeria’s political system in the Second Republic, 1979-1983 
The rancorous political development in Western Nigeria coupled with the instability that 
followed the 1964/1965 elections created the impression that a parliamentary system was not 
suitable for Nigeria77. To this end, the military government approved an adapted version of 
                                                 
77 Indeed, some Nigerian scholars as well as members of the Political Bureau of 1987 in their public discourses 
were quick to submit that the adoption of a presidential system in the Second Republic was the sequel to the 




the American model of presidential system (Nwabueze 1985; Joseph 1991; Olson 2002; 
Adesanya 2002a).  The late head of state, General Murtala Mohammed, expressed this in his 
speech at the inauguration of the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC)78 on October 18, 
1975. According to him, Nigeria needed an executive presidential system of government in 
order to avert the experience of the past (Akinsanya 2002a; Report of CDC 1976). This 
“inescapable conclusion” on the part of the military government was one of the “essentials” 
considered to be required for a system of checks and balances for the promotion of good 
governance(Diamond 1982, p. 630). In other words, the military government instituted 
institutional restructuring in order to avert the ‘destructive, explosive potential that lay in the 
accumulated cleavages of the First Republic’ (Diamond 1982, p. 630). 
The military government, after thirteen years of a praetorian system, handed over power to an 
elected civilian government under a presidential system on October 1, 1979.  The 1979 
presidential constitution differed from the 1960 and 1963 constitutions in terms of the 
relationships among the arms of government. Unlike the fusion of power under the 
Westminster system, the concept of separation of powers exemplified by the constitution 
‘implies a certain degree of opposition between the legislature and the executive’ (Nwabueze 
1985, p.21). Thus, each of the institutional structures is eager to protect its independence by 
asserting its power in a system of checks and balances. With the absence of an official 
opposition in government, the legislature at all levels, irrespective of its composition, became 
the institutional monitoring structure in policy processes. The absence of the dominating 
presence of the Prime Minister or Premier and members of the Cabinet in the legislative 
assemblies during debates, ideally, helped this assertive and independent authority of the 
legislature.   
Ben Nwabueze (1985) identifies the virtues of this system compared to the Westminster 
parliamentary system. He argues that the presidential system in the Second Republic 
encouraged the institution of divided government occasioned by the independent origin and 
survival of the legislature and the executive. This, according to him, is good because it 
affords the greatest opportunity for the effective control of the government by the legislature. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Akinsanya and Davies 2002; The Political Bureau 1987. Other fundamental factors crippled the immediate post-
independent regime other than the governing system. For the details, see Diamond 1982; Sklar 1965. 
78 The military government set up the CDC to draft a new constitution in preparation for the return of the 
country to civilian rule after a spell with a praetorian system. The first military coup took place in January 15, 
1966. This was followed by a counter coup of July 1966 and a 30-month civil war. Another military coup took 
place in 1975 with another failed coup in 1976. 
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He assumes that an executive faced with an opposition majority in the legislature would not 
venture to present arbitrary or objectionable proposals for consideration.  He however notes 
that such a majority usually tends to accentuate the risk of a confrontational or capricious 
assertion of the independence of the legislature.  
This noticeable demerit of the system in Nigeria, he notes, is nevertheless a safeguarding 
instrument against autocracy. He assumes that opposition of executive power by legislative 
authority is capable of producing a modus vivendi (a practical compromise bypassing 
difficulties arising from inherent differences, with a view to forging a peaceful working 
relationship), that would enable the government to function effectively is spite of the division 
between the two arms of government Nwabueze 1985). The true exercise of legislative power 
reduces proclivity of the executive towards the arbitrary use of power. As Nwabueze (1985, 
p. 23) has noted, ‘an executive which does not control the law-making process has very 
limited capacity for arbitrariness and despotism’. To avert this development and take the reins 
of control over the legislature, executive branches of government in presidential systems 
often act surreptitiously to use the legislature as the official extension of the executive arm. 
This is a common phenomenon in the Nigerian Fourth Republic. A former Majority Leader 
of a state legislature who spoke with me confirms the tendency of the state governors to have 
assertive control over the legislature. ‘It is the desire of every governor to have control over 
the legislature’ and that most often, ‘they are having their ways’ (Personal Interview I, May 
3, 2014). 
One of the major components of the presidential constitution of the Second Republic in 
Nigeria was the principle of a single chief executive. Unlike the parliamentary system, the 
executive authority of the governments at the federal and state levels belongs to the president 
and the governors respectively. This principle of singleness of authority is a distinctive 
characteristic attributed to the executive branch of government in Nigeria’s Second Republic. 
Nevertheless, this singleness of authority is not a liberty for misuse or abuse of power: the 
exercise of the authority is subject to the other provisions of the constitution. Constitutional 
restrictions on the exercise of presidential and gubernatorial powers are statutory mechanisms 
to minimize arbitrariness and abuse.   
Within the executive branch, the constitution institutes conspicuous devices to restrain 
presidential or gubernatorial actions (Nwabueze 1985; Akinsanya 2002 a-d; Lawan 2010). 
The constitution requires the president and the governors to hold consultations with various 
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executive bodies and individuals in the determination of general policy and the coordination 
of government activities. For instance, valid appointments of some categories of government 
officials require recommendation from the executive bodies and commissions overseeing 
such offices. The president or governor does not have absolute discretion in some matters 
relating to the exercise of executive authority. Aside from this, the exercise of executive 
authority on other policy matters requires consultations with the legislature and the judiciary. 
This consultative presidential system stems from the nature of checks and balances inherent 
in the system. Besides these consultative requirements, there are several other mechanisms 
instituted by the constitution to checkmate the exercise of the executive authorities by the 
president and the state governors.79 
The height of the system of checks and balances in this separated but shared-power 
arrangement is the legislative authority to remove the heads of the executive branches 
through an impeachment process. Ideally, it is a mechanism of last resort in checking 
executive power (Nwabueze 1985, Awotokun 1998; Akinsanya 2002c; Lawan 2010). Thus, 
impeachment as a legislative weapon provides the means by which to prosecute officers of 
the executive branches for offences committed while in office. 
3.3.1 Impeachment in Nigeria’s presidential system 
In the US, article I, section 2 (5) of the Constitution assigns the House of Representatives  the 
sole power of impeachment while section 3(6) empowers the Senate the sole power of trial 
and conviction of all impeachment cases. Beyond this, members of Senate for the purpose of 
impeachment trials are expected to ‘be on oath or affirmation...and no Person shall be 
convicted without Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present’. Aside from removal 
from office upon conviction by the senate, an impeached officer is liable to prosecution and 
stiffer punishment. Article I, section 3 (7) states:  
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: 
but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment 
and Punishment according to Law Article I, section 3(7), Constitution of the Unite States of 
America). 
 
                                                 
79 For instance, sections 82 and 120 of the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria empower the 
legislatures at the federal and state levels respectively to conduct investigations as part of their oversight 
functions. This power includes monitoring the policy process and other activities of the executive. Besides this, 




Article II, section 4 of the constitution stipulates the offences that an officer should commit to 
warrant removal. 
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed 
from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors80 (Article II, Section 4, Constitution of the Unite States of America). 
 
This provision is remarkably different from the provisions of sections 143 and 188 of the 
Nigerian constitution81.   
In the entire provisions for the removal of the governor/deputy-governor or the 
president/deputy-president, there is no use of the word “impeachment”. The word appears in 
six places in the constitution. In sections 84 (5) and 124 (5), impeachment is mentioned in 
respect of disqualification for pension by the president/vice-president and the 
governor/deputy-governor, respectively. Sections 146 (1) & 3(a) and 191 (1) &3(a), identify 
impeachment as one of the factors that can disqualify the president/vice-president and the 
governor/deputy-governor, respectively, from continuing in office. However, the provisions 
relating to the removal of these officers from office do not contain the word impeachment but 
imply the intent of the framers of the constitution to mean removal from office without a 
criminal charge against the victims. Thus, impeachment is seen as a part of the routine 
manifestation of the behavioural disposition of the Nigerian political elite towards power and 
position in government. Since it has no criminal implication, removal does not preclude 
political office holders from being elected in the future. 
The Nigerian Supreme Court has noted that the appropriate word for impeachment in the 
Nigerian constitution is “removal” because the provisions do not provide for the word 
impeachment. The Court took a cue from the Black’s Law definition of impeachment to 
mean 
A criminal proceeding against a public officer, before a quasi political court, instituted by a 
written accusation called “articles of impeachment;” for example, a written accusation by the 
                                                 
80At the Constitutional Convention, there were dissenting opinions over the desirability of inclusion of the word 
‘misdemeanors’ as part of the offences (Farrand 1911).  
81Section 188 is reproduced in chapter five for the purposes of analysis. Reference to the provisions here is to 
identify the salient differences therein from that of the United States of America. Nigeria adapted the American 
presidential system but not the adoption of the content and the entire system as a whole. Impeachment in the 
USA extended to civil officers while in Nigeria it is limited to the heads of the executive branches of the 
government at the state and the federal levels. Unlike the USA, with the exception of Nebraska which has only 
one legislative house, state legislatures in Nigeria are unicameral while the National Assembly is bicameral. In 
all the 49 states with bicameral legislatures in the USA, the House of Representatives impeach while the Senates 
convict and remove the impeached officer. The two chambers of the Nigerian National Assembly, by virtue of 
section 143 of the Constitution, conduct the impeachment process concurrently. 
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House of Representatives of the United States to the Senate of the United States against an 
officer (Black 1968, p.886).. 
This definition fits into the constitutional provisions of impeachment in the US.  Justice Niki 
Tobi of the Nigerian Supreme Court averred that this definition, 
does not totally reflect the content of Section 188 of the Constitution [Nigeria], as it conveys 
so much element of criminality. Section 188 is not so worded. The section covers both civil 
and criminal conduct (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, P.51)82. 
In scholarly writings on the Nigerian presidential system, scholars use impeachment to 
denote the removal from office of the president/vice-president and the governor/deputy-
governor (Nwabueze 1985; Awotokun 1998; Akinsanya and Idang 2002; Lafenwa 2006; 
Alabi and Egbewole 2010; Fashagba 2010). For consistency and uniformity, this study uses 
impeachment as the removal of president /vice-president and the governor/deputy-governor 
through the legislative process in Nigeria’s presidential system. This distinction is necessary 
because section 189 of the Constitution stipulates another method by which a 
governor/deputy-governor could be removed other than procedural legislative process83. The 
section states: 
 
189. (1) The Governor or Deputy Governor of a State shall cease to hold office if 
(a) by a resolution passed by two-thirds majority of all members of the executive council of 
the State, it is declared that the Governor or Deputy Governor is incapable of discharging the 
functions of his office; and (b) the declaration in paragraph (a) of this subsection is verified, 
after such medical examination as may be necessary, by a medical panel established under 
subsection (4) of this section in its report to the speaker of the House of Assembly. (2) Where 
the medical panel certifies in its report that in its opinion the Governor or Deputy Governor is 
suffering from such infirmity of body or mind as renders him permanently incapable of 
discharging the functions of his office, a notice thereof signed by the Speaker of the House of 
Assembly shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Government of the State. (3) The 
Governor or Deputy Governor shall cease to hold office as from the date of publication of the 
notice of the medical report pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. (4) The medical panel to 
which this section relates shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Assembly of the 
State, and shall comprise five medical practitioners in Nigeria - (a) one of whom shall be the 
personal physician of the holder of the office concerned; and (b) four other medical 
practitioners who have, in the opinion of the Speaker of the House of Assembly, attained a 
high degree of eminence in the field of medicine relative to the nature of the examination to be 
conducted in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section (Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999,as amended). 
 
Though this provision is also procedural, it does not require a legislative process except for 
the involvement of the speaker in the composition of the medical panel.  
                                                 
82Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, (2007) 1 S. C. (pt. I), p.51 
83 Section 144 of the constitution makes similar provision for the removal of the president/vice-president. 
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As shown in chapter two, in some Latin American countries (notably, Ecuador in 1997 and 
2005 and Peru in 1991) the legislatures invoked similar constitutional provisions to remove 
their presidents rather than resorting to unconstitutional means. The feasibility of the 
invocation of this provision is remote in Nigeria. For one, members of the executive council 
at the federal and state levels are appointees of the president and the governor, respectively. 
Their continuity in office depends on their loyalty to the president/governor. When the late 
President Sheu Musa Yar’Adua was sick in 2010 before his death, it was evident that he was 
incapable of discharging his responsibility. Nevertheless, the Federal Executive Council 
(FEC) remained silent on the matter (Adeniyi, 2011). Similarly, the State Executive Council 
(SEC) in Enugu, Cross River and Taraba states did not invoke this provision when their 
respective governors were sick and absent from the states for more than six months (Adeniyi, 
2011). 
 
3.4 Impeachment84 in Nigeria’s Second Republic 
In Nigeria’s presidential system of the Second Republic, the removal of any of the heads of 
the executive branches at the federal and state levels was predicated upon a proven allegation 
of gross misconduct85.Sections 132 (11) and 170 (11) of the constitution define gross 
misconduct as grave violation or breach of the provisions of the constitution or misconduct of 
which, in the opinion of the House of Assembly, amounts to gross misconduct. Sections 132 
(10) and 170 (10) put a lid on this definition by precluding any form of judicial interference 
in the proceedings and determinations of the legislature. By implication, the survival of any 
governor/deputy governor is at the mercy of the legislature who determines gross misconduct 
(Nwabueze 1985; Awotokun 1998; Akinsanya 2002c). Is this definition of gross misconduct 
different from the condition granted to regional governors to define the yardstick for the 
removal of a Premier in the Western region in the First Republic? It is certainly not. When a 
                                                 
84 Impeachment in the American presidential system, as noted earlier, is an indictment of misconduct. In 
Nigeria’s presidential system, the constitution set the procedure for the removal of the President/Vice-president 
and Governor/Deputy-Governor. In the American system and some other Latin American presidential systems, 
an impeached officer might survive removal from office. In Nigeria, once the removal process is concluded by 
the legislature, the officer concerned is removed from office except if the judiciary discovers any breach in the 
process, as will be seen later in this study. Therefore, for the purpose of this study with reference to Nigeria, 
impeachment is used as generic name denoting the removal of the President/Vice-President or 
Governors/Deputy Governors by the legislature.  
85 Sections 132 and 170 of the 1979 Constitution stipulate the procedure for arriving at this conclusion for the 
removal of the President/Vice-President and the Governor/Deputy-Governor, respectively. 
87 
 
statute derives its definition from the personal interpretation of the individual political elites, 
then it becomes a political instrument of control.  
In terms of impeachment in the state, what the legislature does is that they just do the bidding 
of the executive when it comes to the impeachment of Deputy Governor; and that of the party 
executive and party leaders or the president when it comes to that of the governors. There is a 
general lack of playing by the rule in the country’s political system: there is a prevalence of 
impunity (Personal Interview IV, May 11, 2014). 
 
The experience of the removal of the Premier of the defunct Western Region, as discussed 
earlier in this chapter, was an indicator of the capacity of political elites in Nigeria to 
manipulate rules for the purpose of achieving a predetermined objective. This is in contrast to 
the indicators of democracy as outlined by Przeworski (1992). Scholars, political activists as 
well as a section of the political elites appraised the impeachment provisions in the 1979 
constitution. Ben Nwabueze (1985) sees impeachment as an instrument of check against 
gross official misconduct. Drawing from the viewpoint of Clinton Rossiter (1960)86 on the 
American presidential system, Nwabueze argues that the provision is not a means of 
controlling the tenure of the officials concerned but to ensure ethical conduct in the exercise 
of power. Awotokun (1998) sees the provisions as essential mechanism to enhance 
accountability, probity, and responsible executive. In his view, it is necessary to watch the 
official conduct of political heads in order to avert arbitrariness in the exercise of power with 
a view to checking proclivity towards tyranny (Awotokun 1998). In other words, 
impeachment is the antidote to the corruption that is associated with absolute power.  
But a former Deputy Speaker told me that the use of impeachment in the Fourth Republic is 
at variance with its intent. 
In states where impeachment took place, what led to it? You can see that it was a sort of two 
sets of people flexing muscles: intra-elite crisis. In some cases, the governor might want to 
show his deputy that he was in control or probably the federal government is trying to exhibit 
its might over the state governor. In all the impeachment cases, the issues involved have 
nothing to do with the interests of the common man in the street. When I looked at all the 
allegations, none was in the interest of the people. Where impeachment took place, they were 
a reflection of bad belly or a case of two elephants fighting/flexing muscles (Personal 
Interview II, May 10, 2014). 
                                                 
86 Rossiter (1960, p.53) has argued that impeachment is not ‘an extra-ordinary device for registering a vote of no 
confidence’.  Nevertheless, impeachment is akin to the use of a vote of no confidence in a parliamentary system. 
While a vote of no confidence signifies the fall of the government, impeachment only affects the tenure of the 
office holder without affecting the government. Perez-Linan (2007) discusses this point in detail arguing that 
impeachment is an instrument of correction to discontinue with a particular administration while it encourages 
continuity in government.     
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Indeed, a particular deputy governor who was a victim of the abuse of impeachment 
provisions by the legislature told me that the legislature in his state was under the control of 
the governor.  
They were just at the whims and caprices of whoever was the chief executive of any state. 
Once a matter of impeachment case comes up, it was a deed done because there was no 
independence of thoughts. Laws could be breached and nobody care about the government, 
especially when it involves financial inducement (Personal Interview IV, May 11, 2014). 
 
Evidently, this is not part of the intent of the drafters of the constitution. The constitution 
provides the opportunity for an independent legislature to act in accordance with the rules 
presented by the constitution. 
Akinsanya and Davies (2002) argue that the impeachment provision in the constitution is the 
most effective weapon to combat the excesses of abuse and misuse of state power by the 
executive branch. To them, the impeachment power of the legislature is essential to ensure 
effective control of the executive. Balarabe Musa, former governor of Kaduna state, in a 
media interview in 1981, noted that the constitutional provisions for the removal of 
designated officials of the executive branch of government is a necessity in view of the 
concentration of power in the executive (The Punch July 1, 1981). According to him, in the 
absence of a constitutional mode of controlling such power, ‘people holding [these] offices 
will easily develop divine or semi-divine hallucinations about their positions, as several 
leaders have done in this country with disastrous consequences to the nation’ (The Punch July 
1, 1981, p.5). Ironically, the governor is the first victim of the exercise of the power of 
impeachment in Nigeria’s presidential system. 
3.4.1 The Impeachment of Governor Abdulkadri Balarabe Musa of Kaduna State 
In Kaduna state, the 1979 election produced a divided government. The governor’s political 
platform, the Peoples’ Redemption Party (PRP), had twelve members in the 99-member 
legislature (Nwabueze1985; Awotokun 1998). The National Party of Nigeria (NPN) had 
sixty-eight members (a number sufficient to carry our any impeachment process against the 
governor as stipulated by the constitution87), the Nigeria’s People’s Party (NPP) had six 
members, and Great Nigeria’s Peoples’ Party (GNPP) had ten while the Unity Party of 
                                                 




Nigeria (UPN) had three. This composition left the state in the labyrinth of Juan Linz’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘perils of presidentialism’ discussed in the previous chapter.  
Table 4: The distribution of votes among the political parties in Kaduna State in the 
1979 general election 
Political 
Parties 




GNPP 190,936 - 0 1 10 
NPN 592,302 551,252 3 19 64 
NPP 65,321 - 0 2 6 
PRP 437,771 560,605 2 10 16 
UPN 93,382 - 0 1 3 
TOTAL 1,382,712 1,11,857 5 33 99 
 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
It is evident from the table that the electoral victory and the votes garnered by the PRP 
gubernatorial candidate   to defeat his NPN rival were marginal, (9,153) compared to the 
number of seats won by the NPN in the House of Assembly. The NPN had the majority seats 
(64) in the legislature while PRP and other political parties have 35. This shows that 
interparty alliance coupled with intra party crisis within the NPN favoured the PRP during the 
gubernatorial election, while the voting pattern for the legislature reflected the electoral 
strength of each of the political parties. 
The Progressive People Alliance (PPA) initiative was the ‘last minute electoral strategy of the 
UPN’ (Akinsanya 2002, p.214) in order to combat the domineering prospect of the NPN. The 
PPA could not sustain a majority of seats required for the conduct of vital legislative 
business89. This put the governor in a very tight political corner. The NPN dominated 
legislature did not hide its disdain for the PRP-dominated executive. Thus, the lawmakers 
                                                 
88Prior to the conduct of the gubernatorial election in Kaduna State, UPN, NPP, GNPP and PRP had formed an 
informal merger under the auspices of the Progressive Party Alliance (PPA) for the purpose of electoral strength 
against the strength of NPN in its core areas. The other gubernatorial candidates of the PPA group withdrew 
from the race. Thus, the gubernatorial election was formally between Alhaji Lawal Kaita of the NPN and Alhaji 
Balarabe Musa of the PRP. 
89Major legislative decisions such as impeachment require a two-third majority of members of the legislature. 
The Kaduna State House of Assembly had 99 members; meaning that two-thirds required for the conclusion of 
vital legislative is 66 and, the NPN with 64, was short of two to have an absolute majority. Meanwhile, 
legislative authorisation for the composition of statutory bodies, passage of the appropriation bills, among others 




were adamant to take their pound of political revenge against the coalition that denied its 
party of the coveted gubernatorial seat of the state90. 
The seemingly ideological difference between the NPN and the PRP91 coupled with the rigid 
position of the governor accentuated an acute and hostile relationship between the executive 
and the legislature. Rather than adopt a negotiated path of compromise and accommodation 
of the opposition, the governor’s intransigent and hostile disposition was reflected in his 
maiden address where he outlined the policy direction of his government92 (Awotokun 1998). 
This radical posture infuriated the NPN members who were in the majority in the legislature. 
The lawmakers were of the view that the governor should have consulted with the House on 
such a sweeping policy statement. Despite this criticism, the governor insisted he would not 
reach a compromise with the NPN majority legislators. Awotokun (1998) has noted that the 
pedigree of the governor as a principled personality informed his rigid position. According to 
him, his antecedent in the public service depicts ‘a personality that is given to public probity’ 
(Awotokun 1998, p. 62)93. This “transparency credential” did not allow him to cope with the 
familiar political tact and compromise associated with the Nigerian political process. 
 A series of informal meetings and interventions to smoothen the executive-legislature 
relations in the state failed (Awotokun 1999; Nwabueze 1985). The legislature displayed 
hostile attitudes to policy issues that required legislative authorisation with a view to forcing 
the governor to a negotiating table94. At this stage, mutual usurpation of powers between the 
                                                 
90 Kaita went to the Election Petition Tribunal to challenge the result of the gubernatorial election, but he lost 
the case. 
91  The NPN and the PRP were offshoots of two major political parties controlling Northern Nigeria in the First 
Republic–the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) and the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). 
Mallam Aminu Kano, the leader of NEPU was also the founder and leader of PRP. NEPU prided itself as the 
party representing the interests of the peasantry in the North as against its conception of the NPC as the mouth 
piece of the oligarchy and the bourgeoisies class. This radical ideological disposition unsettled the political 
situation in the North, especially in Kano, as the NEPU became the rallying political platform for the Talakawas 
(the poor peasants who constitute the majority) (Dudley 1968; Sklar 1963). This same orientation remained the 
platform upon which the PRP emerged as a political party in the Second Republic. Its electoral fortune was 
restricted to Kano and Kaduna States.   
92 The governor condemned the existing social order with a resolution that his government would initiate the 
building of a new foundation of a new social order. As a demonstration of this policy thrust, the governor 
ordered the suspension, processing, and issuance of certificates of occupancy on government land. To him, the 
land allocation system was an instrument of semi-feudal oppression and exploitation in the society. For the 
details on this, see Musa 1981. 
93 Indeed, Balarabe Musa’s insistence on probity was partly responsible for the termination of his appointment 
with the Kaduna Cooperative Bank Limited (Awotokun 1998).   
94 For instance, the legislature did not approve the lists of commissioners the governor forwarded to the House 
for consideration for four consecutive times. Even when the governor took the legislature to court over the 
refusal to approve the lists, he lost the case. 
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legislature and the executive became rampant (Nwabueze 1985). Rather than soften the 
antagonistic stance of the governor, legislative hostility and frustration drove the governor to 
breach certain procedural rules in the exercise of his power (Nwabueze 1985; Awotokun 
1998; Lawan 2010). The majority NPN members seized this opportunity to commence an 
impeachment process against the governor. The legislature in the notice of allegations of 
gross misconduct leveled against the governor indicated ten categories of breaches they 
considered as evidence of gross misconduct (Nwabueze 1985; Awotokun 1998). With the 
numerical strength of the opposition in the legislature, it was not difficult for the lawmakers 
to conclude and pronounce the removal the governor on the allegations leveled against him95.  
This gridlock situation was exacerbated by a number of factors and circumstances. The bitter 
political rivalry occasioned by the formation of the PPA reopened the ideological difference 
among the political elites in the core Northern part of the country. The PRP was an offshoot 
of the Northern Element Progressive Union (NEPU), led by the late Mallam Aminu Kano, 
while the NPN was the reincarnation of the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), led by late 
Alhaji Ahmadu Bello. During the First Republic, the NEPU with a radical Talakawa96 
ideological disposition was opposed to the conservative NPC. Balarabe Musa explained it 
thus: 
The relies of Nigerian politics today are that the roles and place of the NPC of yester years 
have been largely taken over by the National Party of Nigeria (NPN, just as those of the 
NEPU, have been largely taken over by the PRP). The harsh repression in the form of 
detentions, imprisonment, torture, murder and confiscation, meted by the NPC on the 
members of the NEPU [in the First Republic] are still fresh in the memory of many members 
of the PRP. The postures, the threats, molestations, and general conduct of NPN leaders and 
members, before, during and after the last elections and since, have done nothing o mitigate 
this. As a matter of fact, the intimidations  (economic, social and legal) which characterised 
the conduct of the last elections and which were perpetrated largely by the NPN and its agents, 
both inside and outside the government clearly establish the linkage between the NPC and the 
NPN (cf. Akinsanya 2002, p215). 
 
This historical antecedent rooted in class struggle among the Northern political elites further 
embittered the NPN-controlled legislature. The NPC and, by extension, the NPN, represented 
the aristocratic class with affluence and wealth; the NEPU and the PRP carried the banner of 
                                                 
95 Nwabueze (1985) has argued that such a removal process is pre-determined whether the governor was guilty 
or not and that the legality or constitutionality of the process was subordinated to the political interests of the 
actors. The Panel set up by the Speaker of the House in accordance with the requirement of the constitution did 
not absolve the governor of the charges.   
96 This is an ideological disposition championed by the PRP that appealed to the plight of the peasantry and 
other  less privileged people, and especially the poor.  
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a proletarian ideology97 (Awotokun 1998; Nwabueze 1985). Balarabe Musa saw his electoral 
victory as the triumph of the peasants over the oligarchs in the conservative NPN because of 
its strong root in the Talakawa ideology. According to him, the oligarchic nature of the 
political elites in the NPN could not afford them of the courage to ‘accept competition and 
contest from its immediate slaves and subjects, under whatever type of democratic 
competition’ (cf. The Punch, July 1, 1981, p.5). Evidently, the electoral victory was the 
outcome of the electoral strategy of alliance formation to upstage the ruling party without 
considering the formidable threat of a legislature under the control of the opposition. 
 The second factor that flows from the radical ideological stance is the opposing political 
objectives and policies of the governments of the PRP–controlled states of Kano and Kaduna. 
Balarabe Musa claimed that the NPN and the PRP represent two different opposing forces 
engaged in an embittered struggle. The NPN, he said, ‘represented forces of feudalism, 
capitalism and general backwardness and we obviously represented forces of patriotism, 
democracy and socialism’ (cf. Awotokun 1989, p.56). He sought to redress the unjust 
practices with a view to building the foundation for a new social order. Thus, the 
governments of the PRP in Kano and Kaduna were set, according Abubakar Rimi, to serve as 
vanguards ‘for revolutionary transformation of the decadent social order promoted and 
upheld by the NPN’ (cf. Akinsanya 2002, p.215).  
A manifestation of this policy objective, the third factor, is the abolition of Cattle and 
Community Taxes, Jangali98 and Haraji, respectively, in Kano and Kaduna states (Nwabueze 
1985; Awotokun, 1989; Akinsanya 2002). This policy stance was a cardinal campaign 
programme of the PRP in Kano and Kaduna States (Awotokun 1989). The party argued that 
these two set of taxes were avenues for the reification of the ‘corrupt feudalistic order’ (cf. 
Akinsanya 2002, p215).  Abubakar Rimi, in his maiden broadcast to the people of the state 
highlighted the shortcomings of the administration of the taxes saying they were unnecessary 
(New Nigerian, 08/10/1979, p.3).   
                                                 
97Mallam Abubakar Rimi, another member of the PRP won the gubernatorial election of Kano, the home state of 
the party leader, Mallam Aminu Kano. The two governors, Musa and Rimi, claimed they were the true 
representatives of the peasants who have been under the servitude of the oligarchy elements in the NPN. The 
two states are strategic locations of the Northern political elites. While Kaduna is the political base of the elites, 
Kano remains its commercial nerve centre. 
98Jangali and Haraji are forms of traditional taxation policy in Northern Nigeria that extract more resources 
from the peasant cattle owners. The PRP leadership saw this as forms of oppression of the masses. Their 
abolition became a PRP campaign issue with a view to winning the votes of the majority of peasants.   
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In the first place, they have been a major pillar of feudal and colonial oppression and 
exploitation... It is clear also that while the poor rural masses continue to pay these taxes 
annually and are severely punished for failure to do so, the privileged urban dwellers have 
always evaded taxation (cf. New Nigerian, 08/10/1979, p.3). 
The governor said further that while local officials used Haraji as ‘a weapon of political 
oppression’, they also used it ‘to perpetuate corruption and extortion’, because of ‘an illegal 
increase’ of the fixed amount to be paid by the people (New Nigerian, 08/10/1979, p3). The 
abolition of these taxes boosted the popularity the PRP in the North. This policy, considered 
to be an affront on tradition and custom in the North, no doubt, angered the political elites. 
Nevertheless, the snowballing effect was the cancellation of payment of similar taxes in the 
NPN controlled states in a bid to frustrate the political gain of the PRP. 
 
In a bid to protect the interest of the peasants in Kaduna State, Balarabe Musa placed a 
suspension order on the processing and issuance of certificates of occupancy, a measure to 
halt the acquisition of land by the wealthy (Awotokun 1989). His government also abolished 
the Emirate Traditional Council99 which he said was antithetical to the norms and practice of 
modern democracy (Awotokun 1998). He contemplated a reform that would transform the 
Councils as organs of popular democratic control with a view to servicing the interests of a 
wider population.  
Beyond the policy issues, there was intra-party wrangling within the PRP over the invitation 
by the NPN-led federal government to form an accord of a national government (Nwabueze 
1985). This invitation pitched the leadership of the party against each other. Late Mallam 
Aminu Kano and late Sam Ikoku, the national president and secretary of the party 
respectively, were in support of the invitation while the other group, led by late Chief 
Michael Imoudu, a veteran labour activist and the deputy national president, joined hands 
with the governors of Kaduna and Kano states, and a majority of the party’s membership at 
the National Assembly, to lead a faction opposed to the accord. Instead, the Imoudu faction100 
was more interested in the membership of the PPA, which was opposed to the proposed 
                                                 
99 The Emirate Traditional Council, headed by the Emir of Kano, was a colonial creation to facilitate local 
administration during the colonial period. This later became a prominent traditional administrative structure in 
the post-colonial Nigeria (Blench et al 2006). 
100 Chief Michael Imoudu, as the Deputy National President of the PRP, was opposed to the party’s decision to 
align with the ruling party to form an alliance. He saw this as a possible move to contaminate the ideology of the 
PRP. He thus became the leader of a number of members of the party who were committed to the ideals of the 
ideology of the PRP. 
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accord by the NPN (Nwabueze 1985). Balarabe Musa explained that acceptance of the 
invitation by the PRP would make it an appendage of the NPN. 
Our party, the Peoples Redemption Party, and that other party, are diametrically opposed. We 
represent the forces of change and justice. They represent the reactionary forces against 
change and against progress and justice. If we become linked with that party, we shall have no 
reason for existing (cf. Nwabueze 1985, p140).  
This development further closed the door of reconciliation with the opposition NPN majority 
in the House101.  
The manner in which the governor carried out a series of policy reforms provided the 
template for his breaches of constitutional rules. These major policy reforms required 
legislative approvals which were absent. His antagonistic stance and utterances foreclosed the 
prospect of reconciliation through negotiation with the legislature and the opposition. As 
Akinsanya (2002, p.216) has noted, the governor ‘did not exercise much political tact where 
the situation called for one, and the conservative, NPN-dominated legislature exercised its 
powers with reckless abandon’. Rather than seek a unity government to smoothen executive-
legislative relations in the face of a gridlock (arising from a divided government), the 
governor insisted that he would not concede any cabinet position to the opposition. He was 
not ready for any compromise or negotiation yet his party, and the combination of the 
members of the PPA in the Assembly, is so insignificant to upstage the opposition of the 
NPN majority members. The absence of legislative approvals forced the governor to commit 
a series of infractions which later became the pillars upon which the legislature served him 
with a notice of allegation of guilt against the governor (Akinsanya 2002; Awotokun 1998; 
Nwabueze 1985). 
Divided government is not designed to engender hostility in a policy process, though Juan 
Linz (2010) insists that the gridlock it usually generates is inimical to stability in the 
presidential system.  However, in contemplation of the principles of separated but shared 
power, it is a phenomenon intended to invigorate the strength of the legislature for adequate 
and effective oversight for the public good (Perez-Linan 2007). The power of the legislature 
to approve or reject executive proposals is discretionary. Nevertheless, it is not the intention 
                                                 
101If the accord had been made possible, there was the possibility for reconciliatory negotiation and compromise 
which could have provided a reprieve for the hostile executive-legislature relationship. Though this was not a 
guarantee, because a similar accord with the NPP by the NPN collapsed, at least it would have provided the 
governor with a safety valve to constitute members of his cabinet as well as having access to legislative 
authorisation for the implementation of the policies of his government. 
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of the framers of the presidential system that the legislature should exercise such 
discretionary power arbitrarily or as an instrument of frustration (Nwabueze 985). As 
Nwabueze has noted, such discretion should be in good faith. He argues: ‘It is an abuse of 
power to reject a candidate out of personal prejudice or for purely political considerations or 
for other reasons not rationally or reasonably connected with his suitability for the post’ 
(Nwabueze 1985, pp101-102). Thus, the removal of Governor Balarabe Musa by the 
legislature is a manifestation of the politics of divided-government rather than indicative of 
policy failure by his government. 
3.4.2 Abuse and misuse of the power of impeachment in the Second Republic  
Ben Nwabueze (1985, p.323) has noted that the abuse and misuse of the impeachment 
instrument against Balarabe Musa created a bandwagon effect described as ‘an impeachment 
fever throughout the country’ in the Second Republic. Within a space of one year, after the 
removal of Balarabe Musa, legislators in Niger, Bendel, Rivers, Cross Rivers, Lagos, 
Gongola and Kwara States issued threats to commence impeachment proceedings against 
their governors. Additionally, the Deputy-Governors of Plateau, Rivers, and Cross River 
States also faced impeachment threats. The Kano State House of Assembly actually removed 
the Deputy Governor, Alhaji Ibrahim Bibi Farouk (Nwabueze 1985; Awotokun 1998). 
The motives behind these episodes do not reflect the intent of the constitution (Nwabueze 
1985). Impeachment in its original conception is a design to checkmate gross official 
misconduct defined as a grave violation or breach of the provisions of the constitution. I 
found that Nigerian political elites are aware of this intent but they mostly gloss over it 
whenever they intend to exercise the power an instrument of political vendetta. A speaker of 
a state legislature told me that legislators are aware of the importance of impeachment as 
legislative instrument of controlling the government but that they most often lack the proper 
understanding of what impeachment is intended to do (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014). 
I found that when lawmakers are interested in exercising their power to correct policy failure, 
they prefer to exploit such opportunities to advance personal interests. Thus, impeachment 
has become an instrument of negotiation for the personal welfare of the legislators102.  
                                                 
102 For instance, in a state legislature, 21 members of a 26-member legislature signed the note of impeachment 
but the House could not garner 18 votes, representing two thirds of the members, to finally remove the governor 




Though this definition of gross misconduct, as contained in Sections 132 (11) and 170(11) of 
the 1979 Constitution, and sections 143 (11) and 188(11) of the 1999 Constitution (as 
amended), gives a blanket power to the legislature to determine what amounts to gross 
misconduct, Nwabueze nonetheless argues that a violation or breach of the provisions of the 
constitution or misconduct has an objective meaning fixed by law rather than by a subjective 
opinion of the legislators.  He notes that the opinion of the lawmakers ‘comes into play only 
in determining whether a misconduct in the legal sense of the term amounts to a gross one’ 
(Nwabueze 1985, p.323). He maintains that the legislature in Nigeria often erred in 
interpreting the definition of gross misconduct as a template to commence impeachment. 
Virtually all the cases of impeachment ‘either involved no misconduct at all or the 
misconduct was not a gross one’ (Nwabueze 1985, p.324)103. 
They were prompted by purely partisan or selfish motives - motives of vindictiveness, 
intimidation, jealousy, intra-party struggle for ascendancy and even blackmail. The 
impeachment power is not intended to serve such purely partisan or selfish purposes as these. 
It is simply an abuse so to use it (Nwabueze 1985, p.324). 
 
The other abuse associated with the impeachment episode in the Second Republic was the 
judicial review of the impeachment proceedings that involved the case of Balarabe Musa104. 
Nwabueze argues that the over-liberal interpretation of section 172(10)105 of the 1979 
constitution failed to provide the political system with a vital judicial precedent that was 
necessary for the practical determination of impeachment provisions in the constitution 
(Nwabueze 1985; Fagbadebo 2007; 2010). Nwabueze, in particular, argues that proper 
interpretation of the provisions of the constitution by the judiciary would have saved the 
                                                                                                                                                        
originally signed the notice of impeachment had negotiated their original desire for an enhanced welfare 
package.  
103 The justices of the Supreme Court who adjudicate in the cases of constitutional breaches in the impeachment 
of Governor Rasheed Ladoja of Oyo state condemned the literary interpretation of gross misconduct in the 
constitution as a negation of the intent of the drafters of the constitution. According to them, ‘for any 
misconduct to be gross, it must express some extreme negative conduct such as atrocious, colossal, deplorable, 
disgusting, heinous, outrageous, odious and shocking’ (Inakoju & 17 Ors v Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007)1 S. C (Pt I) 
1). Beside this, such acts should be glaring, noticeable and inexcusable breaches of the constitution rather than 
mere figments of the imagination of the legislators. 
104 When the House of Assembly removed Balarabe Musa, he proceeded to court to challenge his removal, 
claiming that the action of the legislature was in contradiction with the provisions of the constitution. 
105 Section 172(10), often referred to as an ouster clause, precludes judicial interference in the determination of 
the legislature in impeachment matters. See Nwabueze 1985, especially chapter fourteen for an exhaustive 
discussion on the interpretation of this clause. 
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political system from the rash application of the impeachment power that pervaded the 
Second Republic106. 
However, the adoption of the presidential system in the Second Republic was an attempt to 
insulate the system from incessant political instability and the high levels of corruption that 
had characterized the First Republic107. For instance, Nwabueze discovers that some of the 
attempted impeachments failed to eventuate in the removal of the allegedly corrupt 
governors. In the case against Governor Melford Okilo of Rivers State and his deputy, Dr. 
Frank Eke, Nwabueze (1985) argues that there are glaring acts of gross misconduct to support 
the allegations contained in the notice of allegations that was signed by the legislators108. 
However, the lawmakers failed to proceed with the procedure to remove the indicted parties. 
Ben Nwabueze specifically notes that corrupt executive leadership escaped the legislative 
sanctions of impeachment in Nigeria’s  Second Republic  because, ‘the necessary two-thirds 
majority cannot be mustered, or an impeachment move is stopped by the party, or the 
members are simply lobbied to abandon it’ (Nwabueze 1985, p.324). This ‘tragedy’, 
according to him, makes corruption unquestionably ‘the most notorious form of abuse of 
office in Nigeria’ (Nwabueze 1985, p.325). 
The legislators in Rivers State yielded to the lobby mounted by the leadership of the ruling 
party, the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), and abandoned the procedure. Instances of this 
nature pervaded the political system of the Second Republic109. A deputy speaker of a state 
legislature told me that such a phenomenon is common in states where the legislature and the 
executive is being controlled by the same political party. 
                                                 
106 As will be seen later in this study, judicial review of impeachment cases in the Fourth Republic draw largely 
from the submission of Professor Ben Nwabueze. 
107 Larry Diamond (1982) has noted that  in the early days of the Second Republic,  the various structural 
changes introduced by the military further encouraged social and psychological distance between classes 
thereby reinforcing the prominence of the political elites in political conflicts. Indeed, Akinsanya (2002b) 
locates this in the origin of the 1979 presidential constitution. According to him, the drafters of the constitution 
deliberately constructed the provisions to promote and protect the interests of the bourgeoisie class, which 
eventually controlled the political space. For instance, in spite of the regulatory conditions imposed to ensure the 
emergence of national political parties in the Second Republic, the parties that contested elections during the 
period were a reincarnation of the political parties of the First Republic with their ethnic and class cleavages. 
For the details, see Whitaker, Jr.; Diamond 1982; Wright 1982; Okpu 1985; Joseph 1991; Awotokun 1998; 
Akinsanya and Davies 2002; Akinsanya 2002c. Events that led to the collapse of the republic were not different 
from the case of the First Republic.  
108 These allegations include, among others, reckless mismanagement of public funds, docile attitudes to the 
control of bourgeoning corruption among the officials of the administration, gross abuse of power at the expense 
of the public good.  
109 This development is not limited to the Second Republic. I found that in the Fourth Republic, there are several 




In states where the same party controls the executive and the legislature, the lawmakers are 
mere rubber stamp. Yet, this ought not to be. The problem is that the lawmakers do not have 
confidence to challenge the excesses of the governor (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the demise of the regime within the space of four years attests to the earlier 
argument that beyond the structural properties of the governing system, the attitudinal 
disposition of political elites in managing the governing system is a major determinant of the 
course of politics in Nigeria. In spite of the various constitutional provisions to check the 
excessive abuse of power, with a view to ensuring good governance through accountability 
and probity, the Second Republic was fraught with corruption (Nwabueze 1985) and 
characterised by what Richard Joseph (1991) calls clientelism and prebendal politics. 
According to Nwabueze (1985), the extravagant lifestyle of the political elites manifested in 
the pervasive corruption and abuse of power which included the plundering of the nation’s 
resources that should have been used for the benefit of the public.  
Clientelism, according to Richard Joseph, connotes a chain of networks of individuals 
(political elites) competing for access to the state in the struggle for the appropriation of the 
resources for upward mobility. 
An individual seeks out patrons as he or she moves upward socially and materially; such 
individuals also come to accept ties of solidarity from their own clients which they view as 
fundamental to the latter’s security and continued advancement as well as their own. 
Clientelism therefore is the very channel though which one joins the dominant class and a 
practice which is then seen as fundamental to the continued enjoyment of the prerequisites of 
that class (Joseph 1991, p. 55). 
 
The underlying factor in this network is a constant flux of change occasioned by a lack of 
consensus among the group of political elites about the modus operandi of the apparatus of 
state power. From ethno-religious clusters within the networks, at intervals, prebends emerge 
as prominent political elites in a game of rent seeking actors assigned to service the interests 
of patrons (Joseph 1991). Richard Joseph defines prebendal as: 
 
patterns of political behaviour ‘which rest on the justifying principle that such offices should 
be competed for and hen utilized for personal benefit of office holders as well as of their 
reference or support group. The official pubic purpose of the office often becomes a secondary 
concern, however much that purpose might have been originally cited in its creation or during 
the periodic competition to fill it (Joseph 1991, p.8).  
Richard Joseph contends that 
clientelism and prebendalism are two of the fundamental principles of political organization 
and behaviour in Nigeria. An individual seeks the support and protection of an oga [a superior 
person/individual with a measure of influence] or a “godfather,” while trying to acquire basic 
social and material goods-loans, scholarships, licenses, plots of urban land, employment, 
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promotion-and the main resource of the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a 
piece of the state(Joseph 1991, p.56). 
This practice and mode of behaviour characterised the politics of the First and Second 
Republics but has also developed into a blooming political enterprise in the control of the 
political space.. 
The implication of this is that political elites treat ‘state power as a congeries of offices which 
can be competed for, appropriated, and then administered for the benefit of individual 
occupants and their support groups’ (Joseph 1991, p. 63).The personalisation of state power 
at the expense of the public good created an inclement political environment. The legislators 
rarely explore the constitutional mechanism of checks and balances to curb the excesses of 
the executive. As will be seen in chapter five, the provision for the removal of governors 
and/or their deputies; president and or his deputy, for instance, were explored as instruments 
to settle political scores among the individual political elites. 
None of the legislative assemblies either at the federal or state levels sought to correct the 
reckless abuse of power, despite its negative impact on the economy and its negative 
implications for good governance. The case in Kaduna State arose from a divided 
government, while the removal of Alhaji Bibi Farouk, the Deputy Governor of Kano State, 
was traceable to the personal crisis between him and the governor.  The threat against 
Governor Ambrose Alli of Bendel State was informed by the desire of the legislators to 
protect their political interests. Consequently, a majority of the Nigerian public welcomed 
with jubilation the military putsch of December 31, 1983 (Nwabueze 1985). A majority of 
state governors and other officials of government during the Second Republic were arrested 
on allegations of corruption by the succeeding military government (Nwabueze 1985; Forrest 
1986; Joseph 1991; Awotokun 1998; Akinsanya 2002e; Bassey 2002; Isijola 2002). This 
attests to the claim that the legislature, though with requisite constitutional powers, could not 
live up to its constitutional responsibilities.  
 
3. 5   Summary 
In this chapter, I have traced the evolution and the problems associated with the practice of 
the presidential system in Nigeria, particularly in terms of the removal of the heads of the 
executive. Drawing on documentary references and through an examination of the 
behavioural disposition of the Nigerian political elite in the legislature in the exercise of their 
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constitutional oversight power, I discovered that in all cases examined, the exercise of power 
was contrary to the intent of the constitution. My claim in this chapter is that pecuniary 
considerations rather than policy dominated the reason for the series of removal cases in the 
First and Second Republics. 
Young Hun Kim (2013, p.5) admits a dearth of ‘broader comparative evidence on the sources 
of impeachment attempts in the world’s other new democracies’ other than the ‘insights into 
a number of impeachment efforts against particular presidents, and into conditions that have 
fostered or inhibited such efforts across Latin America’. In this chapter, I have identified the 
circumstances that prompted the use of the power of impeachment in Nigeria’s presidential 
system, which are different from the cases in Latin America and Asia. 
A central concern of this chapter is the inability of the legislature in the Nigerian presidential 
system to appropriate impeachment as an instrument of discipline for the abuse of power, 
with a view to promoting good governance. In the midst of abundant resources, the Nigerian 
people celebrate corruption as a virtue while poverty and low standards of living pervade the 
lives of a majority of Nigerians. By contrast, a handful of powerful and wealthy elites live in 
opulence in a system that proclaims checks and balances. Aside from the occasional threats 
of impeachment, Nigeria’s National Assembly has not considered initiating an impeachment 
process against any of the presidents since 1999, in spite of the manifest evidence of the 
abuse of power. The cases of impeachment at the state level are shrouded in the politics of 
strategic political actors seeking power and self-aggrandizement, rather than the promotion of 
good governance and public good. Unfortunately, the Nigerian polity is reasonably lacking in 
an informed public capable of enforcing accountability in the face of legislative failures. An 
informed public (as in the cases in Latin America and Asia) depicts the presence of national 
consciousness as a vanguard for change.110 This is a rarity in Nigeria. Hence, the central 
thesis of this study is that a corrupt laden political system besieged by executive recklessness, 
legislative ineptitude and judicial passivity renders the impeachment process an instrument of 
political vendetta and victimisation.  
                                                 
110 An exception however is the case of the Philippines under President Macapagal-Arroyo where public protest   
could not bring about the desired change in spite of a bourgeoning economic crisis, indiscriminate killings, and 
repression. Though unpopular, Macapagal-Arroyo was able to survive because of a legislative shield and 




Subsequent chapters address the various causal factors to explain the politics associated with 
impeachment in the Nigerian political system. In the next chapter I examine the theoretical 
frameworks for the analysis of the use of impeachment in Nigeria of the executive branch of 













































Structures, Actors and Legislative Roles in the Nigerian Presidential System: 
Content and Context 
 
4.1 Introduction  
An analysis of the politics associated with impeachment requires an examination of the 
activities of political actors operating in multiple institutional structures that are mandated to 
perform certain statutory roles in the presidential system in which the institutional structures 
decentralize the decision-making processes. The concept of a separation of powers depicts 
the existence of interdependent structures operating for a unified systemic purpose. Thus, 
each institution of government has its assigned role with actors bearing the responsibility of 
steering the decision-making process through the policy cycle.  
In this chapter, I present the some theoretical postulations on legislative processes in 
presidential systems with a focus on the practice of presidential system in Nigeria. One 
particular theory is not sufficient for the analysis of the politics associated with impeachment 
in a developing presidential system like Nigeria’s. To this end, I draw upon structural 
functional analysis theory, elite theory and legislative role theory for an understanding of the 
interplay of actors within the institutions in Nigeria’s presidential system in the Fourth 
Republic.  
Institutions are critical to political stability and development in every political system (Ezrow 
and Frantz 2013; Francis 2011; Peters 2005). Scot (2004) notes: 
 
Institutional theory attends to the deeper and more resilient aspects of social structure. It 
considers the processes by which structures, including schemas, rules, norms, and routines, 
become established as authoritative guidelines for social behavior. It inquires into how these 
elements are created, diffused, adopted, and adapted over space and time; and how they fall 
into decline and disuse (Scott 2004, p 410). 
Guy Peters (2005) sees institutions as comprised of patterns of political culture that have 
become institutionalized (Peters 2005). This patterned interaction, overtime, affects the 
behaviour of individual actors rather than institutions within the political system. In other 
words, a group of political elites within or across political institutions, interacting for the 
purpose of achieving a set of objectives, may also be regarded as an institution (Peters 2005). 
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Francis (2011, p.33) defines institution ‘as a formal or informal body, structure or activity 
with established legitimacy or recognition’. Institutions are social structures that have 
attained a high degree of resilience being governed by rules and norms created by individuals 
or a group of individuals to govern their behaviour (Ezrow and Frantz 2013).  
Thus, whether they are being guided by norms and values or rules and incentives, the overall 
objective of members is to advance a particular set of interests within the socio-political and 
economic context of the political system.  State institutions, according to Ezrow and Frantz 
(2013, p.2), ‘structure political dynamics and policy choices, just as these institutions are 
molded and shaped by actors responding to political conditions and reality’  In essence, 
institutions define the health of the state thereby creating the capacity to justify its 
existence111. Depending on the political culture of any society, institutions could promote or 
inhibit good governance. In societies with self-interested elites, the purpose of the institutions 
would tilt towards serving the interest of the individuals while the common interests of the 
people are less well served. The effectiveness of institutions, therefore, depends largely on 
the disposition of the elites who controls the affairs of the institutionalized structures.  
For the purpose of this study, I define institutions as structures in the political system, that are 
guided by a set of rules, formal or informal, created by political elites to govern their pattern 
of interactions and activities. Thus, institutions in every political system have characteristics, 
that may be formal or informal, that are influenced by the behaviour of the political elites. 
This conceptualization of institution is appropriate for an analysis of the activities of the 
political elites in the way in which they exercise power in the political system. Over time, 
certain norms and values that run contrary to good governance have become institutionalised 
as a feature of political action. When the activities of the actors within the institutions of the 
state meet the expectations of the citizens, the public acknowledges the established rules as 
instruments of governance112. Institutions, therefore, are key factors in defining the nature of 
the society in relation to the exercise of power and authority for the promotion of the welfare 
of the citizens. Presidential political systems, in particular, operate within the context of 
institutions. These institutions are interdependent in operation but separated in structures.  
                                                 
111Ezrow and Frantz (2013, p.16) reinstating the positions of early political thinkers, argue that ‘the state 
essentially bound citizens to its existence’ when it functions effectively by providing citizens with welfare. 
112Kaufmann et al (2010) conceptualise governance in this realm as the rules and norms governing the exercise 
of power to include the determination of the origin, survival and processes of governmental activities and 
policies, the extractive capacity of the state and the manner of interaction between the state and the citizens.  
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4.2. Structures and functions in political systems 
Structural functionalist theorists postulate that every political system consists of structures 
performing requisite functions for the stability of the polity (Almond and Coleman 1960; 
Almond & Powell 1966; Smith 1966; Groth 1970; Peters 2005; Almond et al. 2007). 
Function in this regard is the objective consequence of a pattern of action for the system 
while structure is a pattern of action and the resultant institution of the system (Almond et al, 
2007). The central element in the structures is the role, the power to make decisions on behalf 
of the society with a view to implementing the allocation of scarce resources (Fisher 2010). A 
functional approach to the study of the political system focuses on the formulation and 
execution of authoritative decisions designed for the promotion of the common good in the 
polity (Easton 1957; Smith 1966). In other words, the function of each structure within the 
political system is measured in relation to the expected ascribed scope. This is found mostly 
in the objectives principles of the state113. 
David Easton (1957) identifies inputs and outputs as the two requisite functions of the 
political system. Gabriel Almond (1961), a leading proponent of the functional approach to 
political processes, broadens the functions into seven specific categories with the 
corresponding structures assigned to perform each. These functions are political recruitment 
and socialization, interest articulation, interest aggregation, political communication, rule 
making, rule application and rule adjudication (Almond & Powell, Jr. 1966). The first four 
are the input functions while the last three stand for the output functions. This division links 
the process of policy making to two specific collective actors - the governed and the 
governors. The essence of this classification is to ensure the allocation of responsibilities to 
structures, and by extension, actors in the political system. 
The input functions denote the expectations and preferences of the public in terms of 
demands and supports for the political system. The public legtimises the conversion process 
and empowers the actors in the institutional structures of government to exert control in the 
policy process. This approach emphasizes the separation of powers and operational structures 
for the functionality of the political system. This is a crucial aspect of a presidential system 
                                                 
113 For instance, chapter two of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) lists the 
fundamental objectives and directive principles of the state policy where the obligations of the government to 




(Cheibub 2007). The hallmark of a presidential system is the interdependent relationships 
among different structures working towards common goals for the overall interest of the 
public. 
The presence of individuals in control of affairs defines institutions and agencies of 
government. Thus, the formulation and implementation of the collective goals of the society 
become the responsibility of the actors in the institutional structures. In view of the 
competing interests in the political system, the policy process requires effective interaction 
between the environment and the political actors. This is essential because of the need to 
legitimize the outcomes (Kawanaka, 2010). While inputs from these environments shape the 
behavioural pattern of the political elites, their reactions in terms of policy direction, 
legitimately or not, affect the functionality of the institutions or structures in the system 
(Almond et al, 2007).  
Though these institutions or structures are interdependent, their efficiency and stability 
depend largely on the extent of the presence of rent seekers and vested interest actors 
(Almond et al, 2007).  For instance, the 1962 crisis in the Western Regional Parliament in 
Nigeria, as shown in chapter three, is partly a function of the political environment created by 
the conflict within the leadership of the Action Group (AG) party (Ojiako, 1980; Famoroti, 
2011). Similarly, the series of crises that engendered most of the impeachment cases in the 
Fourth Republic, especially those that involved the deputy governors, are precipitated by 
interpersonal squabbles between the governors and their deputies or their proxies114. A 
deputy governor who was a victim of the impeachment process told me that the state 
legislatures usually defer to the wishes and demand of the governors when it comes to the 
impeachment of deputy governors because the legislature lacks the capacity to act 
independently 115(Personal Interview IV, May 11, 2014). The use of monetary inducement to 
facilitate legislative processes has become an institutionalised culture in Nigeria116. 
                                                 
114 As will be seen later in this study, there is no functional constitutional role assigned to deputy governors that 
could have warranted misconduct, as an official of the government, capable of leading to their removal. Yet, a 
series of inter-personal crises between the governors and their deputies created the avenues for the deployment 
of the instruments of state power through the legislative process. 
115 State legislatures depend on the governor for the approval and release of funds for the various activities. 
Thus,ggovernors who want to remove their deputies though the legislative process usually engage in a process 
of negotiation and bargaining over the release of funds in support for the impeachment process.  
116 Francis (2011, pp.33-34) avers that an action becomes institutionalised when it acquires ‘symbolic legitimacy 




There was a crisis between me and the governor; we have had a fallen out which came as a 
result of our different backgrounds and experiences. They made false allegations against 
me…And since there was monetary inducement in the process, it was easier for some people 
(legislators) to work against their conscience. It happened in almost all the cases of 
impeachment…Any governor that does not like his deputy would just make any allegation and 
induced the legislators with money to commence impeachment process for his removal. They 
direct the CJ on whom to pick to constitute the panel (Personal Interview IV, May 11, 2014).  
In this case, the actors in the three branches of the government involved in impeachment 
processes found themselves working together for the execution of the interest of a particular 
actor. This is in abeyance to the intent of the impeachment provision in the constitution. 
Of particular relevance to this study are the output functions - rule making, rule application 
and rule adjudication - performed by the legislative, executive and judicial arms of the 
government respectively. More often than not, policy outputs reflect the interests of 
individual actors. This is a common phenomenon in all political societies. The position of 
Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell, Jr. (1966) is still relevant. To them, informal groups, 
political attitudes, and a multitude of interpersonal relationships shape and often limit the 
roles of formal governmental institutions. This postulation reflects the problem associated 
with the process of legislative activities in Nigeria. Many legislative actions, especially 
impeachment, derive their sources from the actors in the environment that are external to the 
legislature. 
By virtue of the constitutional provisions, impeachment in Nigeria’s political system is in the 
domain of the legislature. Although the judiciary is involved, the primary source of 
impeachment is the legislative institutions. Nevertheless, a series of actors external to the 
legislature precipitated the impeachment cases in the Fourth Republic. The involvement of 
these external actors is not to correct policy failures. As will be seeing later in chapters five 
and six, the prevalence of godfathers in the political system as formidable causal factors in 
impeachment cases is an extension of the corruption in the political space. Similarly, the 
disparate use of an anti-corruption agency to hunt political opponents, in the name of 
sanistising the political system, further entrenched the culture of impunity in the political 
system. 
One of the shortcomings of this theory ‘is the absence of common definitions of the various 
roles and knowledge of which participants perform which roles’ (Skok 1995, p.326). Critics 
                                                                                                                                                        
constitutional breaches in impeachment cases are facilitated by the inducement of rewards by political elites 
outside of the legislature. 
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have noted that the approach ‘is seen as not much more than a translation of familiar and 
known phenomena into blandly broad categories’ (Fisher 2010, p. 79). Beside this, Susser 
(1992 cf. Fisher 2010) is of the view that a structural functional approach relies too heavily 
on mythological components in assuring validity.It tends to be vague and impressive; filled 
with assumptions of definite change without specifics on the nature of interdependent 
structural relationship (cf. Lafenwa 2006). 
Notwithstanding all the shortcomings and criticisms of the structural functional approach, it 
assists in understanding the relationship between the actors and their responsibilities in any 
given political system (Smith 1966; Susser, 1992; Fisher, 2010). It is a derivative of the 
general systems theory adapted for the understanding of complex political issues in terms of 
the interdependent relationships among the various political structures expected to shape and 
being shaped by the environment. Hence, it remains a useful instrument for the analysis of 
the performance of the functions of the legislative institution in relation to the objectives of 
the state (Fisher 2010). Impeachment, as a critical legislative oversight function, is essential 
to safeguard the state against the dangers of executive recklessness. Nigeria’s presidential 
constitution recognises the pivotal roles of the legislature for the realisation of the 
fundamental objectives of directive principles of state policy as stipulated in the 
constitution117. The fundamental objectives of directive principles of the Nigerian state are 
listed in chapter two of the constitution. 
A functional analysis of the legislative process of impeachment in Nigeria therefore seeks to 
establish the link between constitutional responsibilities and the actual performance of the 
legislators. As an integral part of the rule-making function of the legislature, impeachment is 
a corrective as well as control mechanism to ensure the promotion of good governance 
envisaged by the Nigerian presidential constitution. The constitutional procedure for, and the 
purpose of, impeachment is explicit, denoting a definite functional responsibility.  
Even if there are flexibilities as in the cases of some Latin American countries, or legislative 
shields (Perez-Linan 2007; 2014), the outcome should promote the functional intent of the 
constitutional provisions. Perez-Linan’s (2014) two-level model of impeachment incorporates 
                                                 
117Section 13 of the Constitution states ‘It shall be the duty and responsibility of the all organs of government , 
and of authorities and persons, exercising legislative, executive or judicial powers, to conform to, observe and 
apply the provisions’ of chapter two of the constitution dealing with the fundamental objectives and directive 
principles of state policy.  
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public protests demanding the removal of a president, as a motivation, reminding the 
legislature of its constitutional responsibility necessary for the functionality of the political 
system. Thus, in Nigeria, allegations of corruption against the leaders of the executive 
branch, as well as the spate of governance crises in the political system, provides the 
necessary template for the legislative structure to exert its power with a view to achieving the 
intent of the constitution. An understanding of the functional responsibilities of the executive 
vis-a-vis the constitutional oversight roles of the legislature portends the essence of good 
governance as the expectation from the state in Nigeria’s presidential system.  
4.3 Legislative role theory and representation 
One of the offshoots of the structural-functionalist paradigm is the political roles of actors in 
the policy cycle (Fisher 2010). ‘Role’ as a concept depicts ‘the tendency of human behaviors 
to form characteristic patterns that may be predicted if one knows the social context in which 
those behaviors appear’ (Biddle 1992, p.1681). John Wahlke et al (1962, p. 8) define 
legislative role as ‘a coherent set of ‘norms’ of behavior which are thought by those involved 
in the interactions being viewed, to apply to all persons who occupy the position of 
legislator’. They aver that the role of a legislator is different from his position or office but 
that lawmakers are aware of the norms that constitute their roles ‘and consciously adapt their 
behavior to them in some fashion’ (Wahlke et al 1962, pp.8-9). Political actors develop 
acceptable norms of behaviour, based on the realisation of the roles expected of them by the 
system. As such, compliance is essential as a symbol of understanding and interaction with 
others in the system. No doubt, the role perception of political actors often shapes their 
behavioural patterns in decision-making processes.   
In their early work, Eulau et al (1959, p.742) have noted that in democracy, ‘legislatures are 
both legitimate and authoritative decision-making institutions and that it is their 
representative character which makes them authoritative and legitimate’. Functionally, the 
legislature has the authority, as the legitimate representative of the body politic, to ensure the 
institutionalisation of responsible government. Thus, representation becomes effective when 
the people accept the decisions of their representatives as legitimate and authoritative (Eulau 
et al 1959; Rehfeld 2006). In other words, representation involves services because the 
representative stands to perform specific functions on behalf of the people. Representational 
role ‘describes the behavioral orientation of a legislator toward the policy preferences of his 
constituency’ (Alpert 1979, p 587). Representation involves ‘authorisation, accountability, 
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and looking out for others’ interests’ (Rehfeld 2006, p.3).With structural responsibilities and 
control, a presidential system prides itself in role performance as well as the linkage between 
the ruled and their representatives (Hochstetler 2006; Marsteintredet and Bermtzen 2008; 
Hochstetler 2011; Hochstetler and Samuels 2011; Marsteintredet et al 2013; Oleszek 2014; 
Lee 2014; Cheibub & Limongi 2014).  
The theory of representative linkage as propounded by Hurley and Hill (2003) expresses the 
need for an established link between the legislators and their constituents on a range of issues. 
In other words, representatives should pay attention to issues that reflect the preferences of 
their constituents. Hurley and Hill (2003) contend that the conduct of a representative in 
decision making on popular issues should conform to the expectations of the constituent. In 
an earlier publication, Eulau and his colleagues express the importance of such linkages.  
 
The relationship between the representative and the represented is at the core of 
representational theory. The term "representation" directs attention, first of all, to the attitudes, 
expectations and behaviors of the represented-to their acceptance of representatives' decisions 
as legitimate and authoritative for themselves. More particularly, representation concerns not 
the mere fact that they do accept such decisions, but rather the reasons they have for doing so, 
their rationalizations of the legitimacy and authority of the decisions made by their 
representatives (Eulau et al 1959, p. 743).  
This has to do with the expected role of the legislators as espoused in the different models of 
representation (Gerber, 1996; Johnson & Secret, 1996; Katz, 1997; Cooper and Richardson, 
2006). 
4.3.1. Mode of representation 
There are three major categories of representation styles - delegate, trustee and politico 
(Wahlke et al. 1962; Cooper & Richardson Jr. 2006; Rehfeld 2009). The essence of this 
categorization is to define the location of authority of the legislator in voting during the 
decision-making process in the parliament. Delegate representatives subjugate their 
preferences for that of their constituents with a view to looking out for the good and interests 
of the whole constituents (Cooper & Richardson, Jr. 2006; Rehfeld 2009). Here, the legislator 
may disagree with the preference of his constituency but then, the position of the 
constituency prevails. The trustee representative on the other hand acts independently of the 
preferences of the constituents; s/he can substitute the preference of his or her people with his 
or her own. In other words, the representative is not bound to act according to the preferences 
of the constituents. The trustee representative, when confronted with a conflict of opinion 
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between his or her preferences and that of the constituents over a course of policy, would 
consider his or her position as superior, as it could be in the bigger public interest. This mode 
has its root in the argument that representatives could promote the interests of their 
constituents without necessarily seeking their opinions (Kuklinski & Elling 1977; Strom 
1997; Katz 1997; Rosenthal 1998; Cooper & Richardson, Jr. 2006). In sum, a 
 
pure delegate does not express his or her personal opinion on an issue, but rather votes based 
on the opinion of the constituents. On the other hand, a pure trustee believes that he or she is 
in office to act by making the best decision possible on some objective criteria, regardless of 
the constituents' opinions (Cooper & Richardson, Jr. 2006, p.175). 
The politico ‘expresses an overlap of the two orientations, [trustee and delegate] so that 
representative types can be conceived of along a continuum, rather than constituting two 
polar positions’ (Meller 1967, p.464).  
Implicitly, these models of representation denote the existence of a principal-agent 
relationship between the constituents and the legislator (Strom 2000; Mansbridge 2003). 
Indeed, legislative role, though it varies depending on the issues at stake, shapes the 
behaviour of legislators (Mansbridge 2003; Cooper & Richardson Jr. 2006). On the other 
hand, however, the assumption of compliance to universal norms of behaviour among 
political actors might not be total. While some actors are deviant in behavioural norms 
contrary to the expectation of the system, the institution of sanction at times might be weak or 
rarely exists to effect corrections. This is common in political systems where corruption plays 
a vital role in the political process.  
I found this to be a key factor for the poor policy performance of the legislature in Nigeria. I 
spoke with a number of legislators who confirm that the legislative institution in Nigeria is 
not insulated from the pervasive culture of corruption118. A repondent said: 
 
But what do you expect from lawmakers who have no money to buy vehicles, build their own 
house? That will be his preoccupation for the first four years. He will want to recoup his 
electioneering campaign fund. So, if the governor offers him money to look away, he will 
gladly accept (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). 
                                                 
118 Records and reports of corruption in Nigeria between 1999 and 2014 are not encouraging as shown in Table 
1 in the introduction to this study.  Indeed, commentators have regarded corruption as an institutionalised 
structure, naming it as the 37th state of the Nigeria’s federal structure (Ilevbare 2012). I elaborate on this in 
chapters six and seven. 
111 
 
Thus, legislative deliberations will be clouded with considerations of personal gain rather 
than the public good. Cases of impeachment in Nigeria are characterised by flagrant breaches 
of the rules. This kind of corruption goes beyond material desire and includes the abuse of 
power for pecuniary desires. A respondent explains this thus: 
 
Corruption, not just in terms of exchange of material means but also in terms of deployment of 
state power. Obasanjo did it in the most brazen manners; deployed the police, the anti-
corruption agencies, to bring down the heads of Governors that were not willing to do his 
bidding (Personal Interview VIII, May 19, 2014). 
The Obasanjo regime in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic (1999-2007) recorded the highest number 
of impeachment cases where the functional role of the legislature runs contrary to the actual 
implementation of the law. In almost all the major cases of impeachment in Nigeria that 
occurred between 1999 and 2007, there was evidence of interference by the federal 
government (Lawan 2010). As will be seen in chapter five, the cases of impeachment in Oyo, 
Plateau, Bayelsa and Ekiti States, for instance, were facilitated by the EFCC, an agency of the 
federal government.   
Beyond this is the lack of independence of the legislators. Most of the legislators were elected 
through the influence of the leaders of their political parties who wished to exert a measure of 
control over them, particularly when one considers that impeachment is orchestrated by the 
party leadership.  It takes a truly independent legislature to assert its constitutional power in 
the face of a crisis with the executive. Unfortunately, my analysis of interviews reveals that 
Nigerian legislative institutions are peopled by political elites who are subject to control by 
the executive. As one interviewee claimed, 
The governor could influence the removal of any speaker considered to be antagonistic. 
Antagonistic speakers were removed and hounded away; Governors were able to emasculate 
speakers. Most Governors picked their speakers. This now made it easier since the speakers 
are the “boys” of the Governor, they could not move against their bosses (Personal Interview 
IV, May 11, 2014).  
 
Nevertheless, institutional structures in every political system have assigned roles which 
actors have to internalise as approved norms of behaviour and conduct. To an extent, political 
actors in the legislature are aware of the expectations of the system. In a presidential system, 
the constitutional provisions as well as the internal rules and orders of the parliament mostly 
define legislators’ roles. In other words, the position of lawmakers vis-a-vis their role is in the 
public domain and subject to accountability. 
112 
 
The primary role of the legislative institution in presidential systems is to represents the 
interests of the people. Thus, the legislative institution, as the conscience of the public, plays 
a vital role in governance because it performs important functions that are necessary to 
sustain democracy in complex and diverse societies (Huneeus et al., 2006; Alabi 2009; 
Schleiter & Morgan 2009; Franchino & Høyland 2009; Olson 2013). Scholars consider a 
legislative role ‘as a set of norms of behavior that a person in the position of legislator has 
internalized, which (consciously or unconsciously) guides that person's actual behavior’ 
(Johnson & Secret 1996, p.248). The core function of political representation is the ability of 
the legislature to be responsible and responsive to the wishes of the population.  
Oftentimes, the behaviour of the legislators does not reflect their political representation role 
and function. A sizeable number of citizens, especially in developing democracies like 
Nigeria, are not well informed on what comprises the content of the law and the 
responsibilities of their representatives. A lawmaker interviewed in the course of this study 
has this to say: 
I have contested elections and won three times. I did not win because of my contributions at 
the floor of the House. No. people are not interested in that. People are interested in what the 
politicians have personally given out to meet their immediate financial and material needs 
(Personal Interview II, May10, 2014).  
The preferences of the people ‘may be incoherent at the individual or collective levels, their 
preferences may not conform to their true interests and will change over time, or their 
preferences may be trumped by more important principles of justice’ (Rehfeld 2009, p.214). 
To determine the behavioural disposition of legislators in crucial decisions, one needs an 
analysis of the context in which they seek to represent the preferences of the constituents. 
Indeed, the institutions cannot perform any role of its own, without the action of political 
elites. Structures, roles and functions are mere abstractions of the models of expectations of 
the people. These objects derive their meanings and importance when a group of individuals 
interact within the confine of the guiding principles of the institutional structure. This brings 
to the fore the role of elites in every political system. 
4.4 Elites in the political process  
Beyond the structures and their functions are the actors responsible for the performance of 
these functions. One of the underlying assumptions of the democratic process is the notion of 
popular participation. In reality, not all the populace gets involved in government activities. 
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Depending on the nature of the governing system, the only aspect where citizens participate 
directly in politics is through the electoral process. Even then, such participation is often 
restricted to the eligible voters. Apparently, this notion of minimal public participation 
informed Joseph Schumpeter’s definition of democracy as the ‘institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote’ (Schumpeter 1976, p.269). In Schumpeter’s 
minimalist conception of democracy, these individuals who gain the control of government in 
elections exercise actual political power in the decision-making process. 
The principal actors in this respect are the political elite. Elites are generally regarded as the 
holders of top positions in government, business, the military and other professional outfits 
exerting influence on government decisions one way or the other (Putnam 1976; Higley and 
Moore 1981; McDonough 1981; Dye 1983; Hoffmann-Lange 1987; Moyser and Wagstaffe 
1987; Higley and Burton, 1989; Higley, Burton and Field, 1990; Francis, 2011; Higley 2011). 
Nevertheless, Vilfredo Pareto (1935; 1968 cf. Mathiot and Gervais 2011) defines the political 
elite as a group of people with exceptional virtues who show distinguished abilities and 
exercise power in the political domain. Robert Michels (1962) refers to this set of people as 
the dominant class that controls the leadership of any organisation. 
This exemplifies the principle of unequal power that is common in the developing countries. 
John Peeler (2009, p. 32) in his work on Latin American societies identifies ‘persistent and 
pervasive inequality, predatory relations between rulers and ruled, and clientelism’, as three 
features considered as barriers to democracy. The features engender inter-class differences 
and rivalries. Individuals seek to promote and protect the interest of groups represented in 
government. Rivalries occasioned by self-interest occupy the centre stage of government 
thereby endangering the collective interests of the governed. To Mosca, Rousseau’s 
conception of democracy as the government of the majority will is unrealistic (cf. 
Finocchiaro, 1999, p.25). In essence, democratic government exists under the principle of 
minority rule.  
There are two main approaches to the study of the political elites: normative and empirical 
(Francis 2011). The normative approach portends that the operation of power, ‘measured 
against the desirability of a democratically based polity’ depends on the capacity of the 
political elites (Francis 2011, p.3). ‘As such, the special talents that political elites possess are 
viewed as a justification for their domination, with the public playing a subordinate role’ 
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(Francis 2011, p.3). Francis (2011) argues that this approach is a contradiction of the central 
hypothesis of elite theory. Beside this, ‘the approach does not sufficiently recognise that the 
character of the elite group within the context of the particular institutional arrangement may 
be the primary factor shaping the form of power’ (Francis 2011, p.3).  
On the other hand, the empirical approach, according to Francis (2011), portends that ‘in any 
political dispensation, despite the relative desirability of the form and character of it, political 
power is concentrated in the hands of a political elite’ (Francis 2011, p.3). The key element 
of this approach is the behavioural dispositions of the political elite group which could be 
empirically measured by their actions and activities.   
This empirical approach is relevant to this study. The Nigerian political elite have less regard 
for the public as co-actors in the political system. The primary concern of the political elite is 
how to influence the public for the promotion of personal interests. For instance, in October 
2000, 21 out of the 26 members of the Osun State House of Assembly decided to remove the 
former governor, Chief Bisi Akande, as a result of the worsening governance crisis that had 
pervaded the state (Official Report, Osun State House of Assembly October 23, 2000). 
Subsequently, the lawmakers served the former governor with the Notice of Impeachment, 
with 13 allegations of gross misconduct, on November 1, 2000 (Official Report, Osun State 
House of Assembly November 1, 2000). Out of these allegations, ten focused on the violation 
and abuse of the provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
which the governor pledged to protect119. This was applauded by the public that had been 
awaiting legislative action (Bodunrin 2000; Faturoti 2000a and b). Nevertheless, the 
lawmakers exhibited their power of influence and refused to remove the governor in spite of 
the overwhelming public support120. 
                                                 
119 In the the seventh Schedule of the Nigerian constitution, each governor affirms that ‘I will discharge my 
duties to the best of my ability, faithfully and in accordance, with the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and the Law, and always in the interest of the sovereignty, integrity, solidarity, wellbeing and prosperity 
of the Federal Republic of Nigeria; that I will strive to preserve the Fundamental Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy contained in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria’. 
120 The legislature needed a two third majority of members to approve the investigation of the allegations. A two 
thirds majority of a 26-member legislature is 17. The notice of allegations of gross misconduct against the 
governor was signed by 21 members. When, on November 8, 2000, the lawmakers voted on whether the 
allegations against the governor should be investigated,9 out of the 21 legislators who signed the Notice of 
Impeachment voted against the motion to investigate the allegations (Votes and Proceedings, November 8, 
2000).   
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The principal component of the governing process is the act of decision-making. Moreover, 
this is limited to the political elites. They participate directly or influence the decision making 
process that ‘allocates resources within and among social units’ (Welsh 1979, p 1). To this 
end, ‘the actual exercise of political power, in most societies, remains the prerogative of a 
small part of the citizenry’ (Welsh, 1979, p1). Researchers, therefore, often ‘identify elites in 
terms of who holds the most important formal positions in a society, who has a pronounced 
reputation for political power and influence, or who participates in making key decisions and 
policies’ (Higley2011, p.760).  
Classical political thinkers, especially Plato and Aristotle, are concerned about the nature of 
leadership that could promote good governance (Peeler, 2009; Straus and Cropsey, 1987). 
According to Straus and Cropsey (1987), Plato’s noetic121 men or philosopher kings, for 
instance, do not emerge through a democratic process; yet, in Plato’s conception, they remain 
the safety valve for ensuring good governance.  
In Nigeria, the political elite are found beyond the legitimate institutions of government. 
Aside from the elected people with legitimate positions in the institutions of government, the 
political elite that influence the Nigerian political system extend to individuals outside the 
formal institutions of government whose activities exert sufficient influence in the decision-
making process (Adebanwi & Obadare 2011; Kifordu 2010; 2011; Omobowale & Olutayo 
2007). This set of people has and exercises actual and potential influence on decision-making 
and the distribution of spoils and patronage (Zartman, 1974; Hoffman-Lange, 1987). For 
instance, the activities of godfathers122 in Nigeria contributed in no small measure to the 
serial abuse of constitutional orders in the removal of Governor Rasheed Ladoja of Oyo State 
(Omobowale and Olutayo 2007. Elsewhere in Nigeria’s political system, the activities of 
these political patrons have negated the principle of democratic practice.  
                                                 
121 Plato, in his ideal of a political society, conceives the noetic men as the rulers whose development through a 
planned educational system offered the advantage of understanding the nature of the state and what is best for 
the citizens. 
122The Nigerian political system is filled with actors outside the formal structures of government, known as 
patrons, being addressed asgodfathers, who exert substantial influence on the political processes. This set of 
actors determines and direct the course of activities in government circles, at times with brazen impunity. This is 
easy because this set of people usually finance and or influence the elections of most of the political elites in the 
legislative and the executive branches of Nigerian government. In Nigeria, godfathers are the variant of patrons 
in patron-client politics. They get this appellation because they see politics as investment with the expectations 
that their godsons (clients) installed in power should always do their bidding when in power. For the details, see 
Joseph, 1991; Albert 2005; Sklar et al., 2006; Omobowale &Olutayo 2007; Oarhe 2010; Edigin 2010. 
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In Nigeria, these powerful and influential people are usually found within the political parties 
but with no official responsibility. Some provide the financial backbone to the political 
parties, as in the case of Emeka Offor and Chris Uba in Anambra State. Others are influential 
personalities who command a great deal of respect among the electorate, such as the Late 
Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu in Oyo State (Adebanwi and Obadare 2011; Fagbadebo 2010; Lawan 
2010; Omobowale and Olutayo 2007). Their influence and activities often override the 
legitimate decisions of the formal institutions of government, as witnessed by the 
impeachment of the governors of Oyo and Anambra States, respectively (discussed in chapter 
five). 
This does not necessarily mean that non-elites do not matter in the calculations of the 
political elite. According to Higley (2011), the political elite will find it difficult to perpetuate 
their hold on power without the support of people outside the group. The political elite frame 
appeals that seek to promote the political orientation and the interests of the general public 
even if such would not translate into policy outcomes. When these appeals serve only as 
incentives for gaining power, rival group of political elites seek the opportunity to secure 
public support through a more forceful insistence on purposeful leadership. But when such 
appeals manifest in policy outcomes, it provides the platform for the political elite to enjoy 
durable public support or a lack of public acceptability.123 
Scholars have argued that the preferences of the political elite are crucial to democratic 
stability especially in developing countries (Lopez-Pintor 1987; Malloy, 1987). In other 
words, the nature of democratic transitions and breakdowns will be determined by how the 
political elite choose to exercise power within the institutions of government. Higley and 
Burton (1989) identify three basic types of elites: (1) the ‘pluralistic’ or ‘consensually 
unified’ elites, (2) the ‘totalitarian’ or ‘ideologically unified’ type, and (3) the ‘divided’ or 
‘disunified’ elite. Consensually unified elites are found mostly in the developed democracies, 
populated by people who 
share a voluntary, mostly tacit consensus about political norms and practices, the hallmark of 
which is keeping political competition restrained and non-violent. Factions recognize each 
other's right to be heard, they agree to disagree when decisions cannot be reached, they 
emphasize technical and procedural feasibilities rather than ultimate rights and wrongs, and 
                                                 
123 In the case of Osun State that I mentioned earlier, the lawmakers lost public acceptability after the 
disappointing vote that shielded the governor from impeachment. Indeed, the ruling party in the state, the 




they practice enough secrecy to have flexibility when bargaining and fashioning compromises 
on difficult policy issues (Higley 2011, p.762). 
Totalitarian or ideologically united elites are found mostly in totalitarian political systems. 
This is not within the realm of this study. 
Members of the disunified elite group ‘are clearly divided and separated from each other, 
they disagree fundamentally about the worth of existing institutions, and they adhere to no 
single code of behavior’ (Higley 2011, p.762). Elite circulation and the perpetuation of power 
in this group are usually fraught with fraud and manipulation. This is especially so when a 
competitive electoral process is mired with ‘fraudulent practices that few elites and citizens 
accept their outcomes as legitimate’ (Higley 2011, p.762). In other words, the electoral 
process rarely produces a legitimate government. For instance, the outcomes of electoral 
processes in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007 have generated condemnation and misgivings 
because of the extent of violence and fraud associated with them (Kifordu 2010). Yet, the 
political elites who emerged from these elections continue to exert power. This study adopts 
the concept of disunited elites as analytical tool in the analysis of impeachment politics in 
Nigeria.  
One basic characteristic of this elite group is a sense of deep insecurity-the fear, usually 
rooted in experience, that all is lost if some other person or faction gets the upper hand. 
Accordingly, members of the disunified elite routinely take extreme measures to protect 
themselves and their interests: killing, imprisoning, or banishing opponents, fomenting 
rebellions against factions, expropriating opponents’ resources (Higley 2011).In the context 
of elite disunity, these actions are often the most available rational choice to retain, reclaim or 
gain power. Indeed, a political system characterized by this type of elite often experiences 
political instability (Higley & Burton 1989; Higley 2011). David Sanders (1981) identifies 
three properties of instability: political violence, frequent changes in governing coalitions and 
military coups. While military intervention is gradually becoming a rarity in Nigeria (unlike 
before 1998), the spate of violence generated by recurring governance crises as well as 
endemic intra-party conflict accounts for instability in the Nigerian political system. Since 
1999, intra-party crises have led to the alignment and realignment of major political elites 
defecting from one political platform to the other in rapid succession (Fagbadebo et al 2014; 
Fashagba 2014). This episode, though not new in Nigeria’s political system, has further 
created a division among political elites not because of ideological differences but as a 




Disunity among the political elite in Nigeria in this context is a function of the strategy to 
gain power. According to Kifordu (2010; 2011), Nigerian elites are more interested in the 
pursuit of their desired objectives at the expense of the integrity of the statutes. Central to this 
division is the inherent motive of appropriating the power of the state for personal ends 
thereby creating a regime of manipulation and coercion with impunity. According to Richard 
Sklar et al, (2006), Nigeria’s political landscape is, 
 
dominated by powerful ‘godfathers’ who sit atop vast patronage networks at the local, state, 
and federal levels. Political outcomes are primarily a function of titanic struggles among these 
magnates, who bargain among themselves—and at the expense of the impoverished greater 
public—within a political context of multiple ethno religious divisions (Sklar et al 2006, p. 
101). 
Because of the prevailing survival instinct (Kew 2005), Nigerian political elites seek all 
avenues to exert control over state power. A unity of purpose exists when they have a 
common platform for the appropriation of state power for their personal objectives124. Thus, 
power politics in the structures of government remain an elitist game to either retain or 
assume control. This becomes more so in a presidential system where the independent control 
of power remains the hallmark of governmental process.  
The division among political elites is a useful instrument for the analysis of political 
instability in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, especially in cases where governors are removed. 
For instance, in most states where the legislatures removed their governors through the 
impeachment process there is an acrimonious relationship among factions of elites within the 
same political party. For instance, the political crisis that gave rise to the impeachment of the 
former governor, Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo State has its roots in the bitter rivalry between the 
Governor and his godfather, late Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu (Personal Interview I, May 3, 
2014)125. The intra-party crisis snowballed into political violence that affected the entire state. 
Thus, the resort to illegal means of exercising power through breaches of constitutional 
provisions for selfish ends is a manifestation of the desperation of the political elite for 
                                                 
124 For instance, the defection of politicians from the People Democratic Party (PDP) to the All people Congress 
(APC), in preparation for the 2015 general elections is a classical example of this kind of unity. The intra-party 
conflict in the APC generated by the composition of the leadership of the National Assembly indicate that the 
political elites were only united not to present an alternative policy option but to promote their personal interest.    
125The Governor and his godfather belonged to the same political party. Indeed, Adedibu facilitated the process 
that culminated in the emergence of Ladoja as the party’s gubernatorial candidate and as the winner of the 
gubernatorial election. For the details, see Omobowale & Olutayo 2007). 
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power. The pursuit of personal interest over and above public interest weakens the promotion 
of the rule of law in Nigeria. Divisions in the ranks of the political elite in the two political 
branches of government often subject the rules to personal interpretation and brazen 
manipulation. Disunity in the political elite in Nigeria is often a characteristic of political 
survival. 
4.4.1 Strategic political elites in the legislative process 
Scholars have noted that most often, legislators deviate from the preferences of their 
representative role to satisfy the interests of sponsors and financiers of their electoral 
campaigns (Stratmann 1992), or to please the demands and interests of their political parties 
(Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Carey 2007). When the interests of the public are not congruent 
with those of the representatives or public, the outcome is a disjuncture between public and 
private interests. These are sometimes political strategies adopted by the legislators with a 
view to securing their electoral fortunes and political relevance. Strategic politician theory as 
conceptualised by Jacobson and Kernell (1983) posits that the actions and behavioural 
dispositions of politicians seeking electoral positions, especially in the legislature, often 
means that they mediate national conditions on the electoral process. An incumbent president 
and governor has a better chance of winning should they run for re-election (Abramowitz 
2006).   
Strategic political elites, for the purposes of this study, are politicians who see their 
participation in politics as a means to achieving personal ends. These ends are achieved once 
they gain power and become able to influence rules and public opinion. They use all the 
means at their disposal to ensure their continuity in power. The Nigerian political elite, 
particularly in the legislature, strategically exert their power to advance their personal 
interests at the expense of the public good. 
The central focus of the approach of strategic politicians’ in the understanding of the 
behaviour of political elites is how electoral politics enforces accountability (Jacobson 1989). 
Elections in presidential systems are mostly candidate-centered, reinforcing the axiom that all 
politics is local and thereby stifling the expectations of collective accountability (Carson & 
Roberts 2005; Jacobson 1999). Most often, in the advanced presidential systems, the extent of 
the impact of the national economy on the daily living of the public determines the fortunes 
of the political parties and individual candidates in congressional elections. Thus, the winning 
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formula largely depends on the strategy of the candidates (Romero 2004; Basinger and 
Ensley 2007). 
Politicians seeking re-election to the legislature or the executive would want to behave in a 
manner that would boost their chances of success. This is more pronounced in Nigeria where 
the political fortune of the political elite mostly depends on the support and influence of 
influential individuals. In the case of the botched impeachment of the governor of Osun State 
that I mentioned earlier, the nine legislators who refused to vote for the investigation of the 
allegations of gross misconduct against the former governor acted in response to their 
strategic calculation of electoral fortune because they lacked an independent political base for 
repeated electoral success126.  
Originally, the idea of removing the governor of Osun State was not designed to succeed. It 
was, instead, a strategic decision made by the lawmakers to force the governor to a 
negotiating table for an enhanced welfare package (Bello 2011)127. Nevertheless, the 
favourable public support, towards impeachment (Fagbadebo 2011), engendered a 
belligerence in the attitude of the legislators. The Minority Leader of the house, Adejare 
Bello, (who later became the Speaker upon the defeat of the AD government in 2003) 
publicly admitted in 2011 that the action of the lawmakers was not to remove the governor 
but to ‘shake him’ (Bello 2011, p.420). 
We never wanted to impeach Chief Bisi Akande….[he] was given us Ninety Thousand Naira 
a month. Many of us with a lot of indebtedness, we were managing that amount of money. At 
a point in time, the governor just said “you people cannot be earning more than a Permanent 
Secretary, so I am reducing your salary from Ninety Thousand to Sixty Thousand Naira….We 
now said it was because we had not shown this governor the power of the House of Assembly; 
he could not remove us, but we could remove him. We now said we should shake him. It was 
to shake him (Bello 2011, p.420). 
 This portrays the Nigerian political elite, especially in the legislature, as strategic in the 
exercise of their power to not only exert their power for future electoral prospects but to 
negotiate better current conditions because of their lack of financial autonomy.    
                                                 
126On the eve of the voting (November 7, 2000) party leaders who sponsored the elections of these legislators 
had prevailed on them to withdraw their votes or else they would be recalled from the house and lose any 
opportunity to be considered in the future for legislative positions. Unknown to the speaker, prominent members 
of the Alliance for Democracy (AD), the ruling party in the State, had arrived, at the invitation of the governor; 
to appeal to their respective candidates they sponsored not to participate in the impeachment process. The party 
leaders also came to the House of Assembly to impress upon the lawmakers to discontinue with the process 
(Votes and Proceedings Osun State House of Assembly, November 7 and 8, 2000). 
127 His does not mean that the allegations of gross misconduct leveled against him were imaginary, but rather 
that the political elites were interested in making a fortune out of the ensuing crisis. 
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The strategic politician approach considers the electoral process as a measure of enforcing 
accountability with regards to the electorate as the ‘rational god of vengeance and reward’ 
(Jacobson 1989). It sees the local and national variables as conditioning factors determining 
the electoral success of candidates. Jacobson and Kernell (1983) argue that strategic political 
elites would seek to enforce a sense of collective responsibility and accountability among the 
legislators in a presidential system by translating national conditions into election results. As 
Jacobson (1989, p. 775) has noted ‘the best potential candidates will also be most sensitive to 
the odds on winning and so to conditions that affect the odds’. Put differently, strategic 
political elite would time his or her candidature to coincide with favourable electoral 
circumstances (Gibson 1999; Romero 2004). 
In the advanced presidential systems where candidates largely depend on political parties or 
donors and sponsors for regulated campaign funds, they strategically adopt measures and 
better odds capable of inspiring more generous donations and supports (Jacobson 1989; 
Abramowitz 2006). In the legislative arena, Jacobson and Kernell (1981; 1983) aver that 
political elites devise strategies for their future political careers. They argue that the 
behaviour and decisions of potential politicians seeking re-election in the legislature are 
conditioned by certain considerations capable of determining their electoral success. Such 
elites weigh their actions and behaviours in the legislative debates and decisions based on 
experience, the prospects of a challenger and the interests of contributors to campaign funds 
(Jacobson 1989; Basinger and Ensley 2007).  
How does this relate to the impeachment process? Gary Jacobson (1999) applies this 
approach in the analysis of the behaviour of the American Congress in the impeachment of 
President Bill Clinton in 1998. To him, the Monica Lewinsky scandal128 was sufficient to 
upstage the electoral fortunes of the Democrats during the midterm election in the Congress. 
He argues that the popular rating of the president, as well as the strong economy of the 
United States at the time, influenced ‘the strategic decisions of potential candidates and 
campaign contributors’ (Jacobson 1999, p. 37). The scandal had ‘the potential for a dramatic 
deterioration in the public's rating of the president’ a factor that ought to have accelerated the 
removal of the president (Jacobson 1999, p.39) but then, what could have comprised political 
                                                 
128 The Monica Lewinsky scandal was the case of an amorous relationship between President Bill Clinton and a 
female intern in the White House, Monica Lewinsky. The scandal led to the impeachment of the president by 
the House of Representatives but was eventually acquitted by the Senate. 
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capital for the Republican Party worked against it in the Congress (Jacobson 1999). 
According to him, 
satisfaction with the Clinton administration's performance on things that directly affect 
people’s lives, especially the economy, was so strong that most people resolved whatever 
cognitive dissonance the scandal provoked by maintaining a sharp public/private distinction or 
by downplaying the gravity of Clinton's transgressions (Jacobson1999, p. 46).  
Most congressmen voted in the impeachment case based on their strategic calculations in 
relation to their electoral future (Zaller 1998; Jacobson 1999).  
Similarly, John Nichols (2011) cites a series of cases where the US Congress applied the 
political strategy approach in protecting President Ronald Reagan in 1987129. For instance, 
the Congress ignored the advice of Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez of Texas to impeach 
President Ronald Reagan over the Iran-Contra scandal130 in anticipation of a victory in the 
1988 election (Nichols, 2011, pp. 53-54). Unfortunately, George Hebert W. H. Bush, 
Reagan’s deputy, a principal character in the scandal won the election. Another case was the 
fallout from the invasion of Iraq when a revelation from Downing Street131indicated that the 
war ought to have been averted. In 2005, the Wisconsin Democratic Party proposed 
impeachment proceedings against President Bush, his deputy, Dick Cheney, and Defense 
Secretary, Rumsfeld. The Downing Street memo had revealed that the Bush administration 
ignored intelligence report to make a case for the war in Iraq (Nichols, 2011 p.54).  
The war in Iraq which could have been avoided, according to the memo, was one of the Bush 
administration‘s foreign policies that created the economic recession later inherited by 
President Barrack Obama in 2008.  
An opposition party that “waits for the next election” is not being partisan, it is being 
politically strategic. It is not doing what’s right for the country, it is doing what’s right for 
itself-or more precisely, what leaders who are disinclined to take risks think is politically 
“wise” (Nichols 2011, p. 53). 
                                                 
129 Ronald Reagan was the 40th president of the United States of America, January 20, 1981-January 20, 1989. 
He contested the election on the platform of the Republican Party.  
130 The Iran-Contra scandal was the case of a secret arms deal in 1986, facilitated by top administrative officers 
of President Ronald Reagan, to discretely supply arms to Iran, against the decision of to impose and arms 
embargo in a bid to secure the release of American held by a militant group in Lebanon. This group had a link 
with a section of the Iranian military. There was a Contra rebel in Nicaragua fighting the government, group 
supported by the Reagan administration. The Reagan administration official also diverted the money realised 
from the secret arms sales to Iran to fund the Contra rebel group.   
131 10, Downing Street, London, is the office and home of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.  
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The argument here is that if the Congress (and especially the members of the Democratic 
Party), had prevented the war in Iraq, without considering the consequences on their electoral 
chances, the economic recession which now affects the government might have been averted.   
 In Nigeria, a patron sponsors the election of a candidate in order to influence the candidate 
after the election and to control the government for the advancement of his or her personal 
interests. The candidate, as the client, would seek to please the patron who usually remains 
his benefactor, exerting influence to direct and control the process of government. When the 
member of the legislature acts contrary to this, the patron would seek to withdraw his support 
and orchestrate the removal of the candidate through the manipulation of legislative rules. 
Thus, it becomes a strategic necessity in Nigeria for a legislator that is sponsored by a 
godfather to accede to any orchestrated legislative process, despite any indication that the 
process would violate the rules in a bid to remove a governor or deputy governor who has 
parted ways with his patron (Adebanwi & Obadare 2011; Fagbadebo 2010; Lawan 2010; 
Omobowale & Olutayo 2007) should the legislator wish to stay in power. 
The planning and execution of the cases of impeachment in Anambra, Bayelsa, Oyo and 
Plateau States and, more recently, in Adamawa State, rest on strategic calculations on the part 
of the lawmakers, their political parties and their sponsors. Indeed, the outcomes of the 
judicial review processes of the cases in Anambra, Oyo and Plateau States depict the 
proliferation of disunified political elite group seeking to stay in power within the confines of 
manipulated rules. A former deputy governor who was a victim of an impeachment episode 
said that this attitude of the legislators is a manifestation of their lack of independence.  
They lacked independent thinking and actions. They were just at the whims and caprices of 
whoever was the chief executive of any state. Once a matter of impeachment case comes up, it 
is a deed done because there were no independent of thought. Laws could be breached; 
nobody cares about that (Personal Interview IV, May 15 2014). 
Thus it would seem that Nigerian political elite have a common objective of acquiring power 
and remaining in power for the advancement of their personal interests. These interests 
comprise of the access to state resources, becoming recipients of state contracts and 
influencing contracts awarded to others, and the acquisition of personal wealth. To them, 
government position is the best way to access the public treasury for personal use. As a 
commentator remarks, ‘a lot of funds that could have been used for development would be 
trapped in the hands of a few…politics [in Nigeria] is now the cheapest way to make 
money… (Olugbile 2010, p.38). 
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4.5  Structures, functions and elite behaviour in impeachment procedures 
In chapter two, I examined the role of the legislative shield in the process of impeachment. In 
Nigeria, the deployment of a legislative shield is dependent upon the political context. 
Legislators could shield a governor against his or her removal if there is a harmonious 
relationship based on mutual interest and benefits. In other words, ‘all too often, elite 
behavior falls short of public expectations as elected representatives engage in self-serving or 
otherwise morally questionable practices that violate popular norms of ethical behavior’ 
(Allen and Birch 2012, p.89).  
In the impeachment cases in Nigeria, the legislators were often faced with the pressure to 
accede to the demands of the political elite outside the legislature when considering 
impeachment cases. A former Speaker of the Osun State House of Assembly, Mojeed Alabi, 
expressed his dilemma when the legislature could not garner sufficient votes to impeach 
Governor Bisi Akande.  
I had to preside over the matter, exhibit as much of neutrality as I could and even defend the 
position of the House to go ahead with the impeachment. And when the impeachment 
proceedings failed, still justify why we couldn’t proceed in the face of clear provisions of the 
law when indeed some felt I could have pronounced the governor impeached even when we 
didn’t have the required two-thirds majority… Even then, some people still turn around and 
blame you for allowing the proceedings to commence in the first instance, including some of 
those who signed the notices… It was a most challenging period when you had to make a 
choice between political expediency and what was right (cf. Popoola 2014).  
 
The central factor in the impeachment process is the disposition of the legislature.. A law 
practitioner and one of the architects of the 1979 presidential constitution told me that what 
matters in impeachment cases is the willingness of the legislators to vote. ‘What I want to tell 
you is that the critical issue in impeachment is the vote. If you get the appropriate votes, he 
[Governor] is out, if you do not get the appropriate votes, he is in’ (Personal Interview VII, 
May 10, 2014). Though he recognized the importance of the allegations of gross misconduct, 
he considered the strategic disposition of the legislators as critical to the success or otherwise 
of the proceedings. 
In proposing his legislative shield approach to explain the institutional determinants of 
impeachment, Perez-Linan (2007) avers that in the face of public outrage and scandals, the 
president can rely on loyal legislators to avert impeachment. Conversely, the legislators can 
also use this shield against the president. In an ideal situation, Perez-Linan (2007, p.132) 
notes that the legislature will initiate an impeachment process, ‘only if there were sufficient 
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proof of a “high crime”, and would refrain from doing so if accusations were merely 
grounded in partisan or personal motivations’. In his extension of this approach, he argues 
that a ‘legislative shield may protect an unpopular president from the consequences of public 
outrage’ while a popular shield of the public, ‘may also dissuade the legislators from 
unseating the president’ even if he commits offences that warrant removal (Perez-Linan 
2014, p.35)132. In other words, legislators’ strategic considerations within the institutional 
structures of the political system are critical elements in impeachment cases (Perez-Linan 
2014). 
On the other hand, the public that are disillusioned by the failure of the government to 
deliver, they seek a change of leadership. This can happen mid-term, in which case they rely 
upon the legislature to effect this change. Thus, strategic legislators must balance the 
institutional rules with public opinion. In most cases, and particularly in Nigeria, the political 
elite influence public opinion through populist appeals to prevent public protests. At times, 
they exploit the public’s lack of information and understanding of the constitutional rules, as 
was the case in the botched impeachment in Osun State. They also sometimes resort to 
repressive measures such as intimidation to suppress public opinion. 
While the case of President Lugo was exceptional, it is yet to be seen if the Nigerian public 
has the same resilience to influence the removal of a governor through impeachment or shield 
a governor against removal even if he has not committed any offence. The public perception 
in Nigeria is that every politician occupying any government position is corrupt (Fagbadebo 
2007). Even if the public provides the necessary support, as in the case of Osun State in 2000, 
the final decision remains with the legislators whether to accede to public demand or to act 
within the confine of their strategic political reality.  
On the contrary, the social and political context of the presidential system might influence the 
legislators to commence impeachment proceedings (Kada 2000; 2003). The decision to 
initiate impeachment is dependent on the attitude and disposition of the legislators in relation 
to the prevailing social and political context of the crisis. When a legislative shield is solid, 
the legislators might decide to protect a president whose conduct deserves further 
                                                 
132He developed this extended argument based on the removal of President Lugo of Paraguay in 2012, a 




investigation and sanction. On the other hand, a hostile legislature could initiate impeachment 
even if there is no sufficient motivation from the public.  
Nevertheless, the issue of the legislative shield revolves around the credibility of the 
legislature.  Perez-Linan (2007, p. 132) has noted that irrespective of the social and political 
context of a presidential crisis, the legislature as a democratic institution of governance 
‘should act in ways that strengthen its credibility and public standing’. This is where political 
strategy comes in. Strategic legislative elites would not venture to initiate impeachment 
against a president with a high public rating if there are no sufficient justifications or 
motivation to protect the public interest (Perez-Linan 2007; 2014; Kada 2003; Zaller 1998; 
Jacobson 1999). The impeachment of Bill Clinton in 1998 and the removal of President 
Fernando Lugo of Paraguay are classical cases where the legislature, because of partisan 
incentives, chooses to initiate impeachment of a president on issues not considered as 
justifiable by the public (Zaller 1998; Jacobson 1999; Marsteintredet et al 2013; Perez-Linan 
2014). 
President Clinton, for example, enjoyed a high public rating because of an improved 
economy while the public, despite the media frenzy, viewed the sex scandal as the president’s 
personal life with limited effect on the American interest (Zaller, 1998; Jacobson 1999). 
Nevertheless, the Republican dominated Congress proceeded with the impeachment but the 
Senate, dominated by members of the Democratic Party, acquitted the president. The case of 
President Lugo of Paraguay differs. There was little or no justification for this extreme 
legislative action but his relationship with a partisan legislature, as well as a less than 
impressive public rating, provided a shield that worked against him (Marsteintredet et al 
2013; Perez-Linan 2014). Perez-Linan has noted that 
partisan legislators may resist social pressures to impeach the president. Conversely, co-opted 
social movements may mobilize against impeachment proceedings. When opponents 
constitute a challenge and supporters fail to articulate a political shield, the president is 
exposed and the administration confronts a high risk of failure (Perez-Linan 2014, p.38). 
The same actors that provide a shield can also become a source of threat depending on the 
political context. Popular protest is a signal of public discontent capable of undermining 
public order (Perez-Linan 2014). This may embolden the opposition to further discredit the 
administration and demand its fall through a democratic legislative process. If this 
degenerates, the administration might seek to apply force. In the event of popular outcry, the 
political shield might collapse and make the administration vulnerable. Perez-Linan identifies 
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four factors to explain this phenomenon: constitutional rules, the party system, the nature of 
the relationship between the president and the legislature, and the political context which 
might include political scandals, and timing of the electoral year (Perez-Linan 2014; 2007). 
While this worked in the case of President Lugo, it is not sufficient to understand the 
ineffectiveness of the combination of the interaction of popular protests or inactions in the 
explanation of impeachment politics in Nigeria. 
4.5.1 The nature and characteristics of Nigerian political elites 
 
Scholars of the Nigerian political system (Ekeh 1975; Sklar et al 2006; Adebanwi and 
Obadare 2011; Kirfodu 2011) often describe the nature of Nigerian political actors in relation 
to their conduct as corrupt. Peter Ekeh (1975, p.110) attributes this to the transition from the 
‘primordial public’ to the ‘civic public’. He defines corruption in two forms: ‘embezzlement 
of funds from the civic public [the government]… [and] solicitation and acceptance of bribes 
from individuals seeking services provided by the civic public’ (Ekeh, 1975, p. 110). This, he 
argues, was absent in the ‘primordial public’. According to him, any leader who indulges in 
such in the primordial public  
may risk serious sanctions from members of his own primordial public if he seeks to extend 
the honesty and integrity with which he performs his duties in the primordial public to his 
duties in the civic public by employing universalistic criteria of impartiality (Ekeh, 1975, p. 
110). 
Henry Kifordu (2011) says Nigeria’s political elites depend largely on the public, and survive 
on state resources. He contends that they exploit and manipulate state institutions for the 
realization of their personal ambitions, while vested interests continually encumber 
accountability (Kifordu, 2011).  
Richard Sklar et al (2006) aver that ‘Nigeria’s political titans vie for power and control over 
the vast spoils of office’ and ‘sit atop vast, pyramid-structured patronage networks based on 
regular “cash and carry” kickback relationships’ while over 70 percent of the people wallow 
in  poverty (Sklar et al 2006, p. 105). Likewise, Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare 
(2011) see Nigeria as a polity where political actors consecrate corruption while they engage 
in competitive thievery of public funds. The cartoons in figures I and II below provide a 








Figure I: A cartoon presented to describe the body language of typical Nigerian politician 
 towards public appointment 





Figure II: A cartoon illustrating the perception of the Nigerian politician to public 
appointment  





The cartoon in figure I depicts the need for a change of perspective by public officials 
occupying government positions. It shows a fictional discussion to explain how President 
Buhari was to reduce the cost of the government, through encouraging a disciplined life style 
among government ministers and other political appointees (Alli 2015). Aside from this, the 
president had also announced that not all the nominees screened for ministerial appointment 
would be assigned portfolios (Vanguard, 31/10/2015)133. Figure II depicts the fictional 
response of a Nigerian politician to the issue of serving in government without any assigned 
responsibility over a portfolio.  
These political cartoons are not misplaced. A former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, lamented 
that the Nigerian political elites have failed to provide credible leadership for the nation. He 
said: ‘We are jinxed and cursed; we should all go to hell’ (cf. Ajayi, 2013). Similarly, former 
Nigerian Defence Minister (and a member of the prominent retired military elite in the 
current political dispensation), Theophilus Danjuma, denounced the infamous role of the 
country’s political elites who are fond of ‘scheming and screaming for due and undue 
advantages’ while the people ‘are chained down in dehumanising and grinding poverty’ (cf. 
Akhaine & Bello 2013). The positions of Obasanjo and Danjuma are not new. Segun Osoba 
(1978, p.65) has noted in his analysis of the formative stages of the Nigerian political society 
that instability associated with the Nigerian political system was a function of ‘this ever-
widening gap of legitimacy and authority between the rulers and the ruled’. Sklar et al (2006, 
p.110) corroborate this by arguing that if ‘most of these elites … perceive that the democratic 
system serves their interests better than extra systemic alternatives…the system must be able 
to check those elites who conspicuously break the rules’.  
The conduct of Nigeria’s political elites since 1999 has shown growing boldness in 
circumventing the democratic system to advance their personal interests. In all the cases of 
impeachment considered in this study, a common feature is the manipulation of the 
constitutional rules that prescribe the specifics of the procedures to be followed. For instance, 
it is an abuse of the rule of law for six members of a 24-member legislature to carry out an 
impeachment, as occurred in the case of Plateau State. 
                                                 
133 In compliance with the constitutional provisions on the federal character principle of the Nigerian federal 
system, all the 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) would be represented in the 




One major characteristic of the Nigerian political elite relates to Ekeh’s predictions that they 
lack ‘autonomy in the formation of their values and in their decision-making processes 
independent of external sources’ and pressures (Ekeh 1975, p.94). Sule Lamido, the Governor 
of Jigawa state, alluded to this characteristic saying that the conduct of Nigerian political 
elites affects democratic patterns and standards (Aziken 2013). He attributed this to the 
brazen exploitation of rules to obtain personal advantage in the system. This, according to 
him, engenders disorder in the political system. For instance, in virtually all the impeachment 
cases in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, external forces such as political pressures and financial 
inducements, prompted the actions of the legislators134.  
Richard Joseph (1991, p.55) has noted that the nature of the Nigerian political elites revolve 
round what he calls ‘clientelism and prebendal politics’ while ‘access to the state remained 
disproportionately important for the elites who struggle to appropriate the state resources for 
private use’. As Abubakar argues, ‘state power remains highly personalized, immense, 
totalizing arbitrary, often violent and always threatening’ (Abubakar, 2004, p.155). This 
mentality persists. A series of political hiccups associated with the prevailing political 
process in Nigeria are being facilitated by the acute division among the elites over the control 
of state power for the promotion of personal interests. 
Indeed, in Nigeria, previous military interventions were the manifestation of this disconnect 
between the ruled and the political actors135. The public often accept such undemocratic 
changes because of the lack of trust in the political leadership arising from the inability of the 
democratically elected government to promote the public good. The dearth of good 
governance has persisted even after the return to civilian rule in 1999. This explains why the 
Nigerian public, unlike its counterpart in Latin America, would remain unconcerned about 
enforcing public accountability. 
                                                 
134 For example, pressures from the political leaders of the Alliance of Democracy (AD) facilitated the failure of 
the impeachment process against Governor Bisi Akande of Osun State while the same pressure prompted the 
lawmakers to impeach his deputy, Iyiola Omisore. The impeachment of Joshua Dariye, Rasheed Ladoja and late 
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, though there were prima facie cases against them, were facilitated by the prompting 
of external forces rather than the willingness of the legislators. 
135 The conduct of political actors in power facilitated the involvement of the military in Nigeria’s political 
landscape since 1966. By the time the military struck in January 15, 1966, discontent with the government was 
rife among the populace because of the turbulence, looting and arson that greeted the controversial census of 
1962, the general elections of 1964 and the Western Region Election of 1965. These developments arose 
because of the intra-leadership squabbles across the political parties. Similarly, the military justified the 
December 31, 1983 coup because of the spate of crises that followed the widespread protests and violence that 
followed the 1983 general elections as well as indiscipline and corruption among political actors. For details, see 
Ojiako, 1980; Ademoyega, 1981, Joseph, 1991. The military elites while in power did not fare better either. 
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A common feature in the cases of impeachment in Nigeria is the desire to occupy the 
gubernatorial seats at the state levels before the expiration of the stipulated term in office136.  
To accomplish this, the political leaders have to recruit the political elite in the legislature to 
draw up plans to influence the application of the constitutional provisions. If there is no 
unified position among the majority of the legislators, a usually difficult task, the political 
elites would be fragmented.  
This malaise is not limited to actors within the political branches of the government. The 
struggle for prominence and survival has also permeated the attitudes and conduct of the 
members of the judiciary, and particularly the judges in the courts of adjudication, who 
allegedly sell justice to the highest bidders (Momoh 2012; Adisa 2013; Rasheed 2013). As 
will be seen in chapter five, a series of cases of impeachment were complicated by judicial 
pronouncements as well as unethical conduct among a number of judges in the State High 
Courts.  
According to the constitution each institution of government in Nigeria has specific 
responsibilities. The exercise of these responsibilities is the process by which policy is 
implemented and the needs of the population realized. Unfortunately, this is not the case in 
Nigeria and this explains the abysmal global ratings of the country’s performance in all 
sectors based on the reality of the development indexes Development index reports as shown 
in Tables 5,6 and 7, place Nigeria among the countries that exhibit poor human development, 














                                                 
136 A governor is constitutionally qualified to govern for four years. He could be re-elected for another term of 
four years. Most governors would want to spend two terms of 4 years each. Disenchanted political leaders could 
orchestrate a midterm removal through the legislative process of impeachment.  
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Table 5: Nigeria’s Human Development Index (HDI) and Ranking, 1999-2013 
 
Year HDI Rank 
1999 0.456 146 
2000 0.439 151 
2001 0.455 136 
2002 0.466 148 
2003 0.463 152 
2004 0.466 151 
2005 0.466 158 
2006 0.448 159 
2007/2008 0.470 158 
2009 0.425 158 
2010 0.423 142 
2011 0.459 156 
2012  NA NA 
2013 0.471 153 
2014 0.504 152 
 
Source: Compiled by author from the available data produced by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) Human Development Reports for the period. Available at: 
www.undp.org/content/undp/en/hme/librarypage/hdr/ 
 
As shown in Table 5 above Nigeria has, since 1999, consistently remained in the rank of 
countries displaying low indicators of human development. The Human Development Index 
(HDI) measures the capacity of the state to ‘create an enabling environment for people to 
enjoy long, healthy and creative lives’ (Human Development Report 1990). Paul Streeten in 
his contribution to the HDR 1999, defines human development as, 
the process of enlarging people’s choices—not just choices among different detergents, 
television channels or car models but the choices that are created by expanding human 
capabilities and functionings (sic)—what people do and can do in their lives (Streeten 1999, 
p.16). 
The indicators of human development include the capability ‘to lead long and healthy lives, 
to be knowledgeable and to have access to the resources needed for a decent standard of 
living’ (Streeten 1999, p.16). Other choices that are valued include ‘political, social, 
economic and cultural freedom, a sense of community, opportunities for being creative and 
productive, and self-respect and human rights’ (Streeten 1999, p.16). The HDR (1999) 
indicates that ‘human development is more than just achieving these capabilities; it is also the 
process of pursuing them in a way that is equitable, participatory, productive and 
sustainable’. A low HDR index is a threat to human security. The HDR identifies eight 
dimensions of threats to human security: economic insecurity, food insecurity, health 
insecurity, personal insecurity, environmental insecurity, community and cultural insecurity 





Table 6: Nigeria’s Fragile/Failed State Index 2005-2015 
 
Year Indicators Rank Total 
DP REF GG HF UED ECO SL PS HR SEC FE EXT 
2005 7.2 3.0 6.5 8.7 8.9 5.8 8.8 6.9 6.7 9.0 8.3 4.5 54/76 84.3 
2006 8.0 5.9 9.1 8.5 9.0 5.4 9.0 8.3 7.1 9.2 9.0 5.9 22/146 94.4 
2007 8.2 5.6 9.5 8.5 9.1 5.4 9.1 8.7 7.1 9.2 9.5 5.7 17/177 95.6 
2008 8.2 5.1 9.4 8.2 9.2 5.9 8.9 8.7 7.5 9.2 9.3 6.1 18/177 95.7 
2009 8.5 5.3 9.7 8.3 9.5 6.6 9.2 9.0 8.6 9.4 9.6 6.1 15/177 99.8 
2010 8.4 5.8 9.5 8.1 9.3 6.9 9.4 9.1 8.8 9.3 9.4 6.2 14/177 100.2 
2011 8.3 6.0 9.6 7.7 9.0 7.3 9.0 9.0 8.6 9.1 9.5 6.9 14/177 99.9 
2012 8.4 6.5 9.7 7.6 8.9 7.5 9.1 9.1 8.6 9.2 9.8 6.6 14/177 101.1 
2013 8.5 6.6 9.8 7.0 9.2 7.3 8.8 9.3 8.6 9.5 9.4 6.3 16/178 100.7 
2014 8.3 6.9 9.8 7.0 8.9 7.3 8.8 9.0 8.7 9.5 9.5 6.0 17/178 99.7 
2015 8.8 7.5 9.9 7.1 8.8 7.6 9.1 9.1 8.8 9.9 9.8 6.0 14/178 102.4 
 
Source: Compiled by author from the Failed/Fragile States Index Reports produced by The Fund for Peace. 
Available at: www.global.fundforpeace.org 
 
 
Similarly, the Failed/Fragile States Index, as shown in Table 6, ranks Nigeria very low. The 
index is an annual ranking of countries based on the indicators of their levels of stability and 
the combination and severity of pressures they face. The index measure twelve indicators 
divided into two categories: Social and Economic indicators and Political and Military 
Indicators. The social and economic indicators are demographic pressure (DP), refugees and 
IDP (REF), uneven economic development (UED), group grievances (GG), human rights and 
brain drain (HF) and poverty and economic decline (ECO). The political and military 
indicators are state legitimacy (SL), public services (PS), human rights and rule of law (HR), 
security apparatus (SEC), factionalized elites (FE), and external intervention (EXT). 
Nigeria’s position for the eleven years oscillates between high alert and alert category 
denoting the vulnerability of the people to socio-economic problems that engender a poor 








Table 7: Nigeria’s Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIGA) 2000-2015 
 
Year Rank Score 
2000 39 45.7 
2001 NA NA 
2002 41 46.2 
2003 NA NA 
2004 NA NA 
2005 38 47.3 
2006 39 48.5 
2007 37 48.3 
2008 35 45.5 
2009 38 50.3 
2010 40 43 
2011 41 41 
2012 43 42 
2013 41 43.4 
2014 37 45.8 
2015 39 44.9 
Source: Compiled by the author from the IIAG Report produced by the MO Ibrahim Foundation. Available at: 
www.moibrahimfoundation.org 
The IIGA measures African governance based on 4 categories of issues divided into 14 other 
sub-categories and 93 indicators (MO Ibrahim Foundation 2015).  The safety and rule of law 
category is sub-divided into rule of law, accountability, personal safety and national security. 
The second category is that of participation and human rights, which comprises of 
participation, rights and gender. The third category, sustainable economic opportunity, is sub 
divided into public management, business environment infrastructure, and the rural sector. 
The fourth category is human development with welfare, education and health sub-categories. 
In all these indicators, Nigeria’s rating is very poor compared to the resources at the disposal 
of the political leadership137. 
 
From the above data, it is evident that the Nigerian political elites have been unable to 
translate the abundant resources at the disposal of the state into a better quality of life for the 
population.  
In their overview on the fragile States Index 2015, Messner and Blyth (2015) note the ray of 
hope indicated by the peaceful conduct of the 2015 general election, and especially mention 
the historical landmark of an opposition party winning an election without violence. 
Nevertheless, their remark indicates a pessimistic warning for the future. 
                                                 
137According to the World Bank, Nigeria has a healthy economy with a total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 




It has given pause to cynics and raised hopes in the possibility of a maturing democracy and 
representative governance in Nigeria.  Still, more than ever, challenges remain.  None of the 
conflict drivers have gone away.  Next year will be critical for ensuring that Nigeria truly is on 
a trajectory towards sustainable peace and security and that this peaceful transition was not 
just a blip on the radar screen (Messner and Blyth 2015). 
These conflict drivers, according to Nate Haken (2015) include poverty, inequality, and 
dependence on oil as source of government revenue, corruption and patronage networks. 
One of the major problems with elite politics in Nigeria’s presidential system is the desire of, 
and struggle by, the executive branch to “annex” or substantially control the legislative and 
the judicial branches of government as extensions of the executive branch rather than as 
independent organs in a system of interdependent relationships. A former state governor, 
Ibrahim Saminu Turaki, of Jigawa State, confirmed this recently. According to him,  
 
The biggest problem in some states is that the executive arm almost always takes control of 
the legislative body and, by extension, the judiciary…The principle of the separation of power 
has been defeated and the course of democracy subverted (cf. Dangida 2014)138.  
This is a common political strategy to secure legislative and judicial shields against 
impeachment139. On the part of the state governors, a loyal legislature has direct access to all 
its funding requests. Having been co-opted into the regime of executive recklessness, the 
legislature would find it very difficult to move against the governor (even if there are public 
motivations for evidence of gross misconduct, corruption and fraud. One of the legislative 
elite said that in the face of monetary inducement, Nigerian lawmakers could easily 
compromise their representative role. 
Most legislators perceive their roles as gate keepers; being gate keepers, if they can settle 
them, the gate can be opened! If there are weaknesses they observe and there are chances that 
they can be settled, i.e. be given either a contract, they can look the other way (Personal 
Interview IX, May 19, 2014). 
Professor Wole Soyinka attributes this to the type of presidential system in Nigeria. 
According to him, the practice of presidentialism in Nigeria engenders regimes of corruption 
(Kumolu 2014). Since the executive can negotiate with the legislature for mutual benefits, the 
                                                 
138He was alleged to have stole N6billion from the state treasury and to have diverted public funds for private 
use (Kolade-Otitoju 2010). 
139 The legislature and the judiciary play crucial role in the impeachment process in Nigeria. While the 
legislature drafts the articles of impeachment, the composition of the panel of investigation is the prerogative of 
the head of the judiciary. If the legislature refuses to provide a shield against impeachment, the head of the 
judiciary could compose a panel willing to provide the shield by declaring that the allegations were not 
sufficiently grave to warrant impeachment. Thus, a loyal legislature and or judiciary could provide a shield for 
or against impeachment. 
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provision of public good is dependent upon the mutual relationship between the two branches 
of government. If the legislature chooses to allow the policy options of the executive to be 
implemented without proper scrutiny, the public suffers. He argues that the Nigerian public 
‘became critical of the presidential system because it is close to kleptomania. The presidential 
system [in Nigeria] breeds corrupt leaders’ (cf. Kumolu 2014).  
Nigeria’s constitution recognises the prominent roles of the legislature. The realisation of the 
fundamental objectives of directive principles of state policy depends largely on the ability of 
the legislature to enhance the promotion of accountability. The political elite in Nigeria’s 
political system are aware of the impact of institutional failure on good governance.  Sule 
Lamido, one of the former prominent state governors in Nigeria noted this recently, saying: 
 
So, let us have institutions which are functioning… Clearly defined and when they are 
functioning you won’t talk about problems in Nigeria for the next one million years. Not 
Nigeria of today and when a country is not defined by institutions we will keep on remaining 
in one spot (cf. Aziken, 2013). 
The political elite in Nigeria are aware of their roles and responsibilities within the structures 
of the presidential system. A legislator told me that the lawmakers are aware of their 
responsibilities and the extant constitutional provisions to facilitate the discharge of their 
duties. 
 
Basically, the legislature as part of the government in presidential system is saddled with the 
responsibility of checkmating the excesses of the executive branch on order to promote good 
governance. The legislature can sanction the executive through the exercise of the power of 
impeachment. It makes laws for the smooth running of the government, it deliberate on the 
budget estimates of the spending of the government; without legislative appropriation 
government cannot spend money. These are the various ways the constitution designs the 
structure of the legislature to serve as an effective institution in the running to the government 
(Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, they make use of the loopholes in the institutional arrangements to further their 
strategic interests140. According to informants, ‘political immaturity, greed, selfishness, and a 
host of other problems’ (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014)often causes legislators to 
abandon their constitutional assigned roles. Thus, the problem is not institutional failure but, 
rather, the incapacity of the political elite to perform the requisite functions and 
responsibilities within the rules in order to make the institutions function effectively.  
                                                 
140The legislature does not have any independent course of action without a concurrent action by the executive 
in the area of policy-making. While lawmakers can pass resolutions and motions, they do not have the force of 
the law for execution, except in some specific cases such as approval of executive appointments. Beside this, 
state legislatures are not financially autonomous; they depend on the executive for their routine financial needs.     
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While institutional weaknesses serve the political elite, ordinary citizens suffer. Governor 
Lamido asserted that Nigerian political elites strategically weaken the institutions of the civil 
society through divide and rule tactics where one group is being played against others and 
thus take away the dignity of the public in order to perpetuate their interests. According to 
him, ‘the common man [in Nigeria] loses nothing. What is he losing? He is already living in 
hell; he cannot lose anything more than this hell’ (cf. Aziken, 2013).  
Francis Fukuyama (2015, p.12) has noted that the disappointing performance of democracies, 
especially in the developing countries, has to do with ‘a failure of institutionalization’. To 
him, most modern states lack the capacity to keep pace with the popular demands for 
democratic accountability. In the case of Nigeria’s presidential system, this weakness arises 
from the inability of the political elites to adhere to the rule of law because of their lack of 
independent political base.  Political elites tend to pursue intra and inter elite cohesion with a 
view to guaranteeing continuity in power (Kolstad and Wiig 2015; Schedler and Hoffmann 
2015). Nevertheless, such convergence among the political elites, which Schedler and 
Hoffman (2015, p.3) describe as ‘authoritarian elite cohesion’ ‘does not derive primarily from 
mutual trust between minority and majority factions, but from the capacity of rulers to 
enforce their demands of loyalty’. In other words, such levels of unity are ‘not the fruit of 
elite cooperation, but of elite subordination’ (Schedler and Hoffman 2015, p.3). Thus, a 
‘cohesive authoritarian elite is a loyal elite, respectful of and faithful to the commands of the 
supreme leadership’ (Schedler and Hoffman 2015, p.3). 
Fukuyama (2015, p.15) associates state capacity with sufficient human and material resources 
in order to cope with the ‘array of complex services’  that  requires ‘huge investments in 
human resources and in the material conditions that allow agents of the state to operate’. 
Though Fukuyama argues that state incapacity may not necessarily arise from corruption, in 
the case of Nigeria, the political elites incapacitate the state through corruption.  
Nigeria has abundant human and material resources capable of improving the quality of life 
of the citizens. Rather than transform this capacity into positive policy outcomes, the 
Nigerian state, according to LeVan (2014, p.3) ‘possesses many of the qualities associated 
with policy failure’. He notes that civilian dictatorships with a high foreign debt in the midst 
of a robust oil economy undermines growth and stifles public trust in the government. He 
argues that ‘excessive increases in spending on local collective goods are a sign of patronage 
or misappropriation of these policy outputs with excludable benefits’ (LeVan 2014, p.3). He 
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attributes this to the activities of the individual political elites, whom he describes as “veto 
players” in the structure of the public policy environment. These “veto players” are ‘rooted in 
institutions such as legislatures or military ruling councils, or they can emerge from 
alternative centres of power, manifest in military factions, cohesive political parties, or broad 
regional coalitions’ (LeVan 2014, p.3). The poor showing of the Nigerian political elites in 
the provision of public goods has earned them derision by the public, as noted by Governor 
Segun Mimiko of Ondo State. He said: ‘There is this demonic characterisation of politicians 
in Nigeria. Politicians are seen as vagabond, rogues and so on’ (cf. Atoyebi 2015). 
Richard Sklar et al (2006, p.100) have remarked that, ‘the great game of politics in Nigeria is 
perilously rough and at times lawless’.  
Decades of avaricious military rule have left the Nigerian political landscape dominated by 
powerful “godfathers” who sit atop vast patronage networks at the local, state, and federal 
levels. Political outcomes are primarily a function of titanic struggles among these magnates, 
who bargain among themselves—and at the expense of the impoverished greater public—
within a political context of multiple ethno religious divisions (Sklar et al 2006, p. 101). 
 
Nigerian political elites employ many different tactics to outsmart one another in a bid to 
exert control on state power (Omololu 2014). They are patrons, who usually recruit their 
clients into elective positions as proxy methods of access and influence to the largess of the 
state. If the clients fail, they recruit non-elites to disrupt government activities through 
clandestine political activities who become spoilers. For instance, the Niger Delta militancy 
and the Boko Haram insurgency in the South-South and the North Eastern part of Nigeria, 
respectively, have their root in the political divisions among the political elites (Fagbadebo 
and Akinola 2010; Adeniyi 2011; Omololu 2014). . The essence is to create influence over 
those in power. As will be seen in chapter five, late Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu in Oyo State, 
Chief Jide Offor and Chief Chris Mba of Anambra State, are the classic cases of godfathers 
who sought to manipulate the state to advance their interests (Omobowale & Olutayo 
2007)141. 
 4.6 Summary 
In this chapter I discussed the Nigerian political elite. Their desire to control power – 
sometimes at all costs – provides their rationale for their manipulation of constitutional rules. 
                                                 
141They actually sought to compel the governors to take orders from them before implementing any policy. 
When, for instance, when Chris Ngige refused to abide by this order, he was abducted and was forced to resign 
his position as the governor. This is the extent at which individuals could exert influence on formal institutions 
of government in the Nigerian presidential system.   
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This is the bedrock of the ineffectiveness of the institutional checks against impunity. I 
discuss how this trait manifested in a series of impeachment cases since 1999. I examined and 
analysed the operation of the presidential system within the scope of elite theory, structural 
functional analysis and the legislative role theory. I examined the concept of institutions and 
institutionalism and how these concepts relate to the operation of the presidential system. I 
discussed the theories within the context of the institutional framework and claim that the 
Nigerian political elites act strategically in the exercise of power to advance personal interests 
in the political system. Citing relevant cases of the activities of the Nigerian political elites in 
the legislature, I discovered, theoretically, that the exercise of the legislative power of 
impeachment in Nigeria is contrary to the norms in other presidential systems. A single 
theory is insufficient for a comprehensive analysis of the actions of the Nigerian political 
elite.  
The central idea of contemporary representative democracy focuses on the theoretical 
assumption that the rulers and the people are bonded on the promise and benefits of good 
governance. While the rulers secure power through the electoral mandate of the people, the 
general expectation of the public is that leaders will be accountable within the structural 
framework of political institutions.  
Political institutions are mere abstractions without the involvement of political actors, 
comprising the political elite and civil society. The activities of the political elite are 
predicated on the general expectations of the people whose mandate provides the requisite 
legitimate authority. In return, political elites are expected to exhibit behavioural that attracts 
popular approval, is legitimate and is in accordance with the principles of the rule of law and 
good governance. 
Nicholas Allen and Sarah Birch (2012, p.89) note that contrary to public expectations, 
‘elected representatives engage in self-serving or otherwise morally questionable practices 
that violate popular norms of ethical behaviour’. In Nigeria, there is a disjuncture between 
these expectations of the public and the actual behaviours of the political elite in government. 
This is demonstrated in the politics of impeachment. 
In the next chapter I provide an analysis of the practice of the legislative power of 
impeachment in selected states in Nigeria. I examine and analyse cases of impeachment and I 
examine the constitutional provisions relating to impeachment in the Nigerian presidential 
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system. I discuss and analyse the various constitutional breaches in the cases of impeachment 








































Impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, 1999-2007: Analysis of Cases and 
Empirical Findings 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
The military interregnum that followed the collapse of the Second Nigerian Republic in 1983 
lingered until May 1999. Thus, for sixteen years, the Nigerian military, through a series of 
coups and counter coups, dominated the country’s political space and decimated the 
democratic institutional structures. One of the implications of the December 31, 1983 military 
putsch was the inability of the presidential system of the Second Republic to consolidate 
democratically (Nwabueze 1985)142. Rather than progress towards the entrenchment of the 
political culture of democratic principles, the various transition programmes of the military in 
preparation for the country’s return to civil rule further undermined the political system. The 
culture of exclusion from the political space, through divide and rule tactics, became rampant 
with a growing culture of impunity and disregard for the rule of law. 
The application of the legislative oversight power of impeachment was one of the casualties 
of the military coups and subsequent military regimes in Nigeria. Following the impeachment 
of Governor Balarabe Musa, of the defunct Kaduna State, there were a series of cases 
awaiting judicial decisions on whether the constitutional provisions would be applied and the 
governors removed. The judiciary (especially the State High Courts and the Federal Court of 
Appeal) declined jurisdiction in adjudicating on impeachment cases.143 As Nwabueze (1985) 
has noted, this development denied the political system of a judicial precedent on a 
fundamental aspect of the presidential system in Nigeria. There were no fundamental judicial 
pronouncements to define the intents of the constitution with regards to the process and 
                                                 
142The presidential system was adopted as Nigeria’s system of government in 1979 after thirteen years of 
military rule. The immediate post-independence First Republic was based on the British Westminster 
Parliamentary Model. The practice of presidential system, for the first time in the Second Republic, faced a 
series of problems because of the inexperience of the political elites (Ogunbadejo 1980). Nevertheless, the 
military intervention of December 3, 1983, was a setback to the growth and development of the features of the 
system because it denied the political elite the opportunity to adapt to the demanding nature and culture of a 
presidential system. 
143(Musa v. Speaker, Kaduna State House of Assembly,[1982] 3 NCLR 450; Musa v. Hamza & Others, [1982] 3 
NCLR 439 (H.C); Musa v. Hamza & Others,[1982] 3 NCLR 229 (FCA). 
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procedure of impeachment. Hence the flagrant abuse of the legislative rules in the early part 
of the Fourth Republic.  
This unresolved issue of how to exercise of the legislative oversight power of impeachment 
remained until the Fourth Republic and, by extension, the second Nigerian experience with a 
presidential system of democracy. Within the first eight years of Nigeria’s return to a 
presidential democracy, 1999-2007, the country recorded a far greater number of 
impeachments of state governors and their deputies than previously144. The governors of the 
following states - Anambra, Bayelsa, Ekiti, Oyo, and Plateau - were removed via 
impeachment processes by their respective state legislatures. Similarly, legislatures in Abia, 
Akwa Ibom, Cross River, Ekiti, Gombe, Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi, Lagos, Osun145, and Taraba 
States, removed their deputy governors146. In all these cases, there were breaches of the 
procedures required by law and set out in the constitution to impeach these governors.. 
The themes of this chapter are divided into five sections. In the first, I present a brief 
discussion and analysis of the impeachment of the governors in the four selected states. I then 
discuss the constitutional provisions relating to the impeachment of state governors and their 
deputies. I explore the characteristics of the provisions and provide an analysis of the judicial 
review of the various cases. I interrogate the politics of the judicial shield that gave reprieve 
to the governors removed without complying with the extant rules set out in the constitution. 
In the next section, I provide an analysis of the meaning in the constitution as it applies to 
impeachment. Finally, I explore and analyse empirical data on the various infractions 
committed by the governors that ought to have been cause by the legislatures to remove them. 
Some of these infractions violate the constitutional provision regarding the conduct of elected 
governors while in office.  
My claim in this chapter is that the exercise of the powers of impeachment by the legislature 
was not in keeping with the constitution. Though the governors that were impeached had 
                                                 
144 During this period, 16 cases of impeachment were recorded in 15 out of the 36 states.   
145The Governor of the State had earlier escaped removal through impeachment because the House could not 
muster sufficient votes to direct the investigation of the allegations of gross misconduct contained in the notice. 
146The Deputy Governor of Abia State, Eyinaya Abaribe, survived the first two impeachment attempts but 
eventually resigned when the legislature commenced the third attempt. Similarly, the two Deputy Governors in 
Lagos States, Bucknor Akerele and Pedro, also tendered their resignation letters when the legislature 
commenced impeachment processes against them. Tukur Jikamshi of Katsina State, Abdullahi Argungu of 
Kebbi State, John Okpa of Cross River State, Garba Gadi of Gombe State and Shehu Kwatalo of Jigawa State 
lost their positions through impeachment when they fell out with their governors. 
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records of conduct that amounted to the violation of the constitution, the manner in which the 
processes were carried out demonstrates the use of impeachment as a political weapon. 
Judicial review of the cases supports my claims, as the governors of Oyo, Plateau and 
Anambra states were restored to power. This does not mean that they were innocent of the 
charges proffered against them, but rather that the legislature had failed to abide by the 
constitutional rules and procedures relating to impeachment. 
My conclusion is that collaboration between the legislature and the executive would shield a 
governor against impeachment even if there was glaring evidence of infractions.  Most of the 
governors removed, were done so by a minority faction of the legislature which enjoyed the 
support of the majority faction. The critical aspect of a valid impeachment procedure is the 
vote. The minority faction did not embark upon impeachment out of patriotism, but as a 
strategic move to please their benefactors in anticipation of political rewards that were to 
comprise of future appointments or re-election.  
5.2 Impeachment of the governors in the selected states 
In Oyo State, 18 members of the 32-member legislature loyal to a chieftain of the ruling 
Peoples’ Democratic party (PDP), Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu, met in a hotel in Ibadan, the state 
capital, and commenced a process to remove the governor, Rasheed Ladoja. Prior to this 
development, there had been a crisis between the governor and his political sponsor, the late 
Alhaji Adedibu, who was a prominent leader of the PDP, the ruling party both in the state and 
at the federal level (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; Oni 2013)147. The crisis between the two 
was based on what the governor describes as the unreasonable demand of his godfather, a 
claim that Adedibu did not deny (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; Oni 2013). According o the 
governor, his godfather wanted a percentage of the share of the financial allocation to the 
state to be remitted to him for his personal use (Aderemi 2005; Adegboyega 2006; Adeyemo 
2007). Aside from this, the governor also claimed that his godfather wanted to nominate a 
sizeable number of members of his cabinet and political advisers.  
                                                 
147 Late Alhaji Adedibu was a chieftain of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in Oyo State whose political 
influence boosted the electoral victory of Ladoja and a sizeable number of members of the state legislature. 
There was a godfather-godson relationship between them. However, the ‘revolt’ of the godson against his 
godfather created an unstable political environment in the state that divided the members of the legislature into 
two factions - 18 members supported Adedibu while 14 supported Ladoja. 
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Since a sizeable number of the members of the legislature were elected because of the 
influence of Adedibu, the crisis between him and the former governor affected the unity 
among the legislators (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007). The Oyo State House of Assembly 
then became factionalised. The 14 members loyal to the former governor (including the 
speaker and the principal officers of the House) held the normal parliamentary meetings in 
the legislative chamber on December 13, 2005 (Votes and Proceedings, Oyo State House of 
Assembly, December 13, 2005). The 18 members loyal to the godfather, late Adedibu, (in 
their plan to remove the governor) were meeting outside the parliamentary complex at a 
hotel148 and served the governor with a notice that contained allegations of gross misconduct. 
With the support of the federal government (whom provided security and logistics) the 18 
members meeting externally to the parliamentary complex commenced with a process to 
remove the former governor through impeachment149. With disregard for the stipulated 
constitutional requirements, the 18 lawmakers holding their meeting at the hotel eventually 
pronounced the removal of the governor on January 12, 2006150. 
The acceptance of this decision showed the extent of impunity in the Nigerian political 
system. It was evident that the 18 lawmakers, because they enjoyed the support of the federal 
government and the political party, embarked upon a course of action that promoted the 
outright abuse of the rule of law. This is an indication that the Nigerian political elite can go 
to extreme lengths in the circumvention of constitutional rules as long as they received the 
requisite backing of the federal government.   
Similarly, in Plateau State, eight lawmakers of the 24-member House of Assembly, under the 
security provided by the Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), 
commenced a process to impeach the governor (Fagbadebo 2007; Lawan 2010). In 2004, the 
former governor was arrested and charged in court in London over allegations of money 
laundering (Global Witness 2010; Lawan 2010). But this is not the problem. Political elites 
within the ruling PDP in the state had been having a running battle with the governor over the 
                                                 
148 The hotel, D’Rovans Hotel, was located at Ring Road area of Ibadan, the capital city of Oyo State. 
149 The leadership of the political party could not resolve the deepening crisis between Adedibu and Ladoja. The 
president, Olusegun Obasanjo and the leadership of the party were in support of Adedibu asking Ladoja to go 
and apologise to him. When he refused, the leadership sided with Adedibu. 
150 The constitution, as will be seen in the next section, stipulates that the votes required for the presentation of a 
notice containing allegations of gross misconduct is one third of the total members of the House of Assembly. 
The legislature requires two- third votes of all members to validly remove the governor. Oyo State House of 
Assembly was comprised of 32 members. One third of the members is 10.6, while two thirds is 21.3. Aside from 
this, a parliamentary sitting in a hotel is unconstitutional. 
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control of the machinery of the party, especially over the registration of members 
(Abdusalami 2005). This development provided the opportunity for the party to induce the 
EFCC to commence an investigation into the financial transactions of the state government. 
The agency arrested the Speaker of the House, Simon Lalong, his deputy, Usman Musa, and 
11 other members of the legislature on charges of money laundering (Obateru 2006; 
Okanlawon 2006)151. While the EFCC sent the petition against the governor to the legislature, 
the leadership insisted that the House would conduct its own investigation to establish the 
veracity of the claims in the petition (The Nation 2007; Obineche 2006)152. A majority of the 
members of the House of Assembly remained loyal to the governor. Eventually, the EFCC 
was able to secure the support of eight members of the legislature to commence impeachment 
proceedings against the governor (with maximum security provided by the federal 
government). On November 13, 2006, six out of the eight legislators voted and pronounced 
the removal of the governor153.   
Like in the case of Oyo State, an intra-party crisis in the ruling PDP played a vital role in the 
determination of the legislators to commence an impeachment process against the governor 
of Plateau State. In Nigeria, a common feature of party politics is the bitter and acrimonious 
relationships that often exist among the leadership over the control of the party machinery. 
Influential party leaders, who have facilitated an electoral victory, (either through financial 
support, grassroots mobilization or fraud) desire to control the party in order to exert 
influence on the government for the dispensation of patronage. Since the political party is the 
only avenue through which to become elected into the government, such leaders would want 
to monopolise the control of the electoral processes within the party. This usually results in 
conflict with the governor who is regarded as the leader of the party in the state by virtue of 
his position as governor. Legislators elected with the support of the leadership of the party or 
a godfather would want to remain loyal to them, in order to be considered as candidates by 
them in future elections (Fagbadebo, Agunyai and Odeyemi 2014). 
                                                 
151 The arrest of the lawmakers was a ploy to induce them into negotiating their freedom on the promise that 
they would commence impeachment process against the governor. 
152 While the legislature was deliberating on the petition, the EFCC was arresting its members and had frozen 
the state accounts.This development irked the legislators and sought judicial restraint against their arrest. 
Eventually, the committee investigating the petition exonerated the governor of all the allegations. As the crisis 
festered, the governor and 16 other legislators in the state defected to another political party, the Advanced 
Congress of Democrats (ACD). 
153 Constitutionally, the number required to successfully carry out a valid impeachment in a 24-member 
legislature is 16. The Plateau State House of Assembly had 24 members. One third of this number (8) is required 
to vote for the presentation of a notice of impeachment containing allegations of gross misconduct but it requires 
two third votes of all members (16) to vote on the investigation of the allegations.  
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Similar to the case of Plateau State is the circumstances that led to the impeachment of the 
governor of Bayelsa State. The former governor, late Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, was removed 
by splinter members of the legislature. The Bayelsa State House of Assembly had 24 
members but 15 members commenced the impeachment process. The one third of the votes 
(8 members) requirement of to serve the governor with the allegations of gross misconduct 
was met but the two thirds majority vote required to proceed with the investigation was not. 
(Lawan2010). The former governor was arrested in London and charged on allegations of 
money laundering (Polgreen 2005; Lawan 2010). He was released on bail and jumped bail 
and absconded to Nigeria. Prior to this time, the EFCC had been on his trail over sundry 
allegations relating to corruption and the abuse of power. The EFCC was able to establish 
that the members of the legislature were reluctant to impeach the former governor because 
they benefited from the misappropriated funds of the state (Umanah 2005)154. When the 
EFCC invited the lawmakers to Lagos for questioning, they were arrested and threatened with 
prosecution if they refused to commence the impeachment of the former governor.  
Eventually, 15 of the 24-member House agreed to commence impeachment procedures 
against the governor. The Speaker, Peremobowei Ebebi, while announcing that the legislature 
had served the governor with the notice of the allegations of gross misconduct pursuant to his 
removal said, 
 
A governor who disguised himself as a woman to run away from justice in London should not 
be our governor. It is a slap on our collective dignity as a people and our sensibilities as a 
people (BBC News 23.11.2005).  
On December 9, 2005, the lawmakers pronounced the removal of Diepreye Alamieyeseigha 
as the governor of Bayelsa State, though he claimed to be innocent of the money laundering 
charges (BBC News 25.11.2005).  
The case of Anambra is different. On October 16, 2006, 18 out of a 30-member Anambra 
State House of Assembly passed a motion to serve the governor, Peter Obi, and his deputy, 
Mrs. Dame Virginia Etiaba, with charges of gross misconduct pursuant to their removal 
through an impeachment process (Votes and Proceedings, Anambra State House of 
Assembly, October 6, 2006; Ameh et al 2006). The House met at 5:00 am to deliberate on the 
report of the panel and subsequently voted to impeach the governor (Sahara Reporters, 
                                                 
154 The EFCC used the same method to force a splinter group of the Plateau State House of Assembly to 




November 3, 2006). The governor and the majority members of the legislature are from 
different political parties155. While the governor was elected on the platform of the All 
Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), the majority of the members of the legislature were 
from the PDP (Lawan 2010; Oni 2013).  
The members of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the political party with the majority of 
members in the legislature, were uncomfortable with the divided government156. The PDP 
was in control of the legislature while the rival APGA was in control of the executive. This is 
not strange to presidential system, although it is one of the developments that define Juan 
Linz (2010) “perils of presidentialism”. The envisaged gridlock over policy issue in Linz 
conception differs from the pattern of behaviour of the Nigerian political elite. What divided 
government meant for the PDP was the loss of control over the chain of political patronage. 
This means that the PDP would have to negotiate with the governor for any largesse. The loss 
of the state to the rival APGA through election petition was a fall out of the crisis between the 
PDP governor, Chris Ngige and his godfather, Chris Uba (Ologbenla 2007; Ijediogor 2006). 
Chris Uba had disclosed how he fraudulently rigged the gubernatorial election of 2003 to 
ensure the electoral victory of his candidate, Chris Ngige. This confession provided evidence 
for the APGA candidate, Michael Obi, who had challenged Ngige’s electoral victory at the 
election Petition Tribunal (Ologbenla 2007). The option left was either to harass the governor 
to defect to the PDP or get him and his deputy removed through a process of impeachment 
which would, in turn, pave the way for a by-election. The governor refused to leave his 
political party.  
One could argue that legislature moved against the governor because of his decision not to 
defect to the PDP (Oni 2013). Nevertheless, the governor claimed that his major offence was 
                                                 
155 The governor contested the election of 2003 on the platform of the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) 
but lost to Dr. Chris Ngige of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Displeased with the outcome of the 
election, he appealed against the victory of Ngige. After three years of legal battles, the judiciary nullified the 
election of Ngige and declared Obi as the validly elected governor of Anambra State. 
156 When the president, Olusegun Obasanjo visited the state in 2006, shortly after Peter Obi became the 
governor, he had jokingly asked the governor to shift his political base from the APGA to the PDP as a 
condition for retaining his position (Ijediogor, 2006). Indeed, the members of the legislature passed a motion on 
the day asking the president to release one of his aides, Dr. Andy Uba, to contest the gubernatorial election in 
the state in 2007 (Ameh et al 2006). Unfortunately, Obi was able to secure judicial reprieve to complete his term 
of four years starting from the date he was sworn-in as the governor. This judgment foreclosed the hope of 
another gubernatorial election that could have given the PDP victory. 
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that he did not award contracts to the political elite.157. He opted to implement projects 
through the use of existing personnel. The governor said: 
The reason why I was impeached was that they budgeted N298 million to repair my office but 
I spent N43.2 million to repair it and said I didn’t follow due process. I went to court and 
came back. So, I told them “go and do this thing directly because the people don’t have time. 
They want to see these things on the ground (cf. Daily Trust April 5, 2012). 
Beyond this, there are indications that the governor refused to accede to the financial requests 
of the legislators to the tune of N60million (Votes and Proceedings, Anambra State House of 
Assembly, October 10, 2006; Saturday Punch 10/10/2006, p.11). There was an uproar 
following the motion to present the governor with the notice of allegations of gross 
misconduct. One member of the legislature, Mrs. Anthonia Tabansi-Okoye, lamented thus: 
 
Oh, 18 million [naira], because of 18 million [naira], why do we always do this kind of thing 
in Anambra State? What will be the future of the people of this state? Oh, our children… This 
is a shame, endless shame (cf. Ameh et al 2006, p.2)158. 
The divided government in the state coupled with the desire of the leadership of the political 
party provided the impetus for the action of the legislators. Ironically, the National Secretary 
of the PDP, Chief Ojo Madueke, absolved the party and the president, Olusegun Obasanjo, 
from any complicity in the case (Ameh et al 2006). According to him, the legislators were 
exercising their ‘constitutional right’ ‘without the knowledge of the Commander - in-Chief of 
the Armed forces’ [President Olusegun Obasanjo] (Ameh et al, 2006, p.9).  This defensive 
position was to stave off public criticisms on the complicity of Obasanjo’s PDP federal 
government in thel abuse of legislative process to remove state governors perceived to be 
antagonists of the party (Lawan 2010). 
In all these cases, there are obvious breaches of the constitutional provisions which set out the 
process and the procedure for the removal of governors. In view of this, a judicial review 
process provided reprieve to the governors of Anambra, Oyo, and Plateau States (Fagbadebo 
2007; 2010; Lawan 2010; Oni 2013)159. For the first time, judicial pronouncements in the 
                                                 
157 In Nigeria, contract awards are used to facilitate corruption; contract sums are usually inflated while 
contracted works that have been paid for are often abandoned. Political elites therefore see access to executive 
power as a means of ensuring the awarding of contracts to cronies and proxies. 
158Personal interviews with some stakeholders in the crisis corroborate this assertion. Indeed, one of them told 
me that the initial plan of the legislators was to persuade the governor to allow them (legislators) to negotiate a 
path of collaboration where money would be made available to offset the usual gridlock often associated with 
divided government.  
159In Ekiti State, the absurdity associated with the manner in which the legislature carried out the impeachment 
of the governor and his deputy at the same time, engendered the crisis that precipitated the declaration of a State 
of Emergency in the state.  
149 
 
course of adjudicating the cases relating to impeachment provided a far-reaching precedent in 
the interpretation of the provisions relating to the impeachment of governors and their 
deputies in Nigeria160 (Alabi 2014). For instance, the Supreme Court recently quashed the 
impeachment of the Deputy Governor of Taraba State, Abubakar Danladi (Adesomoju 2014; 
Premium Times 2014). The deputy governor was removed from office in 2012 by the 
legislature in a circumstance that the court described as conspiratorial and against the 
procedures set out in the Constitution. Similarly, the panel set up to probe allegations of gross 
misconduct against the Governor of Nasarawa State, Tanko Al Makura, in preparation for his 
impeachment, could not prove the allegations against the governor. Subsequently, the 
impeachment bid failed in spite of the resistance of the legislature to the composition of the 
panel (Fabiyi et al 2014).  
These cases of impeachment illustrate the vulnerability of the Nigerian presidential system to 
manipulation and control. In view of this, society also lacks the capacity to enforce 
accountability. One feature common of these cases of impeachment is the prevalence of 
disunified elites seeking to control power in apolitical environment that is acrimonious.  
5.3 The Constitutional provisions on, and judicial review of, impeachment 
proceedings in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 
 
Section 188 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic, 1999 (as amended), relating to the 
removal of the Governor and /or Deputy Governor of a state in Nigeria’s presidential system, 
provides an elaborate procedure. For the purposes of clarity, these provisions are reproduced 
hereunder: 
(1) The Governor or Deputy Governor of a State may be removed from office in accordance 
with the provisions of this section. 
(2) Whenever a notice of any allegation in writing signed by not less than one-third of the 
members of the House of Assembly- 
(a) is presented to the speaker of the House of Assembly of the state; 
(b) stating that the holder of such office is guilty of gross misconduct in the performance 
of the functions of his office, detailed particulars of which shall be specified,  
the Speaker of the House of Assembly shall, within seven days of the receipt of the notice, 
cause a copy of the notice to be served on the holder of the office and on each member of the 
House of Assembly, and shall also cause any statement made in reply to the allegation by the 
holder of the office, to be served on each member of the House of Assembly. 
(3) Within fourteen days of the presentation of the notice to the Speaker of the House of 
Assembly (whether or not any statement was made by the holder of the office in reply 
                                                 
160Indeed, these precedents have laid the foundation for subsequent adjudications in a series of cases during and 
after 2007.   
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to the allegation contained in the notice), the House of Assembly shall resolve by 
motion, without any debate whether or not the allegation shall be investigated. 
(4) A motion of the House of Assembly that the allegation be investigated shall not be 
declared as having been passed unless is supported by the votes of not less than two-
thirds majority of all the members of the House of Assembly. 
(5) Within seven days of the passing of a motion under the foregoing provisions of this 
section, the Chief Judge shall at the request of the Speaker of the House of Assembly, 
appoint a Panel of seven persons who in his opinion are of unquestionable integrity, 
not being members of any public service, legislative house or political party, to 
investigate the allegation as provided in this section. 
(6) The holder of an office whose conduct is being investigated under this section shall 
have the right to defend himself in person or be represented before the Panel by a 
legal practitioner of his own choice. 
(7) A Panel appointed under this section shall – 
(a) have such powers and exercised its functions in accordance with such 
procedure as may be prescribed by the House of Assembly; and  
(b) within three months of its appointment, reports its findings to the House of 
Assembly.  
(8) Where the Panel reports to the House of Assembly that the allegation has not been 
proven, no further proceedings shall be taken in respect of the matter.  
(9) Where the report of the Panel is that the allegation against the holder of the office has 
been proved, then within fourteen days of the receipt of the report, the House of 
Assembly shall consider the report, and if by a resolution of the House of Assembly 
supported by not less than two-thirds majority of all the members, the report of the 
Panel is adopted, then the holder of the office shall stand removed from office as 
from the date of the adoption of the report. 
(10) No proceedings or determination of the Panel or of the House of Assembly or any 
matter relating to such proceedings or determination shall be entertained or 
questioned in any court. 
(11) In this section – 
“gross misconduct” means a grave violation or breach of the provisions of this Constitution 
or a misconduct of such nature as amounts in the opinion of the House of Assembly to gross 
misconduct. 
This section is a replication of section 170 of the 1979 Constitution, the first presidential 
constitution of Nigeria. However, a major and significant difference is the involvement of the 
Chief Judge of the State in the composition of the 7-person panel to investigate the allegation 
of misconduct against the officer concerned161.While the 1979 constitution made 
impeachment a wholly legislative affair, the 1999 constitution included a role for the Chief 
Judge of the state to set up the panel. The provision stipulated that the Chief Judge of the 
State, rather than the Speaker of the House of Assembly, would constitute the panel assumes 
that the panel would then be neutral. However, the involvement of the judiciary in the process 
limits the judicial role to a crucial aspect of the process: the composition of the members of 
                                                 
161Section 170 (5) of the 1979 Constitution states thus: Within 7 days of the passing of a motion under the 
foregoing provisions, the Speaker of the House of Assembly shall cause the allegation to be investigated by a 
Committee of 7 persons who in his opinion are of high integrity, not being members of any public service, 
legislative house or political party, and who shall have been nominated, with the approval of the House of 
Assembly, appointed by the Speaker of the House to conduct the investigation. 
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the panel. The outcome of the deliberations of the panel would determine the fate of the 
governor. Nevertheless, it does not portend a ‘judiciary-dominant’ model of impeachment as 
conceptualised by Naoko Kada (2003, pp.113- 136). 
In the early stage of its application in the Fourth Republic, this constitutional provision has 
been central to a series of legal and political arguments because of a lack of judicial precedent 
and interpretations of its intent. The legal battles that have followed the abuse of the 
provision gave rise to judicial intervention to interpret the intent of the framers of the 
constitution. The Supreme Court of Nigeria delivered the first judgment on the case of 
impeachment on December 7, 2006. Justice Niki Tobi, who delivered the lead judgment, 
described it as ‘the first pronouncement on this fairly troublesome area of our law on the 
removal of Governors’.162 
The provision is specific and clear in terms of the procedure and requirements for a valid 
impeachment to take place. Yet, members of the legislature resorted to the violation of 
unambiguous procedures. Early judicial reviews of the cases, especially by the state high 
courts further exposed the vulnerability of the Nigerian judiciary to political manipulation. 
Judges in the state high courts declined that they had the jurisdiction to entertain the suits 
brought by the former governors impeached by a faction of the legislature163.  
5.2.1 The characteristic features of the impeachment provision: Requirements of 
membership and the authority of the speaker  
An obvious aspect of the provision is its elaborate procedural and time-bound character. The 
Nigerian Supreme Court, through the judgment delivered by Justice Ikechi Francis Ogbuagu, 
notes that section 188 presents ‘clear and unambiguous provisions…regarding the removal of 
the Governor or the Deputy Governor from office’.164 Besides this, it is not the intent of the 
framers of the constitution to make an impeachment process ‘just like any other business of 
the House of Assembly’ because ‘the impeachment of a serving Governor is a weighty 
                                                 
162Inakoju & 17 Ors vs Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt 1), p 149). The judgment was a confirmation and 
further elaboration of the position taken by the Justices at the Court of Appeal. The appeal was a sequel to the 
Judgment by the High Court of Oyo State where Justice Ige declined jurisdiction and dismissed the originating 
summons seeking for adjudication on the violation of the procedure for the removal of Governor Ladoja. 
163Inakoju & 17 Ors vs Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt 1) 




matter’.165 Thus, the elaborate provision makes the impeachment process a unique legislative 
action different from the other routine legislative processes.  
Section 188 (2) stipulates the presentation of a notice of allegation signed by not less than 
one-third of the members of the House of Assembly and presented to the Speaker to be 
serviced on the officeholder concerned. This foundational step defines the proceedings. For 
one, it takes only one–third of the members to present the allegation of gross misconduct 
necessitating the removal of the governor. However, the provision stipulates a two-thirds 
majority vote of members of the legislature to result in an investigation of the allegation and 
to approve the report of the panel as stipulated in section 188 (4 and 9) respectively. 
Anything short of this specifically renders the process null and void.166 The Court of Appeal 
interpreted this numerical percentage of votes along with the provisions stipulating the 
requirements of electoral votes for the election of a Governor of a state.167 The Court 
interprets this to mean that the removal from office of the governor  
will require the same reverse procedure. This is left in the hand of the State Assembly by the 
framers of the Constitution the obvious reason being the representation of the electorate as the 
House of Assembly members are representatives of their constituencies, i.e. the local 
governments of the State.168 
This interpretation arose from the case in respect of the removal of Dr. Joshua Chibi Dariye, 
the governor of Plateau State in December 2006 by six members of a 24-member House of 
Assembly. The Court elaborates this interpretation further: 
The impeachment of a Governor is serious business and must not be reduced to child’s play. 
Just as a person needs to receive the approval of the majority of people within the State to be 
elected Governor, his removal from office ought to be by a majority of the electorate in the 
State through their representatives in the State House of Assembly. This explains the 
requirements of the concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the State House of 
Assembly; otherwise a tiny cabal can gang up to remove an otherwise popular Governor. This 
could bring about political instability leading to breakdown of law and order which may 
ultimately result in anarchy.169 
Aside from this specific requirement on membership for valid votes, the framers of the 
constitution do not contemplate that the Speaker of the House of Assembly should be one of 
                                                 
165Hon. Michael Dapialong and others v. Chief (Dr.) Joshua Chibi Dariye and another [2007] 8 NWLR, pp.303 
&424 
166See Hon. Michael Dapialong and others v. Chief (Dr.) Joshua Chibi Dariye and another [2007] 8 NWLR, 
pp. 303-304 
167 Section 179 (1b) of the Constitution stipulates that for a Governor to be validly elected, he must have ‘not 
less than one quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the local government 
areas in the state’. 
168See Hon. Michael Dapialong and others v. Chief (Dr.) Joshua Chibi Dariye and another [2007] 8 NWLR, 
pp. 307 




the signatories to the notice. The Court of Appeal, in the judgment delivered by Justice 
Zainab Adamu Bulkachuwa, said: ‘The one-third of the members required to sign the notice 
of impeachment does not include the Speaker as envisaged by section 188(2)’.170 Thus, the 
Court of Appeal held that it is anomalous for any Speaker to be one of the signatories and 
thus party to the impeachment. Not all Speakers in states where governors were impeached 
complied with this. One of them told me that as a lawyer, he knows the limit of his power as 
the presiding officer of the legislature in the impeachment process. According to him, in 
commencing the impeachment process, ‘myself as the presiding officer, has little role to play 
because the presentation of the notice of impeachment would not be signed by the Speaker; it 
will only be handed over to him’ (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014). 
In view of this, anyone who occupies the position for the purpose of impeachment should be 
a person ‘duly elected’171 from among the members as stipulated by section 92 of the 
Constitution172. This interpretation arose from the case in Plateau State where a Speaker 
Protempore, Hon. Michael Dapialong,173 presided over the impeachment of the Governor, 
Chief Joshua Chibi Dariye. The Court of Appeal, in the judgment delivered by Justice Adamu 
Bulkachuwa, held that the provision in section 188 of the Constitution 
is not referring to a Speaker protempore but to the duly elected Speaker of the House. If the 
framers of the Constitution have contemplated a situation where a ‘Speaker Protempore’ 
would make the request for the investigation to the Chief Judge they would have clearly stated 
so.174 
In Inakoju& 17Ors v Adeleke& 3 Ors, the Supreme Court held: ‘Section 188 does not only 
mention the Speaker and the members of the House of Assembly, but also gives them 
                                                 
170See Hon. Michael Dapialong and others v. Chief (Dr.) Joshua Chibi Dariye and another [2007] 8 NWLR, 
pp. 303. One of the numerous reasons for the nullification of the impeachment of Governor Joshua Dariye is 
that the Speaker Protempore, apart from being a strange to the Constitution, was one of the signatories to the 
notice of allegation purportedly served on the Governor. 
171See Hon. Michael Dapialong and others v. Chief (Dr.) Joshua Chibi Dariye and another [2007] 8 NWLR, p. 
303 
172Section 92(1&2c) states that the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker shall be elected by the members of the 
House of from among themselves” and their removal shall be by ‘the votes not less than two-thirds majority of 
the members of the House’. 
173Hon. Michael Dapialong and others v. Chief (Dr.) Joshua Chibi Dariye and another [2007] 8 NWLR 
Dapialong was chosen as the Speaker Protempore following the decision to commence the impeachment of the 
Governor since the substantive Speaker and his deputy were not willing to commence the proceedings. Section 
95 of the Constitution empowers the Speaker (or his deputy in his absence) to preside at any sitting of the 
House. Section 188 specifically gives the Speaker a prominent role to play in the matter of impeachment of a 
Governor of a Deputy Governor. In view of this, the 8 members of the Plateau State House of Assembly who 
commenced the impeachment hurriedly amended section 8 of the House Rule. The amended section reads: In 
the absence of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, such member of the House as the House may elect for that 
purpose shall preside. Such shall be known as “Speakerprotempore”. 




functions to perform in the removal processes’.175 Thus, a Speaker protempore is not ‘the 
appropriate authority known to the Constitution’ to request the Chief Judge to constitute the 
panel to investigate the allegations176 or preside over a weighty matter as the impeachment of 
a Governor.  
Beyond the presiding officer, there are rules about the number of legislators required to 
remove a governor or the deputy. One-thirds of all the members of the House will have to 
sign the notice of allegation for presentation to the Speaker while the subsequent voting 
exercise requires a two-thirds majority vote of all members of the legislature. In Oyo and 
Plateau States, the number of legislators who participated in the removal of Governors Ladoja 
and Dariye, respectively, fell short of the constitutional requirements. In Oyo State, 18 out of 
the 32-member House of Assembly began and concluded the removal of the Governor.  
This interpretation essentially extols the representative role of the legislature as the custodian 
of the sovereign power of the people. Thus, it is envisaged that the legislators would have 
considered the legislative action of removing a Governor or a Deputy Governor as 
representing the overall interests of the people rather than a fractional part of the political 
elite. This therefore requires that lawmakers, as true representatives of the people and key 
political elites in Nigeria’s presidential system, must act in a responsible and civilized manner 
(Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).177 
5.2.2 Service of the notice of allegations containing articles of impeachment 
Section 188 (2b) mandates the Speaker to serve the notice of allegation on the holder of the 
office. One contentious issue regarding this is the interpretation of service. The provision 
does not specify how the notice should be served. Most of the legislatures erred in this. Some 
did the service through newspapers while others served by pasting the notice at the entrance 
of the Governors lodge and office. Why should it be so difficult to serve a notice? The 
governor may evade the notice personally by using security personnel as a barrier and 
instructing them to refuse any documents coming from the legislature during the 
impeachment period. Though there are established channels of communication between the 
                                                 
175 Inakoju & 17 ORS v. Adeleke & 3 ORS 2007) 1 S. C., (Pt 1), p 89 
176Hon. Michael Dapialong and others v. Chief (Dr.) Joshua Chibi Dariye and another[2007] 8 NWLR, p.330 
177Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p184 
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legislature and the executive, a governor can try to evade the process by evading the notice to 
be served on him or her. 
A Speaker who presided over a botched impeachment case in the legislature told me how he 
managed the question of serving the notice to ensure the procedure was followed. He said, 
Immediately the notice of impeachment was submitted to me as the presiding officer, the next 
step for me was to serve the notice on the person against whom it was directed…As a legal 
practitioner; what came to mind was what would be the means of serving the notice. The 
Constitution did not state that the service has to be personal. But in my own case as a legal 
practitioner, I know we must ensure that the service is actually received by the governor. So 
we sent a copy of the notice through the Clerk of the House to be delivered to the Governor. 
We also served another notice through a Courier Company, because it is also a recognised 
means of service under the law (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014).  
In the case of Oyo State, the 18 lawmakers who participated in the impeachment of Governor 
Ladoja failed to comply with the constitutional requirement demanding the presentation of 
the notice to the Speaker who has the constitutional responsibility of serving same on the 
members and the holder of the office.178 Indeed, the Court of Appeal, in the case of the 
removal of Governor Peter Obi of Anambra state, further established the primacy of service 
insisting that service of the notice of allegations of gross misconduct has to be served 
personally on the governor (Hon. Mike Balonwu& 5 others v. Mr. Peter Obi & another)179. 
The court declared that 
 
by virtue of Section 188(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the 
Plaintiff was entitled to be personally served with a notice of any allegation of Gross 
Misconduct against him within 7 days of the 1st Defendant's receipt of the Notice of allegation 
dated 16th October 2006 (Hon. Mike Balonwu& 5 others v. Mr. Peter Obi & another)180. 
Not only was the notice not properly served on the Governor, but members of the House of 
Assembly who did not belong to the group of 18 lawmakers also did not have access to the 
notice of allegations as required by the law. Mr. Ben Chuks-Nwosu, a member of the House 
had protested on the day the motion was moved to serve the governor with the notice thus: 
This procedure is entirely faulty and never done in the history of modern day democracy. The 
allegations were not read to us, we don’t even know what you people are talking about we 
were not served the copies of this motion as is the usual practice to know the contents (cf. 
Ameh et al, 2006, p.2). 
The Speaker of the Anambra State House of Assembly, Mike Balonwu, had insisted, in a 
media interview that  
                                                 
178Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt.1), p 138 
179Hon. Mike Balonwu& 5 others v. Mr. Peter Obi & another(2007) 5 NWLR (Pt.1028) 488 C.A 
180Hon. Mike Balonwu& 5 others v. Mr. Peter Obi & another  (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt.1028) 488 C.A 
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[w]e have served his [Governor Obi] people [government officials] both in Anambra, Lagos 
and Abuja offices, we served the SSG [Secretary to the State Government]. He has received it, 
but he told all his staff not to sign for the notice when they receive it. You see, he knows what 
the law says about getting notices of impeachment. Let him keep denying it, when the time 
comes we will take the necessary step (cf. Sowore, 2006). 
But the Court declared that this method of service, as ‘an act of bad faith’, violates the 
constitutional requirement of service envisaged by the framers of the constitution (Hon. Mike 
Balonwu& 5 others v. Mr. Peter Obi & another)181. As such, for the lawmakers to have 
proceeded in pronouncing the removal of the governor amounted to what the Court described 
as the highest order of legislative rascality (Hon. Mike Balonwu& 5 others v. Mr. Peter Obi 
& another)182. Thus, any impeachment without due service of the notice on the actors 
involved remains invalid. 
 
5.2.3 Gross Misconduct 
Section 188 (2b) of the Constitution stipulates that the notice of allegations against the 
Governor or his Deputy (that could warrant removal) has to indicate the alleged gross 
misconduct in the performance of the function assigned to his or her office. Section 188 (11) 
defines gross misconduct as ‘a grave violation or breach of the provisions of this Constitution 
or a misconduct of such nature as amounts in the opinion of the House of Assembly to gross 
misconduct’. The Supreme Court, in its judgment read by Justice Dahiru Musdapher, 
describes this constitutional definition as ‘nebulous, fluid and subject to potentially gross 
abuse and is also potentially dangerous at this point of our national or political life’ 
(Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).183 All the political elites interviewed admitted that this 
provision gives the lawmakers the free hand to determine the fate of governors and deputy 
governors at will. The subjective definition of gross misconduct enables the lawmakers to 
raise any issue. Thus, it provides the legislature with a weapon to negotiate as long as there is 
a majority of members willing to invoke the provision to remove the governor or his deputy. 
Albert (2009, p.545), in his comment on the constitutional provision for impeachment in 
America, argues that ‘[i]f the purpose of separating powers was to ensure that each branch 
                                                 
181Hon. Mike Balonwu& 5 others v. Mr. Peter Obi & another  (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt.1028) 488 C.A 
182Hon. Mike Balonwu& 5 others v. Mr. Peter Obi & another  (2007) 5 NWLR (Pt.1028) 488 C.A 
183 Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p.183 
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could exercise its functions independently of, and without intrusion from, the other branches, 
then the impeachment power appears to put this in peril’.  He notes  
the congressional prerogative to render a permissive interpretation of “high crimes and 
misdemeanors” undermines the independence of the President and other executive members 
because it gives expansive authority to control executive action to the impeaching House and 
the convicting Senate (Albert 2009, p.545). 
By virtue of the constitutional provisions, ‘impeachment is a judicial function, in which case 
the legislature exercises judicial powers in derogation from the conventional wisdom that 
presidential systems separate powers’ (Albert 2009, p.546). At the same time, it is a 
legislative function where the legislature invites the judiciary to participate. This latter 
expression is similar to the Nigerian situation whereby the definition of the reason for 
impeachment is the domain of the legislature. 
For instance, in Akintola v. Adegbenro184, the Privy Council relied on the literal interpretation 
of the phrase ‘as it appears to him’ in section 33 (10) of the Constitution of the defunct 
Western Nigeria, in holding that the governor was right in removing the Premier. The 
provision states that the governor could remove the premier when it ‘appeared to him’ that 
the Premier no longer commanded the respect and support of the majority of the members of 
the regional House of Assembly. Such discretion to determine what amounts to gross 
misconduct may be abused, especially in cases where a majority of the legislators belong to 
an opposition party, as it happened in the impeachment of the governors of Kaduna and 
Anambra States, Alhaji Balarabe Musa and Peter Obi, respectively (Lawan, 2010; Nwabueze 
1985).  
Professor Ben Nwabueze (1985), a renowned Nigerian legal scholar, in his analysis of the 
impeachment issue in the country’s Second Republic, avers that this political definition 
amounts to misconception of the original meaning of gross misconduct. According to him, 
the constitutional definition of gross misconduct does not give the legislature the discretion of 
deciding what constitutes misconduct (Nwabueze 1985). He says that ‘misconduct in the 
performance of the function of an office has a definite, objective legal meaning which is not 
dependent on, or controlled by, the subjective opinion’ of the legislature (Nwabueze 1985, p 
280). Thus, ‘the Constitution grants it [legislature] no power to regard as a misconduct what 
is not a misconduct according to the legal definition of the term’ (Nwabueze 1985, p. 280).  
                                                 
184Akintola v. Adegbenro 1 All NLR 1962: 461 
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A Deputy Governor, who was a victim of impeachment proceeding, told me in that ‘the 
problem with this law [section 188] is the definition of an act that amounts to gross 
misconduct’ (Personal Interview IV, November 5, 2013). According to him,  
The law, the Nigerian Constitution is ambiguous in the sense that there is nothing provided 
that you will have to do before you are impeached. It simply stated in the law that if in the 
opinion of the House of Assembly, you have committed an offence (Personal Interview IV, 
May 11, 2014).     
A former Speaker corroborated this assertion in an interview that although the 
initiative to remove the governor or his deputy comes from the legislature, ‘the 
grounds are not based on actual facts, I must tell you that…They are grounds based on 
what I just told you about: the selfish nature of the members of the legislature’ 
(Personal Interview III, May 10, 2014).  Thus the legislators are aware that the 
grounds upon which they seek to remove the governor is not based upon any 
infractions. He explained further,  
We had spoken to the governor on telephone and we wanted the deputy governor to do 
something… We learnt that the Deputy Governor was against our proposal saying that we 
were thieves, he regarded us as thieves. Based on this, one of the members was infuriated and 
some others joined him and forced the House to call for a parliamentary meeting. When this 
kind of decision is to be taken, members will move to parliamentary meeting. At the meeting, 
tempers were high, emotions were very high, and all members were looking for a way just to 
harass or in fact impeach the Deputy Governor (Personal Interview III, May 10, 2014). 
This means that even if there is evidence of infraction, as long as the governor satisfies the 
demands of the lawmakers, he or she would be protected by them against impeachment. 
Deputy Governors that are in conflict are vulnerable to removal by the subjective definition 
of gross misconduct. Constitutionally, the deputy governor does not have the specific 
responsibility to perform functions other than the ones assigned to him or her by the 
governor. Section 193 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as 
amended, states: 
(1) The Governor of a State may, in his discretion, assign to the Deputy Governor or any 
Commissioner of the Government of the State responsibility for any business of the 
Government of that State, including the administration of any department of Government. 
(2) The Governor of a State shall hold regular meetings with the Deputy Governor and all 
Commissioners of the Government of the State for the purposes of - 
(a) determining the general direction of the policies of the Government of the State; 
(b) co-ordinating the activities of the Governor, the Deputy Governor and the Commissioners 
of the Government of the State in the discharge of their executive responsibilities; and 
(c) advising the Governor generally in the discharge of his executive functions, other than 
those functions with respect to which he is required by this Constitution to seek the advice or 
act on the recommendation of any other person or body (Constitution of the Federal Republic 




By implication, a governor might decide not to assign any responsibility to his deputy but 
prefer to work with the commissioners in directing the affairs of the state. This means that 
deputy governors do not directly exercise the power. If so, for what reasons have a sizeable 
number of deputy governors suffered from the political instrumentality associated with the 
politics of impeachment? The truth of the matter is that most of the deputy governors were 
imposed on the governors by their respective political parties or powerful political elites 
within the party. When many of the deputy-governors were offered their position, they still 
hoped to become governor in the future. Sometimes during the re-election campaigns the 
governors have sought to undermine the popularity and acceptability of their deputies in a bid 
to frustrate their gubernatorial ambition. Thus their career aspirations create a clash and a 
crisis of confidence between them. Most of the deputy governors that were impeached by the 
legislature had become victims of a lack of trust by their governors, governors that sought re-
election and were concerned about the competition with their deputies for the governorship. 
Most often, the removal of a deputy governor is less difficult than removing a governor 
because the governor controls the executive power and thus the distribution of political 
patronage. A speaker who spoke to me confirmed that the reason for the removal of the 
deputy governor in his state was fallout between the governor and his deputy rather than 
specific breaches of the constitution by the deputy (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014). 
This type of intra-executive conflict leads to a divided-executive: a situation where an 
acrimonious relationship between the governor and the deputy further degenerates to 
divisions within the party. If the majority of legislators support the governor, the deputy will 
try to remove them. If he was to succeed, the capacity of the legislature to remove the deputy 
governor would be weakened185. This is a common feature in the Nigerian presidential 
system. A deputy governor also told me that he suffered direct consequences at the hands of 
the governor, as a result of trying to prevent corruption. 
They made false allegations against me. When I stepped up and defended myself and exposed 
the government, all they were after was to throw me out. And since there was monetary 
inducement in the process, it was easier for some people (legislators) to work against their 
conscience. It happened in almost all the cases of impeachment (Personal Interview IV, May 
11, 2014).   
                                                 
185 This particular deputy governor originally showed his intention to contest the position of governorship but 
the leadership of the party prevailed on him to accept the position of deputy. Indeed, the crisis between the 
deputy and his governor commenced shortly after the assumption of office when his deputy began to mobilise 
support for his own ambitions of becoming governor. 
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The Supreme Court admitted that though section 188(11) ‘is generic and vague in its wording 
[but] cannot be extended beyond its onerously generic and vague nature to include 
misconduct which are not gross’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors)186. Evidently, the 
Nigeria Supreme Court relied on the scholarly position of Professor Nwabueze to arrive at the 
interpretation of section 188 (11) of the Constitution. The Court held that ‘the allegation 
under section 188 is that the officer is alleged to have conducted himself in a perverse and 
delinquent manner amounting to gross misconduct’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors)187. 
The Court, through Justice Niki Tobi, held that ‘only a grave violation of the Constitution can 
lead to the removal of a Governor or Deputy Governor’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 
Ors)188. Such violations include, among others, the abuse of the fiscal provisions of the 
Constitution, interference with the Constitutional functions of the legislature, corruption, 
disregard for and breach of the constitution, abuse of office, and subversive conduct inimical 
to the implementation of the constitution. 
It is not a lawful or legitimate exercise of the constitutional function of section 188 for a 
House of Assembly to remove a Governor or Deputy Governor to achieve political purpose or 
one of organized vendetta clearly outside gross misconduct under the section…Section 188 is 
a very strong political weapon at the disposal of the House which must be used in  appropriate 
cases of serious wrong doing on the part of Governor or Deputy Governor, which is 
tantamount to gross misconduct within the meaning of subsection  11 (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. 
Adeleke& 3 Ors).189 
Section 188(11) ‘is not however a license for the Legislature to open a Pandora’s Box of 
vendetta and rake up misconducts that are not gross’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 
Ors)190. Thus, ‘for articles of impeachment to be relevant, the misconduct must be gross, 
gross here means glaringly noticeable, because of obvious inexcusable badness, or objection 
ableness (sic) or a conduct in breach of the Constitution’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 
Ors).191 The pronouncement of the judiciary indicates that the loose definition of gross 
misconduct by the political elite is contrary to what is intended by the Constitution. This 
lacuna actually made impeachment a political weapon that could easily be invoked by the 
legislature against any governor for any reason. 
 
                                                 
186Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p135 
187Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p182 
188Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p64 
189Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), pp66-67 
190Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors 2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p135 
191Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p183 
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5.2.4 The Ouster Clause  
Section 188 (10) of the constitution can be interpreted as an ouster clause, that precludes 
judicial intervention in the process. . The clause states: ‘No proceedings or determination of 
the Panel or of the House of Assembly or any matter relating to such proceedings or 
determination shall be entertained or questioned in any court’.192 Literally, this clause 
prevents judicial intervention in an impeachment case. Indeed, early judicial pronouncements 
on impeachment cases construed this provision as an exclusionary clause (Alabi 2014). 
In the Second Republic, the courts at the state and federal levels declined to consider 
impeachment cases because of two main factors. First, that impeachment is an exclusive 
legislative mandate because section 170(10) excluded judicial intervention. And, in the spirit 
and principle of the separation of powers, it would violate the principle of non-interference 
by the three arms of government. Justice Adolphus Karibi-Whyte of the Federal Court of 
Appeal193 held in his judgment in Musa v Hamza &Ors that the ‘very essence of the 
separation of powers’ is the avoidance of inter-branch conflict.194 In his view, section 170 of 
the 1979 Constitution insulates the legislature from the control of the courts in all cases 
relating to impeachment.  
 
That the Constitution has vested the power to remove the Governor or Deputy Governor in the 
State House of Assembly is not questioned… I am satisfied that the moment the legislature 
commenced removal proceedings und Section 170 (2), the jurisdiction of the court was ousted 
by Section 170 (10)… Where the constitution has not vested in the courts any supervisory 
jurisdiction the court will be acting contrary to the spirit of the constitution if it went on any 
inquiry into the manner parliament had performed the functions assigned to it by the 
constitution.195 
Nwabueze (1985, p.342) regards this interpretation as ‘an incredible and startling conception 
of the court’s role in constitutional adjudication’. He argues that the exercise of governmental 
power ‘attracts the sanction of judicial review’ and that the court derives this power from its 
original jurisdiction (Nwabueze 1985, p.342).  
                                                 
192The same clause is in section 170(10) of the 1979 Constitution 
193He was later promoted as one of the Justices of the Supreme Court from which he eventually retired.  
194Musa v. Hamza & Others, [1982] 3 NCLR 229, p.251 
195Musa v. Hamza & Others, [1982] 3 NCLR 229, p.257 
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The second consideration is the political question doctrine. Justice Adenekan Ademola of the 
Court of Appeal interpreted impeachment as a political matter, the jurisdiction of which is 
above the court.196 
It is a political matter… for the court to enter into the political thicket as the invitation made to 
it dearly implies would in my view be asking its gates and its walls to be painted with mud; 
and the throne of justice from where its judgment are delivered published with mire.197 
Basically, the political question doctrine is a common principle in the American political 
system which intends to insulate the judiciary from adjudicating on issues which are political. 
Justice Frankfurter, of the US Supreme Court, the proponent of this doctrine, did advocate for 
judicial self-restraint and ‘abstention from injecting itself into the clash of political forces in 
political settlements’.198John E. Finn (2006 p.55) defines it thus: 
 
The political question doctrine holds that some questions, in their nature, are fundamentally 
political, and not legal, and if a question is fundamentally political...then the court will refuse 
to hear that case. It will claim that it doesn’t have jurisdiction. And it will leave that question 
to some other aspect of the political process to settle it. 
Thus, the court is at liberty to exercise its discretion to decline adjudication on issues 
considered to be associated with political decisions. Nigerian courts held onto this doctrine in 
declining involvement in impeachment cases in the Second Republic. Even in the early part 
of the Fourth Republic, Justice Ige of the High Court of Oyo State, Ibadan, in his judgment in 
the case over the impeachment of Governor Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo State, held: 
When the House of Assembly is exercising its Constitutional power in relation to 
impeachment proceedings or any matter relating thereto, it is performing a quasi-judicial 
function. Thus, it is provided in sub-section 11 of Section 188 of the 1999 Constitution that 
the power to determine what constitutes gross misconduct or conduct that will lead to 
impeachment proceedings lies with the House of Assembly and not in the court. By the 
combined effect of the above provisions therefore and having regards to the nature of the 
reliefs claimed by the plaintiffs, it is clear beyond argument that the jurisdiction of this court is 
clearly ousted. Impeachment and related proceedings are purely political matters over which 
this court cannot intervene. The action is not justifiable. It is not part of the duty of the court to 
forage into areas that ought to vest either directly of impliedly in the legislature such as the 
issue of impeachment which is a matter that comes within the purely internal affairs of the 
House of Assembly. The court will therefore decline jurisdiction in the matter.199 
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court set aside this ruling because the trial 
judge ‘was in serious error’ on judicial self-restraint in impeachment matters (Inakoju& 17 
Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors,).200 Justice Niki Tobi in his lead judgment in Inakoju& 17 Ors v. 
                                                 
196Musa v Hamza & Others, [1982] 3 NCLR 229. 
197Musa v Hamza & Others, [1982] 3 NCLR 229, pp 246-247 
198Baker v. Carr , 369 US 186, pp.267-270 (1962) 
199Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p. 22 
200Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p.46 
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Adeleke& 3 Ors at the Supreme Court debunked the applicability of the doctrine of political 
question in Nigeria.   
America jurisprudence has so much developed the political question doctrine in their case law, 
so much so that it has taken very firm root in their legal system. The political question 
doctrine is still in its embryonic stage in Nigeria. Let us not push it too hard to avoid the 
possibility of still-birth. That will be bad both for Nigerian litigants and the legal system 
(Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors,).201 
These previous considerations were consequences of the ouster clause in the impeachment 
provisions of the 1979 and 1999 Constitutions. The Supreme Court held that the initial 
interpretation of the clause is fraught with errors arguing that it is wrong for the judiciary to 
‘gallivant about or around what the makers of the Constitution do not say or intend’ in its bid 
to interpret its specific provisions.202 
The Court of Appeal, vide Justice James Ogenyi Ogebe, held earlier that when considering 
any case that ousts judicial review, it is mandatory that the condition precedent is strictly 
followed (Adeleke& 2 Ors v. Oyo State House of Assembly &18 Ors.)203. To this end, the 
Court has the jurisdiction to intervene if the impeachment proceedings were instituted in 
contravention of the provisions of the Constitution. The Supreme Court hinges its 
interpretation of the ouster clause of section 188 of the Constitution on the submission of the 
Court of Appeal. The Court held:  
It is good law that where the Constitution or a statute provides for a precondition to the 
attainment of a particular situation, the pre-condition must be fulfilled or satisfied before the 
particular situation will be said to have been attained or reached (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. 
Adeleke& 3 Ors).204 
The Court further held that if ‘a law provides for the doing of an act with conditions, it is an 
elementary principle of practice that the courts have a duty to look into the matter to ensure 
that the conditions are fulfilled’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).205 The Supreme Court 
described the ouster clause as ‘a very hard matter of strict law which must be clearly donated 
by the provisions’ rather than ‘a subject of speculation or conjecture’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. 
Adeleke& 3 Ors).206 Consequently, the Court defined the ouster clause in section 188(10) 
within the context of two expressions: procedure and proceedings. According to Justice Niki 
                                                 
201Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p. 75 
202 Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors,(2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p. 79 
203Adeleke& 2 Ors v. Oyo Sate House of Assembly & 18 Ors [2006] 16 NWLR Part 1006, pp. 671-672 
204Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p. 70 
205Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p. 171 
206Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p. 80 
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Tobi in his lead judgment, section 188(1-6) denotes the procedure for impeachment while 
section 188(7-9) denotes the proceedings. 
In my humble view, section 188(1) to (6) sets out the procedure to be adopted in the removal 
process. The proceedings start from section 188(7) and ends in section 188(9)….section 
188(10) ouster clause is clearly on proceedings or determination of the Panel or the House, it 
does not relate to or affect the procedure spelt out in section 188(1-6) (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. 
Adeleke& 3 Ors).207 
In view of this, a valid removal of a governor requires compliance with all the requisite 
preconditions set out in the procedure. Thus, the ouster clause in section 188(10) does not 
provide the legislature with absolute power to remove a Governor or Deputy Governor 
without strict compliance with the procedural requirements spelt out in the constitution. It is 
erroneous, therefore, to assert that the legislature ‘is the sole and only tribunal in matters of 
impeachment and that the decision of the legislature is always final’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. 
Adeleke& 3 Ors).208 Having explored interpretations of the constitutional provisions on 
impeachment, I turn to an analysis of the politics associated with the exercise of judicial 
review in impeachment proceedings in the State High Court.  
 
5.4 The politics of judicial shield in impeachment cases in Nigeria 
There are a number of shields for and against impeachment in the Nigerian political system: 
the legislature, the political parties, political elites, and the judiciary209. Perez-Linan (2007, 
2014), Hochstetler (2006), and Marsteintredet et al (2013)  (as discussed in chapter two) 
identified a series of institutional shields available to either ward off impeachment or hasten 
its application in Latin America. These scholars however do not place much premium on the 
judiciary as a potent shield because the constitutions of Latin American presidential systems 
do not assign a crucial role for the judiciary as provided in the Nigerian impeachment 
provisions. In Nigeria, the involvement of the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) and Chief Judge 
(CJ) of the State in impeachment processes has meant that the judiciary is of paramount 
importance.210 Aside from this, in case of any adjudication arising from the process, the 
judiciary, as the custodian of the Constitution, interprets the requisite statutes. Such 
                                                 
207Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors, (2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), pp. 78-79 
208Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors,(2007) 1 S. C. (pt I), p. 186 
209Perez-Linan, Hochstetler and Marsteintredet et al. identify mass protest, social movements and the media as 
potent shields in Latin America. As will be seen later in this study, these shields rarely matter in Nigeria. 
210 The Constitution empowers the CJN, in cases of impeachment of the President or Vice President, and the CJ, 
in case of the impeachment of the Governor or the Deputy Governor, to compose the panel to investigate the 
allegation of gross misconduct levelled against them.  
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interpretation, as noted in the preceding section, has provided a shield for governors removed 
by the legislatures.  
By the virtue of section 188(5) of the Constitution, the Chief Judge plays a critical and 
determining role in the removal process at the state level.211 In view of this, the appointment 
of this highest judicial position at the state level is usually characterised by intrigue. 
Successive governors would want a Chief Judge capable of providing a necessary shield in 
the event of any impeachment process. A senior Nigerian legal practitioner who participated 
in the drafting of the 1979 presidential constitution told me in an interview that the positions 
of the Chief Justice of Nigeria (CJN) and the Chief Judge of a State (CJ) are crucial in the 
determination of the outcome of an impeachment process (Personal Interview VII)212.  
Therefore, when appointing your [President] CJN at the national level, or your [Governor] CJ 
at the state level, you must have in mind that you are dealing with instrument which might be 
used for your removal or non-removal. That is critical and many people don’t think about that 
when they are doing it (Personal Interview VII, May 7, 2014). 
 
This critical role of the Chief Judge of a State in respect of the impeachment of a Governor or 
Deputy Governor is envisaged to inject credibility into the process. A Judge of a State High 
Court claimed that the CJ is expected to be unbiased and to maintain a neutral position in the 
composition of the panel (Personal Interview XXII, May 3, 2014). Similarly, the Supreme 
Court, vide Justice Niki Tobi, in Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors, held that the CJ must 
bea person of integrity as ‘a man of law and good judgment and should be trusted to take 
decisions with egalitarian outlook’.213 
The fact that he is appointed Chief Judge is a presumption of integrity in his favor and he will 
never betray the confidence the Constitution has placed on him. On no account should he be 
involved in favouratism and nepotism. So too partisanship in the exercise of his quasi-judicial 
function. He must perform his constitutional function above board… (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. 
Adeleke& 3 Ors).214 
The Court avers that the CJ ought not to have invoked his constitutional powers of setting up 
the panel as directed by the Speaker if the provisions of section 188 (2-4) are not complied 
with. Indeed, Justice Musdapher of the Supreme Court reiterates that ‘any Chief Judge worth 
                                                 
211The composition of the panel to investigate allegations of gross misconduct against the governor is the most 
crucial procedural step in impeachment process. The outcome of the panel will determine whether or not the 
governor will be removed from office. 
212In Nigeria, the Chief Judge of the State is usually appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the 
State Judicial Service Commission and approval of the National Judicial Council (NJC) and confirmation by the 
State legislature. 
213Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors(2007) 1 S. C. (Pt 1), pp 56-57 
214Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt 1), pp 57-58 
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his salt should not proceed, under the circumstances [of obvious breaches of the constitution] 
to set up the panel in accordance with the provisions of Section 188(5)’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. 
Adeleke& 3 Ors).215 Justice Niki Tobi affirms that this position ‘is the intendment of the 
makers of the Constitution’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).216 In all the cases 
considered in this study, the CJs overlooked the breaches and invoked their powers to set up 
the panel without considering the various infractions in the process. 
 Pressures from both sides of the parties often put the CJ in a precarious situation. A State 
High Court Judge attributes this to the lack of independence of the judiciary at the state level 
as pressures from the political elite make the CJ vulnerable to abuse of judicial power and 
process (Personal Interview XXII, May 3, 2014). Beside this dependent status, corruption in 
the Nigerian judiciary has been a source of concern at the bar and the bench (Personal 
Interview XXI, May 6, 2014).  
A former CJN, Justice Mariam Aloma Murhktar, lamented the rate of decadence in the 
Nigerian judiciary ‘where the rich get bail while the poor get jailed’ thereby making it a 
negotiable commodity meant for the ‘highest bidder’ (cf. Nnochiri 2013). A Chief Judge of 
Nigeria’s Federal High Court, Justice Ibrahim Auta, has also told the country’s House of 
Representatives that corruption in the bar and the bench hinders the administration of justice 
(cf. Ameh 2013). Nigeria’s first female Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Chief Folake 
Solanke, regretted the numerous allegations of corruption against some judicial officers 
whose conduct denigrates the collective reputation of the entire judiciary (cf. Royal Times 
2012). 
 
A retired president of the Court of Appeal, Justice Ayo Salami, disclosed that there are 
reports of judicial officers who specialised in fixing judgments for money (cf. Nwogu, 2014). 
Confirming the corruption in the judicial system, Justice Salami disclosed that ‘the problem 
of corruption in the Nigerian judiciary is real and has eaten deep into the system’ lamenting 
that the identifiable corrupt judicial officers are being protected by the system (cf. Nwogu 
2014). Indeed, a series of pronouncements by senior judicial officers and actions of judicial 
bodies in the country confirm the depth of corruption and abuse of power in the judiciary. For 
                                                 
215Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt 1), p185 
216Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p. 57. 
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instance, the National Judicial Council (NJC)217 at different times has forcefully retired 
judicial officers on the proven allegations of unethical practices including bribery, corruption 
and the compromise of the administration of justice in their judgments, to satisfy political 
interests (Vanguard February 25, 2013; Ameh 2013; Vanguard July 17, 2013; The Guardian, 
July 17, 2013, Rasheed 2013; Adesomoju 2014).   
In Ekiti State, the legislature removed the CJ, Justice Kayode Bamisile, because of the 
allegation that the members of the panel he raised to probe the allegations of gross 
misconduct against Governor Ayo Fayose were sympathisers of the governor (Oyebode 
2006)218. The new acting CJ appointed by the legislature, Justice Jide Aladejana, constituted 
another panel to investigate the allegation against Governor Fayose and his deputy, Mrs. 
Abiodun Olujinmi. The latter panel accused the Governor and his deputy of gross 
misconduct. The legislature subsequently removed them from office on October 16, 2006.219 
An interviewee informed me that the political elites opposed to the Governor selected 
members of the panel and the list was just presented to the CJ for rubber stamping.220 In some 
cases, especially in the impeachment of deputy governors, ‘[a]ny governor that does not like 
his deputy would just make any allegation and induce the legislators with money to 
commence an impeachment process to his removal; they direct the CJ on whom to pick to 
constitute the panel’ (Personal Interview IV, May 11, 2014). Not only that, the report of the 
panel is usually drafted by people who were not members of the panel.221 The outcome of the 
case in Ekiti snowballed into a larger political crisis that precipitated the declaration of a state 
of emergency by the president.  
                                                 
217The NJC is a regulatory body charged with the responsibility to discipline erring judicial officers. Beside this, 
the body is responsible for approving judicial officers to be appointed as CJ in the state judiciary upon the 
recommendation of the state government. 
218The legislature removed the CJ and nullified the appointment of members of the Panel. Indeed, the report of 
the panel exonerated the governor of all charges preferred against him. In contravention of the constitutional 
rules, the lawmakers appointed an acting CJ, Justice Jide Aladejana, without the approval of the NJC, and asked 
him to constitute another Panel that eventually returned a guilty verdict against the Governor. The CJN, Justice 
Alfa Belgore, frowned at this development and warned Aladejana against accepting the appointment by the 
legislature. The CJN had declared the appointment as unconstitutional. 
219The development that followed this action created a logjam in the State, as the Speaker, Honourable Friday 
Aderemi was sworn-in as the acting governor while Fayose and Olujinmi insisted that they were the Governor 
and Deputy Governor respectively. Eventually, the Federal Government had to declare a State of emergency in 
Ekiti State on October 19, 2006.  
220This informant requested complete anonymity.  In Plateau, Bayelsa and Oyo States, an official of the 
Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) told me that the anti-corruption agency was involved in the 
composition of the members of the panel, monitor and provide security cover for their sittings.  
221 This account seems to be the practice in most cases of impeachment where the judicial shield is against the 
governor. In one of the states where the Deputy Governor was removed, a member of the House told me that the 
lawmakers actually drafted the report of the panel and merely presented it to the panel members for signatures.   
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In Plateau State, the Acting Chief Judge, Justice Lazarus Dakyen, upon the instruction of the 
six members who passed a resolution for the investigation of gross misconduct against 
Governor Joshua Dariye, set up the panel to investigate the allegations (Abdulsalami 2006; 
Okanlawon 2006; Lawan 2010)222. Though Justice Yan Dakwang of Plateau State High 
Court, declared the composition and sitting of the panel as unconstitutional, the acting Chief 
Judge subsequently transferred the case to another Judge who provided the legal cover for the 
sitting of the panel (Abdulsalami 2006). Having discovered that the Acting CJ, by his action 
was in support of the six lawmakers, the Governor reviewed the status of the acting Chief 
Judge and appointed another Judge as the acting CJ (Lawan 2010).223 
A similar case occurred in Oyo State, in the process that led to the removal of Governor 
Ladoja. A judge of the Oyo State High Court, Justice Bolaji Yusuff, had on January 12, 2006 
declared as unconstitutional the composition and sitting of the panel investigating the 
allegation of gross misconduct against the governor (Ogundoke& 3 others v. Hon. Justice 
Afolabi Adeniran).224 Nevertheless, the Acting Chief Judge did not honour this judgment, and 
the panel discontinued with its sitting (Ogienagbon, 2006, p.10).  
The case of Anambra state was similar to what happened in Plateau State. A judge of the 
High Court of Anambra State, Justice Uregbolu Nri-Ezedi, was assigned to preside over the 
case on the impeachment of Governor Peter Obi. As he prepared to deliver his judgment, the 
Chief Judge of the state, Justice Chuka Jideofor Okoli, “arrested the judgment”225and 
subsequently transferred the case to another judge (cf. The Guardian 22 Dec. 2006, p.1; 
Lawan 2010). Though the National Judicial Council (NJC) directed the CJ to allow Justice 
Nri-Ezedi to deliver the judgment, he refused.226 The NJC noted that ‘at the point of 
                                                 
222Aside from the fact that the number of lawmakers who directed the acting Chief Judge to constitute the panel 
fell short of the constitutional requirements, a High Court Judge in Plateau State had earlier restrained the panel 
form sitting having declared the composition as unconstitutional. 
223 Section 271(4-5) of the Constitution empowers the governor to ‘appoint the most senior Judge of the High 
Court’ to perform the functions of a CJ if the office is vacant. Nevertheless, this appointment ‘cease to have 
effect after the expiration of three months” and the “Governor shall not re-appoint a person whose appointment 
has lapsed’. 
224Ogundoke& 3 others v. Hon. Justice Afolabi Adeniran. Guardian Law Report, The Guardian, January 17, 
2006, p. 68. 
225 Arrest of judgment is a legal terminology, denoting the decision of the court to refuse to render a judgment, 
after it has reached a verdict, based because of some legal reasons. 
226 The NJC, headed by the CJN, is constitutionally empowered to discipline erring judicial officer in the 
Nigerian judiciary with a view to ensure sanity and unbiased administration of justice in the country. As in the 
case of Ekiti state, the CJ of Anambra state was subsequently suspended having defied the instruction and 




judgment, it is only a court of competent jurisdiction [Court of Appeal or Supreme Court] 
acting on a formal application by a party to the suit, that can arrest the judgment’ (cf. The 
Guardian 22 December 2006, p.1).   
The CJs in Anambra, Oyo and Plateau States provided the shields that allowed the panels to 
proceed with their sittings though the constitution of the panels was unconstitutional. The 
beneficiaries of these shields are the political elites seeking the removal of the governors. 
This study has established that judicial officers who pronounced, as unconstitutional, the 
composition and the sitting of the panels sought to provide shields for the embattled 
governors as envisaged by the constitutional provisions. Inferences from the judicial 
pronouncements of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court on the cases indicate that the 
intendment of the anti-impeachment judicial pronouncements is to insulate the judiciary from 
the politics of impeachment through a proper interpretation of the constitution.  
The disparities in the judgments of the courts symbolises a lack of uniformity in the 
interpretation of statutes. This is akin to the disunity among the political elites in the 
executive and the legislative branches of the government. Nevertheless, the disunified 
judicial interpretation and adjudication can be facilitated by the politicians.  
Beyond this is the problem of corruption which characterises the judicial branch of the 
Nigerian government (Nwogu, 2014, Aborisade 2014; Olaleye 2001). The CJN has admitted 
that conflicting judgments characterise the Nigerian courts, a development he attributed to the 
‘personal interests of judges and lawyers in certain political cases’ (cf. Aborisade 2014). 
A retired President of the Court of Appeal disclosed that the Nigerian courts are not willing to 
do the right thing in adjudicating political cases, especially impeachment because of 
corruption (Personal Interview XXI, May 6, 2014). Though he admitted that ‘there are few 
good ones [judges]’ but that the lack of independence of judicial officers at the state High 
Courts makes them vulnerable to manipulation by the political elite. A Judge of a State High 
Court corroborates this; he said that judicial officers at the state levels are underpaid while 
their courts are underfunded (Personal Interview XXII, May 3, 2014). A Nigerian lawyer, 
who is also a professor of law, Fidelis Oditah, admits that some judges in Nigeria have lost 
their independence to politicians. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Nri-Ezendi delivered his judgment and upturned the decision of the legislators who had removed the governor 
(This Day, 29/12/2006). 
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I think that poverty is a terrible thing and greed is even more. I do fear that some judges have 
surrendered their independence to politicians. Some for monetary reason, some in order to 
further their judicial ambition... I also believe that the politicians have sought to erode the 
independence of the judiciary. For example, by a Governor refusing to pay a State High Court 
judge his entitlements or refusing to provide them proper courtrooms for them to work with, 
and in some cases even refusing to provide them with official vehicles (cf. Vanguard, 
December 4, 2014). 
A member of the Oyo State House of Assembly during the impeachment of Governor Ladoja 
related his experience with the state judicial officers saying that the independence of the 
judiciary at the state level is a rarity. 
The judiciary is being influenced by the politicians. There is no independence of judiciary, 
Judges take money and maneuver judgment… Politicians use judges as they want…judicial 
officers are not self-disciplined…If you have money you can pervert the course of justice, but 
if you are poor you are denied justice (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). 
It would have been a disservice to the Nigerian presidential system if adjudication on 
impeachment cases terminates at the state level. But the structure of the Nigerian judiciary 
provides protection against miscarriages of justice in the lower courts. This is evident in the 
cases of impeachments where State High Courts declined their own mandate to examine 
flagrant breaches of constitutional orders. The judicial review championed by the Court of 
Appeal and the Supreme Court, provided a way to deepen constitutionalism in Nigeria, 
especially in the area of impeachment. Thus, a judicial shield, albeit tainted with politics, 
does remain a veritable instrument to check the excesses of the legislature in their exercise of 
the power of impeachment.  
5.5 The intent of the impeachment provisions in Nigeria’s presidential constitution 
The Nigerian presidential constitution in the Fourth Republic is a replica of the 1979 
Constitution. A senior Nigerian lawyer who participated in the drafting of the 1979 
Constitution said that the impeachment provision is a political measure to police the activities 
of the executive branch of government with a view to promoting good governance (Personal 
Interview VII, May 15, 2014). He described the provision as a ‘political decision to punish 
somebody [President/Vice President, Governor/Deputy Governor] who is impeachable’ 
(Personal Interview VII, May 7, 2014). The adoption of a presidential system, according to 
him, stemmed from the need for a president with a national charisma rather than someone 
who displayed sectional interests, ‘because the whole country is the constituency of the 




Popular political discourse in the American presidential system is obsessed with the question 
of whether candidates possess national charismatic qualities able to satisfy the ‘public's wish 
for extraordinary leadership’ (Landy and Milkis 2000, p.2). Thus, scholars of the presidential 
system in America often debate the question of ‘presidential greatness’: which is often 
described in terms strikingly reminiscent of Weber's classical definition of charisma 
(Scheuerman 2005, p.25). Max Weber has argued that presidential democracy is intimately 
linked to the quest for charismatic political leaders and the presidential version of modern 
liberal democracy appears adept at generating a necessary dose of executive charisma in an 
otherwise disenchanted universe (Mommsen, 1984). Juan Linz (1994) and Bruce Ackerman 
(2000) build on Weber's political intuition, arguing that presidential systems, to a greater 
extent more than their parliamentary rivals, require would-be political leaders to show 
evidence of extraordinary abilities that raise them above run-of-the-mill politicians and 
ordinary citizens. 
One expectation is that the leadership of the executive branches at the national and state 
levels should exhibit a sense of community capable of engendering good governance as 
stipulated by the constitution227. The Nigerian Supreme Court held that the principle of 
separation of powers in the Nigerian presidential Constitution ‘is meant to guarantee good 
governance and development and to prevent abuse of power’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 
3 Ors).228 In the opinion of the Court, impeachment exhibits a unifying determination rather 
than a sectional representation of primordial interest.  
The exercise [impeachment] is much more than the party the Governor or Deputy Governor 
belongs and the party a member belongs. It is an exercise for the good of the state and 
members must remove their political hats or togas…Let the debate and the subsequent 
findings of the House be donated by the report of the Panel and not by sentiment (Inakoju& 17 
Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).229 
This interpretation correlates with other explanations on the constitutional provisions that 
empower the legislature to have control over the policy process in a manner that promotes 
good governance. Section 4 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 vests 
the legislative powers of the federal and state governments in the legislative institutions and 
this is the first in the list of the powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in the Constitution. 
A former Speaker of a state legislature explains that this arrangement ‘makes the legislature 
the locus of the people’s power’ because lawmakers are elected as representatives of separate 
                                                 
227Chapter II of the Constitution stipulates the fundamental objectives of the policy of the Nigerian state. 
228Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p183 
229Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p. 62 
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constituencies (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014). Thus, the legislators have the power to 
make laws for the promotion of the welfare of the constituents they represent. The legislative 
power of the purse, as stipulated by sections 80-89 and 120-129, of the constitution 
empowers the legislatures at the federal and state levels, respectively, to authorize and 
monitor the disbursement of all funds for government expenditures.230 
This authorisation power of the legislature is crucial in its relationship with the executive 
branch because the executive depends largely on the legislature for the implementation of 
government policies with a view to fulfilling the fundamental objectives of the state policy. 
In the same token, this oversight power enables the legislature to watch and monitor the 
appropriated funds. Specifically, section 128 (1&2) empowers the state legislature to direct 
an inquiry or investigation into  
(a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws; and (b) the conduct of 
affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government department charged, or intended to be 
charged, with the duty of or responsibility for (i) executing or administering laws enacted by 
that House of Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be 
appropriated by such House (The Constitution Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as 
amended).  
Oversight power is designed to effect corrections in case of any defects in the implementation 
of the policies that funds have been appropriated for and to ‘expose corruption, inefficiency 
of waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in 
the disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it’ (Section 128 (2b), The 
Constitution Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). This provision gives the 
legislature the power to control public funds; a major responsibility that establishes the 
legislative institution as the corner stone of public policy (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 
2014).  
When you have a president who is a decent person, who decides and works within the law of 
the land, and an Assembly that is focused, I think what we have in the provisions of 
impeachment are adequate enough. Like I said, it gives a role not only to the legislature but 
also the judiciary. And the framers envisaged that when a governor/president commits very 
big infraction it is then you invoke provisions of impeachment against him not when you have 
partisan division and pressures and all at that (Personal Interview VIII, May 19, 2014).  
Chapter II of the Constitution contains the fundamental objectives and directive principles of 
the policy of the Nigerian state. This chapter provides the template for the promotion of good 
                                                 
230Section 120 (1) states: ‘All revenues or other moneys raised or received by a State (not being revenues or 
other moneys payable under this Constitution or any Law of a House of Assembly into any other public fund of 
the State established for a specific purpose) shall be paid into and from one Consolidated Revenue Fund  [CRF] 




governance. Specifically, section 16 (1-2) mandates the Nigerian state to ‘harness the 
resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an efficient, dynamic and self-
reliant economy’ with a view to securing ‘the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of 
every citizen based on social justice and equality of status and opportunity’ (The Constitution 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). Aside from this, it is the responsibility of 
the Nigerian state to promote ‘planned and balanced economic development’ by harnessing 
the nation’s material resources and to distributes them ‘as best as possible to serve the 
common good’ (The Constitution Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). The 
provisions of this chapter set out the blueprint of the policies of the government as well as the 
philosophical foundations of the governmental process.  
It is within this framework that the meaning and relevance of the functions of the three 
branches of government are found. More importantly, the legislature and executive activities 
are the driving forces for the realisation of the import of these provisions. As one interviewee 
argued, 
 
I also believe very deeply that in a democracy, under a democratic constitution as we have, 
especially the presidential system of government, the legislature is actually the locus of 
influence. A legislature that knows its onions, that asserts its independence reasonably, and 
that is led by visionary individuals, is actually supposed to be the bedrock of democratic 
governance. At first contact, the tendency is to assume that the president is all powerful. They 
call him executive president. The assumption is that the president is so powerful. But a 
legislature that is alive to its responsibilities and made up of men and women of stature, who 
also have vision and deeply patriotic, there is no much a president can achieve except with the 
support of the legislature. It would therefore mean that where the legislature is doing the 
needful, an executive officer cannot go berserk; he cannot turn to become irresponsible 
because that tool of impeachment is there (Personal Interview VIII, May 19, 2014). 
This constitutional provision, when paired with the provisions on the power of the 
lawmakers, strengthens the responsibility of the legislative institution to promote good 
governance (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014). This is important because elected 
members of the legislative and executive branches of government in Nigeria usually swear 
oaths to discharge their duties faithfully and, in accordance with the provisions of the 
constitution (Seventh Schedule, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as 
amended). In other words, they pledge to uphold and defend the provisions of the 
Constitution. They are also bound to abide by the Code of Conduct and to be devoted to the 
service and well-being of the people. These oaths, when pieced together, are expected to 
serve as the guiding principles for their conduct in directing the affairs of the Nigerian state 
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and to ensure the formulation and implementation of policies designed to enhance the welfare 
of the people.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court laments the abuse of these oaths by the legislature and the 
executive. Justice Niki Tobi affirms that in the discharge of crucial legislative responsibility 
such as impeachment, ‘members [legislators] should be most loyal to the oath they took on 
that eventful day of their swearing in ceremony’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).231 The 
Court regrets that ‘some Nigerians regard this oath as another kindergarten recitation, to the 
extent that they did not attach any importance to it’ (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).232 
As important as chapter two of the constitution is, its successful implementation is dependent 
on strict adherence to section 15(5), which states: ‘The State shall abolish all corrupt 
practices and abuse of power’.233 It is in the realisation of this that the constitution further 
mandates the legislature to ensure that any erring official of the executive branch of 
government whose actions amount to the abuse of power and the derailment of the objectives 
of the government, is eased out of the government through  the process of impeachment 
(Personal Interview, May 13, 2014)234.  
Section 308 of the Constitution, often referred to as the immunity clause, shields the heads of 
the executive branch of the government at the state and federal levels, against civil or 
criminal proceedings while in office. Aside from this, they ‘shall not be arrested or 
imprisoned during that period’ and that ‘no process of any court requiring or compelling the 
appearance of a person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued’ (The 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). However, impeachment 
removes this immunity and disrobes governors with questionable characters of all the 
constitutional shields against prosecution. For instance, when the Economic and Financial 
Crime Commission (EFCC) commenced the trial of Governor Joshua Dariye over the 
embezzlement of state funds, the court ruled that section 308 of the Constitution shields the 
                                                 
231Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p. 61 
232Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p. 61 
233 Corruption and abuse of power are the two main challenges which the structure of the presidential system 
seeks to overcome (Kada, 2003; Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Kim and Bahry 2008; Hochstetler and 
Edwards 2009; Kim, 2013). They are formidable among the factors that engender governance problem (The 
World Bank, 2010; MO Ibrahim Foundation, 2011). The concept of separation of power and the doctrine of 
checks and balances are instruments to ensure responsible governance structures in a presidential system. 
234  Section 308 of the Constitution provides immunity for the leadership of the executive against prosecution 
while in office. 
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governor from prosecution (The Guardian, 17/02/2006)235. But, immediately after the removal 
of  late Diepreye Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State in December 2005, the EFCC arrested him 
for prosecution because of allegations of corruption against him while in office (BBC News, 
December 9, 2005)236. 
The impeachment provision therefore is intended to remove the immunity shield provided by 
the Constitution for the governors in order to allow them to answer charges of malfeasances 
perpetrated while in office. As an interviewee said, 
 
I surely believe that the provisions for impeachment in the constitution are adequate in the 
1999 constitution. It is adequate in the sense that it empowers the legislature and the judiciary 
to checkmate an errant chief executive. The framers of the constitution were also very careful 
not to allow the provisions to be so soft that it would create the bases for frivolity in terms of 
the security of tenure of chief executives (Personal Interview VIII, May 19, 2014).  
As such, impeachment is the only constitutional means to sanction this category of people 
who are the custodians of state policy, and to expose them to judicial inquest and prosecution. 
When you have a president/governor who is a decent person, who decides and works within 
the law of the land, and an Assembly that is focused, I think what we have in the provisions of 
impeachment are adequate enough. Like I said, it gives a role not only to the legislature but 
also the judiciary. And the framers envisaged that when a governor/president commits very 
big infraction it is then you invoke provisions of impeachment against him not when you have 
partisan division and pressures and all at that (Personal Interview VIII, May 19, 2014).   
 
Thus, impeachment in the Nigerian presidential system is not an instrument in the domain of 
the legislature to ‘achieve a political purpose or one of organised vendetta clearly outside 
gross misconduct’ in the provision (Inakoju& 17 Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).237 Rather, the 
provision in section 188, 
is a very strong political weapon at the disposal of the House which must be used only in 
appropriate cases of serious wrong doing on the part of the Governor or Deputy Governor, 
which is tantamount to gross misconduct within the meaning of subsection 11 (Inakoju& 17 
Ors v. Adeleke& 3 Ors).238 
Impeachment, as an oversight instrument, is the main constitutional tool available to the 
legislature to sanction leadership of the executive branch in a presidential democracy who are 
involved in corruption or the abuse of power (Hinojosa and Perez-Linan 2002, p.1). In other 
                                                 
235As will be discussed in chapter six, these two governors were arrested separately by the London Metropolitan 
police for money laundering. The report was forwarded to the EFCC.   
236He was eventually convicted but was later pardoned by President Goodluck Jonathan. Incidentally, Jonathan 
was the Deputy Governor who succeeded him after his removal. This is discussed in detail in chapter six. 
237Inakoju & 17 Ors v. Adeleke & 3 Ors (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt I), p. 66 




words, the impeachment provision in a presidential constitution is a measure to persuade the 
political elite to behave responsibly in government with a view to promoting good 
governance.  
 
Nigerian scholars aver that the impeachment provision is a necessity to deal with the 
proclivity of government leadership toward impunity. Fagbohungbe (2007 p.37) posits that 
impeachment ‘is capable of wrenching the Nigerian nation from the clutches of 
pathologically corrupt politicians and promotes both democratic and national development’. 
Thus, the impeachment provision in the Nigerian Constitution is a measure to ‘prevent the 
exercise of arbitrary power and to serve as a check on official tyranny’ because of the fear 
that ‘periodic elections may not be enough check (sic) against absolute tyranny that 
impeachment is considered expedient in the constitution’ (Awotokun 1998, pp.48-49). Lai 
Olurode sees the impeachment provision as a well intended mechanism that seeks to ‘prevent 
those who are found capable of gross misconduct from remaining in office’ (Olurode 2007, 
p.26). The primacy of impeachment in Nigeria, therefore, is predicated on the need to 
empower the legislature to exercise control over public officers (Akinsanya, 2002) in a bid to 
ensure the emergence of ‘a system of government accountability and control’ (Omotola 2006, 
p.187). 
Evidently, Nigerian political elites are aware of the import and intent of the impeachment 
provision in the constitution. A number of them who spoke with me admit that the provision 
is clear enough to convey the overall intent of the framers but that legislators often apply it 
incorrectly. To some, it is an instrument to call the governor to order whenever he/she is 
derailing the implementation of government policy (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014).  
 
If you have the Governor of the state misappropriating funds, involved in misuse of power, or 
executing any project outside the budgets, the legislature might commence an impeachment 
process to remove him from office (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). 
 
This means that the legislative use of section 188 of the Constitution should be borne out of 
the need to enforce good governance. As a former Deputy Speaker noted, ‘impeachment must 
be based on concrete allegations impinging on governance’ (Personal Interview, II, May 10, 
2014). Where the allegations related to governance issues, they were afterthoughts mostly 
occasioned by differences over the attitudes of the governor towards their welfare demands. 
A former Speaker of a state legislature confirmed this saying that the decision of the 
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legislature to remove the deputy governor was occasioned by his [Deputy Governor’s] failure 
to accede to their financial request (Personal Interview III, May 10, 2014).239 
Unfortunately, most legislatures that embarked upon impeachment did not adhere to the 
intent of the constitution.  A Deputy Speaker disclosed that the issues that prompted nearly all 
the impeachment episodes, 
 
have nothing to do with the interests of the common man in the street. In fact, from my 
interaction with colleagues from other legislatures, who were involved in the removal of their 
Governors and or Deputy Governors, the actions took place as a reflection of division among 
the political elites. (Personal Interview, II, May 10, 2014).    
In Oyo, Bayelsa, and Plateau States, the genesis of the impeachment process against the 
former governors was the division between the former governors and their respective political 
godfathers. It is evident from the pronouncements of the courts that the judicial decisions 
were based on the violation of the procedures and the constitutional provisions relating to the 
removal of governors and not on the veracity of the allegations of corruption leveled against 
the former governors. There is evidence that former governors were involved in activities of 
gross misconduct, which included the misappropriation of funds by the former governors. Yet 
the intent of those making the claims was not to serve justice, but to remove them from office 
(Personal Interview VII, May 7, 2014). 
5.6  Governors and the abuse of office  
In most of the of impeachment cases, there were prima facie cases established against the 
former governors that were removed and many others who were spared (Lawan 2010). The 
chairman of EFCC, Mallam Nuhu Ribadu, in one of his appearances before the nation’s 
parliament had disclosed that 26 out of the 36 state governors were under investigation for 
corrupt practices (Okanlawon 2006). Similarly, the Independent Corrupt Practices 
Commission (ICPC) also disclosed that certain numbers of governors were being investigated 
for corruption related issues. Indeed, a former top official of ICPC told me in an interview 
that the agency was able to track over 20 governors with tainted corruption records. 
 
During my tenure, I know that the Commission sent cases of over 20 governors to the CJN 
that ought to be prosecuted for a series of corrupt practices. We were able to establish prima 
facie case against each of them. I left high profile cases but continue to wonder why the 
governors were not prosecuted (Personal Interview 11, May 6, 2014).   
                                                 
239According to the Speaker, the Deputy Governor was acting on behalf of the Governor who was outside the 




5.6.1 Allegations of corruption against former governor of Bayelsa State, late Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha  
 The governor was arrested at Heathrow airport in September 15, 2005 by the London 
Metropolitan Police on the suspicion of money laundering (Global Witness 2010). A sum of 
£1.8m was found on him both in cash at his London home and deposits in the bank (BBC 
News 2005; Polgreen 2005).  He was granted bail on the condition that he should not leave 
London. He however absconded and flew back to Nigeria on November 20, 2005 (Polgreen 
2005). He was eventually impeached by the legislature. Though he claimed that the 
allegations against him were politically motivated (Polgreen 2005; Global Witness 2010), he 
was charged to court after his impeachment and sentenced to 12 years imprisonment in 2007 
on a six-count charge of fraud and false declaration of assets (Iriekpen and Muraina 2007). 
Aside from the imprisonment terms, the court also ordered him to forfeit several of his 
properties acquired in his name with the state fund. Besides, he was to forfeit ‘N1 billion 
worth of shares in former Bond Bank; $160,000 in account number 005482562491 with an 
American bank; and N105million in account number 2010062850006 with former Bond 
Bank’ (Iriekpen and Muraina 2007). The governor held several foreign bank accounts, either 
in his name or companies, which he opened and operated during his tenure. The presidential 
constitution of Nigeria does not permit some categories of government officials to own 
foreign accounts while in office as part of their code of conduct as public officials. Section 3 
of the Code of Conduct in the Constitution states:  
 
The President, Vice-President, Governor, Deputy Governor, Ministers of the Government of 
the Federation and Commissioners of the Governments of the States, members of the National 
Assembly and of the Houses of Assembly of the States, and such other public officers or 
persons as the National Assembly may by law prescribe shall not maintain or operate a bank 
account in any country outside Nigeria (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999). 
Section 6 of the code also bars this category of public officials from receiving gifts or 
benefits from individuals or group of individuals in the course of their service. 
 
A public officer shall not ask for or accept property or benefits of any kind for himself or any 
other person on account of anything done or omitted to be done by him in the discharge of his 
duties... the receipt by a public officer of any gifts or benefits from commercial firms, business 
enterprises or persons who have contracts with the government shall be presumed to have 
been received in contravention of the said subparagraph unless the contrary is proved. A 
public officer shall only accept personal gifts or benefits from relatives or personal friends to 
such extent and on such occasions as are recognised by custom Provided that any gift or 
donation to a public officer on any public or ceremonial occasion shall be treated as a gift to 
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the appropriate institution represented by the public officer, and accordingly, the mere 
acceptance or receipt of any such gift shall not be treated as a contravention of this provision 
(Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended). 
 
The late Governor Alamieyeseigha flouted these constitutional stipulations.. A government 
contractor, Mr. Aliyu Abubakar, confessed he gave the former governor three houses in 
London that were worth £3.15 million as gifts (Global Witness 2010, p.15). In April 2001, 
this contractor also claimed he deposited U$1.5million to buy bonds for the former governor 
while he also bought him a house worth £1.4million in Kilburn, North London (Global 
Witness 2010, p.12). Table 5 below shows the various accounts operated by the governor in 
different banks in Britain in contravention of the constitutional rules.  
Table 8: Some of the bank accounts controlled and operated by Governor 
Alamieyeseigha in the United Kingdom between 1999 and 2005 
 
Bank Account Details Date opened Amount with dates 
UBS  Personal (Ref. No. 323940) 09/1999 £306,000 
(12/2005) 
UBS Falcon (Proxy 








Personal dollar account 



























Sort code 60-13-33 
a/c 48003182 
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    63825538 





Source: Data adapted from Global Witness. 2010. How British banks are complicit in Nigerian corruption. 




Aside from these bank accounts, the former governor also received several gifts from 
contractors handling several projects of the state. Global Witness (2010) in its reports 
presents the various properties in London that were ‘presented’ to the governor as ‘gifts’ by 
contractors240. Few months after his assumption of office, precisely December 1999, the 
former governor acquired Flat 202, Jubilee Height in Cricklewood, Northwest London at a 
sum of £241,000, in the name of one of his offshore companies, Solomon and Peters (Global 
Witness 2010, p.18). He also acquired the property in 68-71 Regent Park Road in Golders 
Green in the name of his company, Solomon and Peter for a sum of £1.4 million (Global 
Witness 2010, p.18). The former governor also bought a £1.75 million luxury penthouse at 
247 The Water Gardens in July 2003, also in his company’s name (Global Witness 200, p18). 
In 2004, the former governor bought another penthouse in the upscale Waterfront 
development area in Cape Town, South Africa at a sum of £949,000 (Global Witness 2010, 
p.19). The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in its 2011 Report indicates that 
Alamieyeseigha laundered a total sum of US$17 M between 1999 and 2005 through shady 
deals in the United Kingdom and South Africa (FATF 2011, p.45). Late Alamieyeseigha 
confessed to all these allegations and confirmed the ownership of the properties (Global 
Witness 2010; FATF 2011).  
5.6.2 Allegations of corruption against Governors Joshua Chibi Dariye and Rashidi 
Ladoja of Plateau and Oyo States, respectively 
Like his Bayelsa State counterpart, the former governor of Plateau State, Joshua Dariye was 
arrested in London in 2004 on allegations of money laundering to the tune of £1.4m (BBC 
News 23/11/205; Ogienagon 2007; Global Witness 2010). The report of the investigation of 
the London Metropolitan Police which led to the conviction of Dariye’s associates in the 
money laundering charges, Joyce Bamidele Oyebanjo241, confirmed the culpability and 
involvement of the former governor in the crime (Global Witness 2010). She allegedly 
confessed that the friendship between her and Dariye facilitated the money laundering 
activities of the governor. According to her,  
 
[he] asked me to choose a private school in England for his children to go to. I found Dean 
Close in Cheltenham but warned him the fees were high. He did not mind at all. He told me he 
                                                 
240 The report details the revelations and confessional statements of witnesses during Alamieyeseigha’s court 
trial in London over the recovery of the laundered funds and properties. 
241Oyebanjo was Dariye’s associate in London who was taken care of his children education. Dariye’s children 
attended Dean Close in Cheltenham. 
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would wire the money to my account because that way he could avoid a lot of bureaucracy 
and that he would refund me (cf. Global Witness 2010, p.26). 
 
In view of his arrest and pending trial in London242, Nigeria’s EFCC began an investigation 
of the financial activities of the state. In the course of its investigation, the anti-corruption 
agency discovered the misappropriation and embezzlement of the N1.6 billion fund allocated 
for ecological problem in the state. In April 4, 2007, the Southwark Crown Court convicted 
Joyce Bamidele Oyebanjo over the charges of money laundering and sentenced her to three 
years imprisonment (Ogienagon 2007; Global Witness 2010). 
The investigation began in January 2004 following the seizure of over £11,000 in cash from 
an address in Portland Street, London SE1...The cash was found to have belonged to a man 
called Joshua Chibi Dariye, a Nigerian State Governor for Plateau State...A joint investigation 
into Joshua Dariye was subsequently launched with the Nigerian State Security and later with 
their Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. It was discovered that vast sums of 
Plateau State Government money had been diverted into Dariye’s personal accounts, using the 
funds to purchase expensive property in London using false names (cf. Ogienagon 2007). 
 
Table 6 below shows the amount of funds Governor Dariye transferred to the accounts of 
Oyebanjo between July 2003 and March 2004 when he was still the governor of Plateau 
State. 
Table 9: Money laundered by Dariye between July 2003 and March 2004 through Joyce 
Bamidele Oyebanjo 
Bank Amount Date 
NatWest £147,000 29 July 2003 
NatWest £147,985 20 August 2003 
NatWest £199,985 27 August 2003 
NatWest £189,970 3 October 2003 
NatWest £404,073 21 October 2003 
NatWest £76,951.87 8 March 2004 
Adapted from: Global Witness. 2010. How British banks are complicit in Nigerian corruption. London: Global 
Witness Limited, p.26).  
 
Aside from the use of this proxy accounts, Dariye also deposited large sum of money into one 
of his accounts in Barclays’ Bank between 1999 and 2004 (Global Witness 2010). This cash 
flow included individual deposits of £55,000 on 9 October 2000, £34,000 on 3September 
2001 and £20,000 on 18 December2003 (Global Witness 2010, p.28). As at the time of his 
arrest in London in 2004, the Metropolitan Police found with him £80,000 cash and over £2 
                                                 
242 Like his Bayelsa counterpart, Dariye jumped bail in London in 2004 to avoid his arraignment over money 
laundering charges (Global Witness 2010; FATF 2011). 
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million deposit in his bank accounts (The Guardian 03/09/2004; Global Witness 2010). The 
police in London wondered how a former governor whose ‘official legitimate earnings 
amounted to under £40,000 per annum’ could acquire ‘assets worth millions of pounds’ (cf. 
Ogienagon 2007). In May 2007, the EFCC sold one of Dariye’s properties in London for 
£450,000 while another £1 million was forfeited to the government of Nigeria (cf. Ogienagon 
2007; Global Witness 2010; FATF 2011). 
FATF in its July 2011 report states: 
Checks issued from the Central Bank of Nigeria to Plateau State for ecological works were 
received by Dariye and, rather than being deposited into a government account, were instead 
diverted to an account in Nigeria Dariye had established using an alias. The money was then 
transferred to accounts held in Dariye‘s own name in the UK. Likewise, Dariye purchased real 
estate by diverting money destined for a Plateau State account into an account in Nigeria in 
the name of a corporation he controlled. That corporation, in turn, transferred money to UK 
accounts in the corporation‘s name to effectuate the real estate purchase (FATF Report 2011, 
p22). 
 
FATF report disclosed that Dariye laundered a sum of US$17 million between 1999 and 2006 
in the United Kingdom though this offshore fund transfers (FATF Report 2011, p45). In an 
apparent confirmation of his money laundering activities, the governor wrote a protest letter 
to the president in 2007 claiming that the London Metropolitan Police seized £2,961, 560 
from him as against £1.4m claimed by the police (Ogienagon 2007). Prior to this time, the 
former governor had confessed that he actually embezzled the N1.6 billion Ecological 
Fund243 of the state and that he shared the proceeds with top government officials. 
Some people will join me to return this money. The talk about billions and billions of naira 
has no element of truth because of this amount (N1.8 billion) only N800 million came to the 
state. I gave N100 million to PDP South-West; N100 million to North-East, is that not one 
billion? Between Mantu [Deputy Senate President] and me, I gave him N10 million. I told 
Mantu when we met in Benue that since they have decided to blackmail me, if I am asked to 
return this money, you should also be ready to return the N10 million I gave you (cf. Obateru 
2006). 
 
 Similarly, the former governor of Oyo State, Rashidi Ladoja, like Joshua Dariye, received a 
judicial reprieve to complete his term after his impeachment in 2006. In the notice of 
allegations of gross misconduct served on him, there were no serious indictments. 
Nevertheless, the EFCC investigation indicated that the former governor laundered a sum of 
N47billion naira while in office (Premium Times 19/04/20132013). The EFCC accused him 
of purchasing an armoured Land Cruiser Jeep for N42million aside from a remittance 
£600,000 into the foreign account of his wife, Bimpe Ladoja (Premium Times 19/04/2013). 
                                                 
243This fund is a constitutional allocation to states to combat environmental problems such as erosion, flood, 
among other natural disasters. 
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 None of the legislatures in these states embarked upon the impeachment of the former 
governors despite the strength of the evidence. Rather, their actions were prompted by the 
EFCC, in Plateau and Bayelsa States, while the influence of godfather, the late Lamidi 
Adedibu, prompted the removal of governor Ladoja of Oyo State. Implicitly, the lawmakers 
chose to look the other way. They had the power to remove the governors, and the evidence 
to do so. However, it took external interventions instead to remove the governors. 
 Aside from the three governors discussed above, there are many other former governors 
accused of violations of the rules and the codes of conduct of public officials where neither 
the legislature nor the EFCC has sought to remove them. Table 7 below shows the various 
infractions of some selected former state governors. 
 Table 10: Records of allegations of impropriety against former governors of selected 




State Allegations Legislative /Judicial Action 
Jolly Nyame Taraba 
1999-2007 
Money laundering and acceptance of 
gratification to the tune of 
N1.36billion (Adewole 2012) 
No legislative action. Charged 
to court by the EFCC but no 
conviction. 
Aliyu Doma Nasarawa 
2007-2011 
Misappropriation of N18 billion 
(Sanni & Balogun 2011; Adewole 
2011) 
No legislative action. Charged 
to court by the EFCC but no 
conviction. 
Alao Akala Oyo 2007-
2011 
Misappropriation of N25 billion 
(Sanni & Balogun 2011; Adewole 
2011) 
No legislative action.. Charged 
to court by the EFCC but no 
conviction. 
James Ibori Delta  
1999-2007 
Stole £50m while in office Embezzled 
£157m. Laundered £1.4million 
(Gesinde et al 2012). 
No legislative action. EFCC 
charged him to Nigerian court 
but was freed for lack of 
evidence to convict him. 





Stole N4.4 billion (Africa 19/12/2008; 
Adewole 2008). 
No legislative action. He was 
charged to court by EFCC and 
found guilty. 
Gbenga Daniel  2003-2011  Misapplication of N58 billion 
(Sanni & Balogun 2011; Adewole 
2011; Musari 2011) 
No legislative action. He was 
charged to court by EFCC, but 
no conviction yet. 
Timpre Sylva Bayelsa 
2007-2011 
Fraudulent stealing of N6.5 billion, 
property of the state government 
(Amaize & Nnochiri 2012) 
No legislative action. He was 
charged to court by EFCC, but 





Facing a 47-count charge relating to 
allegations of embezzlement of state 
funds (Ogannah 2009; Kofarmatta 
2005)). 
No legislative action. EFCC 
pressed charges against him.  
Orji UzorKalu, Abia 
1999-2007 
Criminal diversion of public funds 
totaling over 
N5billion (Saharareporters 12/7/2007; 
Premium Times 27/4/12). 
No legislative action. Was 





Laundered N4.5 billion (Njoku 2007; 
Channels Television 07/02/2013; 
Iriekpen & Muraina 2007). 
No legislative action. EFCC 
pressed charges against him.  
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Danjuma Goje Gombe 
2003-2011 
Diversion of N52 billion state fund for 
private use. Stole N5 billion from the 
state coffers through supply of food to 
the Gombe State Government 
House (Kalu & Onwuemenyi 2011; 
Adewole 2011; Musari 2011). 
No legislative action.  EFCC 
pressed charges against him. 
SaminuTuraki244 Jigawa Stole N6 in one day (Kolade-Otitoju 
2010) 
No legislative action. EFCC 
pressed charges of corruption 
against him 
Ayodele Fayose Ekiti State Money laundering, illegal conversion 
of N11.7 billion funds of the local 
government councils, receipt of illegal 
gift of 37,000 British Pounds, N13 
billion Ekiti Poultry Integrated Project 
funds (Okanlawon 2006; Lawan 
2010). 
No legislative action until 
EFCC arrested the lawmakers 
and promised to set them free if 
they proceeded with an 
impeachment process. The 
lawmaker resorted to illegality 
in the removal process. The 
crisis it generated led to 
declaration of state of 
emergency. He was reelected 
as the governor of the state in 
2014. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from multiple newspaper reports. 
 
The EFCC investigations exposed these infractions. Thus the legislators either colluded with 
the former governors or did not to perform their oversight and monitoring functions during 
the period in which the governors were in office.   
5.7 Summary 
In Nigeria, the constitutional provisions are adequate to serve as an instrument for the 
promotion of good governance. Judicial interpretation of the provisions affirm that the intent 
of the impeachment provisions in the constitution is to serve as a legislative instrument to 
monitor the conduct of the executive with a view to ensuring compliance with extant rules in 
a manner that promotes good governance. Section 188 of the constitution is intended to 
safeguard a governing system, populated by elected officials, against the abuse of power and, 
as such, is intended to protect the interests of the population. The legislature, as the custodian 
of the constitution, is expected to monitor the activities of the executive, the implementer of 
government policies, with a view to ensuring governmental responsibility.  
                                                 
244His successor, Sule Lamido disclosed that he had documents to show how the former governor looted the 
treasury. He said: ‘This is somebody who looted N6 billion in one day. He could write a cheque of N500 million 
and cash across the counter by different people, until he got up to N6 billion. That is not all, he cut an existing 
road into two, that is about one kilometre and awarded the contract at N3 billion. He also gave a contract for the 





I claim, however, that Section 188 of the constitution is flawed, particularly those clauses that 
define ‘gross misconduct’, and, the ouster clause. These clauses are not sufficient for 
justifying the use of legislative power to flout and breach the constitutional provisions. The 
judiciary pronounced that these clauses are mischievously misconstrued by the political elite 
as well as their accomplices in the judiciary, in order to enable the application of the law for 
political purposes. Intra-elite divisions (in line with Higley’s conceptual distinction of 
disunified elites),provides the catalyst for the abuse of the constitutional rules on 
impeachment by the legislative and judicial branches of government. As will be seen in 
chapter six, the application of the rules, was selective. Other governors who committed 
similar offences to those that were impeached but were spared of what Olowo (2006) calls 
‘EFCC fast-track impeachment’. Thus, the constitutional provision of impeachment is not 
used, in practice, to promote good governance, but in effect quite the opposite. 


































Patron-client Politics and the Politics of Impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic  
 
6.1 Introduction 
A common feature in the conduct of the affairs of the Nigerian state as shown in chapter five 
is a pervasive sense of impunity among the political elite, despite a constitutional system of 
checks and balances. In this system, there is a de facto loss of the de jure powers of oversight 
embodied in the legislature  The use of the Economic and Financial Crime Commission 
(EFCC), to influence the impeachment process of some governors, attests to this as it depicts 
a clear manifestation of the loss of the constitutional relevance and actual control. The height 
of this is the use of the EFCC, an agency of the executive branch, to harass or coerce the 
legislature, an independent branch of government, to undertake its statutory role under 
duress.  
This trend depicts a new dimension of patronage politics and corruption in Nigeria’s political 
system. The lack of independence of the legislative institution is partly as a function of the 
prevailing nature of socio-economic and political relationships among the political elite. The 
‘vastly superior wealth and access’ of a number of individual political elites has ‘moved them 
into a select club of elites from across the nation who increasingly came to dominate national 
politics’ (Sklar et al 2006, p.105). Godfathers who display power and affluence establish 
networks of clients among the political elite as godsons and followers among the populace as 
political trading instruments. The godsons in the government are expected to remain loyal to 
the godfathers, carry out orders and meet demands even if such directives run contrary to the 
requirements of good governance. Where a godson revolts against, or shows any sign of 
disloyalty to, the godfather the consequence is either violence against the governor or an 
induced legislative process of impeachment.  
Though they have ‘shown surprising capacity to negotiate compromise solutions that serve 
most of their ends’ (Sklar et al 2006, p.105), the outcome is ‘often at the expense of the 
public good’ (Sklar et al 2006, p.105). Whenever such compromise threatens their personal 
survival, ‘their penchant for displays of brinkmanship... inadvertently - or in some cases 
deliberately - send (sic) their political struggles spiralling out of control and into the streets’ 
(Sklar et al 2006, p106). Flagrant abuses of power, constitutional manipulation and deliberate 
breaches of statutes are the contemporary measures to advance such interests. Thus, disunity 
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and a lack of consensus about the rules impinge on service delivery. Higley (2011) has 
argued that members of the disunified elite, especially in a developing political system (like 
Nigeria), are not interested in the delivery of the public goods but rather in exploiting their 
position within the state to advance their pecuniary interests. Thus, intra-elite crises and 
violence are common features because there is no consensus on the patterns of behaviour of 
members. The outcome of this is usually poor service delivery and crises in of governance.  
In this chapter, I present an empirical analysis on how the activities of godfathers influence 
the decisions in the legislature in the cases of impeachment. In particular, I analyse the 
activities of godfathers in party politics, the legislative process of impeachment, and the 
provision of legislative shields to promote the interests of the godfathers and godsons.  I 
claim that the legislature is filled with godsons that thereby incapacitate it to use the 
constitutional powers they possess to serve the public. The godsons, although elected to 
promote the interests of the public, do not vote against the interests of their godfathers who 
have sponsored their personal electoral victory, even when the consequences of not doing so 
clearly contradict that public interest.  
The consequences of voting against the interests of a godfather are severe. In Oyo State, for 
example, former Governor Ladoja went against the preferences of his godfather, the late 
Lamidi Adedibu, which eventually led to the removal of the governor from office.  Interviews 
showed that although there was evidence of abuse in office by the governor, the legislature 
would not have taken any action if there had not been a rift between Ladoja and his 
godfather. The political elite are thus unified in purpose – they are aware of the rules and the 
consequences of breaking them, but there are no consequences in cases of the abuse of office 
as long as their mutual interests are protected and promoted. Thus, the use of the legislative 
power of impeachment in cases where the constitution is breached indicates that the 
lawmakers were not motivated by the desire to promote accountability and good governance. 
 
6.2 Patron-client politics (Godfatherism) in Nigeria’s presidential system 
Scholars have noted the impact of patronage politics on democratic practice and the 
promotion of good governance (Randall and Svasand 2002; Fonchingong 2004; Marty 2002; 
Fatton 1992, 1995). Rather than promote democratic ideals, patronage politics in Nigeria 
inculcates a culture of personalised politics thereby stifling the prospects of good governance 
by promoting impunity despite a system of checks and balances. Traditionally, patronage 
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politics is understood to be a form of social relationships between the political elite and those 
in the relationship. This involves an exchange of “goods” and services aimed at enhancing 
the welfare of those in the relationship (Lemarchand 1981; Stein 1996; Omobowale & 
Olutayo 2007; Sarker 2008; Mwenda and Tangri 2005, Weingrod 1968). While the patron 
provides the ‘goods’ in terms of socio-economic and political gains, the clients are expected 
to appreciate such gestures with their loyalty; which might translate into support during the 
elections.  
In contemporary Nigerian politics, this concept of goods and services has gone beyond the 
contemplation of this reward system embedded in traditional social relations. Richard Joseph 
(1991, p.116) has noted that the survival of the political elite hinges on their ability to ‘deliver 
the goods’. This might not necessarily be in terms of tangible infrastructural facilities and 
amenities but rather in terms of the satisfaction of the immediate and temporary needs of the 
people, popularly referred to as stomach infrastructure245. Thus, social relations within the 
space of Nigeria’s patronage politics are akin to a trading partnership or investment with a 
proportionate element of coercion. When the rewards fall below expectations, or as Alabi 
William (2009) puts it “when the godson steps on the toes of the godfather”, then the game of 
politics becomes what Sklar et al (2006) refer to as perilously rough and lawless. Thus, the 
political elite often ‘see the electoral process as an avenue for investment through which they 
expect to corruptly reap profits by manipulating and misleading their sponsored candidates 
while (sic) in executive position’ (Uneze 2008). In other words, the primary motive of the 
godfather is to sponsor candidates, especially governors, which would him or her with 
returns, in terms of access to the resources of the state.   
Nigerian political godfathers ‘generally share more in common with each other than with 
their own relatively impoverished supporters’ (Sklar et la 2006, p 105) who risk their lives as 
foot soldiers and instruments of violence to establish the political hegemony of their patrons 
(Animasawun 2013; Kifordu 2010; Oarhe 2010). 
 
                                                 
245This concept was coined in the wake of the electoral victory of Governor Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State in the 
June 2014 gubernatorial election to denote the use monetary and material inducements that cater for the 
immediate needs and consumption of the people to canvass for votes during elections. This is not a new concept 
but a refined appellation of bribery for election which characterised the politics of the First and Second 
Republics. It has regained its prominence as a veritable instrument in determining political process in Nigeria. 
For the details, see Joseph 1991; Ayeni & Soremekun 1988; Fagbadebo 2007. 
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In Nigeria, the patron-client relation is based on master servant relation (sic) and motivated by 
commercial interest at the detriment of public interest. The patrons foist charlatans or 
hooligans on the rest of the people and help to ensure that they stay in office for as long as 
they desire. The clients in return devise (sic) perfidious schemes aimed at boosting the 
residual interest of the cabal (Oarhe 2010, p.54). 
A writer sums up this unethical value that characterises the Nigeria state thus: 
We have politicians bastardising (sic) the political process. We have those in the public and 
private spaces stealing the country blind. We have a judiciary that is less than stellar. We have 
a legislative branch that is more concerned with enriching itself than enriching the nation. We 
have non-state actors killing innocent citizens at will. And now we have petty and pesky 
individuals threatening the survival of the country (Abidde 2013). 
In Nigeria, democracy is about personalities; the political process revolves around the desire 
to please the individuals who are in control of power. In Nigeria, ‘the underlying political and 
social system’ (Joseph 1991, p. 4) has to do with the mode of representation of interests and 
distribution of benefits thereof246. The notion of executive power, associated with the offices 
of the offices of the president and the state governors, have been stretched to afford the 
executive with the omnipotent power of control both in terms of the representation of 
interests and the distribution of benefits. . A former speaker of a state legislature said: 
My experience has shown that whereas the framers of the constitution might have intended a 
system of government that would be modeled along what is operating in the USA, the state of 
our political and economic development is not such as can withstand the kind of presidential 
system we put in place. The notion of executive presidency seems to have gone to the head of 
everybody; we want to make a monster out of a president/governor. In Nigeria today, if 
anything happens instead of looking for ways of solving it, they will be calling on the 
President because we have had the impression that everything must be the president; at the 
state, everybody will be calling the Governor. The totality of governance has been localized in 
one person - the president governor. That is why the politics of Nigeria cannot go very far 
(Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014).  
These perceptions weaken the capacity of the legislature. Godfathers, especially at the level 
of the states, see executive positions as the most important to influence and to control. 
Governors, whom realize the prestige and power attached to this office seek to exert their 
autonomy and to monopolise the resources of the state. My analysis of interviews shows that 
the struggle between the godfathers and the godsons over the control of resources and the 
distribution of benefits is not driven primarily by a concern for the promotion of the public 
good. Thus, the idea of democratic governance is not realised in Nigeria.  
                                                 
246The preoccupation of the political elite in the struggle against colonialism was the need for direct political 
representation by the local politicians as against the monopoly of the political leadership by the European 
officials. Similarly, the political elite demanded the direct utilization of the economic resources for the benefit of 
the indigenous Nigerian people rather than being appropriated to service the interests of the colonial power. 
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Democracy concerns the collective interests of the population who have agreed o be 
governed by a set of rules and principles (Przeworski 1992). This in essence is an expression 
of the ideals of the modern state (Fukuyama 2015). According to Fukuyama (2015, p.13), the 
‘ modern state aspires to be impersonal, treating people equally on the basis of citizenship 
rather than on whether they have a personal relationship to the ruler’. This is unlike the 
patrimonial state where the society is viewed as ‘a species of personal property, and in which 
there is no distinction between the public interest and the ruler’s private interest’ (Fukuyama 
2015, p.13). The syncretic relationship between godfathers and godsons in Nigeria fits 
Fukuyama’s idea of neopatrimonialism where “rent-sharing” kleptocrats run institutions of 
government as private enterprises for the benefit of the political elite.  
Neopatrimonialism can coexist with democracy, producing widespread patronage and 
clientelism in which politicians share state resources with networks of political supporters. In 
such societies, individuals go into politics not to pursue a vision of public good, but rather to 
enrich themselves (Fukuyama 2015, p.13). 
 Hence, the political elite further use measures such as stomach infrastructure to subtly 
coerce the people into voting for them in future elections (Kifordu 2010; Philip et al 2014). 
The assertion of Richard Joseph (1991, p.116) that the survival of politicians in the Nigerian 
political terrain is dependent on the ability of the actor to ‘deliver the goods’ finds relevance 
in the modern day politics of ‘stomach infrastructure’ (Adindu 2014; Olupohunda 2014). 
Often, such people and their cronies seek to have dominant voices that are not in keeping 
with the interests of the public. 
The godfather (patron) provides all the financial and political means for the electoral victory 
of his godson (client) in a transaction that commercializes the political process. The political 
means include manipulation of the political party rules for the selection of candidates for 
elections. This is to ensure that the candidate that emerges is the preferred candidate of the 
godfather. Electoral violence as a mechanism of rigging is a common instrument often adopts 
by Nigerian godfathers to ensure the victory of their preferred candidates during elections 
(Adele 2012; Adigbuo 2008; Agbaje 2006; Bekoe 2011; Omotola 2010; Omobowale & 
Olutayo 2007). The expectation thereafter is that the godson will enable the godfather to 
enjoy unfettered access to the resources of the state through the preferential award of 
contracts, political appointments and through other forms of political patronage. Where the 
godson fails to meet these expectations, the godfather will mobilise the political elite, 
constitutionally or otherwise, to effect compliance with his/her preferences or to ensure the 
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removal of the godson from office. A classic case of this is that of the removal of a former 
governor – Dr Chris Ngige - from Anambra State.  
In Anambra state, Dr. Chris Uba was the godfather of Governor Chris Ngige, who was 
declared the winner of the gubernatorial election in 2003 (Oarhe 2010). Uba funded the 
electoral victory with the expectation of returns, including the appointment of commissioners 
and other principal officers of the state as well as access to the state treasury. When the 
governor reneged on their agreement Uba tried, by several means, to remove the governor. 
First, he forced Ngige to sign a letter of resignation as the state governor (Human Rights 
Watch 2007). However, the letter had no weight as according to the constitution a governor 
cannot resign without submitting the letter to the legislature. This was followed by an 
invasion of the government house and the abduction of the governor by the police (Oarhe 
2010) with the intention to force him to announce his resignation. Public outcry at his 
abduction foiled this attempt. Uba then confessed, on the basis of evidence that had been 
provided, that the 2003 election was rigged in favour of the governor. The Election Petition 
Tribunal then declared the election of Governor Ngige void and his opponent, Peter Obi, of 
the All Progressive Ground Alliance (APGA) was instead then declared the winner (Olaniyi 
2013).Thus, the ‘revolt’ of the godson against the godfather often leads to political crisis. 
One analyst likens a Nigerian ‘politician without a godfather’ to ‘a cyclist without a bicycle’ 
(Ezumezu 2010). They are the ‘underground railway for the corrupt leaders, and office 
holders’ and have ‘become the incubators for corrupt’ political elites (Ezumezu 2010). The 
concept of godfatherism is better seen from the perspective of the actors. Lamidi Adedibu247 
claimed that as the godfather to the governor of Oyo State, Rashidi Ladoja248, he had the right 
to demand money. ‘I put him there, so, if I demand money, will it be wrong? Do I need to ask 
for it’? (Apabiekun 2006, p.21). This confessional statement is an indication of the 
perceptions of impunity and decline of democratic values in the Nigerian political system. 
                                                 
247The late Chief Lamidi Adedibu became an influential politician during the political transition programmes of 
the military in the early 1990s. He was an influential politician in the political parties he joined during the 
aborted Third Republic and the commencement of the Fourth Republic in May 29, 1999 until his death in June 
11, 2008. He was popularly called “the Strongman of Ibadan Politics” (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007), an 
appellation that depicted his political strength in Oyo State. He was reputed to have influenced the electoral 
success of a series of governors and other elected political officers in the legislature.  
248Rashidi Ladoja won the gubernatorial election of Oyo State in the 2003 election under the umbrella of the 
PDP having defeated the incumbent from the defunct Alliance for Democracy (AD), Alhaji Lam Adesina. After 
the crisis that led to his impeachment and subsequent reinstatement by the judiciary, he defected from the PDP 
to establish his own political party, the Accord Party (AP). He had been contesting the gubernatorial election in 
the state since 2011 under the platform of his party without success. 
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His ability “to put him there” is not in accordance with the democratic values of free and fair 
competitive elections. While the governor did not deny the fact he achieved his election 
victory through the influence of his godfather, a confrontation between the godfather and 
godson over the distribution of the benefits of office reveals the depth of prebendalism in the 
Nigerian presidential system. The governor was eventually removed from office, but the 
federal government and the leadership of his political party did not enforce the constitutional 
rules or challenge the illegality of his election victory. It was the judiciary that nullified the 
electoral outcome.  
This neo-patrimonial culture is an indication of transaction politics in the Nigerian state 
where public institutions are governed as private enterprises for the promotion of the interests 
of the political elite. In this scenario democratic values have little relevance, a factor that 
weakens the capacity of the institutions of government to ensure accountability.  
In the 2003 election in Anambra State Chris Uba249, as the godfather, had the governor and 
his deputy and some members of the state legislature, as his godsons. He also financed the 
election of the 3 senators and 10 out of 11 House of Representatives members representing 
the state at the Senate and House of Representatives, respectively250. He was also godfathers 
to 29 out of the 30 members of the state legislature. Like Adedibu of Oyo State, Uba boasted 
that, ‘I also have the power to remove any of them who does not perform up to my 
expectations anytime I like’ (The Comet, 14 March, 2002, p. 12). 
A former governor, Chimaroke Nnamani251, described a godfather as ‘a merchant set out to 
acquire the godson as a client’ (cf. Tell Magazine, 2004, p.17).  The former governor who 
had a running battle with his godfather, Chief Jim Nwobodo, defined a godfather as, 
 
an impervious guardian figure who provided the lifeline and direction to the godson, perceived 
to live a life of total submission, subservience and protection of the oracular personality 
                                                 
249Dr Uba emerged as an influential politician in Anambra State in 2003 when he sponsored and financed the 
majority of the politicians who contested the election on the platform of the PDP. His brother, Andy Uba, was a 
supporter of President Olusegun Obasanjo’s election campaign, and was appointed as the Special Assistant to 
the president on Special Duties and Domestic Affairs. Chris Uba’s closeness and support for the president was 
rewarded when he was offered a position as a member of the Board of Trustees of the PDP. This position further 
strengthened his influence in the local politics in Anambra State.  
250As an influential member of President Obasanjo’s administration, he had access to the leadership of the PDP 
to influence the candidate that would emerge from the party’s primary election. This influence also extended to 
local politics in Anambra State where he exerted his power to engage in electoral malpractice (Oarhe 2010; 
Lewis and Kew 2015).  
251He was a two-term governor in Enugu State, 1999-2011, on the platform of the PDP.  His godfather was 
Chief Jim Nwobodo. In 2007, he contested and won the election as a senator on the platform of the PDP. 
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located in the large, material frame of opulence, affluence and decisiveness, that is, if not 
ruthless (Nnamani 2003, pp.30-31). 
 
Nnamani noted that the main objective of a godfather, as a self-seeking political figure, is the 
subjugation of the godson in an attempt to exploit government resources for personal 
enrichment.   
Chris Ngige252, another godson, described godfathers as a set of political individuals who 
were out, not to improve the state, but rather to live on public resources (cf. Adebanjo, 2003). 
Ngige described his experience thus: 
 
Chris Uba [the godfather] took my former Accountant-General into his hotel room in Abuja at 
NICON. And they typed a letter to the Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, opening up an 
Irrevocable Standing Payment Order, ISPO, on his project that has been on before then. He 
told me that Dr Mbadinuju [former governor] stopped his ISPO because of the political crisis 
between them. So he called me to sign this document directing the Central Bank to pay him 
from the federation account N10 million monthly for the next 87 months totalling N870 
million. I said I could not do that for two reasons: First and foremost, I would not be in office 
for 87 months. I will only be governor for 48 months, that is four years.... That if I will ever 
sign an IPSO, it is for 48 months... Secondly, there are no accompanying certificates to prove 
or show that you are entitled to N870 million. Thirdly, it is wrong for you to bring my 
accountant-general into a hotel room with a prepared letter by him and yourself and you 
expect me to sign it for you. He did not like it. He started making trouble ... Again, he said his 
election expenses total N3 billion and that he wanted a cheque from me. I told him that 
nobody can give a cheque of N3 billion. He insisted I should also sign an agreement. But I 
asked, ‘how did you come about the N3 billion?’ He flared up ... (cf. Tell Magazine, July 28, 
2003, p. 42; The Guardian, July 14, 2003). 
 
He paid this money until the time the crisis set them apart (Adebanjo 2003). The crisis 
between the former governor and his godfather began when the Ngige could no longer access 
the resources of the state to meet his financial obligation. The decision to discontinue the 
payment was not because the governor was protesting against the demand of his godfather 
but simply because the money was no longer available. The governor said in a media 
interview in 2010 that: 
 
I could not pay the N3 billion because I did not  know where I would get it because I looked at 
the state I inherited, the state was owing pensioners, civil servants, financial institutions, 
contractors, some with phony bills in quote and we were even owing traditional rulers (cf. 
Agbo 2010). 
                                                 
252Dr. Chris Ngige contested the gubernatorial election in Anambra State in the 2003 election on the platform of 
the PDP. He was the godson of Dr, Chris Uba. Ngige was removed as the governor by the judiciary when his 
godfather confessed that the 2003 election that brought him to power was rigged. 
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From all indications, he had an agreement with his godfather prior to the election on how to 
distribute the benefits of the government and to dispense and to share political appointments. 
The godfather, Chris Uba said:  
When he [Ngige] became Governor he started playing funny. That is where we disagree, we 
signed before he became governor. We said that I am going to produce [appoint] six to seven 
Commissioners. He is going to produce [some] because he is governor already. I am going to 
produce more; he is going to produce lesser…I spent a lot of money to put him there but I 
never asked him for my money back...I am supposed to bring the Commissioner for Finance, 
this man who funded the campaign is supposed to be Commissioner of Works, I said, look, 
you signed it, and not under duress. The problem is the immunity the governors are having, 
everything they are having, you spend your money to bring them into power and they say “Go 
to hell.” It should be just like, you invest in a bank and then you have power to make some 
decisions because of your controlling shares. But he blackmails you and pays the press to go 
say all sorts of bad things about you and put it in the internet (cf. Human Rights Watch, 2007). 
Ngige admitted that he was not interested in contesting the gubernatorial election but was 
drafted into the race by his godfather who eventually took over the running of the 
government.  
As a governor, he was not in actual control of the government; his Commissioners and other 
principal personal aides were nominated and appointed by his godfather without any 
resistance. He said: 
The first appointment made in this Government House was the Principal Secretary to the 
governor, a personal staff of the governor. Somebody was foisted on me. A man who has 
never worked in the civil service before... He doesn't even know what a file looks like not to 
talk about writing memos for the governor. The Secretary to Government is somebody I know 
very well. He (Ubah) also brought him for appointment. I didn't raise objection because he's 
somebody I know. But we did not agree on that. I didn't choose him. I had somebody else in 
mind and I wanted that particular SSG to have maybe another position in government later. 
The Permanent Secretary (Uche Udedibia) was re-deployed on the instruction of Ubah...while 
I was away in Abuja attending governors' meeting (cf. The Guardian, July 14, 2003). 
It is evident from the above that the former governor had, prior to his election, agreed to 
serve the interests of his godfather. This explains the ease at which he accepted all the actions 
and decisions of his godfather. This is an indication that though he was the governor with 
executive power, he was not in actual control of the powers of the office in which he served. 
Nor was the legislature in the position to take an independent stand against external 
interference in the running of the government. Thus, politics in Nigeria comprises of the 
representation of the interests of the political elite and the distribution of the benefits thereof 
among the elites. 
The former governor and the members of the legislature were elected to represent the 
interests of the public. The actions of the godfather comprised of making decisions about 
political appointments and other government matters. The acceptance by the governor and the 
members of the legislature of such appointments, and the approval of the decisions of the 
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godfather on matters of the state, amounts to a self-imposed abdication of their constitutional 
responsibilities. This is a characteristic feature of the manifestation of patron-client politics in 
Nigeria. 
Indeed, the members of the legislature were aware of the enormous responsibility the 
constitution placed on them. An interviewee told me that: 
 
The constitution provides enough supports for the legislature to function effectively as an 
important arm of the government. Apart from the constitutional provisions, the legislature is 
being guided by the internal rules which are subject to review from time to time. These House 
Rules are recognised as constitutional procedural guidelines in the conduct of the affairs of the 
legislature in order to enable it perform effectively in the routine policy process. Nobody can 
jeopardise these functions (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the Nigerian lawmakers often jeopardise their performance of these functions 
because of their lack of capacity. This incapacity is a product of the syncretic relationship 
between the godfathers and godsons. If there had been no conflict between Chris Uba and the 
governor, the misappropriation of the state funds would have continued and the members of 
the legislature would have supported the former governor because of the smooth relationship 
he had with the godfather.  
It is evident that godfather-godson relationship is a voluntary arrangement for mutual socio-
economic and political benefits. The tie between the two is motivated by mutual materialistic 
desire (Joseph 1991). James Scott (1972) has noted that such relationships exist as a result of 
the desire of a weaker political figure to seek refuge and protection from an individual of 
higher socio-economic and political clout. It is an exchange relationship involving the offer 
of service in anticipation of an agreed reciprocity for ‘genuine affective ties’ (Scott 1972, 
p.92). Richard Joseph elaborates on this thus: 
 
An individual seeks out patrons as he or she moves upward socially and materially; such 
individuals also come to accept ties of solidarity from their own clients which they view as 
fundamental to the latter's security and continued advancement as well as their own. 
Clientelism therefore is the very channel through which one joins the dominant class and a 
practice which is then seen as fundamental to the continued enjoyment of the perquisites of 
that class (Joseph 1991, p.55). 
The mutual agreement often centres on the struggle for the control of the resources of the 
state for their upward mobility. In Nigeria, the crisis of godfather-godson relationships 
becomes public when greed infringes on the expectations of the godfather. The godfather 
would thereafter withdraws his support and mobilise the leadership of the party and a sizeable 
number of the members of the legislature against the interests of the governor. Both Ladoja 
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and Ngige acknowledged the immense roles of their respective godfathers in ensuring their 
electoral successes at their inaugurations in May 29, 2003 (Albert 2005; Smith 2007). Their 
relationships changed when the interests of the godfathers conflicted with the personal 
interests of the godsons. While Nigerians struggle under the burden of economic and social 
maladies, political elites prosper in a mercantilist political environment whose preoccupation 
is the cravings for ‘monetary gains’ through kickbacks (Edigin 2010). 
Sklar et al (2006) have noted that  one of the consequences of patronage politics in Nigeria is 
the excessive personalisation of power ‘while national policy is driven by elite relationships 
rather than by public needs’ (Sklar et al 2006, p.107). Beyond this, it weakens the institutions 
of government, especially the legislature, often populated by clients who won their elections 
at the behest of a godfather. The result is a legislature that is subservient to the executive. The 
political elites I interviewed in the course of this study believe that the majority of legislators 
at the state level are not independent of the executive branch because most of them are 
sponsored by the governors (or the group of political godfathers where the governor is a 
stakeholder, as in the case of Anambra and Oyo States) (Smith 2007; Omobowale and 
Olutayo 2007). State governors, when they assume power often seek to “buy off” the 
legislators, a political strategy to maintain a ‘good rapport’ and to further entrench their 
interests. The system of checks and balances becomes circumvented while a culture of 
impunity, in a cascading process of transaction politics through the branches and levels of 
government, dominates the policy process.  
Respondents from the legislature who spoke with me related their experiences on the ways in 
which the influence of their godfathers affected the discharge of their legislative 
responsibilities. For instance, in a state where the legislators had concluded plans to remove 
the governor, based on a series of breaches of the constitution by him, the governor reached 
out to the party leaders who sponsored the legislators to instruct their godsons to back out of 
the process (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014). Above all, its ‘mechanisms also undercut 
and undermine the tenets of democracy and governance such as transparency, accountability, 
equity, effectiveness and efficiency, rule of law, and fair competition’ (Oarhe 2010, p.40). 
Attempts to institutionalise an ‘informal balance of power among political elites’ with a view 
to checkmating the ‘ambitions of political godfathers,’ often degenerates into violent 
confrontation (Sklar et al 2006, p.107).   
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In Anambra state, for instance, an attempt by a former governor, Mbadinuju, to resist the 
power his godfather, Emeka Offor, had over him resulted in violence (Alachenu 2013; Oarhe 
2010). In the case of for Ngige in Anambra, armed policemen abducted him and forced him 
to sign a letter of resignation (Smith 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007). When this failed, 
armed men attacked the Anambra State Government House in Awka, with explosives and 
burnt part of it down, while the members of the Nigerian Police watched (Human Rights 
Watch 2007). The attack was alleged to have been masterminded by the godfather, though he 
denied involvement in the incident. In spite of the magnitude of the attack, the incident was 
not investigated (Human Rights Watch 2007). The final action the godfather took to ensure 
the removal of the governor was his confession that the election that brought the governor to 
power was rigged (Human Rights Watch 2007; Smith 2007)253.  
On December 21, 2004, Chris Uba, in a publicly circulated statement, admitted that the 2003 
gubernatorial election in Anambra State was rigged in favour of the PDP candidate, Chris 
Ngige. He said: 
As the truth of Anambra issue is being gradually revealed and denials and lies are being 
traded, I believe that as one of the main activists in the whole issue, the moment of truth and 
remorse has come. First of all, let me express my heartfelt regret for my error and the 
activities involved with others in Anambra to put Ngige in power as the governor of the 
state.  In showing remorse, I sincerely ask for understanding and forgiveness of all our people 
in Anambra state and those Nigerian leaders and citizens who have been affected and insulted 
by the Anambra issue. My mistake for which I ask for understanding stemmed from my belief 
that election is like a battle and since all is fair in war, I believe the end justifies the means in 
an election. We did everything possible, to put Ngige in power. In the presence of the 
President of Nigeria, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, I asked Dr. Chris Ngige whether he actually 
won the election; he confirmed he did not win the election. The President drove us out. As 
from that point, he did not want to listen to our story again (cf. Nigeria Muse 2004). 
Uba claimed further that he also notified the National Chairman of the PDP, Chief Audu 
Ogbeh, who ‘advised that we should all keep quiet on the issue of the governorship election 
in Anambra. I obeyed’ (cf, Nigerian Muse 2004). Though Ogbeh and Ngige denied the 
statement (This Day, 22/12/2004), former president, Obasanjo, confirmed that the former 
governor told him that he did not win the election (Vanguard 26/12/2004). Chris Uba did not 
elaborate or provide any details of how he rigged the election. However, there was evidence, 
                                                 
253The electoral law prescribes punishment for electoral offences. Aside from this, the Independent National 
Electoral Commission (INEC) has a list of election offences and penalties (see Election Offences and Penalties. 
Available at: http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/ELECTION-OFFENCES-AND-




albeit circumstantial of connivance between the officials of the electoral body. As an analyst 
put it, 
Although, Uba failed to give details of how he manipulated the result of the election in favour 
of Ngige, it was clear that both the police and INEC in Awka might have effectively 
collaborated with the godfather to pave way for the rigging. On the election day, all entrances 
to the INEC[Independent national Electoral Commission] office along the Okpuno Road, 
Awka, were cordoned off by heavily armed mobile policemen who denied everybody except 
Chief Uba access to the commission’s office. Powerful politicians and contestants from other 
political parties who attempted to visit INEC to ensure the votes cast for their parties were 
accurately recorded never had access to the commission (Vanguard 26/12/2004). 
Prior to this revelation, the candidate of the APGA in the election, Peter Obi, had challenged 
the electoral victory of Ngige on the basis that there was electoral fraud. He had provided 
evidence of electoral malpractice (Human Rights Watch 2007). Uba’s confession 
strengthened the case at the Court of Appeal, and the election of the governor was nullified in 
March 2006 (Human Rights Watch 2007).  It is evident that beyond the politics within the 
state, the support received from the federal government and the leadership of the political 
parties often emboldens godfathers to exert influence on the governors and the members of 
the legislature in Nigeria. This case demonstrates the extent of the impunity in the Nigerian 
political system. One would have expected punitive measures to sanction Uba, based on the 
evidence provided in his confessional statement. No action has been taken against the 
godfather. 
Table 11 below shows three cases of the godfather-godson relationships between 1999 and 
2007. This table does not capture a series of other relationships such as the subtle growth of 
influence by chieftains of political parties deferring to the overbearing presence of the 
president, as the national leader of the ruling political party. At times, some chieftains of 
political parties, in a bid to retain their seats and free themselves from the power of 
godfathers defect to the opposition political parties. This is also an attempt to establish a new 
political base. In states controlled by the opposition political parties, with no elected officials 
at the national level, local godfathers within those political parties exert control over the 
activities of the parties. Thus, influential political elites who defect from the ruling party to 




Table 11: Three cases of prominent godfather-godson relationships, 1999-2007254 
S/N Period State Godfather Godson Nature of relationship 
1 1999-
2003 
Anambra Emeka Offor Chinwoke 
Mbadinuju  
 
It was a rancorous relationship, strained by 
the financial demand of the godfather who 
collects N10million monthly from his godson 
(Alachenu 2013). The use of violence, 
including multiple murders, often generates 




Anambra Chris Uba Chris Ngige The Godfather unleashed terror when the 
godson reneged on the pre-election 
agreement to provide money from the state 
treasury to the godfather.  The governor was 
abducted and forced to resign from his 
position. Uba confessed to the rigging of the 
election in favor of Ngige. Ngige was 
eventually removed by a judgment of the 








The governor reneged on the agreement with 
the godfather. The relationship became 
strained as a result of the deployment of force 
to destroy government property and that of 
the governor. The governor was removed by 
a faction of the legislature loyal to the 
godfather. Judicial review of the legislative 
decision reinstated the governor as the Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court declared 
the impeachment unconstitutional. . 
Source: Compiled by the author from different newspaper reports. 
 
The primary focus of these godfathers is to ensure that the godsons, as the 
governors/legislators, accede to their demands in terms of access to lucrative earnings 
through the godsons’ position in government.  
The godson becomes rebellious when it becomes obvious to him that the godfather would not 
allow him to enjoy anything from the instrumental relationship. The godfather too becomes 
apprehensive when he realises that the godson does not want him to have all he wants from 
the government, such as jobs and contracts (Albert 2005, p.95). 
Any deviation from this often generates a succession crisis as the godfather will seek to 
replace the ‘recalcitrant’ godson with someone that is more compliant, as in the case of 
Ngige; violence and political instability, as in the case of Mbadinuju and, unconstitutional 
manipulation of legislative rules, as in the case of Ladoja. 
                                                 
254My choice of these three cases is based on their relevance to the selected states in this study. I omit a 
prominent godfather, Dr. Olusola Saraki (now deceased), whose sprawling political influence in Kwara State 
spanned from the Second Republic to the Fourth Republic. His son, Dr. Bukola Saraki, is another budding 
godfather in the state who has stepped into the political shoes of his late father .His father ensured that he was 
elected as the governor of Kwara State for two terms, 2003-2011. He also won an election as a senator in 2011. 
He later defeated to the APC and was re-elected into the Senate in the 2015 election. He also contested the 
position of the President of the Senate and won, though this was against the directive of his party. 
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6.3 The ‘revolt’ of the ‘godson’ and   the impeachment of Governor Ladoja of Oyo 
State 
The former governor of Oyo State, Rashidi Ladoja, was impeached by 18 members of the 32-
member state legislature in January 2006. The late governor Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu was a 
political godfather who ensured the emergence of Ladoja as the gubernatorial candidate of 
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) in 2003 (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007). In Nigeria, 
political godfathers see the exchange of ‘goods’ for loyalty as a mechanism to ensure political 
victory (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007; Oarhe 2010). This set of political elites often enjoys 
government protection and uses it to harass political opponents, sometimes deploying 
strategies that include manipulation and force. Adedibu belonged to this group of political 
elites.  
He established himself as formidable member of the political elite with the influence to 
determine the political fate of party candidates during elections. Three successive governors 
of the state benefited from his political networks serviced by ‘an informal coercive force of 
thugs and street urchins from the “army” of disenchanted low class [people] who depend on 
him for survival’ (Omobowale and Olutayo 2007, p.434). The parting of ways between him 
and his godson, Ladoja, began when he sought to have a de facto control over the 
administration of the state. Adedibu expected 100 percent loyalty from Ladoja including that 
he would not ‘appoint his commissioners without input from Adebidu, and had to pay a 
certain percentage of his security vote to Adedibu’ (Obiagwu and Ogbodo 2006). 
Nevertheless, Ladoja had a different plan: he rebuffed his godfather who had allegedly 
sought, ‘to dip his hand into the state treasury’ (Oni 2013, p.122). The outcome was an open 
confrontation between the supporters of the godfather and his godson (Oni 2013). 
Ladoja had said at the heat of the crisis that his problem with Adedibu is, ‘on the difference 
in our interpretations of governance and politics’ (cf. Adegboyega, 2006:13). Omobowale 
and Olutayo (2007, p.443) note that attempts by Ladoja to de-emphasise the influence and 
‘political relevance’ of Adedibu, because of his (Adedibu’s) insatiable demands for ‘goods’, 
widened the gulf between the godson and his godfather. A principal officer of the Oyo State 
House of Assembly expressed it this way: 
…Baba Adedibu sponsored Ladoja as the governor; he was expecting constant returns from 
Ladoja after he became the governor. Ladoja was not ready for that because as a business man 
and budding political elite, he was mindful of his name and reputation. He wanted to be an 
independent man but Baba Adedibu wanted him to be taking orders from him. Ladoja’s 
refusal angered Baba that he had to report him to the president. The president told Ladoja to 
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go and beg Baba if he wanted to remain as the governor of the state. Most of us were 
sponsored by one political elite or groups within the political party or in our towns. Very few 
of us got elected independent of any godfather. That is the pattern in Nigerian politics. 
Electoral contest is like a business deal, you have to make returns. If you fail to do that, you 
risk the loss of your political relevance (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). 
 
In other words, the major offence of Governor Ladoja that the 18 lawmakers regarded as 
gross misconduct is that he ‘displeased his erstwhile godfather [Adedibu] by not forwarding 
him the demanded amount of the state budget or control of key appointments’ (Sklar et al 
2006, p 100). This connotes the pervasive influence of godfatherism in Nigerian politics, 
irrespective of the extant rules. Two thirds of 32 is 21.3 and not 18. In order to allow the 18 
lawmakers to accomplish their purpose, the federal government provided them with security. 
Police escorts guarded the hotel where they were meeting for the impeachment of Ladoja 
(Omobowale and Olutayo 2007).  
In this case Adedibu was so powerful that he enjoyed the support and protection of the state 
security agencies against a constitutionally recognised governor. In addition, as Omobowale 
and Olutayo (2007) discovered in their study, he also had the support of the federal 
government because Olusegun Obasanjo, was seeking to manipulate the constitution to 
extend his tenure.  
 
Perhaps all the support Adedibu needed had to be granted, because as well as Ladoja’s 
disagreement with Adedibu, he was also against the supposed third-term bid of President 
Obasanjo. Retaining Ladoja in power meant losing the vital support of one of the Yoruba 
South Western states that Obasanjo considered his primary constituency and base of the third-
term campaign. And since Ladoja was out of favour with the ‘real powers behind the throne’, 
he was impeached, though unconstitutionally (Omobowale & Olutayo 2007, p443). 
 
Richard Sklar et al (2006, p101) have averred that as power brokers, these individuals ‘have 
grown increasingly bold in circumventing the democratic system’ to include constitutional 
manipulation to justify their brazen disdain for the rule of law.  Sklar et al (2006, p.105) aver 
that ’they are primarily self-interested wealth and power seekers’. This self-seeking 
behaviour explains the politics behind the processes of impeachment that occur in practice. 
You know, many of us are not independent of our sponsors… Ladoja’s problem has to do with 
his disagreement with his benefactor, Baba Adedibu. He compounded this problem when he 
preferred to support the Vice-President, Atiku Abubakar, against president Obasanjo’s desire 
to go for the third term. If it was the disagreement with Baba Adedibu alone, Obasanjo could 
have resolved it. His [Ladoja’s] problem with Adedibu coincided with the Obasanjo third term 
project. The president was seeking for support from all the PDP controlled states. Virtually all 
the PDP governors who opposed his ambition or discovered to be in alliance with his deputy, 
Atiku Abubakar, were having problems with either their legislature or political party or 




The position of the state governor is crucial for the mobilization of members of the political 
party. A sitting governor is the leader of his political party in the state because he has access 
to the instruments of political patronage. This means that the governor has the control of the 
votes of the members of the party whenever the need arises for the selection of electoral 
candidates. When the loyalty of the governor can no longer be guaranteed, then the president, 
as the national leader of the party, can use all the machinery at his disposal to orchestrate the 
removal of the governor. Where the executive of the political party at the state is loyal to a 
“recalcitrant” governor, the national leadership of the party will dissolve the party executive 
and appoint a temporary executive whose membership is loyal to the national leadership in a 
bid to weaken the political base of the governor. This partly explains the pervasive culture of 
the fragmented political party in Nigeria and its effect on the political stability in the country. 
The Nigerian constitution limits the term of the president to 8 years. But Obasanjo sought to 
manipulate the constitution through an omnibus amendment that would benefit the state 
governors and the legislature, the principal actors needed in the stipulated amendment 
provision of the constitution. His deputy, Atiku Abubakar, was opposed to this idea because 
it would jeopardise his own ambition to succeed the president after the completion of his 
second term in 2007. Atiku had rallied his numerous supporters within the ranks of the 
governors and legislators to scuttle the amendment. The amendment eventually failed. Beside 
this, Obasanjo as the president was a godfather in his own right with towering influence over 
the machinery of the ruling party, PDP. 
The division between the two members of the political elite in the executive branch led to the 
fragmentation of the ruling political party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and, by 
extension the ranks of the governors of the PDP-controlled states. In an attempt to coerce 
support from the governors, the EFCC began to reopen cases where there were allegations of 
financial misappropriation against the governors. Governors Ladoja, Dariye, Alamieyeseigha 
and Fayose of Oyo, Plateau, Bayelsa and Ekiti States respectively, belonged to this group of 
“recalcitrant” governors who were targeted to be removed from office by all means. Ladoja’s 
case was compounded by the open confrontation with his godfather, Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu.  
One of the features of the Obasanjo administration was the use of unconstitutional means to 
achieve personal political ends. A respondent described this as the other version of the 
corruption culture that characterised the regime of the former president. 
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Corruption, not just in terms of exchange of material means but also in terms of deployment of 
state power. Obasanjo did it in the most brazen manner; deployed the police, the anti-
corruption agencies, to bring down the heads of Governors that were not willing to do his 
bidding (Personal Interview VIII, May 19, 2014).  
This manifested in different dimensions.  At the wake of the crisis in Anambra State between 
the governor, Chris Ngige, and his godfather, Chris Uba, the president was in support of the 
unconstitutional activities of Uba (Adebanjo 2003; Albert 2005). The former chairman of the 
PDP, Audu Ogbeh, expressed his frustration thus: 
It would appear that the perpetrators of these acts are determined to stop at nothing since there 
has not been any visible sign of reproach from law enforcement agencies... How do we 
exonerate ourselves from culpability and worse still, how do we even hope to survive it... Mr 
President, if I write in this vein, it is because I am deeply troubled and I can tell you that an 
overwhelming percentage of our party members feel the same way though many may never be 
able to say this to you for a variety of reasons... On behalf of the People's Democratic Party, I 
call on you to act now and bring any, and all criminal, even treasonable activities to a halt. 
You and you alone, have the means (cf. Saturday Punch, 11/12/2004, p.16). 
This opinion eventually set Ogbeh against the president and provided the template for his 
removal as the national chairman of PDP. In this respect, the governors are seen naturally as 
the godsons of the president, the national leader of the party, who also symbolizes the 
leadership of the party. Any opinion or position contrary to that of the president is nothing 
other than a “revolt” by these godsons that must be crushed by all means. In essence, the 
president, as the national leader of the political party, is the godfather to all other elected 












Table 12: List of Impeached Governors, 1999 and 2007 
Name State Date Impeached Alleged Offences 
Rasheed Ladoja Oyo December 13, 2005 Conflict of interest 
Fraudulent 
conversion of public 
funds.  
 
Peter Obi  Anambra November 2, 2006 Misapproprition of 
public fund 




Bayelsa December 9, 2005 Embezlement of 
public funds 
Ayo Fayose Ekiti  Mismanegement of 
public fund 
 
Table 13: List of impeached Deputy Governors, 1999-2007 
Name State Date Impeached Alleged Offences 
Eyinaya Abaribe Abia March 21, 2003 Conflict of interest 
  
 
Iyiola Omisore  Osun  December 14, 2002 Conflict of interest 
Kofoworola Akerele-
Bucknor 
Lagos December 3, 2002 Disloyalty to the 
party 
Femi Pedro Lagos May 10, 2007 Disloyalty to the 
party 
 Abdullahi Argungu  Kebbi  December 9, 2002 Gross miscondct 
Tukur Jikamshi Katsina July 2002 Gross Misconduct 
John Okpa Cross River February 2003 Gross misconduct 
 
6.3.1 Allegations of gross misconduct against Ladoja 
The allegations of gross misconduct leveled against Ladoja by the 18 lawmakers as contained 
in the report of the panel255are: 
1. Conflict of interest 
2.  Fraudulent conversion of public funds.  
3. Establishment of Oyo State Road Maintenance Agency without the consent of the State House of 
Assembly  
4. Operation of Foreign Accounts, Sponsorship of attack on Honourable Members of the House of 
Assembly 
5. Sponsored attacks on members of the legislature 
                                                 
255See This Day 13/01/2006. ‘Ladoja Impeachment –Report of the Panel’.  
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6. Undermining the integrity and constitutional power and functions of the legislature 
7. Undermining the integrity of the judiciary,  
8. Acts unbecoming of a Governor of Oyo State  
9. Nepotism on contract  
10. Chieftaincy matters,  
11. Usurpation of the power of the state legislature on local government affairs,  
12. Undermining the principle of separation of powers,  
13. Purchase of 33 graders  
14. Dereliction of duties. 
 
The panel in its report detailed how it arrived at its conclusions despite the legal objections of 
the governor’s representatives. Aside from this, the governor did not respond to the 
allegations, because of pending litigation over the composition of the panel. As shown in 
chapter five, one of the reasons why the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court nullified the 
impeachment of the governor was that the panel was illegally composed. It was nullified by 
the acting Chief Judge (Ag. CJ) of Oyo State, Justice Afolabi Adeniran. Nevertheless, the 
panel disclosed that nine out of the 14 allegations of gross misconduct against governor was 
proven. The panel referred the remaining 5 allegations for further investigation (This Day 
13/01/2006). 
.  
The judgments of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, as discussed in chapter five, 
point to the fact that the activities of the panel were in breach of the constitution.  One 
important issue here (which is also common to other cases of impeachment) is the politics 
behind the allegations of gross misconduct. The legislators that I interviewed confirmed that 
the moment the lawmakers decide to impeach a governor, allegations are presented to the 
panel. The members of the panel are loyalists of the faction of the legislature seeking to 
impeach the governor. In the case of Oyo State, a principal officer of the legislature told me 
during an interview that the allegations of gross misconduct against the governor were 
fictitious and simply an attempt to remove him. 
 
Godfatherism was the main issue… had it been that Ladoja actually committed these offences 
and the process was legal even if he went to the Supreme Court, he would have lost… If you 
look at the allegations leveled against Ladoja, you will discover that they are not all valid. The 
panel itself could not prove the ones that could be regarded as gross misconduct in the 
violation of the constitution. The other ones proved by the panel are trivial ones that are just 
mere matters of politics rather than policy of the state. The bottom-line is that he angered his 
godfather and at the same time he was not in the good book of the president who could have 
appeased Baba. Those of us who opposed the impeachment at the legislature did so at the risk 
of our lives and political relevance (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014).  
Evidently, the removal of the former governor goes beyond the independent decision of the 
18 legislators. They did not make their decision in the official chamber of the legislature. 
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Instead, they conducted the proceedings of the impeachment in a hotel. The number of 
legislators required to impeach was less than the constitutional requirements (Human Rights 
Watch 2007).  Indeed, it may be argued that the legislators were mere instruments to be used 
by the godfather.  
The confession of a prominent traditional ruler in the state, the Alaafin of Oyo, Oba Lamidi 
Adeyemi256, attests to this. According to the Oba, the president, Olusegun Obasanjo had 
intimated to him and a popular Muslim Cleric and member of the political elite in the state, 
late Alhaji Arisekola Alao, of his intention to remove the governor. 
 
Initially, when the former president [Obasanjo], made his intention known, Aare [Late Alhaji 
Arisekola Alao] and I were displeased and unhappy, in spite of all odds, as we were 
sympathetic to the cause of former governor Ladoja. As a result, we passionately appealed to 
ex-president Obasanjo to forgive Ladoja and let off the hook on him.... Consequently, former 
president Obasanjo became more enraged and stood his ground that Ladoja must go. You 
know Obasanjo; he is like a moving train ready to crush anyone who attempts to obstruct his 
plan or decision.... So, we set the ball rolling, though reluctantly, by thinking of those to 
constitute the panel through the then acting Chief Judge (cf. Ojuaiye 2014)257. 
The decision of the president and the support granted by the traditional ruler is not motivated 
by the desire for the delivery of public goods, but instead as a consequence of personal 
animosity against the governor. The Alaafin, who did not have a cordial relationship with the 
governor, claimed that, ‘I single-handedly drafted the three [out of the nine] charges 
proffered against the former governor’ (cf. Ojuaiye 2014). 
I noted in chapter five that the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court on 
the impeachment of Governor Ladoja and others were based on the violation of the 
constitutional rules rather than the veracity of the allegations against the governors. In Oyo 
State, the 18 legislators breached the constitutional provisions in order to remove the former 
governor because it was the wish of their godfather. This does not mean that Ladoja did not 
commit any malfeasances while in office that warranted his removal. Though the panel could 
not prove the allegations that public funds were misappropriated there were allegations of 
corruption leveled against the governor by the EFCC after he left office (Ahemba 2008). I 
now turn to discuss and explore these allegations in the next section.  
                                                 
256The Alaafin is a prominent king (Oba) of an ancient town, Oyo, in Oyo State. He was the chairman of the 
state Council of Traditional Rulers. The chairmanship of the council was based on rotation among the prominent 
kings in the various towns in the state. There was no cordial relationship between the Alaafin and the governor. .  
257The emphasis in this expression is necessary to indicate the politics associated with the composition of the 




6.3.2 Allegations of corruption against Ladoja 
In August 2008, the EFCC charged Ladoja in court with embezzling N15billion (US$127 
million) (Ahemba 2008). The anti-graft agency alleged that Ladoja ‘sold stocks belonging to 
Oyo state for 6.2 billion naira [US$53million] but remitted 4.3 billion naira, [US $36.76 
million] pocketing the balance of 1.9 billion naira [US $16.24 million]’ (Ahemba 2008). 
Besides this, Ladoja was also alleged to have laundered 4.7 billion naira (Premium Times 
19/04/2013). This court adjudication over the charges is still pending. 
While the EFCC was able to uncover the various infractions the governor committed, the 
panel could not establish a prima facie case against the governor on the issue of the 
mismanagement of public funds. This is an indication of the problems associated with the 
practice of the presidential system in Nigeria whereby institutional measures and structures to 
eradicate corruption and harness the resources of the state to promote good governance are 
circumvented to promote the vested interests of the disunified political elite. 
One of the consequences of godfatherism politics in Nigeria is the fragmentation of the 
political process and political institutions. Godsons seeking to renege upon the syncretic 
relationship with their godfathers deploy their gubernatorial power to remain in office but 
defect to another party. The outcome of the crisis between Ladoja and his godfather was the 
weakening of the influence of the governor in the PDP (Atoyebi 2013).  Many governors who 
clashed with their godfathers defected to another party where possible. For example, Ayodele 
Fayose (Ekiti State) left the PDP for the Labour Party (LP), Ladoja left the PDP and formed 
the Accord Party (AP), Omisore (Osun) left the Alliance for Democracy (AD) for the PDP, 
Eyinaya Abaribe  (Abia) left the PDP for the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP),  Dariye 
(Plateau) left the PDP for the Action Alliance (AC) and later contested elections for the 
senate on the platform of the Labour Party (LP). Intra-party crisis often degenerates to what I 
refer to as fragmented-party-in-government.     
6.4  Fragmented-party-in-government and the analysis of the politics of 
impeachment in Nigeria: The impeachment of Governor Dariye   
One explanation for defection and resulting party fragmentation in Nigeria is found in the 
pursuit of power. The struggle for the control of state power often engenders disunity among 
the political elite in Nigeria. Political parties are the only platforms through which leaders 
emerge for the control of state power. To this end, political elites compete for the control of 
208 
 
the machinery of each political party with a view to ensuring that their preferred candidates 
emerge as the leadership of the party258. Thus, I claim that political parties in Nigeria are 
theatres of struggles to attain and maintain power among the various godfathers. Political 
elite deploy their strength and influence to seize the control of the dominant factional group 
in each of the political parties.  
Whenever the ambition of the dominant group to control state power is threatened, it often 
leads to a further realignment of forces, especially when a deprived candidate commands 
popular support and followership within the political party. For instance, Governor Olusegun 
Mimiko was a member of the ruling PDP in Ondo State when he defected to the Labour Party 
(LP) to contest the 2007 gubernatorial election against the incumbent, Late Olusegun Agagu. 
His popularity within the party affected the political fortunes of the ruling party after his 
departure and he eventually won the election against the incumbent 
This crisis is generally precarious at the state level where the governor is the leader of the 
party. Where there is a conflict of interest between the governor and the national leadership 
of the party, factional struggles will be focused on the decimation of the political structure of 
the former with a view to orchestrating his removal from a position whereby he controls state 
power259. Competition for state power, is usually perceived as a matter of life and death, 
which explains why the exercise of the legislative power of impeachment is important to 
godfathers who wish to remove a governor whom no longer fulfils their demands.  
In Plateau state, the problem of Governor Joshua Dariye has its roots in the crisis between 
him and the Deputy Senate President, Senator Ibrahim Mantu (Obateru 2004). One 
interviewee claimed, 
The impeachment of Governor Dariye was an extension of the politics of godfatherism in 
Plateau State. The problem of Dariye started with his disagreement with Mantu [Senator 
Ibrahim Mantu, the Senate Deputy President]. You know, Mantu was a close associate of the 
president [Obasanjo]. Mantu was the man that the president was using in the Senate to 
promote the third term agenda. Any crisis with Mantu is a declaration of war against 
Obasanjo! Because of that crisis, Dariye started to shift his loyalty toward Atiku [Alhaji Atiku 
Abubakar, the Vice-President]. That further created the problem for him because Obasanjo did 
not want Atiku to succeed him…The president wanted to have control of Plateau state but the 
crisis between Mantu and the governor was threatening this ambition. There and then, the 
                                                 
258The Nigerian constitution recognises the political party as the avenue through which state leaders emerge. 
There is no provision for independent candidacy in elections. 
259 With the exception of the case of Peter Obi (Anambra State) whose removal was based on divided-
government, all other cases of impeachment in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic are partly products of fragmentation 
of the political party in control of the government in the state. 
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president supported the Mantu group against the governor. That is the genesis of his problem. 
(Personal Interview X, May 19, 2014). 
In essence, one of the primary forces behind the impeachment of Governor Dariye is the 
disaffection with the leadership of the political party, rather than the gravity of the charges of 
financial malfeasances against him. As long as he enjoyed good rapport with the leadership 
of the party, he is sure of protection. 
Even if we discover any corrupt practices that could amount to gross misconduct, as long as 
his [governor] relationship with the president and the leadership of the party remains cordial, 
we are handicapped to take any legislative action against him… We are all members of the 
same political party before the crisis separated us. The leadership knows the language of 
appeasement… By the time they wanted us to take action, our party was already in crisis in 
the state, our own political relevance was under a threat… we were on the side of the governor 
and we cannot move against him (Personal Interview X, May 19, 2014). 
This is a general pattern in virtually all the states. For instance, the principal officer of the 
Oyo State House of Assembly who spoke with me said that even if cases of gross misconduct 
against governor Ladoja were established, the legislators would find it difficult to initiate any 
impeachment process against him so long as there was a rapport between the governor, 
Adedibu and the president. He said, 
Though we have the power to do so, but the leaders of the party will prevail over them not to 
do it. They will settle it amicably. But when there is a problem between the governor and the 
leadership of the party, everything will work against the governor. They will stir up the 
legislature to remove him. Impeachment is more of collaboration than policy outcome. If you 
look at the allegations leveled against Ladoja, you will discover that they are not all valid. The 
panel itself could not prove the ones that could be regarded as gross misconduct in the 
violation of the constitution. The other ones proved by the panel are trivial ones that are just 
mere matters of politics rather than policy of the state. The bottom-line is that he angered his 
godfather and at the same time he was not in the good book of the president who could have 
appeased Baba. Those of us who opposed the impeachment at the legislature did so at the risk 
of our lives and political relevance (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014).  
The lack of independent decision-making in the legislature means that they may be 
subservient to the executive and/or the leadership of the ruling party. Since legislators are 
sponsored by the godfathers and/or the party leadership, their capacity to act independently is 
weakened. 
They are “contracted” to participate in impeachment processes initiated by the party and/or 
the godfather. In some impeachment cases, the legislators that participated were under strict 
surveillance, camped together in a location throughout the period of the impeachment, in 
order to maintain unity and cohesion and to avoid being influenced by the opposition.  
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President Obasanjo himself was a godson to some the established members of the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), notably military elites (Sklar et al 2006; Adegbamigbe & Ugbolue 
2002)260. Having consolidated his power, Obasanjo ‘gradually gained ground against his 
godfathers, using the powers of the presidency to build alliances with some and to undermine 
others, most notably [his deputy] Vice-President Atiku Abubakar’ (Sklar et al 2006, p.106).  
In a similar fashion, most of the current governors arrived as protégés of godfathers and power 
networks within their states, but have used the executive branch to build increasingly 
independent bases of their own. Some, such as the governor of Enugu, have succeeded. 
Others, such as the governors of Anambra and Oyo states, have found themselves losing to 
their former sponsors (Sklar et al 2006, p. 106). 
Thus, the personalised nature of the Nigerian political system often weakens the political 
party In addition, one interviewee said of the political parties, 
The people at the helms of affairs of political parties are the dreg of the society; they are not 
fit to be there. This set of people is not supposed to be there. And they suddenly become the 
principal factors and actors in the selection of party candidates (Personal Interview II, May 10, 
2014). 
 
The stakes for the leadership of the party is high because the party is responsible for choosing 
candidates to run in the election. Thus, in this system of patron-client relationships, 
prospective candidates would want either their sponsor to become a member of the executive 
body of the party. Consequently, the struggle for the acquisition of state power starts in a 
struggle over the composition of the leadership of the party. Once the leadership is composed, 
members who were not successful in gaining a position often defect to another party. 
In order to consolidate their power in the state, the leadership of the party will strategies to 
ensure that the leadership of the legislature is the same group of the political elite that 
controls the party. A leadership of the legislature that is opposition to the leadership of the 
executive is perceived as a threat to the security of the tenure of the governor. As such, the 
leadership of the party as well as members of the political elite in the executive branch would 
want to ensure that the leadership of the legislature is composed of members from within 
their group. A former Speaker of the House of Representatives, Bello Masari, said: 
 
                                                 
260His emergence as the presidential candidate of PDP in 1998 in preparation for the election was largely 
facilitated by the military government that released him from prison. While in prison, different political elites, 
notably prominent people who participated in the government of the military, with a view to forming a political 
platform in preparation for the transition programme of General Abdusalami Abubakar. He was not part of the 
foundational structure of the PDP. His deputy, Atiku Abubakar, was the heir of the People’s Democratic 
Movement (PDM), the political association  formed and led by late General Sheu Musa Yar’ Adua. 
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The support of the party and the executive arm is important for you to get to the office of the 
Speaker. If you get their support, it makes the race easier and simpler but immediately you get 
to that office you must start to build your own structures because you simply cannot prepare 
for a fight on the day of the battle (cf. Akpe and Iyashere, 2009). 
The consequence is that the leadership of the legislature would then bebe subservient to the 
leadership of the party. In such a situation, the emergence of credible candidates to fill 
political offices is rare. One interviewee said, 
Credible candidates will be unable to emerge if they are not ready to play the game according 
to their own rule, not according to the standard rule because they have their own rule. Nigerian 
political elites have their own rule of operation which is different from the constitutional rule. 
Majority of the political actors are not the set of people the system envisaged to populate the 
critical environment of political process. Most of them got to power though fraud; they have 
no respect for the rule of law (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). 
Another interviewee told me that because of the influence of the political party, the 
legislature is unable to function effectively.  
The party has been weakened. They are practically in the hands of the executive branch at all 
levels of government. They assumed the leadership of the political party. Eventually, those 
who emerged as the candidates are those favoured by the heads of the executive. Thus, 
members of the legislature emerged at the mercy of the governors. Most legislators at the state 
levels are in the “pockets” of the governors. They eventually do their bidding most of the time. 
They hardly perform their oversight function (Personal Interview IX, May 19, 3014). 
Often, the lack of internal democracy in the political parties leads to divisions. The leadership 
of the political parties is mostly composed of the members of a particular group of the 
political elite; the preoccupation therefore is the consolidation of power within the party for 
the promotion of the interest of the group. 
 
It might be argued that this activity of modern godfathers or ‘big men’ (Sklar et al 2006, 
p.105) in Nigeria derives from the practices of the traditional patrimonial system. This system 
is characterised by personalised rules, often associated with natural rulers who often possess 
actual power and exercise control over the resources of their communities (Joseph 1991; 
Sklar et al 2006; Ekeh 1975; Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984). They distribute these resources and 
other privileges, such as positions, to service the coterie of their supporters in return for 
loyalties (LeVine 1980). This distribution of benefits among the political elite has found its 
relevance in the modern presidential political system in Nigeria and manifests as a way to 
build and maintain loyalty among supporters inside and outside the confines of political 
organisations (Auyero 1999; Ikpe 2000).Richard Joseph (1991) in his analysis of the fall of 
Nigeria’s Second Republic, refers to this as prebendal politics. This has been a major 
defining characteristic of party politics in Nigeria since independence in 1960.  
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One can also explain this prebendal practice from the perspective of the longue durée 
approach: the epistemological argument of a French historian, Fernand Braudel (Wallerstein 
2009) and the Annales School of thought. This approach sees present political events as a 
product of a long-term historical evolution. As Emmanuel Wallerstein puts it: 
History is about the present. The reason we want to study the longue durée is because we want 
to be able to analyze the present. The present is the point of the game..Men make their own 
history, but they are not aware of doing it (Wallerstein 2009, p.166).  
Despite Wallerstein’s perspective the concern of this School of Thought was the manner in 
which historical traditions and processes come to be re-produced in the present and in the 
case of Nigeria the way in which patrimonial practices from the past become re-defined under 
the present “modern” system of politics and structure relationships within it.  
Godfathers have a vested interest in the continuity of the status quo in terms of continued 
representation and the distribution of benefits. Almond et al (2008) have noted that people 
with a vested interest would not want to lose the benefits they enjoy in government and are 
likely to resist change, unless the change means an expansion of the scope of the benefits. 
Nigerian godfathers therefore see the “revolt” of their godsons as a measure to reduce or 
remove their benefits.  
Evidently, godfatherism weakens the capacity of the legislature to fulfill the constitutionally 
designated mandate act as a serious check against executive recklessness in the management 
of the affairs of the state. One of the interviewees said: 
 
Godfatherism is one of the banes of the legislators. I can beat my chest and tell you that after 
2003, the issue of godfatherism came to play because most of the members that emerged from 
2003 till date in the legislatures are cronies of somebody: the Governors, influential people in 
the society, or heavy party executive members, or people who bought the process for them 
(Personal Interview X, May 19, 2014). 
He posits that legislators with capacity to represent the people should be able to analyse and 
review situation and take independent decision. ‘But when you are a crony of a godfather, 
you are not your own self; all your activities and decisions are reflections of the thinking and 
desire of the godfather or patron’ (Personal Interview X, May 19, 2014). Thus, godfatherism 
incapacitates the legislature. This attitude of godfathers aligns with Pareto’s idea on the 
circulation of elites (Pareto 1968). Pareto is of the view that the rise of certain elites would 
lead to the decline of others in terms of their relevance and their ability to exercise of power.  
Thus, godfatherism in Nigeria is an instrument of elite circulation. In this way, the weakening 
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of the power of the lawmakers makes them subservient to the elites in the executive branch of 
government. Because “big-men” politics reigns in Nigeria, ‘godfatherism is a big clog in the 
wheel of the legislators exercising their constitutional role’ (Personal Interview X, May 19, 
2014). By extension, in the exercise of its oversight power, ‘it will be difficult [for the 
legislature] to use impeachment as a process of deepening our democracy, to correct some 
lapses in governance issues’ (Personal Interview X, May 19, 2014). 
As long as the phenomenon of godfatherism persists in the Nigerian political system, the 
legislature will be unable to function effectively and the political elite will remain 
“disunified”. An example of a recent crisis in the Nigerian National Assembly over the 
composition of the leadership of the Senate and the House of Representatives supports this 
argument. Constitutionally, the legislature has the power to choose its leadership from among 
the legislators. On June 9, 2015, Senator Bukola Saraki and Mr. Yakubu Dogara emerged as 
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, respectively 
(Folasade-Koyi 2015). They were not the preferred candidates of the leadership of the ruling 
party, the APC. The leadership perceived this as an act of rebellion (Al-Ghazali 2015).  . 
6.5 The legislative shield and the politics of impeachment 
Marshall Ifenayi (2006) describes this endemic corruption in relation to the unconstitutional 
application of the impeachment provision thus: 
The composition of the various State Houses of Assembly and the crucial role of corruption, 
coupled with greed cannot be over emphasised in the various impeachment exercises so far 
recorded. Many of the legislators were sponsored to the house by their respective governors 
who never wanted a vibrant assembly. Some of the state’s Chief Judge were also those who 
coupled be controlled by the governors who on monthly basis disburse fat sate funds without 
recourse to transparency and accountability (Marshall 2006). 
A former state legislator believed that the culture of corruption in the legislature is a larger 
problem of integrity. He argued,   
It is an integrity problem; it is individual attitude. By the nature and structure of the 
legislature, a tree cannot make a forest. Unless a majority of you has the same vision and 
mission of what you want to achieve as legislators, it is difficult for you as an individual 
trying to drive the process. They can cut you to size, or suspend you indefinitely, even if it is 
illegal, if they discover you are going to be a clog in the wheel of their bidding (Personal 
Interview IX, May 19, 2014).  
Integrity here connotes the ability of the political elites to govern according to strong ethical 
principles which include honesty and integrity. The position of the interviewee is that many 
of the political elites in Nigeria do not act in accordance with those principles, but instead 
support the breach of rules and procedures in exchange for pecuniary gains.  
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Constitutionally, the legislature has the power to appropriate the impeachment provision to 
promote good governance, but the overwhelming influence of the governor over the 
legislature continues to stifle this power. The lack of independence of the lawmakers hampers 
their ability to actually enforce this sanctioning power. A former Speaker of a state legislature 
said: 
It is politics; because ab inito, you find out that most governors always have a hand in the 
election of the speakers of their legislatures. When it is not so, there will be kind of cold war 
between the speaker and the governor. The governor will marshal all power of patronage to 
ensure that the speaker belongs to his camp or get him removed (Personal Interview III, May 
10, 2014).  
The position of the speaker in a state legislature might be considered the first among equals. 
In such a system of patronage, the governor would prefer the Speaker to be his ally. This 
factor has weakened the capacity of the legislature to actually harness its power to uphold the 
tenets of its constitutional responsibilities. ‘It is the desire of every governor to have control 
over the legislature. They are having their ways. Most legislatures are rubber stamps. They 
always agree with executive proposals’ (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). A rubber stamp 
legislature would not be opposed to any of the decisions of the executive. This weakens the 
capacity of the legislature to assert oversight control over the affairs of the government. 
In Bayelsa state, for instance, from 1999-2007, the government was under the control of the 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Table 12 shows the number of seats controlled by political 
parties in the House of Assembly. Like the case of Plateau state, the legislators did not see 
any reason to discipline the governor over allegations that he had misappropriated of the 
resources of the state. The majority of the members supported the governor. 
Table 14: Membership of the Bayelsa State House of Assembly by political party, 1999-2007 
Political parties 1999-2003 2003-2007 
PDP 15 23 
ANPP 6 0 
AD 3 1 
Total 24 24 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
The governor enjoyed the support of the members of the legislature because there was no 
crisis within the political party during the period. In the absence of a prominent godfather the 




The rationale for a governor seeking to influence the emergence of the presiding officers of 
the legislature is to ensure a good working relationship that would in turn ensure that the 
policies of the government are approved. Evidently, from the responses of the political elites 
that I interviewed, such synergy is a vital instrument to stave off legislative scrutiny of the 
activities of the executive261. A former Speaker confirmed that such rapport is a common 
feature of the relationship between the executive and legislative members in Nigeria. 
According to him,  
Usually there is….  I won’t be a governor now and not be interested in who becomes the 
speaker, majority leader and other principal officers of the legislature. It makes sense for me 
as the governor to make sure that the Speaker of the House and the Principal Officers are in 
my good book. Good rapport enhanced peace, good governance… If we are making war with 
the governor who has his own policy agenda, and every time you are calling him to the House, 
we are harassing him, he will be distracted… in the interest of good governance, the executive 
and legislature should collaborate in a way. Most of the time, we use impeachment as an 
instrument of harassment there are lots of politics behind it (Personal Interview III, May 10, 
2014).  
 
In practical terms, the governors have an interest in who emerges as the leader of the 
legislature because the governor will wish to control him or her. A good rapport between the 
governor and the speaker is an important strategy to pursue. Given that in Nigeria, many 
politicians make politics a professional career they do become susceptible to the dominant 
political culture that pervades the legislature. This therefore makes them susceptible to 
manipulation for in exchange for financial rewards. A repondent said: 
Most of the legislators do not have other means of livelihood. Most of them do not have jobs 
of their own. Their fear is that the governor could corruptly enrich the Speaker and other key 
members to remove or sanction any legislator that seeks to expose the misdeeds of the 
governor. They abdicate the checks and balances responsibility on the platter of financial 
rewards from the executive (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). 
In the face of obvious infractions and abuses of power, state legislatures are unable to 
establish prima facie cases of corruption against their governors with a view to exercising 
their power of oversight to discipline them and protect democracy and the public interest. 
This is despite the fact that other agencies of government like the EFCC (as well as the 
international security outfits, especially the London Metropolitan Police) have been able to 
do so with damning records that show a high magnitude of corrupt practices in Nigerian 
legislatures. 
It is the same problem of corruption. When the majority in the House knows the right thing to 
do but refuse to do it… Even if there is evidence, the party leadership will not allow them to 
                                                 
261This concept of rapport/synergy is a terminology of corrupt collaboration where the legislature overlooks the 




take up the challenge. Where impeachment took place, you will discover that it is as a result of 
intra-party crisis. Impeachment is being used as instrument to settle political scores. There is 
massive corruption in Nigeria; there is nobody to enforce the law relating to punishing corrupt 
political officials. The Nigerian people are generally corrupt; their orientation and mentality 
promote negative attitude to life. There is a general lack of nationalism and patriotism among 
the people. Nepotism hinders good governance. We celebrate corruption and iniquity; no 
justice and equity. There is also leadership problem; there is lack of political will by the 
leadership to fight corruption. Most of the followers too are sycophants. Those who work hard 
lack motivation (Personal Interview XI, May 6, 2014).    
A former principal officer of a state legislature confirmed this development and attributed it 
to the lack of capacity by the lawmakers in the face of an endemic corruption culture. He 
said: 
It is neither structural neither institutional: it is the lack of capacity of the members and the 
virus of corruption to sway opinions and decisions…Impeachment is one of the democratic 
processes; it is an instrument to strengthen democracy. That is why it is in the constitution. 
But if you look at our members [legislators], most of them are lacking in capacity to really use 
it as a democratic instrument which should be used to correct some imbalances or as a check 
on the executive. But because majority of members are lacking in capacity, they don’t even 
understand, they don’t even know…they think impeachment is impunity: it is not impunity, it 
is a tool that can be used to strengthen and deepen democracy (Personal Interview X, May 19, 
2014). 
Another respondent attributes the corruption in the legislature to the weakness of the 
legislators in terms of ‘our level of integrity, honesty and the weakness of the institution 
itself’ (Personal Interview IX, May 19, 2014). The respondent explained further: 
Most legislators perceive their roles as gate keepers; being gate keepers, if they can settle 
them, the gate can be opened! If there are weaknesses they observe and there are chances that 
they can be settled, i.e. be given either a contract, they can look the other way. That is one of 
the major reasons why we have not been able to get acts together in terms of ensuring that the 
legislature does its job, ensure good governance and checkmating executive recklessness and 
lawlessness. Most legislators have problem of integrity (Personal Interview IX, May 19, 
2014). 
 
This depicts an entrenched political culture of collaboration between the legislative and the 
executive structures to circumvent the practice of the doctrine of checks and balances. There 
are requisite constitutional provisions that empower the legislature as major stakeholder in 
the promotion of good governance through the enforcement the oversight power. Legislators 
themselves are aware of the enormity of this power. One of the legislators said: 
There are numerous functions of the legislature recognised by the constitution. Basically, the 
legislature as part of the government in presidential system is saddled with the responsibility 
of checkmating the excesses of the executive branch on order to promote good governance. 
The legislature can sanction the executive through the exercise of the power of impeachment. 
It makes laws for the smooth running of the government, it deliberate on the budget estimates 
of the spending of the government; without legislative appropriation government cannot spend 
money (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). 
They know that ‘[i]f you have the governor of the state, misappropriating funds, or executing 
any projects outside the budget or misuse of power by the governor, it might lead to 
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impeachment’ (Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). It is evident that members of the Nigerian 
legislature are aware of the import and intents of their power. Nevertheless, they are 
incapacitated to function effectively because of the influence of the godfathers who 
sponsored their elections. According to a respondent, many of the Nigerian legislators 
 
got elected through the help and assistance of godfathers. Thus, they are not independent of 
some individuals outside the government or structures that reduce their capacity to acts 
independently. Aside from this, the process that brought them in was not free, mostly 
manipulated by the godfathers who sponsored their election. I think the best election…, the 
1999 election, was the best so far in terms to free and fair and credibility of the process. The 
prevalence of godfathers weakens the independence of the legislators. The electoral process is 
not credible. This also weakens the independence of the products of the election (Personal 
Interview IX, May 19, 2014). 
The legislature is single most crucial actor in the impeachment process. Even in cases where 
the EFCC fast track impeachment cases, there is still a heavy reliance on the legislature. The 
Nigerian Constitution recognises the legislature as the only legitimate institution in the 
removal of a governor and or his deputy through the legislative process (Section 188, 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). This makes it the 
strongest shield because in an ideal situation, the primary initiator of impeachment is the 
legislative arm. An interviewee said that members of the legislature are aware of this 
legislative responsibility. He said:  
The constitutional provisions are there. But the initiative has to start from the House of 
Assembly. Once you create an initiative, then you serve the governor with the allegation of 
gross misconduct. There are so many offences you can allege against the governor or his 
deputy. Don’t forget even till now, implementation of the budget not in accordance with the 
appropriation law is an impeachable offence. It is a ground of impeachment (Personal 
Interview III, May 10, 2014).  
Constitutionally, the primary actors to determine what constitutes gross misconduct that 
warrants impeachment are the legislators. The procedure begins with the signing of the 
allegation claiming that the accused has committed acts that amount to gross misconduct.  
When the governor enjoys a syncretic relationship with the legislature, the lawmakers 
sometimes, as one interviewee puts it “look the other way”. In other words, the legislators are 
aware of the malfeasances of the governor but would not to take any action because of the 
prebendalism that they benefit from. 
A constitutional law expert told me that members of the legislature could indeed manipulate 
the impeachment provision. He said: 
218 
 
There is no human relation that cannot be manipulated. No matter how brilliant the work of 
the legislature might be in passing a law, some people have to implement the law. In the 
process of implementation, they can be manipulated. Thus, impeachment provision in the 
constitutions is a piece of legislation. It can also be manipulated in the sense that if there is a 
strong political difference between the executive and the legislature, the legislature can move 
against the executive…This is not the intendment of the provision but it will be difficult to say 
there is no major offence because there is nobody, no person… no individual is perfect. There 
could be honest mistakes but when crisis comes, such mistakes that have been overlooked 
become cogent and valid proofs of misconduct (Personal Interview V, May 13, 2014).  
 
 Where there is no crisis or division between the legislature and the executive, the offence 
will never amount to gross misconduct. A former speaker explained that the decision of the 
lawmakers to begin an impeachment process usually arises when they are discontented about 
their personal benefits.  He said: 
No…. there is always politics. Some people are annoyed, some people are aggrieved, some 
people are angry. It starts from there. It is purely an elitist game; desire to pursue personal 
interest… And the impeachable offences are so numerous that you can easily pick on any one. 
For instance, non-implementation of the budget is an impeachable offence. So people can 
easily go there. I have not seen any government in this country that implements budget up to 
50% including the federal government. Then it is easy to look for loopholes in the contracts 
through legislative assessment by the oversight committees (Personal Interview III, May 10, 
2014). 
As important as the legislative shield is, its effectiveness is dependent on the disposition of 
the political elite who control the actual exercise of power within and outside of the 
legislative institution. In other words, lawmakers could be coerced by their godfathers to 
commence an impeachment process even if they were not prepared to do so. Here, the 
disposition of the leadership of the ruling political party towards the governor determines the 
success of any legislative initiative towards impeachment. If the elections of the lawmakers 
are at the behest of the leadership of the party, the extent of their independence in crucial 
decision making like impeachment will be weak. Thus, a rubber stamp legislature under the 
control of the governor is an effective shield for the governor against impeachment. On the 
contrary, it becomes a shield against the governor if the leadership of the party is in control of 
their survival in the legislature. 
In table 13 below, I present data on the available shields that existed in the cases of 
impeachment in the selected states of this study. This is indicates the various ways that 







Table 15: The available shields in the cases of impeachment in Anambra, Bayelsa, Oyo 




Underlying  causes Major actors 
involved 
Final outcome / 
Shield 
Anambra/ Peter Obi Misappropriation  
of state fund 
Divided government  Leadership of the 
PDP and the 
dominant legislators 
Legislative shield 
weak in the face of 
divided government 







Conflict between the 
governor and the 
president over third 
term ambition 
Leadership of the 
PDP and the EFCC 
Legislative shield in 
favour was strong 
until the superior 
godfather deployed 
the instrumentality 
of the EFCC to 
coerce the few 
legislators to remove 
him from office. He 
was removed 
through breaches of 
the constitution. 
Judicial reprieve 
abandoned, tried in 
court and found 
guilty but later 
pardoned. 
Oyo/Ladoja Corruption and 
the illegal 





him and his 
godfather and, by 
extension, the 
leadership of the 
PDP 
President Obasanjo 
and Chief Lamidi 
Adedibu, his 
godfather 
Enjoyed a factional 
legislative shield but 
removed through an 
unconstitutional 
procedure. Favoured 
by a judicial shield. 
Plateau/ Dariye Corruption and 
money laundering 
Division between 
him and the 
president over his 
lack of support for 
the third term bid. 
President 
Obasanjo/Federal 




Removed through an 
unconstitutional 
procedure but 
favoured by judicial 
shield 
Source: Compiled by the author 
It is evident that in the face of infractions by the governors, state legislatures lack the capacity 
to initiate impeachment process to remove such governors. A respondent described the 
Nigerian legislature as an institution composed of the ‘3rd eleven leaders playing the role of 
the 1st eleven’ (Personal Interview VII, May 7, 2014). He said: 
My generation of political leadership was excellent. I entered parliament in my 20s, our salary 
was 840 pounds per year. There was no car, no house, and people were satisfied and happy. 
Many of the players at that time were 1st eleven playing the role of 1st eleven. But in our 
legislature now, we have people in the 3rd eleven playing the role of 1st eleven (Personal 
Interview VII, May 7, 2014).   
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The use of the allegory “1st eleven” and “3rd eleven” by the interviewee is to denote the level 
of the competency and commitment of the legislators. He was comparing the commitment 
and the capability of the present generation of the Nigerian lawmakers with those of the First 
Republic. The legislators in the “1st eleven playing the role of 1st eleven”, as in a football 
team, are the best set of lawmakers performing their legislative responsibility with utmost 
commitment. On the other hand, the “3rd eleven playing the role of 1st eleven” stands for the 
third best that are performing the responsibility meant for the best. His argument is that the 
contemporary Nigerian legislators lack sufficient competency and commitment. The 
distinction that is made by the interviewee above implies a negative assessment of the 
capability of the Nigerian legislators.  
The legislators in the First and Second Republics did not fare better. The level of impunity 
among political elites in the Fourth Republic legislature is high and the mode to influence the 
public remains the same - what Bayart (1993) conceptualizes as the “politics of the belly”. In 
the modern Nigerian terminology, it is referred to as the quest for “stomach infrastructure”. 
This description of the disposition of the Nigerian legislators is evident in their quest for 
enhanced remuneration packages. The July 15 2013 edition of The Economist262 lists 
Nigerian legislators as the higest paid across the globe. A former legislator who spoke with 
me agreed that this emolument is outrageous but that the system encourages the emergence of 
individual political elites whose primary motive of gaining power is to pursue pecuniary 
gains and rewards. The legislator pointed out that 
emoluments of political office holders to us are outrageous but the designer of the structure 
did not have in mind the set of people that earn that money. The designer envisaged the 
emergence of experienced but retired principals, head teachers, top civil servants, people who 
have had experience in the public service capable of contributing meaningfully to the society 
not secondary school dropouts as we have them now (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). 
Another former legislator said that because of this motivation, ‘most of the lawmakers 
maneuver their ways into power to enrich themselves rather than stand for the truth’ 
(Personal Interview I, May 3, 2014). The public perception of power in Nigeria coupled with 
the general culture of corruption provides the template for the emergence of ‘such people 
[who] have nothing to offer to the society’ (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). It could be 
further argued that Nigerian society, because of the loss of confidence in the capacity of the 
                                                 




state to deliver public good, prefers immediate gains from the political elite in exchange for 
their support and loyalty. A respondent said: 
 
The society itself is a challenge. I left office in 2011, people still expect me to be paying their 
bills. Constituents want lawmakers to pay for their social engagements and ceremonies. Such 
largesse has become the standard being used to measure performance. The society lacks a 
credible standard to measure the performance of the lawmakers. If, for instance, a lawmaker, 
who is vibrant in legislature, fails to pay school fees of children from his constituency, he will 
be regarded as a failure. If he seeks for reelection, he will lose (Personal Interview II, May 10, 
2014). 
It takes an informed society sufficiently motivated to demand accountability from the 
political elite. In Nigeria, the public lacks the capacity to hold the leaders accountable. And 
that ‘is why lawmakers are not effective since they know that legislative outputs is not the 
standard to measure performance’ (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). When citizens are 
invested in horizontal accountability, as conceptualised by Adamolekun (2010), the 
population support civil society organisations in compelling public representatives to be 
accountable. This is not the case in Nigeria. The quest for “stomach infrastructure” and the 
“politics of the belly” means that a transactional political culture has replaced a desire for 
accountability. 
A civil society group, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), considers state 
legislatures in Nigeria as “dead institutions” in terms of the performance of their 
constitutional responsibility. The group states that 
In Nigeria, the state Houses of Assembly have turned themselves to be the stooges of their 
state governors as a result of their weaknesses. The state legislatures have failed to ensure full 
implementation of budgets passed by them by the governors. After reviewing the performance 
of state Houses of Assembly in the current dispensation, human rights activists, civil society 
organisations, eminent lawyers and leaders of some political parties, have declared them 
“dead” (cf. Abdallah 2013). 
The Nigerian presidential constitution designed the three principal institutional structures of 
government as co-equals in the administration of public policy, with an appropriate system of 
checks and balances. Unfortunately, according to one interviewee, the principle of separation 
of power regulating the relationship among the branches of government,  
only exists on paper as the state legislatures have become mere extensions of the executive 
arm of government, because they are more of toothless bulldogs. Some speakers of the states 
legislatures and other lawmakers have turned themselves to rubber-stamp to the governors… 
For instance, in many states lawmakers have failed to call their governors to order over their 
shoddy implementation of the state’s budgets, unbudgeted spending, misconduct, 
abandonment of capital projects, looting and stealing of public fund etc… (cf. Abdallah 2013). 
A newspaper editorial describes this as mind-boggling. 
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Corruption reports have become a daily feature, of mind-boggling proportions, in newspapers. 
Here is a monster that has defied successive administrations' soulless cures, thereby 
threatening to consume the country. Government officials, including civil servants accumulate 
wealth and property illegally and with reckless abandon; unmoved by any sanction attached to 
their conduct. Federal legislators are derisively now referred to as “legislooters”; for helping 
themselves to loads of unmerited perks, unjustly, and at the expense of the poor citizens. 
Hardly do any of them condemn corruption openly. Many too have been justifiably accused of 
having no vision for the country. That should worry any patriotic lawmaker (The Guardian, 
26/04/2012). 
A former Speaker of a state legislature told me that that the failure of the legislature to hold 
the executive to account is a function of the personalized nature of Nigerian politics. He said, 
In the US, the power of the legislature is manifest in the activities of government. The 
Congress can effectively censor the power of the executive. But here in Nigeria, the legislature 
cannot exercise such power because they don’t have independent existence, they don’t have 
adequate financial, even human resources to be able to compete effectively with the executive 
in ensuring the kind of good governance that will usher in a lasting democracy in Nigeria 
(Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014). 
He noted that the state of Nigeria’s political and economic development is not such as can 
withstand the way in which the presidential system functions in practice in Nigeria. ‘The 
notion of executive presidency seems to have gone to the head of everybody; we want to 
make a monster out of a president/governor’ (Personal Interview VI, May 13, 2014). This 
personalisation of politics further entrenches the culture of corruption as a regular feature of 
governance in Nigeria. According to another respondent, the nature of the country’s party 
system produces subservient legislators. 
One of the factors responsible is that to a large extent, the party system that we have usually 
throws up a House of Assembly that is beholding unto the governor; that cow tow to the 
governor because at the point of selection, whoever emerges as the governorship candidate is 
the bigger personality in the party. He has all the influence. Those who eventually get elected 
into the legislature are those people who, to all intents and purposes, are not comparable to the 
governorship candidate in terms of stature, experience, access to material resources. So, 
invariably, the governor is like a super king that has to be worshipped by the members of the 
House of Assembly. Even when they are elected and sworn-in, and the legislature got 
convoked, you don’t find many of the state legislatures in a position to look the governor in 
the face and call his bluff. You have instances where a governor commits impeachable offence 
yet the House of Assembly will not be able to do much (Personal Interview XIII, May 19, 
2014). 
This is a general problem that characterises the operation of the legislature in Nigeria. The 
legislators struggle with a lack of independence from the leadership of the party and from 
their godfathers which in turn weakens their capacity to challenge the governors. Even if they 
seek to challenge decisions made by the executive, they would be unable to do so if the 
interests of their godfather were being threatened. This incapacity makes them vulnerable to 






In Nigeria, the legislature is constitutionally empowered to provide oversight of the 
executive. In practice, this oversight is lacking. In this chapter, I explored the phenomenon of 
godfatherism in an analysis of impeachment cases in the selected states of this study. I 
presented my empirical findings on the influence of godfathers in impeachment cases in 
Nigeria. I also explored the role of how the interests of the political elite affect the 
functioning of political parties in Nigeria. I discussed this along with an analysis of how the 
lawmakers determined the tenure of governors.  
In my analysis in this chapter, I discovered that the Nigerian legislators at the state level have 
been unable to use their constitutional powers effectively because of the phenomenon of 
godfatherism. I claim further that the activities of the godfathers, who sponsor the election 
campaigns of the lawmakers, weaken the capacity of the legislature to take independent 
action. A subservient legislature rubber stamps the decisions and proposals of the executive.  
I also found that the attitudinal disposition of the lawmakers also impedes their ability to hold 
the executive accountable. Corruption in the Nigerian legislature incapacitates effective 
oversight of the actions of the executive. Rather than exert their constitutional powers to 
enforce accountability, Nigerian lawmakers negotiate the public good in exchange for their 
pecuniary gains. Disparities in the application of impeachment principles in Nigeria, is a 
function of the attitudinal disposition of the lawmakers. This attitude is influenced by 
godfatherism, the party system and the “politics of the belly”. This further supports a culture 
of impunity and prebendalism which undermines democratic governance and is at the 
expense of the public interest. 
















Deciphering the politics of impeachment in Nigeria: 




The framers of the Nigerian presidential constitution anticipated the emergence of a 
legislative institution that would represent the collective interests of the public, rather than 
those of factionalised law-making bodies besieged by the politics of vested interests. From 
the cases considered in this study, evidence suggests that none of the legislatures acted in a 
manner that fulfils the intent of the framers of the constitution. Those who engaged in 
flagrant abuses and breaches of the constitution to remove their governors acted on the 
prompting of their godfathers.  
Others who refused to use the constitutional provisions of impeachment to sanction erring 
governors have also not acted in the public interest. Many of the heads of the executive 
branch, at the state and national levels, sees the legislature as an extension of the executive. 
There is little or no regard for the autonomy and independence of the legislature. For 
instance, the governor of Ekiti State, Ayodele Fayose, addressed the state legislature as ‘my 
house of assembly’ (Fabiyi, 2014).  
 In the absence of effective legislative institutions, Nigeria is experiencing what Olowo 
(2006) calls ‘EFCC-induced fast-track impeachment’. One could argue that this is an 
“innovation” in the face of the refusal of the legislature to act. Nevertheless, the “selective 
use” of the ‘EFCC-induced fast-track impeachment’ challenges its credibility. While EFCC 
was investigating governors noted for their disagreements with the president, it spared others 
who were supporters of the president. Though Nuhu Ribadu, the former Chairman of the 
EFCC, told the Senate that 31out of the 36 state governors were under investigation for 
financial malfeasance, the political will to bring them to book was lacking. An attestation to 
this analysis is the disparate use of the EFCC as agents of impeachment. The use of the EFCC 
to fast track the impeachment of Governors Dariye and Alamieyeseigha, in the absence of a 
willing majority of members of the legislature is political rather than a transparent process to 
ensure accountability The flouting of constitutional provisions and procedures by the EFCC 
in the impeachment of a number of governors suggests that extraneous factors, other than 
corruption, may have propelled the move against them (Dike 2006). 
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In this chapter, I present my analysis of the cases of former governors who were involved in 
abusing their powers of office and misappropriating state funds.  I claim that that there are 
disparities in the application of impeachment in Nigeria. I explore a series of cases to support 
my claim.  In the first section, I provide an analysis of a series of impeachment cases of 
deputy-governors. I claim that it is less difficult to impeach a deputy governor whose 
working relationship with the governor is not on good terms. Few deputy-governors are 
impeached by lawmakers as a consequence of gross misconduct.  In the second section of this 
chapter, I explore the cases where the EFCC established evidence of malfeasance committed 
by some former state governors. I also provide data on former governors who have been 
investigated and indicted by the EFCC but still occupy prominent positions in the legislature. 
I claim that this set of people could influence the outcome of the EFCC investigation and 
decision. In particular, I provide empirical data on the case of a former governor of Delta 
State, James Ibori, who was tried and convicted of corruption charges in London. I explore 
this case in particular, to argue that in Nigeria, impeachment only take place when a governor 
loses the protective shield of the legislature. I support this claim with an analysis of the 
impeachment of the former governor of Adamawa State in 2014.    
7.2 Deputy Governors and the burden of impeachment 
Impeachment in Nigeria has become a part of the daily routine by which godfathers whip 
recalcitrant godsons into line and force their compliance or their removal. For deputy 
governors not willing to ‘be more urbane and diplomatic in dealing’ (Odivwri 2004) with 
their political godfathers - the governor, and or party chieftains – could mobilise the 
legislature to remove them. Thus, the impeachment of a deputy governor, perceived to be 
competing with the governor, is usually a strategy to weaken his political strength. In other 
words, a deputy governor is removed by impeachment not because of he has breached the 
constitution or abused his of office, but instead for political reasons (which may include a 
breakdown in the relationship with the governor). In Nigeria, deputy governors do not have a 
specific constitutional role to play in government. They operate according to the instructions 
provided to them by the governor. But when a deputy governor is seeking to be elected as 
governor and the governor is also seeking re-election their conflicting interests clash. As a 
result, some governors have erected ‘a superstructure of power hanging a top’ their deputies 
who only operate in the shadow of the governors (Odivwri 2004). Any attempt by the deputy 
governor to operate outside of the influence of the governor could be met with consequences.  
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Orji Kalu and Bola Tinubu, former governors of Abia and Lagos States respectively, (1999-
2003), had three deputies in 8 years (Odivwri 2004; Azubike 2006). For Tinubu, Kofoworola 
Akerele-Bucknor and Femi Pedro were too ambitious to operate within the “shadowy straw” 
he created for them (Adedayo 2006). The governor and his deputies became embroiled in 
personal feuds over their mutual desire to contest gubernatorial seats. Mrs. Akerele-Bucknor 
was the deputy governor of Lagos State from May 29, 1999 until December 16, 2002, when 
she resigned her position (Adedayo 2006). The Lagos State House of Assembly had served 
her with an impeachment notice in preparation for her removal (The Nigerian Voice 
02/02/11). Her problem with the governor started the moment she indicated her intention to 
contest the 2003 gubernatorial election in the state (Adedayo 2006). Initially, she was 
persuaded by the leadership of the party (AD) to step down in support of Tinubu in the 1999 
gubernatorial election. The “agreement” was that she would succeed Tinubu at the end of his 
first term in 2003. 
Femi Pedro succeeded Akerele-Bucknor as the deputy governor of Lagos State in April 2003. 
He made clear his intention to succeed Tinubu at the end of his second term in 2007. Tinubu 
had instead decided that his Chief of Staff, Babatunde Fashola, would succeed him. The 
relationship between Pedro and Tinubu broke down as a result of this and Pedro was 
impeached by lawmakers in May 10 2007 (Akoni 2007). In these two cases, there was no 
evidence of any abuse of power by the deputy governors. 
In Abia State, the governor Orji Kalu, considered his deputy, Eyinaya Abaribe263 to be too 
politically aggressive in the pursuit of his ambition (Odivwri 2004). The governor had 
expected that Abaribe would be a loyal deputy that could be trusted (Odivwri 2004). Chima 
Nwafor succeeded Abaribe in 2003 and was impeached in February 2006 (Nwakanma and 
Uche-Ukon 2006). When he assumed office, he was described by a newspaper writer that he 
was ‘heavily guided by an over-bearing loyalty complex’ (Odivwri 2004). Nevertheless, this 
did not take prevent him from being removed by the legislature at the insistence of the 
governor on August 31, 2004 (Azubike 2006). Nevertheless, intervention by the political elite 
in the state halted the implementation of the impeachment order as the legislators had to 
                                                 
263Abaribe was the deputy governor of Abia State from May 29, 1999 until March 7, 2003 when he resigned but 
the state legislature claimed he was impeached.  Having escaped an impeachment process twice, the former 
deputy sent his resignation letter to the legislature when he discovered that the legislature would have the 
required two-thirds majority of votes to impeach him.    
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‘pardon him’ (Azubike2006). There was no specific reason to explain the pardon of the 
deputy governor after his impeachment.  
The constitution does not make provision for the legislature to pardon a deputy governor 
impeached through a constitutional procedure. Thus, in 2006, a notice of legal action to 
challenge the action of the legislator forced the lawmakers to finally removed Nwafor as the 
deputy governor (Azubike 2006). It is evident from my interviews that the legislators were 
not acting as an independent institution of government. 
A member of the legislature who spoke with me disclosed that when the governor was 
presurised to reconcile with his deputy, he approached the house to ask for a pardon but that 
the relationship could not be sustained. He added that on the prompting of the governor, the 
lawmakers had to rescind the pardon two years later because it was an error. In both instances 
– those of giving the order and then rescinding it, the legislators acted as a political tool of the 
governor. The decision to retract the pardon was not because of a realisation that it was 
unconstitutional. As the interviewee told me, those who prepared the legal notice were asked 
to do so by the lawmakers because the governor wanted a retrial of the pardoned deputy 
governor with a view to his removal. It is evident, therefore, that the lawmakers compromised 
the integrity of the legislature in order to please the governor.   
The Speaker of the legislature, Stanley Ohajuruka, claimed that the decision to remove 
Nwafor as the deputy governor was to correct the error associated with the pardon (Azubike 
2006). Nevertheless, the interviewee disclosed to me that the primary motive was that the 
governor had promised the lawmakers that the deputy speaker, Eric Acho Nwakanma, would 
be nominated to succeed Nwafor as the deputy governor.  
The real reason for the decision of the governor was to forestall further enquiry into 
allegations of misconduct by him. In 2006, the EFCC report had indicted the governor Kalu 
and his family had looted N35 billion of state funds (Aziken 2006). He has since been 
charged with the misappropriation of funds in court (at the end of his term in 2007).  The trial 
is still pending (Alli 2015a). Indeed, the EFCC had confiscated 10 properties and frozen bank 
accounts of 13 companies that were linked to him (Alli 2015a).  
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When Nwakanm was the deputy speaker, he supported the governor every time the EFCC 
indictment came up for debate. However, once their relationship broke down, he disclosed 
the misappropriation of funds264. He said, 
I was his deputy governor (sic) and I can tell you that most of what Kalu did was to run the 
government as a family business with his mother at one end in charge of the local government 
treasury, and the rest of the family at the other end, having the apparatchik of government 
placed under their watch and control. When Abia was sinking, Kalu’s business empire was 
growing (cf. Oboh 2014).  
This allegation has not been retracted neither has it been contested as libelous. Indeed, the 
EFCC have documented the various infractions of Orji as the case is still pending in the law 
courts for prosecution (Odunlami 2015). The EFCC had also confiscated some of the 
properties seized from him (Alli 2015).He was the deputy speaker of the legislature and, 
later, deputy governor, when the governor was running the state like a family business 
(Azikien 2006). He could not muster the constitutional provisions that were at his disposal to 
promote good governance265.  
In Enugu State, the deputy governor, Sunday Onyebuchi, was impeached on August 25, 
2014, in what is popularly known as the ‘chicken impeachment’ (Premium Times 
26/08/2014; Aziken 2014; Owete 2014a; Ndujihe et al, 2015).266He was elected as the deputy 
to the governor, Mr. Sullivan Chime, in 2007 and got re-elected in 2011 (The Sun 
30/08/2014; Obi 2014). In a notice that alleged gross misconduct against the former deputy, 
signed by 22 out of the 24 members of the legislature, the lawmakers accused Mr. Onyebuchi 
of two offences. These offences are:  operation of livestock poultry farms within the premises 
of the official residence of the deputy governor, alleged refusal to represent the governor at a 
public function (Owete 2014 b). 
The truth is that the governor and his deputy were not on good terms. The feud between the 
former governor and his deputy arose when Onyebuchi (the deputy-governor) told the 
                                                 
264The EFCC had initially discovered this development when Nwakanma was the deputy speaker. The 
legislature did not take any legislative action to redress the development because the lawmakers were part of the 
deal.  
265He was the deputy speaker when his predecessor, Nwafor, was removed. At that time, he supported the 
impeachment of a deputy governor but objected to the removal of the governor who was indicted of abuse of 
office (Alli 2015a).  
266The major allegation against the deputy governor was that he was running a poultry farm within the premises 
of his official residence. In his response to the allegations, he defended himself by showing laws in which 
provisions had been made for the maintenance of the poultry farms in the Agricultural Unit located in the 
official residences of the governor and the deputy governor. For the details, see Aziken 2014; Obi 2014; 




governor that he wanted to contest the elections as a senator,  a position that the governor had 
indicated he wished his chief of staff to occupy (Owete 2014 a and b; Obi 2014; Aiken 2014).  
In his response to the allegations of gross misconduct, Onyebuchi claimed that Chime had 
asked him to reign for no just reason (Aziken 2014). 
On the 16th of July, 2014 I went to the Governor’s office to inform him of my intention to 
travel out of the country for six days and he asked me to give him one reason why he should 
approve it. I told him that I did not know of any reason but if there is any that I would like to 
know. He then said that I did not represent him at the South East Governors’ Forum Meeting 
that took place in Enugu on the 6th of July 2014. I told him that he never instructed me to 
represent him. He now directed me to resign immediately from my office or he will make my 
life miserable. I told him that not representing him at that meeting was not enough reason for 
me to resign (cf. Aziken 2014). 
He refused to resign and the governor was left with the option of persuading the legislators to 
remove him from office through impeachment (Owete 2014 a and b). This is a pattern that 
was not different from the cases of other deputy governors that were removed.  
I claim that the allegations of gross misconduct leveled against the former deputy governor 
did not fall within the definition of gross misconduct. The Nigerian Supreme Court in its 
judgment in the case of former governor of Oyo State, Rashidi Ladoja, had ruled that 
allegations of gross misconduct have definite parameters267. The Supreme Court therefore 
defined gross misconduct as ‘a grave violation or breach of the constitution’268. Thus, the 
reason behind his removal was his decision to contest the senatorial election against the wish 
of the governor. This illustrates that deputy governors are susceptible to removal from office 
whenever their interest runs contrary to that of the governor. 
More recently, the former deputy governor of Ondo state, Alhaji Ali Olanusi, was impeached 
by the legislature on April 27, 2015 (Johnson 2015). His problem started when he declared 
his intention to defect from the ruling PDP to the APC (Akintomide 2015; Fanaro et al 
2015)269.  On April 22, 2015, the lawmakers served Olanusi with the notice of allegations of 
gross misconduct in preparation for his impeachment (Sahara Reporters, April 22, 2015). The 
legislature accused Olanusi of negligence (a failure to discipline his staff allegedly involved 
                                                 
267Inakoju& 17 others v. Adeleke& 3others.(2007) 1 S. C. (pt. I). 
268Inakoju& 17 others v. Adeleke& 3others.(2007) 1 S. C. (pt.I), pp63-64). 
269The state governor, Olusegun Mimiko initially defected from the PDP to the Labour Party (LP) to contest the 
2007 gubernatorial election. In 2014, the governor defected from the LP back to the PDP. His deputy, Olanusi 




in fraud), antagonism towards the governor, frequent absence from work and engaging in 
conduct that undermined the government (Sahara Reporters 22/04/2015).   
Aside from the allegation of unlawful enrichment, all other offences, were allegedly 
committed between the time he announced his defection to the APC and the time he was 
impeached (Sahara Reporter 22/04/2015). On the allegation of unlawful enrichment, the 
legislators claimed that the former deputy governor committed this offence between 2009 and 
204 (Sahara Reporters, 22/04/2015) and that he,  
collected various sums of money for the purpose of travelling and medical bill (sic) as 
follows: 2009 (N8, 175, 410), 2010 (N8, 952, 600), 2013 (N10, 833, 200) and 2014 (N11, 
328, 100) when in actual fact, the said Alhaji Ali Olanusi did not travel on the said specified 
dates or did not travel at all and, or did not expand the approved medical bills as appropriate, 
thereby unlawfully enriching himself and/causing loss to the State Government (cf. Sahara 
reporters 22/04/2015). 
The lawmakers did not bring up these allegations within the period they were allegedly 
committed until the former deputy governor defected from the ruling party in the state to the 
APC. Like the previous cases analysed in this chapter, it is evident that even if the allegations 
were true, the lawmakers would not have removed he deputy governor if had not defected 
from the ruling party to the APC.  One might thus claim that he impeachment of Olanusi was 
political and rooted in competition, rather than as a result of any breaches of the constitution 
which he may or may not have done. If he had not defected to the APC, the PDP dominated 
legislature would not have contemplated impeaching him. 
There is little in the way of constitutional protection for the office of the deputy governor. In 
view of the judgment of the Supreme Court,270 I contend that the removal of the deputy 
governors was in contradiction to the purpose of the constitutional provisions on 
impeachment. The legislatures in these cases exercised their powers of removal ‘to achieve a 
political purpose’271. The Supreme Court had declared:  
 
It is not a lawful or legitimate exercise of the power of constitutional function in Section 188 
for a House of Assembly to remove a Governor or a Deputy Governor to achieve a political 
purpose or one of organised vendetta clearly outside gross misconduct under the section272.   
 The Supreme Court, in the judgment delivered by Justice Niki Tobi, therefore interpreted  
gross misconduct as contained in section 188(11) thus: 
                                                 
270Inakoju& 17 Others v Adeleke& 3 Others (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt.1), 
271Inakoju& 17 Others v Adeleke& 3 Others (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt.1), p.66, 
272Inakoju& 17 Others v Adeleke& 3 Others (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt.1), p.66, 
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The word “gross” in the subsection does not bear its meaning of aggregate income. It rather 
means generally in the context atrocious, colossal, deplorable, disgusting, dreadful, enormous, 
gigantic, grave, heinous, outrageous, odious and shocking. All these words express some 
extreme negative conduct...By the definition, it is not every violation or breach of the 
Constitution that can lead to the removal of a Governor or a Deputy Governor. Only a grave 
violation or breach of the constitution can lead to the removal of a Governor or a Deputy 
Governor. Grave in the context...mean, in my view, serious, substantial, and weighty.273 
In view of this interpretation, the Supreme Court averred that  the impeachment provision ‘is 
a very strong political weapon at the disposal of the House which must be used only in 
appropriate cases of serious wrong doing on the part of the Governor or Deputy Governor, 
which is tantamount to gross misconduct’.274 
In view of this judicial interpretation, the impeachment of the deputy governors was 
politically motivated. In most cases, there was no substantive evidence to show that the 
deputy governors violated the provisions of the Constitution. Politics is about conflict 
resolution, among the political elite, with a view to ensuring cooperation and collaboration in 
the midst of conflicting interests for the promotion of public good (Fukuyama 2015). In 
Nigeria, political competition is usually characterised by divisive politics. While some 
legislators insisted in removing their deputy governors because of offences that did not 
impact governance, some refused to remove their governors where there had been evidence 
of their abuse of power.  I turn to an analysis of these empirical cases in the next section.   
7.3 The EFCC investigation and the indictment of some former governors: 
Outcomes and problems 
The activities of the EFCC were selective and widely seen as a mechanism to weaken the 
political base of prominent governors, within the ruling party, the PDP, that opposed the 
ambitions of the former president, Olusegun Obasanjo, to extend his term of office. In the 
case of Dariye, Obasanjo insisted that the governor should either resign or be removed by the 
legislature (Dike 2006) If the governor committed an offence tantamount to gross misconduct 
it was the duty of the legislature of the state, as stipulated by the constitution, and not the 
president of the country, to determine whether or not the governor should resign or be 
removed through an impeachment process. One of the constitutional experts who spoke with 
me discussed this leadership culture. 
                                                 
273Inakoju& 17 Others v Adeleke& 3 Others (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt.1), pp.63-64 
274Inakoju& 17 Others v Adeleke& 3 Others (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt.1), pp.66-67. 
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The problem with Nigeria is leadership at all levels - executive, legislature and judiciary. 
When Obasanjo was the president; he was just orchestrating the removal of Governors. He 
was treating the Governors as if they were servants under him. It was wrong (Personal 
Interview VII, May 7, 2014). 
At different times before he joined partisan politics, Nuhu Ribadu, as the chairmen of the 
EFCC, had disclosed that there were established cases of corruption against the wife of 
President Goodluck Jonathan (when he was the Governor of Bayelsa State) (Olumeshe 2014). 
He claimed in 2006 that the EFCC had seized US $13.5 million dollars from Mrs. Patience 
Jonathan and obtained the judicial authority to freeze a sum of ‘N104 million Mrs. Jonathan 
had allegedly tried to launder through one Nancy Ebere Nwosu’ (Olumeshe 2014). As the 
head of the Joint Task Force (JTF) against corruption in 2005, Nuhu Ribadu had announced 
the indictment of 15 governors on sound corruption charges (Olumeshe 2014). Among the 
governors then were Ahmed Bola Tinubu275 of Lagos State and Goodluck Jonathan of 
Bayelsa State (Olumeshe 2014). Ribadu had boasted then that, 
Bola Tinubu and the rest should consider themselves very lucky. But they can’t escape. We 
are after them. After their tenure as Governor, they will be prosecuted. It is a matter of time. 
They remain indicted and are not fit to hold public positions. They have to answer for their 
misdeeds (cf. Ubochi 2011). 
Former president, Olusegun Obasanjo confirmed this. According to him, 
Nuhu Ribadu tried to investigate almost all of them [governors] to the best of 
my understanding. At a time, he publicly announced that 28 out of the 36 
governors were either manifestly corrupt or had been tainted in one way or 
other. He gave me a copy of his report on those governors. Bola Tinubu was 
definitely one of the worst cases (cf. Sotubo 2014). 
In September 27, 2006, Ribadu told the Nigerian Senate that the corruption profile of Tinubu 
was of an ‘international dimension’ (Senate Official Report, September 27, 2006; Olumeshe 
2014; Ubochi 2011)276.  
Abia is number one (of corrupt states) not because it is number one alphabetically, but because 
we have one of the biggest established cases of stealing, money laundering, diversion of funds 
against Governor Kalu. The governor used his mother, daughter, wife and brother to divert 
N35 billion to build his business empire including Slok Airlines, Slok Pharmaceuticals and 
newspaper house… Tinubu’s corruption is of international dimension (cf. Ubochi 2011). 
 
                                                 
275A documentary, Lion of Bourdillion Part I, documents the various allegations of corruption perpetrated by 
Tinubu when he was the governor of Lagos state. 
276By international dimension, Ribadu meant that the cases of corruption being investigated by the EFCC against 
the former governor involved certain allegations of criminal activities perpetrated outside the country. 
Curiously, Ribadu recanted this allegation when he emerged as the presidential candidate of   the Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN), a political party led by Tinubu, in the 2011 presidential election. In preparation for 
the 2015 election, Ribadu defected to the People Democratic Party (PDP), where Jonathan is the leader, to 




Neither Tinubu, nor Kalu nor Jonathan was subjected to an EFCC-induced impeachment 
process. It is ironic that out of many other governors alleged to have misappropriated state 
funds, the EFCC chose to fast track the impeachment of only three. An official of the EFCC 
who I interviewed said that the EFCC usually act upon instructions by the president in cases 
that involved governors and other elected political officeholders (Personal Interview XIV, 
May 7, 2014). The EFCC is empowered by law to be responsible for, among other things,   
the investigation of all financial crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering, 
counterfeiting, illegal charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of 
negotiable instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam, etc.;  (c) the co-ordination 
and enforcement of all economic and financial crimes laws and enforcement functions 
conferred on any other person or authority;  (d) the adoption of measures to identify, trace, 
freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist activities, economic and financial 
crimes related offences or the properties the value of which corresponds to such proceeds; (e) 
the adoption of measures to eradicate the commission of economic and financial crimes; (f) 
the adoption of measures which includes coordinated preventive and regulatory actions, 
introduction and maintenance of investigative and control techniques on the prevention of 
economic and financial related crimes…(EFCC Act 2004). 
 Section 7(i) of the act also empowers the EFCC to ‘cause investigations to be conducted as 
to whether any person, corporate, commission body or organization has committed any 
offence under this Act or other law relating to economic and financial crimes’ (EFCC Act 
2004).  
The person in this Act includes government officials and all political office holders. The 
Commission has the authority to institute legal proceedings against anybody indicted by the 
investigation. In practice, the extent and the outcomes of the investigations depend on the 
relationship between the office holder and the presidency or notable political elites connected 
with the presidency. As a routine measure, in the discharge of its functions, the EFCC 
officials  is assigned to monitor the activities and financial transactions of political office 
holders across the country and compile reports of any movement of funds into and out of the 
country (EFCC Act 2004). Thus the agency could potentially have a dossier on each 
officeholder.  
The use of this information collected by the EFCC in practice is dependent on the 
personalities involved. An interviewee cited the cases of Governor James Ibori and Peter 
Odili of Delta and Rivers States, respectively. In these two cases, there was overwhelming 
evidence of corruption and mismanagement of state funds, but the presidency, according to 
the interviewee, gave a directive that any further investigation should be suspended because 
the two governors were loyalists of the president and the ruling political party. The 
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respondent claimed that  the presidency ordered the EFCC to move against governors Dariye, 
Ladoja, Alamieyeseigha and Fayose of Plateau, Oyo, Bayelsa and Ekiti states respectively, 
because they had shifted their loyalty to the Vice-President (Personal Interview XIV, May 7, 
2014). The vice-president was opposed to an extension of the term of the president who was 
seeking a third term (Personal Interview XIV, May 7, 2014).  
The former governor of Adamawa State, Murtala Nyako, was also impeached in July 
2014.He defected from the PDP to the opposition party, the APC, in anticipation that the 25 
members of the legislature who followed him to the APC would remain there (This Day 
18/07/2014). However, the 25 members defected back to the PDP few weeks after their initial 
defection (Yusuf 2014a). Following his defection, Nyako became critical of the actions and 
policies of the former president, Goodluck Jonathan. For instance, at the height of the Boko 
Haram insurgency in north eastern Nigeria, Nyako accused Goodluck Jonathan of using the 
attacks on the insurgents to commit genocide against the North (Tukur 2014).  
These incitements were seen as a national disservice and had to be stopped (Aribisala 2014). 
With an overwhelming majority in the legislature, the PDP leadership had to persuade the 
lawmakers to commence the process of removing him as the governor (Yusuf 2014a; Ndiribe 
2014). The legislators accused him of 26 allegations of gross misconduct that included the 
misappropriation of state funds (Yusuf 2014b). The members of the legislature did not admit 
that they were mobilised by the PDP to remove the former governor. Nevertheless, the former 
Chief Whip of the legislature, Mr. Jerry Kumdisi, disclosed that the impeachment of the 
governor was a mission of revenge (Ndiribe 2014).  He explained 
We impeached Nyako because he was not doing well for the state. 
Secondly as people who were supposed to be working together, he didn’t think that we 
mattered in the administration of the state. As our governor, we had the right to ask for certain 
things from him. One of such things was our constituency projects. We expected that every 
member ought to get it so that he or she can execute some projects in his or her constituency 
and remain relevant (cf. Ndiribe 2014; Nwosu 2014). 
Following his impeachment, the EFCC spokesman, Wilson Uwujaren, said that the former 
governor and his son – Abdul Aziz - were wanted ‘for criminal conspiracy, stealing, abuse of 
office and money laundering’ (cf. Obi 2015). He was eventually arrested and arraigned on 
charges of misappropriation of state funds and money laundering (Ibeh 2015). The former 
governor was accused of laundering N15 billion of the Adamawa State (Ibeh 2015; Soniyi 
2015). The EFCC alleged that the laundered money was traced to bank accounts of five 
companies that were believed to be owned by the former governor and his son (Soniyi 2015; 
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Ibeh 2015). Witnesses who testified against the former governor provided details on how the 
state funds were withdrawn and lodged into private accounts of companies that belonged to 
the former governor. The case is still pending in court (Alli 2015a).   
In 2008, the lawmakers had wanted to remove the former governor but the leadership of the 
PDP persuaded them to resolve their differences (Hallah 2008). The former Chief Whip said 
that the intervention of the leadership of the PDP made them discontinue the plan. 
I was part of those who wanted to impeach him when President Yar’Adua was still in power. 
We served him impeachment notice then but because he was still in PDP and the party was 
one family, we were called to a meeting in Abuja and told to stop the impeachment move. We 
told them what the governor was doing and yet he was not being called to order by the party 
We tried to resist the intervention but the late President Umar Yar’Adua asked the then Vice- 
President, Goodluck Jonathan to sit with us because he was traveling abroad. We agreed on 
certain things with the governor. He was asked to implement the agreement while we were 
asked to drop the impeachment moves. We did as agreed (cf. Ndiribe 2014; Nwosu 2014). 
Indeed, the former national chairman of the PDP told the media that the feud between the 
lawmakers and the governor had been resolved and that they should ‘bury the hatchet and 
concentrate on how to move Adamawa state forward’ (Hallah 2008). It is evident from the 
statement of the former Chief Whip that the motivation to remove the former governor was 
based on a personal feud between the legislator and the former governor. I claim that in 
Nigeria, impeachment is being used as instrument to settle personal feuds between the 
legislators and the governor.  
The Adamawa State House of Assembly finally impeached the former governor on July 15, 
2014 based on the findings of the report of the panel raised by the Chief Judge of the State to 
investigate allegations of gross misconduct against the governor (Daniel and Aziken 2014). 
The panel had found the former governor guilty of the misappropriation of funds. . He was 
eventually arrested and charged in court (Ibeh 2015).  
The irony of the impeachment of the former governor is that the lawmakers had on October 
2, 2013, passed a vote of confidence in him (Leadership 02/10/2013; Sani 2014; Pella 2014). 
The lawmakers praised him because he ‘demonstrated a high sense of responsibility and 
dedication to duty’ and because he had managed to maintain a cordial relationship between 
the legislature and the executive branches of government (Leadership 02/10/2013). The 
Deputy Majority Leader of the House of Assembly, Mr. Adamu Kamale, who moved the 
motion said that the decision ‘became necessary to inspire confidence in the leaders in their 
commitment to continue to deliver dividends of democracy to the electorate’ (Leadership, 
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02/10/2013).Just a few months after this vote of confidence, the legislators alleged his gross 
misconduct. The alleged infractions were apparently committed prior to the passing of the 
vote of confidence. The former Chief Whip of the legislature, Mr. Jerry Kumdisi, admitted 
that the lawmakers passed the vote of confidence as a measure to get favours from the former 
governor. He said: 
I agree that there was a vote of confidence but we all know how that confidence vote came 
about. It may be of no value to begin to dissociate myself from the action because if the House 
takes a decision, whether you voted for or against such decision, it is binding on you, you are 
bound to be part of it. Some of us didn’t agree with the confidence vote but we were in the 
minority. We didn’t have the voice to say that this vote of confidence cannot stand. The way 
our democracy operates, sometimes when some members want to get favours from the 
executive, they engage in praise singing. It happens in all the states. I am not disassociating 
myself from the decision because it was taken on the floor of the House and it was the 
decision of the House. I cannot exclude myself from it (cf. Nwosu, 2014). 
 My finding here is that the lawmakers were aware that the former governor was involved in 
the abuse of office and misappropriation of state funds but concealed it because of the 
personal favour they wanted from the former governor. This further strengthens my claim 
that the Nigerian lawmakers are incapacitated to harness their constitutional authority to 
promote good governance because of “the politics of the belly” and “stomach infrastructure”. 
If the former governor had not defected to the APC, the lawmakers would not have decided 
to remove him, even though they were aware that he was involved in the misappropriation of 
state funds. My claim here is that the use of impeachment would remain an instrument of 
political negotiation as long as the lawmakers continue to trade their constitutional role for 
pecuniary gains. 
There are other former governors indicted of embezzlement and the misappropriation of state 
funds who have been taken to court by the EFCC. Charges of allegations of mismanagement 
and the diversion of over N52 billion in state funds are still pending against Senator Danjuma 
Goje, the former governor of Gombe State (EFCC 18/03/2015; Alli 2015a; Umar 2015; 
Odunsi 2015). Other charges include conspiracy to loot the state treasury and money 
laundering (EFCC 16/12/2014).   
In the last hearing of the case at the high court in Gombe on November 2, a witness, Mr. 
Shehu Atiku, who was also the Clerk of the Gombe State House of Assembly during the 
tenure of the former governor, informed the court session that Mr. Goje “forged” a resolution 




My Lord, the said resolution did not emanate from the Gombe State House of Assembly and I 
was not a signatory to it. As the admin officer of the House, I chair management committee of 
the House, keep the record of House proceedings and maintain its records (cf.Umar 2015). 
Late Abubakar Audu was the governor of Kogi state from 1999-2003. Until his death on 
November 21 2015, he was facing charges of ‘criminal breach of trust and misappropriation 
of public funds to the tune of N10,965,837,040 (ten billion, nine hundred and sixty five 
million, eight hundred and thirty seven thousand and forty Naira)’ (EFCC 6/03/2015; Alli 
2015a). The allegations against the late former governor include,  
stealing money from the First Bank account of Directorate of Rural Development of Kogi 
State and was lodging it into the Diamond Bank Plc account of Bulkom Nigeria Ltd, a 
company that handled most of his building projects during his tenure (EFCC 06/03/2015). 
Aside from this, the late former governor was also alleged to have siphoned off state funds 
through the inflation of contracts, to construct private houses (EFCC, 29/01/2015; EFCC 
28/01/2015). He was alleged to have forged contract papers for the provision of water for the 
state and increased the contract sum from less than N18 million per one project to N49, 
649,000.00, almost N50 million (EFCC 28/01/2015). The contractor, Lewechi Terry 
Ozoemenam, told the court that, 
I have never handled any contract up to N18m (eighteen million naira) let alone signing a 
project worth N49m (forty nine million naira)... a voucher for additional payment for water 
project...a project valued N41million...a project valued N20million...a project worth 
N30million... a forged receipt and... a project N20m... All these documents are forged, my lord 
(cf. EFCC 28/01/2015). 
In the build up to the 2015 gubernatorial election in Kogi State, the former chairman of the 
EFCC, Mr. Ibrahim Lamorde, had notified the leadership of the APC on the need to 
disqualify the late Abubakar Audu from being the candidate of the party in the election277. 
The former EFCC chairman, in a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Government of the 
Federation (SGF), Mr. Babachir Lawal, said: 
The candidate was arraigned by the Commission for abuse of office, theft of public funds and 
money laundering during his tenure as Executive Governor of Kogi State between 1999 and 
2003 at both Kogi High Court, Lokoja in 2006 and the Federal Capital Territory High Court, 
Apo Abuja in 2013. The Lokoja case was stalled for six years on the account of frivolous 
interlocutory applications by the accused person, which has taken us twice to the Supreme 
Court and eventually decided in the commission’s favour on 23rd November 2012. The trial 
effectively continued in 2013 with the filing of fresh charges in Abuja. Eight prosecution 
witnesses have so far given evidence and 166 exhibits tendered at the proceedings, while the 
                                                 
277Until his death, shortly before the announcement of the results of the election, on November 21, 2015, late 
Audu was the APC candidate. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) would have announced 
him as the winner of the election but for the cancellation of the results in 91 polling units.  
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case adjourned till 14th October 2015 for continuation of trial. We are genuinely concerned 
that the trial will be suspended for another four years if Prince Audu emerges as Kogi State 
Governor, similar to the situation of Governor Ayo Fayose of Ekiti State. While not being 
unmindful of the constitutional presumption of innocence of all accused persons until proven 
guilty, we are nevertheless greatly concerned that swearing in of another accused person as 
Executive Governor in Nigeria may not be in consonance with the current anti-corruption 
policy of the new administration (cf. Jaafar 2015). 
The leadership of the APC ignored this submission of the former EFCC chairman. If late 
Audu had not died, it is probable that he would be declared the winner of the election. As if 
to confirm the allegation that the former governor misappropriated state funds, the chairman 
of the APC in Kogi State, Alhaji Hadi Ametuo, said: 
Nobody is a saint. No governor can claim he has not done any malpractice or stolen anything 
during his time in the office. We heard of Saraki’s case, even Tinubu is being accused of 
stealing funds but the truth is that Prince Abubakar Audu has pledged to return the money to 
the Kogi treasury when he gets elected on the November 21st, yes he will return the 11billion 
naira or even more than that and that will add to the Kogi economy (cf. Odunsi 2015a). 
The statement of the chairman of the APC in Kogi State implied that the late governor 
actually stole the N11billion that belonged to the state. I claim that the Nigerian political elite 
consider misappropriation of public funds as a routine phenomenon in political life.  
Akwe Doma, a former governor of Nasarawa state, 2007-2011, was accused of money 
laundering to the tune of N800 million (EFCC 24/02/2015). The EFCC alleged that the 
administration of the former governor used to withdraw state money without legislative 
authorisation. Section 120 (3-4) of the Nigerian  
No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the State, other than the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund [CRF] of the State, unless the issue of those moneys has been authorised by a 
Law of the House of Assembly of the State. (4) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State or any other public fund of the State except in the 
manner prescribed by the House of Assembly (Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999 as amended).. 
There was no indication that the Nasarawa State House of Assembly challenged the former 
governor for this unconstitutional action that drew on the finances of the state. Ideally, the 
legislature, by virtue of requisite constitutional provisions, has the mandate to monitor the 
implementation of projects included in the appropriation law. The state governor is mandated 
to present the estimate of the fiscal policy of the government to the legislature for 
deliberation and approval. The intent of the provisions of section 120 of the constitution is to 
ensure that the executive withdraws money to fund projects that have been authorised by the 
legislature. This abuse of the fiscal authorisation of the legislature is a common phenomenon 
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in the Nigerian presidential system. This is an indication that the lawmakers do not perform 
their oversight in respect of policies authorised for implementation.  
Governor Jolly Nyame governed Taraba state for 8 years, 1999-2007 (Onwuemeyi 2011). In 
2007, the former governor had confessed that he collected some kickbacks and that he was 
ready to refund his own share of some of the looted funds (Nigeria Political July 23, 2007). 
The EFCC alleged that he defrauded the state to the tune of over N1.7billion. Though he 
pleaded not guilty to the charge, the court declared that a prima facie case of corruption had 
been established against him (Nnochiri 2012). The case has since then been pending (Alli 
2015a). Eventually, Nyame defected from the ruling PDP to the ACN where he contested a 
seat in the Nigerian Senate but lost in the 2011 elections. He is now a member of the ruling 
APC.  
The confession by Nyame that he was involved in bribery and kickbacks, as in the case of the 
Audu, is an indication that the conduct of the governor while in office was properly 
monitored by the lawmakers as expected. On the other hand, it could be argued that the 
legislature might be aware of these infractions but decided to look the other way since the 
action did not significantly impact on their personal benefits.  Conversely, if the N1.7billion 
alleged to have been misappropriated by Nyame had adversely affected the allocations to the 
legislature, they might have sought to investigate him for gross misconduct. A former speaker 
of the Osun Sate House of Assembly, Adejare Bello, in his account of how the legislators 
sought to impeach the former governor, Bisi Akande, disclosed that they were prompted to do 
so when the financial crisis in the state adversely affected the personal benefits of the 
legislators (Bello 2011).   
Similarly, Lucky Igbinedion was the governor of Edo State for 8 years, 1999-2003.  He was 
prosecuted by the EFCC and convicted by the court. Charges proffered against him included 
a 191-count charge of embezzlement of public funds to the tune of N4.3 billion when he was 
the governor (Adewole 2008). He was found guilty of the charges and was asked to pay a fine 
of N3 million.  Not satisfied with the punishment, the EFCC appealed the judgment seeking 
stiffer penalties that would serve as a deterrent to others. The head of media and publicity of 
the EFCC, Mr. Wilson Uwujaren, said: 
Following the furore generated by the option of fine handed the governor by the trial judge, 
the commission filed fresh charges against Lucky Igbinedion. The action was challenged in 
court with the trial court ruling that the commission cannot try the ex-governor on the same 
matter for which he had already been convicted.  The EFCC appealed against the ruling with 
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the Court of Appeal affirming the commission’s position that Igbinedion really has a case to 
answer. Following that, two of his accomplices, his younger brother, Michael Igbinedion and 
his Personal Assistant, Charles Eboigbodin, who were charged alongside the former governor, 
were successfully prosecuted and convicted, just last month (April 29, 2015, precisely) (cf. 
Alli 2015a).  
In April 2011, with another N25billion charge of fraud against the former governor, the 
EFCC sealed off two of his properties in Abuja on the basis of a forfeiture order granted by 
the Federal High Court in Lagos, Nigeria (Iriekpen 2011; Okonta 2011; Alli 2015a). The 
EFCC had also confiscated 11other properties belonging to the former governor (Iriekpen 
2011; Okonta 2011). 
Throughout the eight years he governed the state, there was no indication that the legislators 
monitored the implementation of the policies of the state. Since all money of the state in the 
CRF requires the authorisation of the legislature, it means that the governor must have 
circumvented the laws to divert public funds for private use. If the members of the legislature 
had been effective in the exercise of their oversight power, they ought to have apprehended 
the governor.  
Saminu Turaki was the governor of Jigawa state for 8 years, 1999-2003, on the platform of 
the PDP. The EFCC arraigned him in July 2011 before a Federal High Court in Dutse on a 
32-counts of fraud and misappropriation of over N36 billion (Alli 2013; Dangida 2014). 
Some of the charges included N12 billion withdrawn from the state government treasury for 
financing former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s third term ambition (Alli 2013). The former 
governor has since defected from the PDP to the APC (Anako 2015). The EFCC has also 
frozen the accounts of six companies that were linked to the former governor (Alli 2015a). 
Orji Kalu governed Abia state for eight years, 1999-2007). He defected from the PDP to form 
the Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA) The EFCC accused him of embezzling a sum of N59 
billion. His appeals against the trial failed both at the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court 
and, since then, he was returned to the trial court to face criminal charges before Justice 
Adamu Bello of the Abuja Federal High Court. The case is still pending. The EFCC had 
confiscated 10 of his properties and frozen 13 bank accounts that were linked to the former 
governor (Alli 2015a). Adjudication over the charges of corruption leveled against him is still 
pending in the Supreme Court (Alli 2015a). 
The allegations against Gbenga Daniel, the former governor of Ogun State, 2003-2007, 
include ‘stealing (of) public funds, bribery, fraudulent conversion of public property and false 
declaration of assets in the amount of N211.3million’ (EFCC 05/12/2014). His administration 
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was characterised by allegations of the abuse of power and privileges. The case is still 
pending in the law court. 
The EFCC has the requisite legal authority to conduct investigations into financial crimes 
committed not only by public servants, but also by political office holders. Nevertheless, this 
agency is not an alternative to the legislature - which has the requisite constitutional power to 
perform oversight the activities of the executive branch of the government. The EFCC is an 
agency of the government that depends on both the legislature and the executive to provide 
the necessary administrative logistics for its operations. However, the activities of the agency 
have exposed the weaknesses of state legislatures in the area of oversight.  
I therefore claim that the lawmakers in all these states failed to attend to their constitutional 
responsibility of oversight. There is no doubt that the cases of corruption and 
misappropriation of public funds established against these former governors were valid. The 
fact that many of the properties of former governors have been confiscated or seized, indicate 
that the former governors actually misappropriated public funds while in office. This is an 
indication of the prevalence of corruption in the authorisation and disbursement of public 
funds for. This shows clearly the failure of the legislature to its powers of oversight in the 
execution of its mandate. 
It is a routine legislative assignment for legislators to inspect the progress of work in the 
different projects that are budgeted for. In Kogi State for instance, one of the socio-economic 
problems confronting the population is the dearth of portable water (Alabi 2010). Bayelsa and 
Delta States are among those that failed a solvency test of the Debt Management Office 
(DMO) as at December 2011 (Okwe 2013). The solvency test measures the domestic debt 
stock of a state vis-a-vis its Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) profile. Bayelsa State had 
the highest rating of insolvency with a domestic debt of N162.82 billion and the capacity to 
generate a sum of N9.510 billion as IGR. Delta State had a domestic debt of N90.843 billion, 
with an IGR that stood at N34.601. 
These former governors with pending corruption charges against them in the courts of law are 
prominent political elites in the Nigerian political system. Danjuma Goje is a serving senator 
who has just won another term of four years in the recent elections. Aside from being a 
member of the Nigerian legislature, he was one of the senators that sought to be elected as the 
president of the Senate. If he had succeeded, he would have emerged as the third most senior 
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political office holder in the country’s leadership hierarchy. Audu, until his death, in 2015, 
was a prominent member of the ruling APC. He was the APC candidate for the November 
2015 gubernatorial election in Kogi State (Vanguard 22/11/2015).If he had not died, he 
would have been declared as the new governor of the state where he faced charges of 
corruption. It is evident from the data presented in chapter five that there are several other 
governors whose records were tainted by abuse of power, yet faced no consequences from the 
legislature nor action by the EFCC to fast track their impeachment. The case of the former 
governor of Delta State, James Ibori, is pertinent here. He spent eight years as the governor 
without any legislative reprimand but was jailed in the United Kingdom for money 
laundering, an offence committed while he was the governor (Tran 2012; BBC News, 
27/02/2012). 
The cases analysed above provided insights into the disparities in the way in which the 
lawmakers exercised the power of impeachment. Where there was evidence of the abuse of 
power, governors were spared by their legislatures.  
7.4 Saint at home, convict abroad: The analysis of the abuse of power by and 
corruption charges against James Ibori  
James Onanefe Ibori was sworn in as the executive governor of Delta State in May 29, 1999. 
He spent eight years as the governor. Prior to this time, Ibori was a confirmed convict in the 
UK, having stolen goods from the store where he was working and fined £300, along with his 
wife (Glanfield 2014). In 1992, he was involved in a stolen of American Express credit card 
scam where he had fraudulently withdrawn $1,590 (Glanfield 2014; Crawford 2012. He was 
convicted and made to pay a fine of £100 (Crawford 2012; Glanfield 2014). By virtue of 
extant constitutional provisions on the rules of eligibility of candidates to contest elections in 
Nigeria, Ibori was not fit to have contested for the gubernatorial seat in Delta State. Section 
182 (1) (d & e) stipulates: 
No person shall be qualified for election to the office of Governor of a State if... 
(d) he is under a sentence of death imposed by any competent court of law or tribunal in 
Nigeria or a sentence of imprisonment for any offence involving dishonesty or fraud (by 
whatever name called) or any other offence imposed on him by any court or tribunal or 
substituted by a competent authority for any other sentence imposed on him by such a court or 
tribunal; or (e) within a period of less than ten years before the date of election to the office of 
Governor of a State he has been convicted and sentenced for an offence involving dishonesty 
or he has been found guilty of the contravention of the code of Conduct;... (Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended).  
But Ibori won the election ‘after tricking his way into power by hiding details of his previous 
convictions in the UK for theft and changing his age’(Glanfield 2014). Aside from this UK 
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conviction, a Nigerian court had also convicted Ibori for stealing building materials at a 
construction site in Abuja, Nigeria in 1995 (Ochuko 2010). His opponent in the 2003 
gubernatorial election, Great Ogboru, had petitioned the Election Tribunal in the state to 
disqualify Ibori in view of the fact that he was an ex-convict (Ochuko 2010). But Ibori 
claimed that he was not the same James Onanefe Ibori that was convicted in 1995, and that 
this was a case of “mistaken identity”. He claimed this even when the investigating police 
officer, Sgt Mambo Odumu, recognised and testified against him (Ochuko 2010).   
He held onto power in the state with a very “good rapport” with the legislature although the 
leadership turnover in the legislature was very high. For the 8 years he spent as the governor, 
the state legislature had 7 Speakers. Table 14 below shows the rate of turnover of the 
speakers in the Delta State House of Assembly between 1999 and 2007. 
Table 16: Turnover of the Speakers of Delta State House of Assembly, 1999-2007 
S/No Name Office Constituency 
1 Rt. Hon. Francis Megbele Speaker 
03/06/99 – 22/11/99 
Warri North 
2 Rt. Hon. (Prince J.F.K. 
Omatsome 
Speaker 
23/11/99 – 13/03/02 
Warri South West 
























Source: Compiled by the author from the data provided by the Delta State House of 
Assembly at:  http://deltastateassembly.gov.ng/the-5th-assembly/past-members/ 
 
There is no empirical evidence to show that the high rate of leadership turn over in Delta 
State House of Assembly was a result of the quest for legislative protection in favour of the 
former governor. Nevertheless, my fieldwork research shows that state governors often 
induce the removal of a speaker who is proving difficult to control.  An interviewee told me 
that the governors would always seek to ensure the emergence of a speaker that would not be 
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critical of the policy proposals and decisions of the executive (Personal Interview III, May 
13, 2014).  For instance in Osun State, a former Speaker, Mojeed Alabi, 1999-2003, was 
faced with the threat of removal on more than nine occasions legislators allegedly working 
for the state governor. This threat was because he refused to compromise on his opposition to 
a number of policies and decisions of the executive (Bello 2011). 
I claim that the frequency in the change of leadership in the Delta State House is connected to 
the influence of the governor. My argument is that for the 8 year duration of his tenure, the 
state legislature did not, at any point, seek to monitor the implementation of state projects. 
Requisite constitutional provisions empower the legislature to police the disbursement of 
public funds with a view to ensuring judicious application for the promotion of good 
governance. Sections 120-129 of the Constitution provide the state legislatures with broad 
powers to control public funds in a bid to achieve the fundamental objectives and directive 
principles of state policy contained in chapter two of the Constitution. Section 16 (2b) 
specifically mandates the states to harness the material resources and distribute the same ‘to 
serve the common good...’ (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as 
amended). 
Like the other states where corruption and mismanagement of public funds have become a 
routine part of governance, the Delta state legislature could not enforce these provisions to 
monitor the disbursement of public funds for 8 years. In April 2012, the Southwark Crown 
Court in the UK sentenced James Ibori to 13 years imprisonment on the charges of corruption 
and money laundering (Glanfield 2014; Crawford 2012; The Guardian 2012; Walker 2012; 
Vanguard 4/11/14). Ibori admitted that he actually committed these offences (Tran2012a and 
b).  Table 15 below shows the details of properties, discovered by the London Metropolitan 







Table 17: Ibori’s properties discovered by the London Metropolitan Police  
S/N Property Financial Worth Location 
1 Private Jet £12.6million London 
2 Armoured Range Rovers £600,000. London and Nigeria 
3 Bentley (Car) £120,000 Sandton, Johannesburg 
4 Mercedes Maybach £340,000 London 
5 Mansion £3.2million Sandton, Johannesburg 
6 House £2.2m Hampstead, north 
London 
7 A property £311,000 Shaftesbury, Dorset 
8  Haleway and Boyd Properties N/A Gibraltar and Teleton 
Quays (BVI) 
9 Three Properties  N/A 58 Uphill Drive, London 
NW9 OBX;  
76 Woodhill Crescent 
Kenton, Harrow, 
Middlesex HA OLZ;  
139 Kingfisher Way, 
London NW10 (Adeniyi 
2011)278 
10 Ownership of 30% share of 
Oando Oil Company 
N/A Nigeria 
11 Undisclosed amount of Money   
PKB Private Bank 
N/A Switzerland 
12 Two Properties US$4.43m Washington, DC 
13 A mansion N/A Houston 




Source: Compiled by the author from foreign newspapers and Court papers of the UK 
Metropolitan Police on the trial and conviction of James Ibori.  
The total annual salary package of a state governor in Nigeria is estimated at N11,540,896 
(£38,508) (Ujah 2015). In other words, a governor earns an estimated total sum of 
N92,327,168 (£308,065) for the duration of 8 years.. Judge Anthony Pitts of the Southwark 
Crown Court told Ibori that ‘it was during those two terms [1999-207] that you turned 
yourself in short order into a multi-millionaire through corruption and theft in your powerful 
position as Delta State governor’ (cf. Crawford 2012). Angus Crawford in the analysis of the 
case said ‘when a man who has an official salary of £4,000 a year buys a house in Hampstead 
worth £2.2m, why did no-one smell a rat?’ (Crawford 2012). 
                                                 
278 These properties were owned in the name of his sister, Christine Ibori-Ibe. 
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Aside from the above, Ibori admitted to have sold the £23million ($37m) shares of Delta 
State in Vee Mobile, a telecommunications company (Crawford 2012). Rather than remit the 
money to the state, he spent the proceeds ‘to fund a lavish lifestyle including a monthly 
£125,000 credit card bill while his people languished in poverty’ (Crawford 2012)279. The 
Judge, Anthony Pitts, of Southwark Crown Court, told Ibori in the open court: ‘You lived 
modestly in London in the 1990s and no-one, I think, hearing at that time would imagine the 
multi millionaire high profile governor that you became some eight or nine years later’ (cf. 
Walker 2012). Ibori was also linked with the ownership of Wings Aviation Limited and 
Stanhope, the companies he used to launder money through his London Attorney, Mr. 
Bhadresh Gohil and several other fronts and friends (Sharareporters12/12/2010).280 
Indeed, analysts had wondered how ‘a man who has an official salary of £4,000 a year buys a 
house in Hampstead worth £2.2m’ [and]… no-one smells a rat?’(Crawford 2012). It is 
ironical that such monumental fraud took place in a system characterised by checks and 
balances and that the legislature could not detect it with its multiple of oversight functions.  
The UK Metropolitan Police, in cooperation with the EFCC had been on the trail of Ibori 
since 2005 upon the discovery of ‘a purchase order for a private jet, made through his 
solicitor in London’ (The Guardian 17/04/2012). This search was possible because Ibori was 
an ardent supporter of Atiku Abubakar, the then Vice-President who was contesting the 
presidential ticket of the PDP against the ambitions of the President, Olusegun Obasanjo, 
who wanted to extend his term limit (The Guardian 17/04/2012; Walker 2012). In realization 
of this, and the need for his protection, Ibori strategically switched his loyalty back to the 
president and became an ardent campaigner for an extension of the term that would have 
provided the opportunity for Obasanjo to run for a third term of another four years. Thus, the 
pace of the EFCC investigation slowed. While the EFCC relaxed on the trail of Ibori, the UK 
Metropolitan Police intensified its investigation that culminated in the freezing of his UK 
assets that were worth US $35m in 2007 (Walker 2012; Adeniyi 2011). After the retirement 
                                                 
279 Two other state governors, Bola Tinubu (Lagos) and Obong Victor Attah (Akwa Ibom) were also involved in 
this alleged illegal deal. 
280 Mr. Gohil, Ibori’s wife, Theresa, his mistress, Udoamaka Okoronkwo and his sister, Christine Ibori-Idie, 




of Obasanjo, the EFCC began to investigate him and he was arrested in December 2007 on 
allegations of corruption (Walker 2012)281.  
Prior to this, he had become one of the influential political elites in the government of 
Obasanjo’s successor, Umaru Yar’Adua (now deceased)(Adeniyi 2011).Adeniyi was one of 
the close aides of the late president, Yar’Adua. In his book, he provided a detailed account of 
the overwhelming influence of Ibori in the administration and how his presence impacted 
negatively on public perceptions of anti-corruption. This personal account validates a series 
of rumours about the factors and forces responsible for the removal of Ribadu as the 
chairman of the EFCC. As an insider, the account confirms the use of the EFCC as 
instrument of intimidation and persecution of political opponents while it protects supporters 
of government with records of shady deals during Obasanjo’s regime. He also revealed how 
the Yar’Adua administration did not allow the EFCC to be effective in a bid to protect Ibori, 
in particular, against prosecution.  
Adeniyi recalled that Ibori knew he was using his influence in the Yar’Adua government to 
stave off prosecution against his corrupt practices while in office. According to him,  
Ibori came to my office to warn me, he said something very instructive: “Look, Segun, there is 
nowhere in the world where you help somebody to power and his reward for you is that you 
go to jail. It doesn’t happen anywhere, and it won’t begin with me” (Adeniyi 2011, p.22). 
This statement is an indication of his involvement in the politics that facilitated Yar’Adua as 
the presidential candidate of the PDP in 2007 and his subsequent election as the president. 
The primary motive was to use the presidential cover to escape further investigation and, 
possibly, indictment. This he enjoyed until the death of President Yar’Adua in May 2010. 
Like the case of Joshua Dariye, part of the money Ibori looted from the state went to the third 
term campaign as well as the presidential campaign of Yar’Adua in 2006 (Walker 2012). 
Indeed, his prominence in the administration of Yar’Adua tainted the personal integrity of the 
president and thus increased ‘the perception that he [Yar’Adua] was leading a government 
that was protecting the corrupt’ (Adeniyi 2011, p.14). 
 
                                                 
281 Although President Obasanjo provided the initial cover for Ibori after the discovery of the crimes he 
allegedly perpetrated in UK, he dumped him when he discovered the extent of his influence and power in the 
Yar’Adua government, especially, the weakening of the power of the EFCC and the redeployment of the key 
staff of the agency in order to prevent the prosecution of Ibori. 
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Unfortunately, the president did not appear to see what most Nigerians, and indeed several of 
us within the administration, could see very clearly: that the seeming connivance between his 
attorney general and justice minister, Mr. Michael Kaase Aondoakaa, and the former Delta 
State governor, Chief James Ibori, was destroying the reputation of the government and also 
compromising his own personal integrity (Adeniyi 2011, p.14). 
While the former chairman of the EFCC, Nuhu Ribadu, was adamant in pressing corruption 
charges against Ibori, the government provided a sufficient shield to retain him in the services 
of the administration as a prominent power broker282. Former president, Obasanjo, had 
revealed that the removal of Ribadu, as well as the appointment of Farida Waziri, was at the 
behest of Ibori. ‘I know that the woman they brought in to replace Ribadu [Farida Waziri] 
was not the allegedly right person for that job, because I understood that one of those who 
head-hunted her was James Ibori’ (cf. Itua, 2003).283 In 2009, the EFCC formally charged 
Ibori in court on170-count charges of corruption and money laundering. The charges were 
however dismissed on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence.284 
The death of President Yar’Adua in 2010 and the emergence of Goodluck Jonathan, as the 
president, emboldened the EFCC to reopen the case of Ibori285. In London, the Southwark 
Crown Court found him guilty of the charges. Having admitted involvement in all the 
charges; the former governor was sentenced to 13 years imprisonment (Walker 2012; 
Crawford 2012). By virtue of this judgment, the EFCC pledged to continue with the trial of 
the former governor after serving out his jail term in London. The spokesperson for the 
EFCC, Mr. Wilson Uwujaren, declared that although Ibori was sentenced to 13 years 
imprisonment in London, the details of his corrupt practices as the governor were 
monumental. The EFCC claimed that: 
                                                 
282In the process of seeking for the prosecution of Ibori, a move that ran counter to the desire of the government, 
Ribadu was removed as the chairman of the EFCC. He was demoted from the rank of Assistant Inspector 
General of Police (AIG) to Deputy Commissioner of Police. The succeeding chairperson of the EFCC, Farida 
Waziri, in conjunction with the Minister of Justice, Aondoakaa, provided the necessary cover for Ibori.  
283Although one might argue that the utterance might be in reaction to the treatment meted out to his stooge, 
Ribadu, by the Yar’Adua’s administration, nevertheless, the revelation of Waziri in the same newspaper report, 
indicates a link between Waziri and the Minister of Justice, Aondoakaa, who, according to Adeniyi (2011) was 
in charge of the instrumentality of shielding Ibori from the long arm of the law. 
284This judicial pronouncement generated a series of criticism of the Nigerian Judiciary. Concerned citizens and 
civil society groups protested against the decision of the judicial officer who delivered the judgment, describing 
the judgment as a as miscarriage of justice in the face of irrefutable evidence. 
285The emergence of Jonathan as the President provided another opportunity for former President Obasanjo to 
renew his call for the prosecution of Ibori. Obasanjo facilitated the emergence of the duo as the occupant of the 
residency. In view of the acrimonious relationship created by the sickness and the death of Yar’Adua, political 
elites fenced off by Ibori sought for revenge. At the wake of this development, James Ibori fled to Dubai to 
evade prosecution in Nigeria. However, pressure on Dubai led to his [Ibori] deportation to London to face 
criminal charges on fraud and money laundering. 
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For the benefit of stakeholders and lovers of justice, it is interesting to note that the offences 
for which Ibori faces imminent jail term in London is (sic) only a minute aspect of the bouquet 
of offences committed by the governor during his eight years rule of Delta State… The former 
governor didn’t steal alone. There were accomplices (cf. Sobowale 2012). 
This statement depicts the helplessness of an agency caught in the web of elitist politics. The 
EFCC spokesperson had said that once Ibori finished his jail term in London, the EFCC has 
more allegations that will keep him in prison. In the Nigerian political system, to convict 
Ibori would be a very tall order. By illustration, many of the cases initiated by the EFCC 
against former governors are still pending. These indicted former governors are actively 
participating in government without any sanctions as a result of their past records of abusing 
power.   
 
7. Summary 
In this chapter, I have explored, empirically, cases of the abuse of office by former governors. 
I discovered that the lawmakers in these states failed to monitor the implementation of 
projects of the government as demanded by the constitution. I began the analysis with a 
consideration of cases of deputy governors that were removed by their legislatures. Deputy 
governors suffer more from the disparate use of impeachment by the lawmakers than 
governors. I found that these impeachment cases were prompted by the governors because of 
political competition. Thus, the competition between the governor and his deputy is not 
effectively processed through the rules and procedures of the system of government. 
I also explored the cases of some former governors who were indicted by the EFCC for the 
misappropriation of public funds while they served in office. Some of them are still facing 
criminal charges in court. The EFCC has also seized and confiscated some of the properties 
of these former governors alleged to have been illegally acquired. 
One example was the case of a former governor of Adamawa State who was removed after he 
defected to another political party. While he was a member of the ruling party, he enjoyed the 
protection of the lawmakers. However, the protection ceased when the former governor 
defected from the PDP to the APC. Impeachment is not to be used as a weapon of political 
competition. 
The lawmakers ought to have exercised their oversight power to remove the former governor 
prior to his defection to the other political party. The Supreme Court had decided that the 
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legislature could not invoke the provision of impeachment ‘merely because the House does 
not like the face or look of the Governor of Deputy Governor in a particular moment’.286 
Aside from this, I specifically examined the case of a former governor of Delta State, James 
Ibori. Throughout his eight years tenure as the governor of Delta State, Ibori was shielded by 
the legislature. Even when he was charged in court by the EFCC (after his term as governor 
had expired), the judiciary cleared him of any wrong doing on the basis of their claim that 
there was of a lack of evidence. Nevertheless, the same evidence was used by the Southwark 
Crown Court in London to convict him.  
My finding here is that in Nigeria, the law is applied only against people who are critical of 
the dominant political elite. In view of this, political elites with cases of constitutional 
breaches usually defect to the ruling party to escape prosecution.   This worked for Ibori for 
more than eight years until the death of his godfather, the late president UmaruYar’ Adua in 
May 2010.     
I claim that as long as people with vested interests populate the institutions of government in 
Nigeria, the rules will continue to be manipulated to promote the pecuniary interests of the 
political elite. Though impeachment is a powerful means of ensuring accountability, its use 
since 1999 has been in accordance with the intent of the constitution.  

















                                                 
286Inakoju& 17 Others v. Adeleke& 3Others. (2007) 1 S. C. (Pt. 1), p. 65.  
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Chapter Eight  
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
8.1 Conclusion 
This study explored the ways in which the legislature in selected states in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic, exercised the power of impeachment. The central theme of the study is the exercise 
of the legislative power of impeachment to promote good governance in Nigeria. I began the 
study with the discussion of the major features of the presidential system and the exercise of 
the power of the legislature. I focused on the purpose of impeachment as a measure to ensure 
accountability in a governing system that promotes shared powers of the government. I 
anchored my analysis on three major theories and their components: structural functionalist 
theory, legislative role theory and the elite theory.   
I approached this study from the interpretative tradition of knowledge, which is concerned 
with understanding of the people, their actions and motivations. The concern of the approach 
is to explore detailed accounts of the conduct of the people within their social and political 
environment. My methodology was qualitative and I thus adopted qualitative methods for 
data collection. I explored the key questions of this study through interviews of key 
participants in the legislative process, personal observations and through documentary 
analysis. I consulted the records of legislative procedures, judgments of the courts, 
government documents and other public documents for my primary data. I relied on extant 
literature for my secondary data. My eyewitness accounts of legislative debates and processes 
in a state legislature for four years, 1999-2003, provided further background for most of my 
claims and assertions. 
My examination of the key issues relating to impeachment in the Nigerian presidential 
system was divided into eight chapters. In chapter one, I provided a general overview of the 
presidential systems and set out the context of my arguments and analysis. I provided a 
comparative overview of the principles of a presidential system.  
I examined scholarly perspectives on the study of presidential systems in chapter two, where 
I engaged in a review of extant literature on presidential systems from the two broad 
perspectives of the traditional school and the developmental school. Both agree that a 
presidential system seeks to promote accountability in government. Scholars note the need to 
institutionalise a system of accountability. I found that each political system operated the 
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presidential system in line with the demands of their particular society. I therefore claimed 
that the political elite in each political system determined the way in which the principles of 
the governing system were put into practice. I claim that political elites in this case study 
perceived power as a means to advancing their personal benefits.   
In the third chapter, I traced the development of the Nigerian presidential system to the 
collapse of the post-independent parliamentary system. I compared the cases of the removal 
of the Premier of the Western Region in the First Republic parliamentary system with the 
impeachment of the governor of Kaduna State, in the Second Republic. I analysed the 
processes and the outcomes of the two cases with the claim that the flaws associated with the 
exercise of the power of the legislatures in the two periods emanated from the attitudinal 
disposition of the political elite.  I claimed that abuse of power for the promotion of personal 
gains was the bedrock of the crisis associated with the exercise of the power of impeachment 
in Nigeria.  
In chapter four, I discussed the three principal theories used in the study. I identified the 
usefulness of the structural functionalist, the elite and the legislative role theories in my 
analysis of the politics associated with the way in which the legislators exercised their power. 
I evaluated the strengths of these theories to provide insights into the general analysis of the 
exercise of power in a presidential system. I discovered, from the literature, that none of these 
theories is independently capable of providing an adequate explanation for the ways the 
political elite exercised power in the Nigerian presidential system. I applied this to the ways 
in which the Nigerian political elite exercised the power of impeachment. I found that there is 
a wide gap between the behaviour of the political elite and the theoretical postulations that 
defined their roles and responsibilities within the institutions of government. I claimed that in 
Nigeria, the concept of separation of power is an avenue for the political elite to negotiate for 
personal benefits. 
In chapter five, I presented empirical data on the way in which the political elite exercised 
their legislative power of removing state governors. I examined this through the lens of the 
judicial review of the legislative actions in selected states. First, I explored the requisite legal 
rules that guide the exercise of the legislative power to remove specified elected officials.  
Second, I identified the constitutional meanings of the purpose of impeachment to include 
monitoring the exercise of executive power, guaranteeing good governance, strengthening the 
legislative responsibility, and adherence to the rule of law. Insights from these meanings 
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provided the basis for my claim that the use of impeachment as a political weapon is 
responsible for governance crises in the Nigerian presidential system. I proved this with data 
that showed evidence of abuse of power by former state governors. I found that intra-elite 
crisis facilitates the resort to constitutional breaches in the exercise of the legislative power of 
impeachment. I supported this claim with extant judicial pronouncements that nullified a 
series of cases of impeachment as justifiable legislative action taken in violation of the laws. 
In chapter six, I explored how internal and external factors influenced the exercise of 
legislative power of impeachment in the selected states. I located this within the confines of 
the concept of patron-client politics or what Richard Joseph (1991) calls prebendal politics. I 
presented empirical data to illustrate how the political elite outside the legislature facilitated 
the abuse of power in the selected states.  
In chapter seven, I explored a series of cases to analyse the disparate use of impeachment in 
Nigeria. I began the chapter with an analysis of the impeachment of former deputy governors. 
I found that these impeachment cases were prompted by the competition for positions 
between the governors and their deputies.  I therefore claimed that deputy governors suffer 
more from the disparate use of impeachment as a weapon of political victimisation and 
intimidation. I also explored the cases of former governors who were investigated and 
indicted by the EFCC on the misappropriation of state funds while in office. I specifically 
devoted a section to examine the case of a former governor of Delta State, James Ibori, whose 
8 years of rule was riddled with the evidence that he abused the power of his office, yet no 
action was taken against him by the legislature. He escaped justice in Nigeria but was 
charged and convicted in the United Kingdom.  I therefore factored this into my claim that 
the nature of patronage politics in Nigeria undermines political accountability. I supported 
this claim with empirical illustrations of the misappropriation of public funds that involved 
state governors.  
I explored the level of corruption that characterises the exercise of power in this system of 
checks and balances and how the behaviour of the political elite incapacitated the institutions 
of government. I argued, using empirical evidence, that the primacy of corruption as an 
instrument of statecraft in the Nigerian presidential system frustrates political accountability. 
I claimed that weak institutions of government, and especially the legislature, expose the 
public to the abusive use of power against the public interest. 
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8.2 Summary of findings 
 
A key finding of this study is the primacy of corruption as an instrument of statecraft in 
Nigeria’s presidential system. Beyond the mismanagement of funds, a synergy between the 
legislature and the executive undermines the doctrine of checks and balances in Nigeria’s 
system of separated but shared power. The executive seeks a “rubber stamp” legislature and 
the lawmakers are, in turn, usually willing to compromise their constitutional responsibilities. 
The weakening of the capacity of the legislature, in return for political gains, to effectively 
monitor the implementation of policies enables executive recklessness. 
In his reflections on the misfortune of Nigerians who sojourn abroad, Tunde Adeyemo (2010) 
laments that ‘if Nigeria worked for the common man, people would be contented to remain in 
Nigeria and those abroad would return’. His argument is that human capital in Nigeria is 
wasted abroad because of the crisis of governance in Nigeria. Sixteen years after the 
country’s return to civilian rule, and the promises that the political institutions would promote 
good governance in a presidential system, the quality of life of the people is not improving. 
One scholar describes the governance crisis in Nigeria in the following way: 
Life expectancy is fast dropping as many have continued to lose their lives through mostly 
avoidable causes including motor accidents due to bad roads, air mishaps resulting from 
negligence, avoidable diseases due to poor environmental conditions and lack of adequate 
medical facilities, sectarian and ethnic clashes due to poor mutual understanding to make life 
better (cf. Ihediwa 20012, p.3).  
 
Nigeria earned US$370 billion between 2000 and 2008 from the export of oil and gas. During 
this period, Nigeria’s position on the human development and governance index was poor 
(Global Witness 2010).  Evidently, the abuse of the constitutional provisions of impeachment 
in the Nigerian presidential system is not in accordance with the constitution. Nevertheless, 
such abuses characterise the practice in Nigeria’s presidential democracy. I claim that the 
factors that are responsible for this may be categorized as institutional, systemic and 
attitudinal. 
Institutional problems emanate from the misconception of the meaning ascribed to the offices 
of the president and governor. The concept of the executive president and governor is being 
conceived as a conferment of absolute power in the executive branch. Thus, this facilitates 
the possibility of the personalisation of the political process. The consequence of this is the 
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emergence of individual political elites that exert tremendous control over the policy process. 
This is antithetical to the features of a presidential system. 
This institutional malaise has become systemic whereby the abuse of constitutional powers 
and failure to fulfill responsibilities is with impunity. Breaches of the constitutional order 
have become a norm rather than an exception. Inadequate legislative checks on the excesses 
of the executive, coupled with a symbiotic relationship between the legislature and the 
executive, underpinned by the politics of the belly (Bayart 1993), promotes the pursuit of 
personal and communal goals at the expense of the public good. Thus, there is little 
accountability in practice.  
 
In Nigeria a culture of impunity clouds the constitutional provisions of impeachment. Some 
of the former governors that were indicted of corrupt practices while serving in office and 
whose properties have been confiscated by the EFCC have since been elected as members of 
the Senate. In particular, the former governor of Plateau State, Joshua Dariye, is a serving 
Senator of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. He is currently facing charges of corruption and 
money laundering proffered against him by the EFCC (Alli 2015 a). Impeachment is no 
longer a political stigma.  
 
8.3 Theory and development: External influence, legislative responsibility and the 
politics of impeachment in Nigeria 
 
A presidential system is designed to institutionalize the culture of responsible government 
and accountability. The principle of separation of powers and the doctrine of checks and 
balances is to avert the consequences of the concentration of power. The operation of these 
principles is supposed to guarantee a system of governance that serves the public good. In 
essence, an institutionalised culture of presidentialism, over time, offers the public a shield 
from the dangers of autocracy. Power is controlled in a manner that provides the public, 
through their representatives, the rare opportunity of controlling the government. 
Impeachment is the constitutionally recognised measure for this important oversight function.  
In the advanced presidential system like that of the US, impeachment is rarely used by the 
legislature. In the history of the US presidential system, for instance, only six state governors 
256 
 
have been impeached and removed from office.287 Impeachment in the Nigerian presidential 
system has been used as an instrument of control. This is in contradiction to its intended 
purposes. In the various cases discussed in this study, it is evident that the lawmakers often 
compromise their constitutional responsibilities by allowing godfathers as well as other 
political elites to influence their decision. Mis-governance in the political space is a sufficient 
reason to exercise this legislative oversight power. In all the cases, none originated from the 
independent actions of the legislatures as required by the law governing the practice of 
impeachment in Nigeria.  
Politics in Nigeria is highly personalised. This manifested greatly in the First Republic, in 
spite of a parliamentary governing system that enshrined the principle of collective 
responsibility. Irreconcilable conflicts, differences and division among political elites, 
accentuated, partly by the manipulation of the ethno-religious divide, characterised the 
politics of the First Republic. The perception of politics and political power, by the political 
elite, as the source of personal wealth has remolded the behaviour of the Nigerian political 
elite. This is a manifestation of Peter Ekeh’s concept of the two publics. 
In Western society, Ekeh contends that the public and the private realms share the same 
moral foundation. 
Generalized morality in society informs both the private realm and the public realm….what is 
considered morally wrong in the private realm is also considered morally wrong in the public 
realm. Similarly, what is considered morally right in the private realm is also considered 
morally right in the public realm (Ekeh 1975, p.92).  
 
Similarly, the post-colonial African state also presents the two realms but is ‘differentially 
associated...in terms of morality’ (Ekeh 1975, p.92). His conception of the two publics 
emerges from the behaviour of the political elites, first, influenced by ‘primordial groupings, 
ties, and sentiments’ and, second, by identification with the civil structures of the colonial 
administration (Ekeh 1975, p.92). 
                                                 
287 In the US, the House of Representatives impeach while upon conviction by the Senate, the impeached officer 
is removed from office. Thus, it is possible that the House might impeach but the officer escape conviction as in 
the case of President Bill Clinton. Governor William Holden of North Carolina was the first governor to be 
impeached in March 22, 1871 (Holden 1911, cf. Wagoner ND) and David Butler, governor of Nebraska, 
impeached and removed by the Senate on June 2, 1871 (The Downfall Dictionary, 2008).Similarly, Governor 
William Sulzer of New York was impeached on August 13, 1913 (Dunne 1986; O’Donnell 2013), Governor 
James E. Ferguson of Texas was impeached on August 25, 1917 (Steen 2010) while John C. Walton, the 
governor of Oklahoma, was impeached by the House of Representatives on October 23, 1923 and convicted and 
removed on November 19, 1923 (Duren 2002-2003).  Governor Rod Blagojevich of Illinois was impeached and 
convicted in January 2009 (Gay & Saulny 2009). Only two presidents, Andrew Johnson (1868) and Bill Clinton 
(1998), have so far been impeached by the House of Representatives, in the history of the American presidential 
system (Congressional Directory 2009). None of them was convicted b the Senate (Staff n.d). 
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The primordial public is moral and operates on the same moral imperatives as the private 
realm…The civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized moral imperatives 
operative in the private realm and in the primordial public (Ekeh 1975, p.92). 
 
The products of these two publics dominated post-colonial Nigerian politics with the 
reification of the nature and characteristics of the civil public. Since there is a disjuncture 
between the two, the civil public often secures the power of the state to advance further 
personal gains. . Electoral fortunes however impact less in the public but promote the private 
good of the civil public. This characterised the Nigerian First Republic and remains an 
important lens for the analysis of the politics of the Nigerian parliamentary system.    
Richard Joseph (1991) advances this further in the study of the presidential system of the 
Second Republic. To him, the primacy of ‘the nature, extent and persistence of a certain 
mode of political behaviour, and of its social and economic manifestations’ cannot be 
overemphasized in the understanding of the Nigerian political turf (Joseph 1991, p1). His 
theory of prebendal politics rests on the insistence by which the political elites exploit state 
power to procure private socio-economic goods at the expense of those of the public (Joseph 
1991). This objective, like the civil public, subjects the Nigerian state to the consequences of 
‘the intensive and persistent struggle to control and exploit the offices of the state’ (Joseph 
1991, p1). Prebendal politics is therefore used to explain the,  
 
patterns of political behaviour  which rest on the justifying principle that such offices should 
be competed for and then utilized for the personal benefit of office holders as well as of their 
reference or support group. The official public purpose of the office becomes a secondary 
concern, however much that purpose might have been originally cited in its creation or during 
the periodic competition to fill it (Joseph 1991, p8). 
 
Prebendalism characterised the politics of the presidential democracy of the Second Republic. 
The public space became highly competitive with acrimonious relationships among the 
political elite (Ayeni and Soremekun 1998). 
One of the consequences of this development which spanned to the Fourth Republic is the 
prevalence of godfatherism (Albert 2005). This is a situation where an individual emerges, in 
different realms, as a towering force over and above institutional and non-institutional 
mechanisms and comes to determine political outcomes. Activities of political parties are 
largely determined by the influence of godfathers to satisfy a pecuniary political objective of 
exerting control over the political system through the elimination of competitors. When the 
godfathers begin to lose their political influence over their godsons in government, they 
gradually withdraw their support, mostly through violent means.  Akinola (2009, p.268) notes 
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that ‘godfatherism has taken a strange dimension in Nigeria’s political environment. It has 
become a menace pulling down the foundations of masses-driven governance, thereby 
denying Nigerians the much-deserved dividends of democracy’.  
I re-conceptualise this as a mercantilist version of politics. This mercantilist 
conceptualisation seeks to define politics as a business enterprise with the expectation of 
rewards for private goods. As an advanced form of prebendal politics, mercantilist politics 
permits a godfather to buy off the political space with a view to determining the outcome of 
the socio-economic and political process. He recruits godsons as subordinate trading agents 
to oversee the various political outposts in the executive and the legislative arms of 
government. Since the presidential system decentralises the exercise of power, the presence 
of the godsons of a godfather in the legislature provides a legislative shield for the godson in 
the executive to further the private interest of the godfather. The major characteristic of 
godfatherism is the imposition of candidates through the elimination of the opponents, like 
the mercantilist, in order to monopolise the political space. 
Mercantilism is an economic system, both in theory and practice, which seeks to strengthen a 
state, economically and politically, at the expense of other states (Heckscher 1935(2007); 
Hutchison 1988, Irwin 1991). Its primary objective is not to further trade and welfare but to 
monopolise the trading system to the disadvantage of other states with a view to eliminating 
them out of competition. As a strategic trading policy, it ‘entailed extensive government 
regulation of international trade to ensure that these gains accrued to one's own country, a 
pursuit that even carried European states into military conflict with one another over 
commercial interests’ (Irwin1991, pp 1296-1297). In order words, mercantilist policy often 
degenerates into conflict because the weaker seek measures to avert the consequences of the 
monopolised trading system. Since it is meant to augment the power of a state at the expense 
of others, it is characterised by rent-seeking, a zero-sum game, economic oppression, 
monopolies and illegal trading activities (Heckscher 1935; 2007; Hutchinson 1988). That is 
why Terence Hutchinson describes it as an unpleasant and obscure economic system. 
I use mercantilist politics as a lens through which to explain the pervasive external influence 
on the exercise of legislative oversight power (as a trading instrument in exchange for socio-
political rewards in favour of the godfather). The godfather sees the impeachment provision 
as a veritable political tool to be manipulated to advance private goods to the disadvantage of 
the public. It is an instrument that is used to by the political elite to determine the outcome of 
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any conflict of interest between the godfather and the godsons. As subordinate trading agents, 
the godsons in the legislature lack the requisite independent status conferred on them by the 
constitution. All the impeachment cases that have taken place in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 
are characterised by elements of a mercantilist politics. The godfather as a mercantile is 
concerned about his profit measured by his personal benefits. 
Like the civil public, mercantilist politics is amoral; it thrives in an environment of 
constitutional breaches and political disorderliness. It stifles accountability in Nigeria’s 
presidential system. Judicial intervention affirms this. In all the cases, the judiciary did not 
address the substantive issues in the allegations of gross misconduct against the former 
governors. The judgments were based on breaches of the constitutional rules of impeachment 
by the legislators. In other words, judicial review of the impeachment cases did not exonerate 
the former governors of the allegations of gross misconduct. My eye witness account of three 
impeachment episodes in one of the states in Nigeria bears testimony to this. 
 
When the late military head of state, General Murtala Mohammed pronounced the decision of 
the Supreme Military Council (SMC) that the executive presidential system would be adopted 
for the Second Republic, the expectation was the institutionalisation of the culture of fiscal 
responsibility and good governance (The Political Bureau 1987; Teniola 2014)288.  Nay, 
political mercantilists took over the control of the two political branches of the government. 
A delegate at the 2014 National Constitutional Conference in Abuja has rightly noted that the 
Nigerian people ‘find it difficult to trust their governments that they will embezzle their 
money’ (cf. Umoru et al 2014). This lack of trust manifests in the lackluster attitude of the 
Nigerian public towards the political elite and the government in general.  
 
The relative power imbalance between the governors and the legislature in Nigeria is not 
peculiar. In the United States, legislative scholars have noted that many citizens perceive 
state governors as the ‘face of the government’ (Joaquin& Myers 2014; Carpenter & Hughes, 
2011).  The annual speech in the legislature whereby state issues are put forward for 
consideration offers them the opportunity to set the legislative agenda.  To this end, ‘they 
tend to be more visible and seen as being out front in the development of the legislative 
agenda’ (Joaquin& Myers 2014, p.3). Nevertheless, in a true presidential democracy, 
                                                 
288 General Mohammed made the pronouncement at the opening session of the Constitution Drafting Committee 
(CDC) in preparation for the drafting of the Constitution meant to usher in the Second Republic after almost 
thirteen years of military rule. 
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gubernatorial leadership and prominence does not guarantee stability. As Hale (2013) has 
noted, the governor needs the legislature for fiscal responsibility. In other words, a bipartisan 
political environment is a necessity for fiscal accountability and good governance because the 
policy process is not exclusive to the gubernatorial domain. Late Rotimi Williams, one of the 
architects of the presidential system in Nigeria, noted that the political elites operating in the 
Nigerian presidential system lack the necessary experience and knowledge (Soyinka 1999).  
The Nigerian legislature often uses impeachment as a weapon of control and negotiation for 
personal benefits, a shield of protection in favour of political elites external to the legislature 
and a mechanism for the intimidation of opponents. The legislature in Nigeria has lost the 
control over the exercise of its constitutional role as an agent of accountability. The use of 
impeachment in recent times, especially in the aftermath of the 2015 general election, attests 
to this.  
Drawing from Varol’s (2012) attributes of democratic military coups, impeachment could be 
regarded as a democratic civilian coup. Varol hinges his justification on seven conditions: the 
presence of an authoritarian/totalitarian regime; popular public discontent at the regime; a 
refusal of the leader to accede to popular discontent, the existence of coup leaders who are 
respected; the removal of the leader through a coup, the facilitation of an early return to 
civilian rule and the transfer of power to a democratically elected regime. These attributes 
present a polity in dire need of a change because of the failure of government to fulfill its 
mandate.  
In the same manner, the legislature, the constitutional guardian against authoritarian and 
totalitarian executive leadership, should consider these attributes in the application of the 
impeachment provisions. Thus, impeachment of a president or governor in Nigeria should be 
based on the findings of the legislature that established the allegations of gross misconduct.  
The constitutional provisions are explicit, not ambiguous. Breaches of these provisions do not 
require an ambiguous interpretation of gross misconduct. A comprehensive constitutional 
amendment to protect the interests of the citizens and to ensure the promotion of good 
governance is necessary to make impeachment a truly democratic process that promotes good 





The Nigerian state is yet to address the structural foundations of corruption. The 
accumulation of wealth by the political elite at the expense of good governance and 
accountability characterizes the system as one which lacks checks and balances. The 
character of the Nigerian state is such that it is unable to address the fundamental challenges 
of corruption in government. The political economy of corruption in Nigeria’s presidential 
system is such that the state lacks the capacity to scrutinise its public and private sectors 
thoroughly for corruption. The most pernicious form of corruption is the manipulation of 
rules relating to the process of electing political leaders and in the application of the 
constitutional provisions of impeachment. 
   
Corruption creates an internationally negative image of Nigeria. Nigeria is seen as a bastion 
of corruption with a crisis of governance. The single incident of the conviction of James Ibori 
by a London Court is just one example of the poor image of the country’s democratic 
institutions and structures. The state legislature, for eight years, failed to apprehend the 
governor. The Nigerian judiciary also failed to uncover the truth and absolved the governor 
of corruption charges in 2009. The Federal High Court quashed all the charges proffered 
against him by the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC)289. It took a process 
in another country to convict him on the same charges for which he escaped justice in 
Nigeria. Thus, the legislature and the judiciary, the two major institutions of oversight and the 
gatekeepers of probity, transparency and justice demonstrated severe weaknesses despite the 
immense constitutional powers that they possess.  
8.4 Recommendations 
a. Constitutionlally Emplacing Multiple Measures of Accountability in the Nigerian 
Presidential Syatem 
In view of the abuse of the legislative power of impeachment, I argue that it is necessary to 
develop multiple measures of accountability. By this, I mean to legally mandate and to 
authorise independent civil society groups or bodies to investigate any act of misconduct or 
abuse of legislative and executive power in Nigeria’s presidential system. This measure 
remains one of the instruments that allow state governors in the United States to pursue 
                                                 
289 See Elombah, Daniel. 2009. ‘James Ibori, Corruption trial and Asaba Judge Letter to London Court Judge’. 
Available at: www.elombah.com November 04, 2009; Nigerian Tribune, 02/5/2012. ‘Ibori and Nigeria’s justice 





policy issues that improve the quality of people’s lives. For instance, a grand jury, not the 
legislature, indicted Governor Rick Perry of Texas for the abuse of power in August 2014 
(Fernandez 2014). Similarly, the indictment and subsequent impeachment of President Bill 
Clinton by the US House of Representatives was facilitated by the activities of independent 
private investigators. This measure could also be abused in a political system besieged by an 
entrenched culture of corruption. The development of a conscious and active civil society and 
an informed public is necessary to accomplish this. I agree with the view of one of the 
respondents in this study that this culture will evolve gradually overtime. He said, 
 
as we thread this path of democratic governance, we will continue to build a critical mass of 
independent minded political officials, who continue to people the national and state 
legislatures, things will continue to improve. An impeachment clause will then be able to 
serve the purpose meant for it by the framers of the constitution (Personal Interview XIII, May 
19, 2014). 
The fear of monitoring from independent bodies outside a partisan legislature could induce 
the executive arm to abide by the rule of law in the exercise of executive power and help the 
legislature develop a non-partisan character in dealing with policy issues. This would create 
an atmosphere of responsible leadership with a view to entrenching a culture of 
accountability. This new political culture will be directed towards the promotion of the 
welfare of the people. Rather than resolve to be content with the palliatives of stomach 
infrastructure, the Nigerian citizens will have the capacity to demand accountability from the 
political elite. This they can do, in the exercise of their sovereign power, through direct 
confrontation and protestation against ineffective leadership. They can exercise this power, 
indirectly compelling their representatives to effect change when executive power is 
exercised contrary to the intent of the constitution.  
This possibility is, however, dependent on the character of the civil society. It is my claim 
that a politically conscious society is a sine qua non for taming the recklessness and abuse 
associated with the exercise of executive and legislative powers in the country’s presidential 
system. Such a civil society should be aware of the rights and responsibilities of members and 
be prepared to defend such in the face of any abuse. These rights include the power to choose 
political leaders under a free and fair electoral process: first, from the intra-party electoral 
contest leading to the emergence of candidates for the inter-party elections. An entrenched 
democratic consciousness will arouse a true sense of national community rather than the 
divisive tendencies associated with palliative handouts from political elites to a docile civil 




b.  Independen Judiciary 
The above recommendation will become effective when the judiciary at the federal and state 
levels is truly independent. This is necessary for the effective administration of justice in a 
manner envisaged in the constitution. The judiciary, especially at the state level, should be 
truly independent of the executive. The judiciary should be insulated from politics and 
develop a culture of an impartial arbiter.  An independent judiciary is a necessity for effective 
administration of justice. 
 
c. Legislative Independence 
There are factors that prevent the Nigerian legislature from fulfilling its constitutionally 
designated oversight power of impeachment. These comprise a lack of legislative 
independence, the lack of appreciation of the importance of the legislature as an institution of 
government in Nigeria’s presidential system, and the unequal power relations between the 
legislature and the executive (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). An interviewee noted 
that ‘most of them [legislators] rode to power through a godfather or traditional rulers. Such 
lawmakers cannot act independently when it comes to the legislative process’ (Personal 
Interview II, May10, 2014). The absence of stability in the legislative process is a function of 
the long years of militarization of the Nigerian political space. In other words, the Nigerian 
political system is yet to develop a culture where the legislature is populated by people with 
substantial experience in a democratic legislative process.  
With a high turnover of experienced legislators, ‘lawmakers will know the rules on how to 
challenge the executive… If we have stability in the parliament, it is then they will be able to 
checkmate the executive’(Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014).  The attitudinal disposition 
of the Nigerian political elite to the distribution of benefits in government often makes them 
compromise their constitutional responsibilities.  An interviewee said: 
But what do you expect from lawmakers who have no money to buy vehicles, build their own 
house? That will be his preoccupation for the first four years. He will want to recoup his 
electioneering campaign fund. So, if the governor offers him money to look away, he will 
gladly accept. (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). 
 
The dearth of experienced legislators who are committed to the ideals and practice of the 
legislative process prevents the emergence of a legislative institution capable of enforcing 
probity in governance.  
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d. Re-Orienting People’s Perception of Political Power 
This problem is compounded by the public perception of political power. With a prevailing 
culture of stomach infrastructure, among the populace, political elites have equated 
accountability with providing only for the personal needs of the people through palliative 
measures. 
There is a trend in our society now: people feel if you are elected as a legislator, you should 
come home and donate motorcycles, sewing machines, from your own pocket. That is clearly 
not the function of a legislator; they don’t care whether you are discharging your 
constitutional duty or not. All they want is largesse or handout. If everybody has economic 
capacity then things will be better (Personal Interview X, May 19, 2014).  
 
In other words, the prevalence of stomach infrastructure, in the Nigerian society has eroded 
the societal value of probity and accountability. ‘The problem is attitude. Look at our 
presidential system here: the legislature is the most expensive in the world; they are just 
spending money as they like’ (Personal Interview VII, May 7, 2014).Many legislators won 
their elections through manipulation and electoral malpractice orchestrated by their 
godfathers. Because of this, they are responsible more to their sponsors rather than to the 
public. An interviewee said:  
Legislators are not responsible to the people; they get public mandate through bribes and 
monetary gifts to the electorates. Because of this, the people are not keenly interested in what 
the elites do but what they can offer in terms of monetary and material inducements. People 
have lost confidence in the political space (Personal Interview II, May 10, 2014). 
The legislature populated by the godsons of godfathers would be unable to harness its 
constitutional power to promote accountability.  
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Semi-structured Interview Questions 
 
Questions for Legislators from the selected states 
1. What are the powers, functions and responsibilities of members of the legislature? 
Can you provide examples of how these powers, functions and responsibilities work 
in practice? 
2. Is there sufficient institutional support for these powers, functions and 
responsibilities?  
3. What are the major impediments to the performance of these powers, functions and 
responsibilities? Could you please provide examples? 
4. Can you tell me about the impeachment episode in your legislature? How and why did 
this come about? 
5. In what ways do you as a legislator provide oversight over the other branches of 
government? Can you provide examples? 
6. Are there cases, where this constitutionally designated mandate does not function as it 
is supposed to? Can you provide examples? 
7. What is at the root of this? Is it a lack of institutional support, party politics, a lack of 
capacity by legislators or something else? [ask to explain and give examples for each] 
Questions for principal officers from other legislative assemblies 
1. In what ways, if at all, does the legislature promote good governance? Please provide 
examples. 
2. Has there been a time during your tenure that you conceived the idea of initiating 
impeachment against the governor? Can you tell me about this? 
3. For what reasons has an impeachment not been brought in this legislative assembly? 
What is it about this legislative assembly that differs from those where an 
impeachment has been brought? (institutional support, party politics, institutional 
capacity of members) 
4. What, in your own view, would be the appropriate application of the power of 
impeachment by the legislature? 
Questions for former governor/deputy governor affected by the impeachment 
1. Can you tell me how you came to be governor/deputy-governor and about the 
constitutionally designated relationship between you and the legislature during your 
tenure? 
2. Can you tell me about the impeachment episode? 
Questions for Judicial officers involved in the adjudication of impeachment cases 
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1. Can you tell me about the process of impeachment and what your role entails in cases 
where impeachment is brought before you? 
2. What factors informed your judgments in impeachment cases brought before you? 
3. Have you ever experienced forms of political pressure during impeachment cases? 
Can you tell me about it?  
Questions for former chairman of EFCC 
1. How would you describe the activities of EFCC as an anti-graft agency? 
2. Can you tell me about the impeachment cases in Plateau, Bayelsa and Ekiti States 
during your tenure as the chairman? 
3. What informed the actions of the EFCC in the impeachment crises in Plateau, Bayelsa 
and Ekiti States during your tenure as the chairman? 
4. How many governors did your agency indict of graft while in office? Were the 
circumstances around these indictments similar or not? 
Question for officer in ICPC 
1. What is the role of the ICPC? 
2. How many former state governors has your agency prosecuted for corruption offences 
while in office? Were the circumstances around these prosecutions similar or did they 
differ? 
Question for constitutional law practitioner 
1. In what ways does the constitution support, or not, the promotion of good governance 
in Nigeria’s presidential system? 
2. What would be your assessment of the practice of the provisions relating to 
impeachment in Nigeria’s constitution by the legislature?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
